Showing posts with label Ajmal Kasab. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ajmal Kasab. Show all posts

Friday, May 3, 2013

Sarabjit Singh: Execution by Murder


Sushant Sareen, 
Senior Fellow, VIF

In the end, Sarabjit Singh was executed not by a hangman but by Pakistan’s famed ‘non-state’ actors – his fellow prisoners on death row – who are believed to have been put up to the job of bludgeoning him into a lifeless pulp by ‘state’ actors (jail officials). Of course, instead of someone pulling the hangman’s lever, in Sarabjit’s case it was the proverbial plug being pulled on the life support machines by ‘state’ doctors. Regardless of what spin is put on his death by the Pakistani authorities, it is quite clear that it was a political decision taken by them to put a closure to the entire drama surrounding Sarabjit.

The entire Sarabjit saga is a tale of clinical solutions being used by Pakistani authorities against him: his arrest – he was a convenient scapegoat for the Pakistani security forces who needed someone to blame for a series of bomb blasts; his conviction – all evidence proving that he was not the person responsible was disregarded, and fake and tutored witnesses were produced (some of whom later retracted their testimony) to procure a guilty verdict and have him sentenced him to death; his murder – get already condemned prisoners to beat him to death (their punishment can’t get any worse but they will be able to earn ‘sawab’ or rewards in the after-life for having killed a despicable infidel) and pre-empt any possible reprieve or release for him, in addition to getting even with the ‘hated Hindus’ for executing two soldiers of Islam (Ajmal Kasab and Afzal Guru) and sending a strong signal to Infidel India; and finally his execution – carried out by doctors who switched off his life support systems because it was too expensive for to keep him alive indefinitely and it was not politically possible to send him to India.

Even after Sarabjit was reduced into a vegetable as a result of the brutal beating he was subjected to, the Pakistani bloodlust wasn’t satisfied. It was almost as though the only thing that would satisfy the talibanised Pakistani mindset was stringing Sarabjit’s comatose body on the gallows! Having committed the terrible wrong of outsourcing his execution to ‘non-state’ actors, the Pakistanis could still have done the right thing by sending a lifeless but still alive Sarabjit back to his country and his family. For anyone to argue that the interim government in Pakistan was not empowered to take a decision on releasing even a comatose Sarabjit is complete nonsense. If it wanted, the caretaker government was fully competent to have advised the President to grant him clemency him and repatriate him to India on humanitarian grounds. That it chose not to, suggests that it is either scared of a right-wing reaction or else subscribe to the extremist mindset.

Having blown this opportunity, the Pakistanis should be prepared for a blowback of hostility, if not from an effete Indian government then at least from an incensed public opinion in India. The murder of Sarabjit will certainly add bitterness in relations and serve as a setback to efforts to promote people-to-people ties between the two countries. Perhaps, this is exactly what those who conspired to murder Sarabjit were aiming for. But to say that Indian people should not play into the hands of enemies of peace by giving in to their emotions over the brutal killing of Sarabjit is to miss the point.

If indeed peace is such a desirable objective and is in the interest of peoples of both countries, then is the onus for peace only on India? Doesn’t Pakistan also have a responsibility to rein in these enemies of peace? Didn’t Pakistan understand the sensitivities attached to Sarabjit’s case and how any untoward incident could embitter an already tenuous state of relations? And if it did, why didn’t they take precautions of the type India took with Ajmal Kasab to safeguard Sarabjit from any assault? Or is it that they didn’t care a whit for the sentiments and emotions of Indians? If so, then what is this people-to-people relation that is being promoted and incessantly parroted by apologists for Pakistan? Isn’t it therefore time that we re-evaluate the state of relations and re-examine the assumptions that are guiding India’s policy on Pakistan? Of course, if we want to prove Einstein’s definition of insanity – doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result each time – correct, then we are on the right track. Otherwise, there needs to be a new approach adopted towards Pakistan, one that sheds the shibboleths of the past.

Tuesday, April 9, 2013

The Power to Pardon

Dr M N Buch, 
Dean, Centre for Governance and Political Studies, VIF

The sovereign’s right to pardon an offender has always gone together with the concept of sovereignty and hand in hand with the sovereign’s power to punish. Before the Magna Carta the King ruled England through the Divine Right of Kings and all the powers of the State were centralised in him. The signing of the Magna Carta at Runnymede did not bring democracy to Britain, but it did lay down the principle that there is a limit to the sovereign’s power and that the feudatory aristocracy had both a share in power and could call the King to account. The importance of the Magna Carta is that from this small beginning ultimately grew the magnificent tree of parliamentary democracy in which sovereignty meant the right to reign but the authority to govern passed to be people through their representatives. It also foreshadowed the concept of separation of powers between the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary. Now the King’s justice fell within the domain of judges who, though appointed by the King, were independent, administered the law impartially and were not accountable to the Executive in any way. In India the separation of powers is given in the Constitution itself and the power to judge an offender, to hold him guilty or otherwise and to award punishment on conviction vests only in the judge. The sovereign, as personified by the ruler or, in the case of a republic, by the President, no longer personally punishes an offender because that power does not vest in him. Unfortunately even after such separation there is really no finality of a judicial order in a criminal case because even today the power to pardon, remit or commute or suspend the sentence given by a court vests in the Executive as personified by the President or the Governor. This anachronistic practice in which the Executive is virtually able to nullify a judicial order in a criminal case dates back to a period when the King was an absolute ruler. Can such a practice be carried over into a democratic polity?

Article 72 of the Constitution gives the power to the President to grant pardon, reprieve, respite or remission of punishment and to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of an offence in (1) a case tried by court martial (2) a case relating to a law to which the executive power of the Union extends. (3) the sentence awarded is of death. Under Article 161 the Governor enjoys similar and concurrent powers in all matters pertaining to a law to which the executive power of the State extends, or a case in which the death sentence has been awarded. In exercising powers under Articles 72 and 161 the President or the Governor, as the case may be, does not act according to his own discretion. Under Article 74 of the Constitution the President is required to exercise his functions and act in furtherance thereof on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. This applies mutatis mutandis under Article 163 to the Governor of a State. In deciding a matter of pardon, etc., under Article 72 and 161 the President or the Governor will mandatorily act according to the advice so rendered and this means that the exercise of powers under Article 72 and 161 will be coloured by political considerations and not necessarily be based on merit.

Sections 432 to 435 Cr.P.C. give the power to pardon, etc., to the appropriate government, Union Government in the case of a law to which the executive power of the Union extends and the State Government in the case of a law to which the executive power of the State extends. As per the Rules of Business of the Executive Government framed under Article 77 and 166 of the Constitution, all orders are to be issued in the name and on behalf of the President or the Governor as the case may be and here, too, the decision to pardon, reprieve, remit or commute a sentence would not necessarily be based on the merits of the case but rather on its politics.

Let us try and understand the process by which a person is held guilty, convicted and then sentenced. The report of the commission of a cognisable offence is required to be reduced to writing under section 154 Cr.P.C. by the officer incharge of a police station or an authorised police officer, with such report being entered in a book to be kept for this purpose as prescribed by the State Government. Such information is called the First Information Report (FIR). The police officer in a police station has no alternative but to register every complaint or report because the law gives him no other option. Thereafter under section 156 the police acquires the power to investigate a cognisable case. Section 157 Cr.P.C gives the procedure for investigation. Under section 157 (1) (b) the officer incharge of a police station, if he is convinced that there is no sufficient ground for entering into an investigation may, after recording the reasons in writing, decide not to proceed with investigation. Other than such a contingency the police is required by law to proceed with investigation and for that Chapter XII Cr.P.C. gives adequate powers to the police. Ultimately under sections 170 and 173 Cr.P.C the police is required to submit either a challan before a Magistrate if prima facie the case is established against an accused person or persons or, if no such case is made out, then to file a final report before the Magistrate concerned and seek permission to close the case.

What this means is that the proceedings prior to the trial fall within the domain of the Executive, which operates through the police or any other investigating agency created by law. For example, forest officials under the Forest Act have the power to investigate an offence relating to the forest or wildlife and can themselves prosecute the case before a court having jurisdiction. However, once the challan is submitted chapters XIV, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXI (A), XXII and XXIII and XXIV Cr.P.C. apply and the matter passes into the domain of the judiciary. All these chapters together with Chapters XXV, XXVI, XXVII and XXVIII lay down a very elaborate procedure of trial, recording of evidence and arrival at a judgement about innocence or guilt, followed by conviction and sentencing. All evidence is recorded strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, which is very well and tightly structured and enables the court to filter out all evidence which is irrelevant, hearsay or lacking in credibility. The matter does not end here because every death sentence given by a Court of Session has to be submitted for confirmation to the High Court having jurisdiction. There are elaborate provisions for appeal, revision and review and where there is a sentence of death the High Court can certify that the case is fit for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Under Indian law, which follows Anglo Saxon Jurisprudence, a person is deemed to be innocent till proved guilty. The burden of proof, that is, proving beyond the shadow of a doubt that an accused person has committed the offence of which he is charged, rests on the prosecution. The accused does not have to prove his innocence. Under Article 20 (3) a person accused of an offence cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself, which means that constitutionally a court is debarred from drawing any adverse inference against an accused person because he refuses to subject himself to the rigours of examination as a witness. So far as the death sentence is concerned the Supreme Court has on several occasions stated that it must be awarded in the rarest of rare cases, which is why trial courts are very reluctant to sentence a person to death.

The entire judicial process is weighted heavily in favour of the accused. The plethora of judicial filters through which the trial passes, including the right of appeal, is such that, provided the court has strictly followed what is stated in the Indian Evidence Act, it is virtually impossible to wrongfully convict a person of an offence that he did not commit. Let us take the cases of two persons who committed heinous offences in which many innocent lives were lost. The first relates to Afzal Guru who masterminded an attack on Parliament which, though not successful in killing a large number of parliamentarians still led to the murder of nine innocent people, including five policemen and the killing of five terrorists by the security forces in defence of parliament. The case was investigated by the police, which was able to establish a virtually irrefutable prima facie case against Afzal Guru. The matter was tried by the Court of Sessions, which held Afzal Guru guilty and sentenced him to death. The death sentence was confirmed by the High Court, which also rejected Afzal Guru’s appeal. The Supreme Court, in rejecting the appeal of Afzal Guru, gave a concurrent finding with the order of the Court of Session and the High Court. Three courts in ascending order unanimously held Afzal Guru guilty of the offence as charged and upheld his death sentence. Despite this Afzal Guru moved a petition for commutation of the sentence to life imprisonment and the Government of India sat on it for almost eight years. Where is the justification for this? One could guess what went on in the mind of government. Afzal Guru hailed from Kashmir and government did not want to alienate any element of Kashmiri society, including separatists and militants, by executing Afzal Guru. At the same time had government commuted his sentence there would have been a national uproar and this, too, government did not want to risk. Perhaps it was felt that if one just kept the matter pending long enough the outrage would subside and people would forget. Could or should the family of the five slain policemen either forget or forgive? What is more, by not executing a person who had attacked the very base of our democratic polity, the Parliament, what sort of message was government sending to other would be terrorists and militants? Obviously the message would be that you can do anything you like in India and we shall not exact from you the ultimate price for your crime. Partly, of course, there was also the consideration that the accused was a Muslim and the party in power is trying to woo Muslim votes. This is the supreme insult that the government could inflict on the Muslims because it was virtually stated that government was sparing a terrorist who happened to be Muslim and this should please the Muslims because they in any case supported terrorism by Muslim. The fact is that no Muslim likes terrorism in India and the Indian Muslim is like every other Indian, loyal to his country, desirous of law and order and eager to participate in and share the fruits of development.

The other case is of Ajmal Kasab who, together with his companions, killed more than 166 people in Bombay in 2008. He was tried, convicted and given all the opportunities of appeal as available to any other citizen, despite the fact that he was a Pakistani. It took three years for the sentence against him being executed and it became possible only because he was not an Indian and the government felt that hanging him would not have any adverse implications. His case for commutation also went to the President and had circumstances been different, who knows this mass murderer might also have been spared. I have given these two cases because it was politics which was the determinant of whether or not the judicial order was to be implemented. In the case of Afzal Guru had government not feared a massive Hindu backlash he might still have been pardoned. Thus politics would have determined whether a judicial decision would be final or not.

When the Executive exercises authority to pardon, etc., a convicted criminal it does so on the basis of what? There is no procedure laid down whereby the Executive can weigh up the decision of the Judiciary and then decide whether to give a pardon, commute or remit a sentence, suspend a sentence or otherwise decide in favour of the convict. The judgement of the court or courts could be nullified by executive order because that is what virtually happens when powers under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution or sections 432 to 435 Cr.P.C. are exercised by the Executive. This means that the executive decision can be arbitrary, obtained through corruption or decided by the whimsy of wayward politicians or civil servants. This is not the scheme of our Constitution and it militates against the very principle of governance in a society of laws. Even in recent cases we have seen how at different times the Home Minister argued that delay takes place because cases have to be dealt with seriatim and cases required detailed examination. Then when Ajmal Kasab jumped the queue government offered some weak excuses and in the case of Afzal Guru the government did not have a leg to stand on because there were other cases older than that of Afzal Guru pending a decision on clemency. In other words, government by its own actions proved that it is arbitrary. How can there be arbitrariness in a democratic polity and in a society of laws?

My own view is that in order to go strictly according to the separation of power and to strengthen such separation Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution should be done away with. Similarly sections 432 to 435 Cr.P.C should be modified so that whereas the general power to remit, reprieve. commute, stay, etc., a sentence should be done away with, a person awaiting execution of a death sentence or undergoing life imprisonment in which the term of imprisonment is the entire life and not a shorter period of fourteen or twenty years, may be allowed one petition in his lifetime, which may go before an Authority which will not be subject to the Executive. The composition of this Authority could be as under:

  1. In all matters in which imprisonment for life or death sentence have been awarded under a law which comes within the purview of the executive power of the Union, the Authority should consist of a sitting judge of the Supreme Court nominated by the Chief Justice of India, the Chief Justice of the High Court in whose jurisdiction the trial and conviction took place, a judge of another High Court nominated by the Chief Justice of India, the Chairman of the National Human Rights Commission or a member nominated by him, the Attorney General and the Chairman of the Supreme Court Bar Council.
  2. Where the sentence has been awarded under a law to which the executive power of the State extends the Authority may consist of the Chief Justice of the High Court under whose jurisdiction the trial took place, a Judge of another High Court nominated by the Chief Justice of that High Court on invitation by the Chief Justice of High Court having jurisdiction, the Chairman of the State Human Rights Commission or a member nominated by him, the Advocate General of the State and the Chairman of the State Bar Council.Without sitting in judgment over the decision of the court or courts concerned, the Authority may recommend whether considering the special circumstances of the convict, his background, his family situation or any other good cause to be recorded in writing, the death sentence may be commuted to life imprisonment or the full lifetime clause of the life imprisonment be reduced to twenty years or fourteen years. The advice of the Authority would be binding on the President or the Governor, as the case may be. No other power of remission, reprieve, suspension, commutation or pardon should be vested in the President, in the Governor or the appropriate government. The only exception to this would be where on account of a treaty obligation or in the course of international negotiations the Government of India and a foreign government reach an agreement about a prisoner in a case where there are international ramifications. In such cases the matter may be placed before Parliament in which the two Houses, by resolution, may permit government to go ahead with what has been agreed to during international negotiations. Here the sovereign power of the State may be exercised, but totally hedged in either by the recommendation of an Authority which is virtually judicial by nature or a resolution of Parliament. Other than this the Executive should have no power whatsoever to nullify through a pardon, etc., the judgment and sentence of a court of law.



Friday, February 15, 2013

The Politicisation of Criminal Justice


Dr M N Buch 
(Visiting Fellow, VIF)

Afzal Guru masterminded the attack on Parliament in 2001, which left nine security and parliament staff dead, with five attackers also being killed. He was arrested and tried for his crimes, sentenced to death by the Sessions Court and his conviction and sentence were upheld by the Delhi High Court and the Supreme Court. For several years after sentencing Afzal Guru’s fate hung in the balance because his mercy petition to the President remained pending. Government obviously hesitated to take a decision lest it trigger a violent reaction in the Kashmir Valley. All sorts of excuses were trotted out for the delay, including examination of the case by the NCT of Delhi Government, Home Ministry, Law Ministry, the President and so on. In 2009, the then Home Minister, P. Chidambaram, said publicly that there were a number of such petitions in the queue and Afzal Guru would have to await his turn. Even at a railway booking office a queue moves on as tickets are issued. In the MHA booking office obviously no tickets were being issued as the clerks either slept or dithered and the queue remained static.

In India all systems are selective in operation. At Tirumala-Tirupati there is a queue of devotees, but VIPs jump the queue. In crime, too, there seems to be a similar procedure, because suddenly Ajmal Kasab came on the scene and though he was at the bottom of the queue he was made to jump it and was hung before any one else. May be because he was a foreigner, a Pakistani, a different queue was formed for him as there is for foreigners at immigration counters. But surprise of surprises, the next was Afzal Guru, who happens to be Indian despite separatist efforts by the Hurriyat and its Indian quisling supporters to change the status of Kashmir. How has this happened and how does this reconcile with Chidambaram’s averment in 2009? The Congress spokesman, Abhishek Manu Singhvi, fields all questions on this by blaming BJP (NDA) for not hanging Afzal Guru when it was in power. Perhaps he has forgotten that by the time NDA demitted power in mid-2004 the entire legal process in the Afzal Guru case had not been exhausted. In any case BJP has been consistent in its demand that the sentence be carried out, not because Afzal Guru was Muslim but because the attack on Parliament was a vile crime. In Indian law, murder is the worst offence that can be committed because it deprives a person of his life and this is irreversible. Therefore, under section 302 IPC a person who commits a murder faces only one of two sentences, death or imprisonment for life. Under section 109 IPC if a person abets an offence he would be liable to the same penalty as is provided in the main office. If the offence is of murder then the abettor is liable to the same penalty of death or imprisonment for life as the person actually commits the offence. Under section 120B IPC if a person is part of a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence and that offence is punishable with death or imprisonment for life, then the conspirator is liable to the same penalty as the main offender. Under section 34 IPC if there is a common intention to commit an offence, then every person who does a criminal act in furtherance of the common intention is liable to the same penalty as if the act was done by him alone. Afzal Guru was part of a conspiracy to attack Parliament, which amounts to an offence under sections 121 and 121A IPC. Afzal Guru was part of a conspiracy, both to commit murder and to wage war against the Government of India and joined with others in the common intention of attacking parliamentarians and murdering them. Once the offence had been proved in a fair trial there is no sentence which could be awarded to him other than death because this case went beyond the rarest of rare cases and jeopardised the governance itself. Suppose the conspiracy had been successful and several hundreds of parliamentarians had been killed would the President have had any other option but to declare a state of Emergency under Article 352 of the Constitution, thus temporarily establishing authoritarian rule in the country in order to tide over the crisis?

The seriousness of the offence is such that for BJP to demand that the sentence of death be carried out without any delay is fully justified. If anything, it is the UPA government headed by the Congress Party, which could be accused of playing politics by delaying the decision on the mercy petition of Afzal Guru. Chapters XXVII and XXVIII, Cr.P.C. give trial courts the exclusive right to deliver judgment in a criminal trial and to the High Court to confirm a death sentence There is provision of appeal, remission and review, but that is all within the judicial system. Sections 432 and 435, Cr.P.C. give the State Governments and Central Government the power to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of a person convicted of an offence. In this, however, the opinion of the presiding judge of the court which convicted the offender should be sought, which means that the right of suspension, remission or commutation of sentence given to the appropriate government by Chapter. XXXII, Part E has to be exercised judiciously. Government cannot be capricious in this behalf. In addition to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure we have Article 72 of the Constitution in which the President has the power to grant pardon and to suspend, remit or commute a sentence in certain cases. These relate to punishment awarded by a court martial, by a court in a case under a law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends and in all cases where the sentence is death. Under Article 161 the Governor of a State has similar powers in a matter to which the executive power of the State extends. Let it be clearly understood that this power, whether under the Code of Criminal Procedure or under the Constitution, would be in exercise of an executive function and not a judicial function, despite the fact that the power has to be exercised judiciously.

The scheme of the Indian Constitution clearly divides the State into three separate but equal constituents, the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary. Undoubtedly the Constitution also provides for the points of contact between the three organs of the State, but essentially the investigation of criminal offences is an executive function performed by the Police. The trial, conviction or acquittal which follows investigation are purely judicial functions. Chapter II, Cr.P.C. constitutes criminal courts in which under the High Court there are the courts of session and the courts of Judicial Magistrates. In addition there are the courts of Executive Magistrates. Under Chapter III, Cr. P.C. a court of session can try any class of cases and pass any sentence, including death, subject to confirmation of a death sentence by the High Court. A Judicial Magistrate, First Class can try a case and award a sentence of upto three years of imprisonment, with a Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate having the power to pass a sentence upto seven years of imprisonment. No executive authority has the power to try cases which fall within the jurisdiction of the Judiciary. Functions exercisable by an Executive Magistrate are generally confined to administrative or executive matters, except in certain States and Union Territories in which the Act makes a special provision.

In the normal course of things it is for a judge or magistrate to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving its case beyond any reasonable doubt that the accused has not been able to counter this and that on the basis of evidence the accused should be convicted and sentenced. In this the executive has no role to play and certainly the provisions of Cr.P.C. and the Constitution about remission, etc., of sentences have to be read in the context of the role of the judiciary in determining the guilt or otherwise of a person accused of a crime. I am prepared to concede, though reluctantly, that there may be some rare circumstances which could not be taken into consideration in a judicial trial but which may, at some later stage, merit an executive decision about holding a person prisoner or not, but that has to be truly rare, exceptional and based on arguments and evidence which both are irrefutable. A person convicted of a heinous offence and given the death penalty may have a commutation of sentence if, for example, government is contemplating legislation on the abolition of death penalty itself. Sometimes the relations between two sovereign States may call for reconsideration of a sentence awarded to a convicted person. Such instances, however, would be extraordinary and certainly the exercise of executive power in this behalf cannot be done in order to negate or reverse a judicial decision. Normally the decisions of the courts have to be considered as final and the executive should have nothing whatsoever to do with the quantum of punishment awarded by a court.

Neither the Code of Criminal Procedure nor the Constitution lay down any time limit for processing of a mercy petition. In fact under Chapter XXXII of Cr.P.C. the execution of a sentence is, in the case of sentence of death, the responsibility of the Court of Session which will issue a warrant of execution after all due process of law has been exhausted by the accused and the sentence is confirmed by the High Court and, if there is an appeal, by the Supreme Court. If there is levy of fine the court may issue a warrant to the Collector of the district, who will then be authorised to recover the fine as an arrear of land revenue. Under section 425 Cr.P.C. for every other sentence the warrant of execution will be issued by the judge or magistrate who passed the sentence. A convicted person may make an application under section 432 Cr.P.C. to the appropriate government for suspension or remission of sentence and the government will then by general rules or special orders deal with the matter. One presumes that a similar procedure would apply in the case of exercise the power by the President under Article 72 of the Constitution and by the Governor under Article 161.

Unfortunately at present there is no legal provision about the time limit within which any application made in this behalf may be disposed of, which is why government takes its own sweet time in deciding such matters. In the absence of general or special orders, or rules framed in this behalf, government can and does act arbitrarily in deciding such matters. This has been evidenced in the case of all those persons who face the death penalty, which has not been executed as yet. The entire process of trial is judicial and is prescribed by law. Should not a post trial power also be governed by law? Can a judicial process be reversed or adversely affected by executive action or lack thereof? These are very important questions of law and must be answered, perhaps by the Supreme Court.

The Eight Amendment of the Constitution of the United States reads as follows:- “ Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fine imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted”. This means that the medieval punishments of being sawn in half, impalement, being hung, drawn and quartered or being crushed beneath the foot of an elephant cannot be given in the United States. In India Article 21 of the Constitution which guarantees life and liberty except through due process of law can also be read as the equivalent of the Eighth Amendment of the American Constitution. The Preamble of the Constitution which calls upon our republic to secure for all citizen fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual also rules out all cruel or unusual punishment. But cruelty need not be only physical, because mental cruelty can sometimes be more harsh than the purely physical. Imagine how a person sentenced to death must feel when he is awaiting execution of sentence. Every day when he wakes up he must wonder whether he will see another day and in such conditions he must die a little every day. It is unfair to keep a person hanging under the sword of execution. Let the judicial process be totally fair, as it is in India, let the courts be extremely conservative in awarding the death penalty, but once it is awarded let the process of appeal be fast and if an executive decision is for commutation or pardon, let that come within the shortest time possible after the judicial process if completed. There is no reason why it should take more than three months for the President or Governor to receive the advice of the Council of Ministers and to take a decision in the matter. If a man is to die let him die quickly, if he is to live let this be communicated quickly. It is my submission that any delay in this matter is tantamount to cruelty. If a convicted criminal has the right to dignity as an individual he should not be mentally tortured when awaiting execution.

It is alleged and widely believed that Afzal Guru’s execution was delayed partly because there was fear of reaction in the Kashmir Valley, but partly because the ruling party was playing politics on whether Afzal Guru should live or die and what should be the appropriate time for taking a decision in this behalf. There is a school of thought that till the Congress Party saw the emerging and looming shadow of a revitalised BJP, which was demanding swift justice, it did not act. Perhaps the unfortunate remarks of the Home Minister about saffron terror caused some tremors in the Congress because it feared that this could have an electoral backlash because Hindus would be annoyed at such a tactless remark. Perhaps the ruling party thought that its anti terrorism credentials were under threat and that it should show itself as a strong party by executing Ajmal Kasab and Afzal Guru. This has only raised further questions about why the assassins of Rajiv Gandhi and of Beant Singh have not been executed. My unhappiness abut this whole episode is that Afzal Guru was a living human being and entitled to the dignity which the Preamble predicates. He did a criminal act of which he was found guilty and for which he has paid the ultimate price. The tragedy is that people feel that he was made a pawn on the chess board of politics as played by the Congress Party. No one, not even the worst of convicted criminals, can have his life depending upon what suits a party in power at a particular time. His conviction was justified, as was his death. What is not justified was the manner in which the execution was decided on, not because of his guilt but because it suited government to take action. This has left a dirty taste in one’s mouth.

Thursday, August 23, 2012

The ISI’s Psychological Operations



Dr. Prem Mahadevan,
Senior Research Associate, VIF


The government has stated that recent distress migrations of northeastern Indians were triggered by electronic messages originating from Pakistan. Investigators have found that the first hints of pogrom-style killings appeared on Pakistani internet forums, and rapidly spread to India as part of a coordinated psyops offensive. The modus operandi was vaguely familiar: doctored images and vitriolic texts flooded telecommunications networks, gaining credibility before law enforcement agencies could react. The apparent purpose was to stir up public anger in an already polarized setting and prepare the political mood for an outbreak of communal violence. During 1989, Pakistan had adopted similar methods when it broadcast television footage of anti-communist revolts in Eastern Europe and urged Kashmiri Muslims to likewise rise up against New Delhi.

What intelligence agencies now need to assess is whether their Pakistani counterparts were merely out to embarrass India, or if the scare campaign had a deeper purpose. It is possible that the Inter Services Intelligence, if it was involved, has no strategic end-game regarding present tensions between Bangladeshi immigrants and Bodo tribesmen. The agency’s covert operations cells might just be taking opportunistic advantage of the situation in Assam. Provided Indian authorities maintain public order, the matter might rest there. However, past experience of ISI psyops suggests that the agency rarely desists from coordinating its propaganda offensives with paramilitary action. Its favourite tactic is to combine persistent low-visibility subversion with sporadic high-visibility attacks, conducted on a deniable basis using local assets or expendable mercenaries.

A Suggestive Pattern

On at least three occasions, the ISI is thought to have used psychological and paramilitary operations in a synergistic role. The first was in late 1983, when masked turban-wearing gunmen hijacked buses in Punjab and selectively killed Hindu passengers. Since the attacks occurred amidst worsening Hindu-Sikh relations, most commentators assumed that they were carried out by Sikh separatist militants. However, eyewitness accounts cast doubt on this theory: the killers’ language and demeanour had indicated a military background. Furthermore, local intelligence was unable to identify them, suggesting that they were not based in Punjab itself. As such attacks continued into early 1984, arguments were advanced that the masked gunmen could have been Pakistani Punjabi mercenaries, working as agent provocateurs in a ‘false-flag’ campaign.
Irrespective of whether the hijackers were Indian or Pakistani, what is unquestionable was that their actions were intended to deepen Hindu-Sikh tensions. Furthermore, it is now generally acknowledged that Islamabad did intervene covertly in Indian Punjab. Throughout the 1980s and ‘90s, radio broadcasts expressed support for Sikh separatism. Pakistani scholars wrote about a possible second partition of India along Hindu-Sikh lines. ISI officials posted in Western capitals funded Sikh separatist publications and organized publicity events. These propaganda initiatives were matched operationally by linking terrorist attack cells to ISI networks. One occasion in 1992 saw two ISI operatives being killed in the company of a Sikh terrorist leader. Although Islamabad initially tried to deny their Pakistani nationality, it relented after protests from their families.

The second case of (suspected) ISI subversion being used to camouflage (largely proven) paramilitary action occurred in Mumbai in 1993. A spate of rioting plunged Hindu-Muslim relations in the city into a downward spiral. With innocent Muslims having suffered disproportionately, some of their co-religionists within the criminal underworld plotted retaliation. Led by Dawood Ibrahim, they organized eleven synchronized blasts across the city in March 1993, targeting Hindu-majority areas. The explosive material used was military-grade, suggesting a state supplier. A detonator recovered by Indian investigators from one of the blast sites was traced to Pakistan army ordnance stores.

What is interesting is that the pre-blast riots had occurred in two distinct waves. The first, in December 1992, was spontaneous; a symptom of country-wide religious polarization following the Babri Masjid demolition. The second wave, in January 1993, appeared to have been planned: it began with knife fights in the Mumbai docks, which expanded into pitched battles across the city. Investigators noted that the docks were a stronghold of Dawood Ibrahim, whose smuggling operations were based there. Although a causal relationship was difficult to prove, circumstantial evidence indicated that Ibrahim’s men had deliberately triggered the second round of rioting. If true, this hypothesis would suggest that the January 1993 riots were a classic intelligence provocation operation.

Ibrahim himself is believed by this time, to have come under ISI influence. Defectors from his group later revealed that the Pakistani government had impounded his shipping fleet, thus gaining leverage over him. The men who actually planted the bombs were trained in explosive-handling in Pakistan, but their passports contained no stamps by Pakistani immigration authorities. Surmising on this, one reputed American commentator has noted that such free movement could only have been facilitated by powerful elements within Pakistani state institutions. 1 The ISI is the logical suspect.

The third case is Mumbai 2008. It is now known that the ISI was aware of Lashkar-e-Toiba’s plan to attack Mumbai. Testimony from Zabiuddin Ansari, one of the planners, even states that the agency provided the weapons and ammunition used in the attack and that two ISI officers personally supervised its implementation from a control room in


Karachi. The Indian prime minister and national security advisor have long asserted that the Mumbai 26/11 attacks bore signs of state support. Even if the Pakistani government as a whole was not involved, highly influential elements within it appear to have been.


This brings the context of the attacks into sharp focus. During the fall of 2008, alarm had been growing in India about a possible terrorist threat from Hindu extremists. These concerns were exploited by members of the political class, to deflect attention from the government’s failure in preventing jihadist attacks. The Mumbai gunmen played to this discourse, forging identity cards under Hindu names and wearing saffron wristbands. The attack planners had calculated that once the gunmen were killed by Indian police, these ‘clues’ would mislead the subsequent investigation and media commentary.

In this regard, it is important to note that the initial reaction from Islamabad was to reject any possibility of Pakistani involvement. The killings in Mumbai were projected as an outcome of domestic instability within India. Seen from hindsight, such discourse (later discredited by theconfession of AjmalKasab, one of the gunmen) seems to fit the thesis that the ISI masks its paramilitary activities with calibrated propaganda offensives.

The Logic of Pakistani Psyops

Reacting to claims made over the Assam crisis, Pakistani officials have accused Indian authorities of evading responsibility. They insist that India address its own domestic problems rather than attribute culpability to Pakistan. Such demands would be credible, if they were not preceded by episodes such as Kargil ’99 and Mumbai ‘08. On both occasions, Pakistani diplomats had initially ridiculed charges of cross-border involvement and accused India of spoiling bilateral relations. However, once the immediate crisis had subsided and international attention had drifted elsewhere, Islamabad found it expedient to quietly admit to such involvement. It did so in order to claim ownership over a spoiling action that had disrupted bilateral relations and driven up the price of further engagement.

Therein lies the real ‘core’ issue that bedevils India-Pakistan relations. It makes sense for the Pakistani security establishment to occasionally bring bilateral rapprochement to a shuddering halt. There are three reasons for this obstructionist stance:
  1. Spoiler actions derail grassroots-level peace initiatives and stop them from assuming an independent forward momentum, which Islamabad might later not be able to regulate. Civil activism for friendly bilateral ties is thereby held in check.
  2. These actions also drive a political wedge between India and its main security partners. They compel countries such as the US and UK to abandon New Delhi and instead assume a neutral refereeing posture on Indo-Pak tensions – one which invariably glosses over past jihadist transgressions against India.
  3. Lastly, spoiler actions cement the Pakistan army’s domestic image as protector of the people against a vengeful Indian government and public. Certain actions such as Mumbai ‘08 are also meant to serve narrower objectives, such as deflecting domestic Islamist militancy onto a foreign (and thus ‘legitimate’) target.
In each of the cases outlined above, Pakistani officials loudly proclaimed that terrorist attacks in India resulted from domestic tensions. This consistency in emphasizing India’s internal fissures is revealing: it implies that at the governmental level, Pakistan views India as an artificial state, riddled by identity-based conflicts. Such views, if they actually do dominate official Pakistani thinking, would represent a colonial inheritance from the British Raj. During the 1940s, Raj officials had derided secular Indian nationalism as a doomed experiment. They predicted that, post-independence, India would fragment under the centrifugal influence of its own diversity. Building a common polity from a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious population was thought to lie beyond the capabilities of the country’s native leaders. So far, this prediction has been proven wrong, but continuing societal rifts provide hope to some ISI officers that it might yet come true.

Thus, while Pakistani writers claim that Indian elites have never accepted the logic of Partition, the same can be said of Pakistani elites. If India refuses to endorse the principle of religious exclusion that underwrote Pakistan’s formation, Pakistan has also refused to recognize the legitimacy of the secular nationalism that keeps India together. The ISI, if it orchestrated the hate campaign that prompted thousands of northeastern Indians to flee to their home states, was merely acting in conformity with Pakistani ideological dogma.
What Indian security forces now have to prepare for is the more serious possibility that this might not be the end of it. As might have occurred previously in Punjab, there is a chance that ISI operatives shall create a communal flashpoint through agent provocateurs. Reports suggest that the Pakistani agency is keen to erase international memories of the Mumbai ’08 attack. It hopes to achieve this by facilitating a major act of domestic terrorism in India, using only local assets. Islamabad could then argue, with all apparent reasonableness, that even if the Mumbai attack had featured Pakistani involvement, India still needs to put its own affairs in order. Towards this, ISI officials have already met with leaders of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) in Dubai, to discuss possible collaboration. The Maoists have allegedly asked for military-grade explosive, and the ISI is believed to have asked in turn that the Maoists use these explosives to attack economic targets, such as oil refineries, so as to attain maximum strategic impact.

Even if the ISI were to support the Maoists however, the main focus of its psyops would still be on identity-based conflicts rather than ideology-based ones. The agency has plenty of experience in exploiting ethnic and linguistic fault lines to its own advantage. One example would be the East Pakistan civil war (1971), when the ISI organized Bihari Muslims into vigilante groups to fight Bengali separatists. Another would be its covert support for Mohajir militancy in Karachi during the 1980s – a tactic intended to contain Sindhi and Pashtun nationalism. However, the agency has little insight into ultra-leftist discourse, having never confronted a communist insurgency. Its ability to relate to the peasant and tribal revolution in central India is likely to be quite limited. Moreover, class struggle is not an issue that ISI strategists would want to publicize, as it might backfire on Pakistan, given the country’s own quasi-feudal social structure. For these reasons, it would make sense if the agency focused on Hindu-Muslim/Bodo-Bengali tensions.

Further ‘Rogue’ Operations Likely

Following the Mumbai ’08 attack, the then ISI chief told US officials that rogue officers from the agency might have been involved. This same argument had previously served Pakistan well in 1993, when ISI involvement with Dawood Ibrahim had attracted American queries. Basically, the ‘rogue operative’ thesis capitalizes on the tendency of Western listeners to equate such operatives with ‘enemies of the state’. Western analysts assume that if individuals within the ISI support terrorist attacks, Pakistani authorities would seek to identify and pursue them. Instead, India’s experience has so far belied this paradigm – although some ISI paramilitary activities might have been carried out without express sanction from above, these have not resulted in punitive measures against the officials involved. Rather, the immediate consequence tends to be a reshuffling of agency postings, to throw off Indian and Western counterintelligence efforts against the ‘rogues’.

There is a strong possibility that ‘rogues’ within the ISI will plan and assist a major act of terrorism in India, using local proxies as the triggermen. Such a scenario may not occur in the short term (i.e. the next three months), since the renewed India-Pakistan dialogue has not yet made much progress. A major improvement in atmospherics however, such as a summit between civilian politicians of the two countries, would likely set attack preparations afoot. By a spoiler action, the Pakistan army and ISI would want to emphasize their veto rights over any political process that bypasses them. Given the ongoing instability in India, caused by poor governance and communal polarization, they are likely to have many opportunities for combining psychological and paramilitary operations. The Bodo-Bangladeshi conflict shall probably be just one among these.

Dr. Prem Mahadevan is working with Centre for Security Studies, Zurich

Endnotes
  1. Jessica Stern, ‘Pakistan's Jihad Culture’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2000, accessed online at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/jstern/pakistan.htm, on 20 August 2012.