Method in The Madness

Kanwal Sibal 

(Member, VIF Advisory Board)

If it was wrong to invite Pakistan’s interior minister Rahman Malik to India because he prevaricates on investigations into the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks and lets Hafiz Saeed make hate speeches against India unchecked, is it right to believe that the Pakistani president and PM are welcome because they want to genuinely bring to justice expeditiously those Pakistanis involved in the Mumbai carnage, including Saeed, its mastermind?

Those against Malik’s visit should say whether being tough with the minister personally but dealing with Pakistan, per se, with benevolence will satisy us on the terrorism issue. So far, despite many political concessions to Pakistan, such as breaking the link between dialogue and terrorism and recognizing it as a victim of terrorism, Islamabad has not taken decisive steps to curb the terrorist threat. The extremist groups are alive and Saeed continues his jihadi tirades.

If the heart of the Pakistani government is in the right place on terrorism but it is characters like Malik who are stalling condign handling of the 26/11 case, then he is not a loud-mouth political non-entity as some make him out to be, but a truer face of the Pakistani Deep State that seeks limited cooperation, not strategic reconciliation, with India.

We should understand that Malik, with roots in the system within which he functions, represents the pervasive thinking in Pakistan that as a victim of terrorism itself- even greater than India- it can hardly be involved in promoting terrorism outside. Our terrorism problem is thus seen as home grown.

According to this narrative, 26/11 was staged by non-State actors. If there is delay in trying those responsible, it is because legal procedures are dilatory not only in Pakistan but in India too, as the delay in providing information on the bombing of Samjhauta Express shows.

The dismay in New Delhi at Malik’s statements is hardly justified as they are consistent with those made in the past by Pakistan. During S.M.Krishna’s last visit, his counterpart Hina Rabbani Khar made no mention of terrorism in her remarks at the joint press meet. Indeed, in a separate interview she expressed surprise that the non-issue of terrorism was still being raised. Their erstwhile foreign secretary had dismissed our evidence on Saeed’s activity as “literature”. Their leaders have repeatedly said that proceeding against Saeed needs evidence that can stand scrutiny in court. They have repeatedly asserted that Pakistani authorities have had no role whatever in the 26/11 attacks. All these statements have not deterred us from continuing our comprehensive dialogue with Pakistan, relaxing the visa regime, expand trade links. and now, playing cricket.

Malik came here knowing that he could safely restate Pakistan’s standard position in response to our well-worn litany on terrorism and 26/11. He went further in ridiculing India’s case by equating the 26/11 to Babri Masjid, implying that the latter was a terror attack against Muslims by Hindu elements, a sort of precursor to the Samjhauta bombing. He did not mention the Gujarat riots probably because of elections there. By claiming Abu Jundal is an Indian national who was in contact with Indian intelligence, he imputed that Pakistan was an unwitting victim of a larger conspiracy.

That an Indian intelligence contact like Jundal should be in Pakistan begs the question why known Indian terrorists are residing in that country and their extradition is being steadfastly refused. Even more egregiously, Malik claimed that infiltrators into J&K are migrants, just like the Mexicans who migrate to US across the border. That he wanted to convey the truth to the Indian public, which our government is supposedly hiding, shows how warped Pakistani thinking is on the terror issue.

Pakistan has taken our measure and knows what it can get away with. Our position that we have no option but to have a dialogue reduces vastly our manoeuvrability. No wonder our foreign minister had to downplay Malik’s remarks, calling them “packaging” that covers a modicum of progress. We think being hard-headed with Pakistan would prevent us from dealing with it imaginatively- the so-called out-of-the-box thinking. We prefer being soft-hearted and then begin dreaming.

Going by The Script

Kanwal Sibal 

(Member, VIF Advisory Board)

Rehman Malik’s provocative statements imply that powerful people in Pakistan such defiance of India on the core issue of terrorism.

All those who have criticized the Indian government’s decision to invite Pakistan’s interior minister Rahman Malik to the country to operationalize the revised liberalised visa regime have missed several pertinent points. If Indian ministers of external affairs, home and commerce can visit Pakistan as part of the mutual efforts to address disagreements or expand trade between the two nations, then, there is no reason why Malik cannot visit the country.

If the argument is that Pakistan has not dealt with the issue of cross-border terrorism effectively and has not brought to justice those responsible for the Mumbai terror attacks on November 26, 2008, the responsibility for doing that lies with the Pakistan government, not exclusively with the home ministry of that country.

If the government of Pakistan can be engaged at higher levels of political responsibility -meetings between the Pakistan president and the prime minister of India and that too despite Pakistan’s unwillingness to address the terrorism issue satisfactorily- then why should there be such squeamishness in engaging with Rahman Malik? Why do we think that cold-shouldering the interior minister would have sent a message that the Pakistan government is otherwise unwilling to hear? Would the Pakistani military and the Inter-Services Intelligence have become more amenable to good neighbourly behaviour if Malik had not been invited to India?

In any case, New Delhi has long broken the link between dialogue and terrorism. The government, no doubt, reminds Pakistan periodically that we expect an expeditious trial of those accused in the Mumbai case, but then we must remember that we are appealing, not laying any pre-condition, to Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan has been given the political space to stall without much cost, on the issue of terrorism.

Malik came to India with the knowledge that he can continue to side track India’s demands with disingenuous arguments. How would being “hard” with Malik on terrorism (by denying him an India visit) have compensated for being “soft” with Pakistan on the same issue?

Even the Pakistan government understands that the bilateral relationship is sensitive, especially when to comes to the issue of terrorism. The Pakistani minister would not come here without internal consultations and adequate briefing. It would be a mistake to believe that his seemingly outlandish statements were made by a loose-tongued individual on the spur of the moment. If not the exact language, the thrust of the remarks can be taken as “approved” internal thinking on terrorism of the Pakistani establishment.

Which is why the visit has been helpful: The minister’s remarks have underlined that Pakistan is not defensive on terrorism. On the contrary it is exploring ways to put India on the back-foot. Pakistan has already created, and India has in effect indirectly conceded equivalence between 26/11 and the Samjhauta Express bombing. Both cases have been mentioned in India-Pakistan joint statements. Malik’s reference in Delhi to this bombing in connection with 2008 attacks was, therefore, predictable.

But Malik went further in obfuscating the enormity of the 2008 attacks by offensively bracketting them with the Babri Masjid issue. This again was not an off-the-cuff statement: remarks made in public and their implications are usually discussed beforehand with advisers. Malik was giving the Babri masjid episode the character of a terrorist attack by a section of the Hindus against Indian Muslims on whose behalf, Malik insidiously implied, he could speak, just as he could on behalf of the Pakistani Muslims killed in the Samjhauta Express attack.

If Malik affirms that Abu Jindal, who was extradited from Saudi Arabia for his involvement in 26/11, is an Indian national and was in touch with India’s intelligence agencies and that India and Pakistani non-state actors in Pakistan in league with a US national staged the Mumbai attacks which, he argues, Indian agencies failed to prevent, it only shows how far Pakistan can go to reject any guilt for the attacks and how much the sense of being a victim of conspiracies is ingrained in the Pakistani mindset.

We have shown our anger by refusing to issue a joint statement and have justifiably called Malik’s statement on Abu Jindal “ridiculous”. But such statements only widen the gap in our respective perspectives on Pakistan’s complicity in terrorist acts against India. This and Malik’s boast of standing up to Indian pressure on Hafiz Saeed prove that we must draw proper conclusions about Pakistan’s readiness to deal with Mumbai honestly. We should shed illusions that after the Pakistani judicial commission comes here and examines the witnesses, Pakistan will move forward rapidly on the Mumbai case, as Rahman Malik dubiously affirms.

We may think that Rahman Malik’s visit has stoked controversy and damaged the ongoing trust-building effort. But Malik would believe that he has used his visit to convey Pakistan’s perspective on Mumbai bluntly and tell the “truth” to the Indian public which he thinks our government is hiding. If through this he was raising his political stock in Pakistan, it would imply that powerful lobbies there support such defiance of India on the core issue of terrorism.

Instead of paying any price for his provocative statements, Malik returned home with a prize: a liberalized visa regime, which is based on India’s hope of greater Pakistani restraint on India-directed terrorism, the reality of which the Pakistani minister was determined to deny.

How Do We Revive Healthy Politics In India?

Dr. M.N. Buch
Visiting Fellow, VIF

When India became independent the one and only national level political party was the Congress, whose identity as the party in the vanguard of the freedom movement gave it a very special place in the hearts and minds of Indians. Mahatma Gandhi was the national icon, he galvanised the people into participation in the freedom movement,he was the conscience keeper of the nation and he provided that degree of leadership which enabled the Congress to become the party of the nation. The freedom struggle brought together widely disparate group of people under the umbrella of the Congress Party and welded them together as a potent force for fighting British imperialism. The Mahatma clearly understood that the glue which held together all these people was a common enemy, British rule in India, to oust for which we needed a unified command and a concerted effort aimed at bringing independence to India. Gandhiji was the unified command and the Congress made a concerted effort to hold together a wide variety of people in order to make that concerted effort.

When independence came Gandhiji realised that apart from the Congress there was no viable political party and, therefore, no viable Opposition. Therefore, the government of independent India would constitute the rule of one single party. Louis Fischer, in his book, ‘The Life of Mahatma Gandhi’ states, “… he realised that a one party system could actually be a no party system, for when the government and the party are one, the party is a rubber stamp and leads only a fictitious existence”. To quote Fischer again he said that Gandhiji understood that, “Without free criticism and potent opposition, democracy dies, without political criticism and opposition, the nation’s intellect, culture and public morality stagnate, big men are purged and small men become kowtowing pygmies. The leaders surround themselves with cowards, sycophants and grovelling yes-men whose automatic approval is misread as a tribute to greatness”. Gandhiji further realised that groups within the Congress, such as the Socialists, had ideological, political and personal differences with conservative and right wing Congressmen. He also knew that perhaps opposition to the British would be replaced by the cementing force of power which would hold together these different groups, but ultimately, as Lord Acton said, “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely”. Therefore, power as a cementing force would also be the main source of corruption. To quote Gandhiji, “There is so much corruption today that it frightens me”. Gandhiji wanted the checks and balances of a strong opposition and of freely expressed public opinion to keep the government under control. His advice was that after independence the Congress should disband itself so that people holding different ideologies could come together and form political parties based on their own philosophy, with each party sometimes being in government and at other times in opposition. Had the Mahatma been heeded India would have had a middle of the road party, perhaps the Congress, a left of centre party, perhaps the Socialists and a right of centre party, perhaps the Swatantra Party of C. Rajagopalachari. This would have kept in check religious fundamentalism, Left Wing Extremism and unbridled right wing capitalism.

Mahatmaji was unfortunately not listened to and the Congress enjoyed twenty years of almost absolute power. However, because of the Mahatma and the legacy he left behind the miniscule opposition did function with a degree of effectiveness because people such as Shyama Prasad Mukherji of the Hindu Mahasabha, Randive, Homi Daji and Shakir Ali Khan of the Communist Party and Ram Manohar Lohia of the Socialist Party enjoyed a very special position in Indian politics and were heard with respect. At the same time the internal bickering within and jockeying for power in the Congress did create strains and there were signs that the system of one party government could not continue indefinitely. Because the Mahatma was not heeded, when the Congress started breaking apart splinter groups rather than defined political parties emerged and the fragmentation of Indian politics began. The culmination was in 1967.

What is the importance of 1967? That is the year in which in States such as Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Haryana, the purchase of Members of the Legislative Assembly began in order to make them defect from the ruling party, cause the elected government to fall and to bring to power new coalitions of persons who had no ideological similarity but who had sold themselves in order to get power. This is the blackest day in the history of India because now legislators realised that they enjoy a price, which could only be paid by subversion of the State and widespread corruption, which resulted in the end of principled government in India. Ideology, a political agenda and a programme of governance no longer had any place in the Indian polity and what became important was to come to power, use power to buy more power or to continue in power and for this purpose convert public servants from their role of service into predators. No political party in India has been free of the taint of coming to power through corruption and remain in power through more corruption. It is almost as if the politicians have become a breed apart, self-centred, self-seeking and totally indifferent to national interests and the welfare of people at large.

Playing the blame game may be cathartic, but it solves no problems and gives no desirable results. Nevertheless, if we are to improve the system we have to understand who was responsible for its downfall. Because the Congress enjoyed more than twenty years of unchallenged rules this is the party which must accept the largest share of the blame for the degradation of our polity and the corruption which both caused it and emanated from it. Why did this happen? So long as the Mahatma was alive the Congress had internal party democracy. On 15th November, 1947 J.B. Kripalani, the President of the Congress Party, resigned, stating that though it is the party from which government derives powers the government chooses to ignore the party. As a replacement Gandhiji suggested the name of Acharya Narendra Deo, a leading socialist. Unfortunately both Nehru and Sardar Patel wanted a President who would be weak and, therefore, they suggested the name of Dr. Rajendra Prasad, despite Gandhiji’s advice that Rajendra Prasad should not offer himself as a candidate. Ultimately Nehru prevailed and Rajendra Prasad became the Congress President. From that day on the Congress has never looked back and either the Congress President has been weak, like Devkant Baruah, or Indira Gandhi has been President and, in due course, Sonia Gandhi is the President. Indira Gandhi was both Congress President and the Prime Minister and combined in herself State power and party power. Sonia Gandhi is not Prime Minister, but as Chairwoman of the National Advisory Council and leader of the UPA she definitely controls both party and government.

To return to the question of democracy I must tell in brief two incidents separated from each other by a gap of twenty-six years. In 1958 I was Assistant Collector in Morena District and Dr. K.N. Katju was Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh. He, accompanied by his powerful Home Minister, Narsingrao Dixit, came to Morena on an official visit. They were duly received by the District Collector and other district officers at the circuit house and subsequently the Chief Minister had a meeting with the officers. That evening, there was a public meeting organised by the Congress Party. There were only two chairs on the dais and when Mr. Dixit tried to climb up the podium after the Chief Minister Dr. Katju firmly told him to sit with the audience and invited the District Congress Chief, Shri Rathi, to sit by his side. The message was that so far as the Congress Party was concerned, in Morena the most important person was the District Congress President, and why not ? He had been elected by party workers in open election and he truly represented the party in the district. The Congress still had a semblance of internal party democracy in those days. Twenty-six years later in 1984 I had already put in my papers and was awaiting the expiry of my notice period. Ramgopal Tiwari was the Pradesh Congress Chief and he called on Muni Prasad Shukla, the Revenue Minister, with a request that a particular thing should be done. I was summoned and I advised against the suggested course of action as being contrary to law and the rules. Ramgopal Tiwari angrily told the Minister that he was the PCC President and the Minister should not pay heed to what a mere officer has advised. Muni’s reply was, “Mr. Buch has come through a tough competitive examination. I am a Minister because I was elected. You, Ramgopal, are only an imposition of the High Command and, therefore, I prefer to seek advice from my Secretary”. Ramgopal Tiwari represented a superimposed functionary, not elected by the party and appointed by a far away High Command. The Congress Party no longer had internal democracy.

I shall return to the Congress Party in due course, but it is necessary here to review the other political parties who are players on the Indian political stage. Let us begin from the Left. Upto 1962 the Communist Party of India was the major representative of the Left. In 1962 at the time of the Sino-Indian war the party split into the Communist Party of India –Marxist (CPM) and Communist Party of India (CPI). An extreme Left wing group became the Naxalites or Communist Party (Marxist Leninist), who did not believe in the democratic system and advocated a class war based on violence. The Left has remained splintered ever since and though in 2004 it did enjoy a moment of glory as one of the major supporters of the first UPA government, this advantage was frittered away over the question of the nuclear deal and the 2009 election saw the Left decimated in Parliament. In the subsequent State elections the Left lost its two major State strongholds in West Bengal and Kerala. Defeat should be a time of introspection, a time for planning the future, a review of both ideology and policy and a period of consolidation.

To me the schism between CPI and CPI (M) is rather like the Shia-Sunni divide in Islam. One of the major hallmarks of a Muslim is that he can perform Haj. For a non-Muslim to enter the municipal limits of Mecca is to invite a mandatory death sentence. Because a Shia can perform the Haj he is by definition a Muslim. Islam is a highly unitary religion which is against sectarianism and, therefore, there cannot be a divide on account of the basic tenets of the faith between two different groups. One either accepts the Kalima, or one is not a Muslim. No one has been able to explain to me the religious difference between a Shia and a Sunni. The Shia-Sunni divide, therefore, is founded on a major difference of opinion on who should have been the Imam of the Caliphate. Because Islam does not recognise a prophet other than Mohammed, Sallalah Waleh Sallalam, the post of Imam is temporal and has no spiritual significance. A fight over who should be Imam, therefore, is a struggle for power and has nothing whatsoever to do with religious belief. It is in this context that I look at the divide between CPI and CPI (M). Both parties are weak because they will not come together, iron out their differences in matters of detail rather than principle and come together as a unified Left. The Left certainly has a significance in India and it would be a great pity if it faded away, leaving the door open for Left extremism and its counterpart Right extremism.

In the case of the Socialists the story is somewhat similar in that the Samajwadi Party and the Janata Dal of Lalu Yadav have no ideological differences because they no longer have an ideology. Local-centric power is the name of their game and, therefore, socialist unity in India is a distant mirage. Unfortunately it has manifested itself in the form of regional groupings and this has been aggravated by the emergence of a large number of small regional groups in States such as Assam, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. Because the interests are local, a national perspective is not developing and these parties are now just groups of people pushing their own little agenda. This agenda does not have the nation in mind and is not aimed at furthering public welfare. Therefore, the Trinamool Congress insists on the Railway Ministry because it feels that this Ministry has a vast potential of being milked for both financial and political gains. DMK, on the other hand, wants the Communications and the Shipping Ministries, because Communications proved to be a virtual Kamadhenu for DMK. The emergence of regional parties now poses a grave danger both to the integrity of India as a country and a strong government at the Centre which can provide governance which is people oriented, honest, development minded and just.

This brings us to a major component of Indian politics, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). It is a serious contender for power in the Centre, having governed for several years as the lead party of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). It rules the States of Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Goa, Karnataka and Himachal Pradesh and it shares power as a partner in Bihar and the Punjab. This party claims to have internal democracy, though there are allegations that the ultimate outcome of who will lead the party depends on the approval of the RSS, which is at least the mentor if not the controlling authority of BJP. One of the main charges against BJP is that it is excessively influenced by RSS, which enjoys poor secular credentials and, therefore, through its Hindutva programme, BJP is strongly inclined to communal politics. This is vehemently denied by BJP, though it is a fact that Hindu rituals, Hindu practices, Hindu festivals, etc., enjoy State patronage in BJP governed States. That by itself means nothing because there are equal allegations against other parties such as the Congress that they, too, extend patronage to different religions on different religious occasions and this does not exclude Hindu festivals. Unfortunately there is suspicion about BJP amongst the minorities, especially the Muslims, and BJP has not been able to completely allay it.

In its heart of hearts BJP knows that it cannot allow a permanent sense of alienation to exist amongst more than fifteen crores Muslims and L.K. Advani on more than one occasion has expressed this view. At the same time the Muslims do not trust BJP and, therefore, the party has a really uphill task of convincing the minorities that they are not its target. If Americans have Israel as their millstone which prevents them from reaching out to the Arabs and solving the problem of Palestine, BJP has the Babri Masjid and the Hindutva programme has its own surplus baggage which drags it down. BJP has to fine-tune its policies so that a balance is struck between Hindu interests, minority interests and the needs of secular India and if BJP does this successfully it has a very good chance of winning the next elections. If BJP does not address the question seriously then one cannot say how it can come to power in the foreseeable future. BJP’s best bet is to credibly convince the minorities that they will be safe, comfortable, with equal access to opportunities for advancement under BJP rule, without treating them as a vote bank or hesitating to consolidate Hindu votes. We need the Congress, but we equally need the BJP and its leaders would do the country a great disservice if they are not able to arrive at this balance.

To return to the Congress, Indira Gandhi was responsible for not only destroying internal democracy but also for promoting her family as the only natural choice for leading the Congress Party. First Sanjay and then Rajiv held the reins of the party, especially Rajiv after Sanjay and Indira departed from the scene. Not only did the party focus exclusively on Indira and Rajiv, it also voluntarily gave up any semblance of internal free thinking when Indira firmly was in the saddle. No one in the party questioned the right of Sonia to succeed Rajiv Gandhi as the supreme leader and now the party sycophants are promoting Rahul Gandhi and Priyanka Vadra Gandhi as the undisputed leaders of the party and future Prime Ministers of the country. There is hardly any election for party posts and in Madhya Pradesh in the last local government elections the party went to the polls with thirty-eight districts Congress committees not having a President. Village units no longer elect the Mandal units, the Mandals do not elect the D.C.C. President and certainly the P.C.Cs do not elect the State President, who is appointed by Sonia Gandhi. The whole party leadership from top to bottom is nominated and does not represent the choice of workers at the grassroots.

A senior Congress leader once told me that anyone who believes that the Congress is a party is a fool. It is the personal fiefdom of the Nehru-Feroze Gandhi family. If the top leadership of the Congress believes this then what Mahatmaji said about sycophants and cowards surrounding the leader holds true. Boorish and, perhaps, uncharitable it may sound, but perhaps the time has come for the Congress to completely come out of the shadow of this family, forget Sonia Gandhi and her children in the matter of leading the party and instead try and establish democratic functioning in which grass root workers really determine who their leaders will be. When a prop is removed one feels shaky and, perhaps, the party without the Feroze Gandhi family will feel orphaned and exposed. However, if the party is to have a future as a self-sustaining organisation with great influence in Indian politics it will have to take this step. There is still a great deal of talent in the Congress Party and if it rebuilds itself from village level upwards it can go back to becoming a party of the type which existed before 1967. This is very important because India does need a middle-of-the-road party and the Congress is best qualified to fulfill this role, just as the BJP is best qualified to act as the right of centre party. Ultimately it is these parties, kept on a short rein by a resurgent Left, which can provide purposive, well directed welfare based government to the people of India.

The Justice System and the Secular State

Dr. M.N. Buch

Visiting Fellow, VIF

Gujarat has been touted around as a State steeped in communalism, with a government which is right wing, extremist Hindu, anti Muslim and totally communal in outlook. The Congress, on the other hand, projects itself as the party which is secular, pro-minority and, in particular, totally protective of the Muslims. The pro-Muslim secular stance of the Congress formed the main plank of its election campaign in the recent elections in Uttar Pradesh, the end result of which was that the Congress got only twenty-six seats in the State Legislative Assembly and trailed behind BJP to emerge as number four in the electoral race. By contrast in the allegedly communalised State of Gujarat the Mephistopheles of Indian politics, Narendra Modi gave tickets to and was able to have elected over a hundred Muslim candidates in local government elections. Anti Sikh riots took place all over the country in 1984 and at that time the Congress ruled at the Centre and in many other States in India. Not a single conviction has been obtained for these horrendous riots in which in Delhi alone three times more Sikhs were killed than the Muslims in Gujarat in 2002. The entire Hindu Pandit population of the Kashmir Valley was driven out and they became refugees in their own country. Not even one of the culprits of this ethnic cleansing has even been prosecuted, leave alone been convicted. The Pandits even today are either living in refugee camps or are scattered throughout the country. Neither the activists who claim secular credentials nor government has raised a finger to help these refugees.

In 1992-93 the worst rioting post Babri Masjid demolition occurred in Maharashtra, notably in Bombay city. The State was then under Congress rule. No one has been convicted for these riots and the Commission headed by Justice Shri B.N. Srikrishna gave a very categorical report, in which officers who failed in their duty were identified and named, but has been completely ignored by government. Both the Congress and NCP in their election manifestos promised to implement the recommendations of the Srikrishna Commission, but nothing has happened in this behalf despite the fact that it is a coalition of the Congress and NCP which is in power in Maharashtra.

The latest in the series is the complete break-down of law and order in four districts of Assam, with Bodo tribals being in direct conflict with Muslims. Allegedly these Muslims are illegal migrants from Bangladesh whose presence is resented by the Bodos, which has resulted in direct ethnic conflict. Several hundred villages have been burnt down and lakhs of people displaced. There have been Bodo casualties also but, as happens in many communal conflicts, it is the Muslims who had suffered the most. Even the international community has taken note of what has happened in Assam, with unfavourable comments about how we have handled the situation. The Chief Minister of Assam, who is a Congress man, had at an early stage reacted to press reports that Assam was burning by stating that the media had exaggerated as usual and that only three districts were aflame. Considering the size and population of an Indian district the Chief Minister virtually confessed that an area containing a population of five to six million people was seriously affected and that he considered this as a fairly minor event. This could only be expected of a Chief Minister who, in order to win the election, had played the contrary communal card by ignoring the Muslims to win the Hindu votes which might otherwise have gone to the BJP. Can such a government be considered secular?

What about our friends from the Left? Undoubtedly the Left Front Government in West Bengal had a popular image of secularism, so much so that in 1984-85 the Sikhs as a community publicly honoured the then Chief Minister, Jyoti Basu, for ensuring security for the Sikhs and maintaining communal harmony. It is also a fact that West Bengal remained relatively free of Hindu-Muslim conflict during the Left Front rule. Towards the end this image had begun to change and that is because massive land acquisition in Nandigram largely affected Muslim cultivators and the Trinamool Congress was able to project this, at least partially, as the anti Muslim policy of the Left Front. The fact that this was not true is not really relevant in the electoral politics of the India of today. However, in Kerala the Left Front had no inhibition whatsoever in playing the communal card and when it suited LDF it allied itself with the Indian Union Muslim League. Surprisingly in a State in which the BJP has a poor political presence RSS is quite strong, partly because of communal Muslim politics¸ which is why there have been a number of communal clashes in Kerala, especially in the old Madras Presidency Malabar District (now divided into several districts). LDF did little to oppose such communalism, which does not speak well for its secular credentials.

Let us revert to Gujarat. No one can be an apologist for what happened in 2002 and in one letter to the Prime Minister I have said that had I been Governor of the State I would have strongly advised the Chief Minister and actually ordered the Chief Secretary and the Director General of Police to restore order immediately. I would have also gone around the State and if I saw any rioting I would have ordered my escort to fire on the mobs and disperse them. This would not have gone down well with the Government of India and would have probably resulted in my immediate removal, but nevertheless this is how I would have interpreted Article 154 of the Constitution which vests the executive power of the State in the Governor and also acted according to the oath sworn by me under Article 159 which required me to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution and the law. I would have seen it as my duty to remind the Chief Minister that the law required him to maintain law and order and I would certainly consider it a breakdown of the Constitution if the State itself became a party to lawlessness. At the same time it is equally a fact that neither in Delhi, nor in Maharashtra, nor in Assam, nor in Rajasthan during the recent conflict between Jats and Meos has any worthwhile judicial action been initiated and large-scale conviction of wrongdoers obtained. No doubt Nitish Kumar in Bihar, who is truly secular, has been able to take effective legal action. Otherwise Gujarat is the only State in India where six successful cases have been fought against the perpetrators of the 2002 riots and a large number of people have been convicted. This is as true of the Best Bakery case as it is of the Naroda Patiya case in which thirty-two persons, including an ex-minister, have been convicted. A great deal of credit must go the Supreme Court which has forced the Gujarat Government to act, has activated the Gujarat Police which bore the brunt of the investigation and set up an impartial Special Investigation Team (SIT) which has spearheaded the investigation. Everyone is considering the convictions as a set back to Narendra Modi. I disagree with this because the Gujarat Government has, however reluctantly, gone along with investigations, has not obstructed them, nor interfered with the course of justice. Even in the Sohrabuddin case, where the ex-Minister of State for Home, a DIG and other police officers are facing murder trials, the Gujarat Police has not destroyed the evidence and, therefore, the relevant SIT has been able to proceed with the investigation. The encouraging thing about Gujarat is that a largely Hindu Supreme Court, an overwhelmingly Hindu Gujarat Police and the SIT set up by the Supreme Court, Hindu judges such as Jyostna Yagnik have brought justice of the victims of the 2002 riots and convicted a large number of persons involved in these riots. So long as we have this example we can be assured that India has institutions which are secular, though unfortunately none of these are political. Real secularism requires the political class to also be on board.

How communal is Narendra Modi? To his opponents he is the communal devil incarnate, who is unrepentant about what happened in 2002, who refuses to apologise to the Muslims and whose ministers interfered with the maintenance of law and order during that crucial period. But is there another side to Modi? In the State of Gujarat in 2002 the whole of Saurashtra remained largely peaceful and the district administration and the police intervened strongly and effectively to keep the area peaceful. This was true of Kutch also. North Gujarat, mainly Sabarkantha and Banaskantha Districts, remained peaceful despite the substantial Muslim population there. The Central and Southern Districts of Gujarat, in particular Ahmedabad, Kheda, Baroda, Panchmahals, Bharuch and to some extent, Bulsar and Surat were the focus of rioting. This region has had communal conflict even during British days and the worst communal riots in the history of Gujarat occurred in 1969 in Ahmedabad when Hitendra Desai was the Chief Minister. I had written to Dr. Manmohan Singh when he became Prime Minister that the history of this part of Gujarat is such that regardless of which party in power, this region will remain prone to communal tension. I suggested that a person of the calibre of P.S. Appu, IAS should be asked to hold a free ranging administrative enquiry into the causes of communal unrest in these districts and to look into why the district administration and the police did not react strongly and positively to a communal situation. If the root cause of Hindu-Muslim animosity could be identified and then removed Gujarat would be peaceful. Narendra Modi was a phenomenon but he was not the cause of communal strife in these districts of Gujarat. The underlying cause is much older and deeper. The Prime Minister responded favourably but did nothing and, therefore, we still do not know why this region of Gujarat has Hindu-Muslim animosity.

Narendra Modi has not reached out to the Muslims as such, but he has kept RSS, VHP, BKS and the Bajrang Dal under strict control since 2002, which is one reason why rabble rousers such as Pravin Togadia dare not open their mouths in Gujarat. Since 2002 there have been no communal riots in Gujarat and whatever his detractors might say, Gujarat is a relatively corruption-free State with a service oriented, efficient government which has accelerated the pace of development. Whereas there is no special effort to bring the Muslims on board, Muslims have not been denied the fruits of development and many of them have prospered. Whereas the Muslims are hardly ever likely to forgive Narendra Modi for the 2002 riots there are many of them who believe that one must not remain in a period mourning for the past and must move forward to a new future. That is why paradoxically Gujarat is the one State with a BJP Government where at least some Muslims have participated in local government elections and a small section has even voted for Narendra Modi’s party. They certainly did not do so for Sonia Gandhi’s allegedly secular Congress in Uttar Pradesh.

Amongst so-called secular parties there is a mistaken notion that any secularism which is not pro Muslim loses votes. The vast majority of the people of India are Hindu and if a polarisation of their votes takes place in which the present fragmented Hindu votes become concentrated, can we ever keep extremist Hindu parties out of power? Therefore, India’s best bet is the politics of genuine secularism in which government follows policies which give equal opportunities to all communities, without singling out one for opprobrium and another for appeasement. Narendra Modi says that he does not speak for any community but is concerned only about the ‘asmita’ of five and a half crores Gujaratis. Is it not about time that political parties begin talking about the ‘asmita’ of 110 crores Indians without dividing them into religion, caste, class, or region?

The Bharat Ratna is an individual award given to individuals who have achieved high distinction and merit in the service of the country. The George Cross is the highest gallantry award during peace time for defence personnel and for civilians during war and peace, which the British can give. It is an individual award and is equivalent to the Ashok Chakra in India. However, because the people of the Island of Malta stood collectively with the British against the Germans in the Second World War and exhibited the highest degree of gallantry under massive bombardment, the Island of Malta was collectively given the George Cross. On this analogy the Supreme Court of India deserves the Bharat Ratna for the manner in which it has upheld, protected and enhanced the status of the Constitution of India and in particular the secular nature of this republic. My respectful submission to the President and to the Government of India would be that in the Republic Day awards to be announced on 26^th January 2013 they may collectively award to the Supreme Court the Bharat Ratma as a token of gratitude of this nation for being the one pillar of the Constitution which has remained true to its salt. No greater tribute could be paid to what I consider the best Supreme Court in the whole world.

The ISI’s Psychological Operations

Dr. Prem Mahadevan,

Senior Research Associate, VIF

The government has stated that recent distress migrations of northeastern Indians were triggered by electronic messages originating from Pakistan. Investigators have found that the first hints of pogrom-style killings appeared on Pakistani internet forums, and rapidly spread to India as part of a coordinated psyops offensive. The modus operandi was vaguely familiar: doctored images and vitriolic texts flooded telecommunications networks, gaining credibility before law enforcement agencies could react. The apparent purpose was to stir up public anger in an already polarized setting and prepare the political mood for an outbreak of communal violence. During 1989, Pakistan had adopted similar methods when it broadcast television footage of anti-communist revolts in Eastern Europe and urged Kashmiri Muslims to likewise rise up against New Delhi.

What intelligence agencies now need to assess is whether their Pakistani counterparts were merely out to embarrass India, or if the scare campaign had a deeper purpose. It is possible that the Inter Services Intelligence, if it was involved, has no strategic end-game regarding present tensions between Bangladeshi immigrants and Bodo tribesmen. The agency’s covert operations cells might just be taking opportunistic advantage of the situation in Assam. Provided Indian authorities maintain public order, the matter might rest there. However, past experience of ISI psyops suggests that the agency rarely desists from coordinating its propaganda offensives with paramilitary action. Its favourite tactic is to combine persistent low-visibility subversion with sporadic high-visibility attacks, conducted on a deniable basis using local assets or expendable mercenaries.

A Suggestive Pattern

On at least three occasions, the ISI is thought to have used psychological and paramilitary operations in a synergistic role. The first was in late 1983, when masked turban-wearing gunmen hijacked buses in Punjab and selectively killed Hindu passengers. Since the attacks occurred amidst worsening Hindu-Sikh relations, most commentators assumed that they were carried out by Sikh separatist militants. However, eyewitness accounts cast doubt on this theory: the killers’ language and demeanour had indicated a military background. Furthermore, local intelligence was unable to identify them, suggesting that they were not based in Punjab itself. As such attacks continued into early 1984, arguments were advanced that the masked gunmen could have been Pakistani Punjabi mercenaries, working as agent provocateurs in a ‘false-flag’ campaign.

Irrespective of whether the hijackers were Indian or Pakistani, what is unquestionable was that their actions were intended to deepen Hindu-Sikh tensions. Furthermore, it is now generally acknowledged that Islamabad did intervene covertly in Indian Punjab. Throughout the 1980s and ‘90s, radio broadcasts expressed support for Sikh separatism. Pakistani scholars wrote about a possible second partition of India along Hindu-Sikh lines. ISI officials posted in Western capitals funded Sikh separatist publications and organized publicity events. These propaganda initiatives were matched operationally by linking terrorist attack cells to ISI networks. One occasion in 1992 saw two ISI operatives being killed in the company of a Sikh terrorist leader. Although Islamabad initially tried to deny their Pakistani nationality, it relented after protests from their families.

The second case of (suspected) ISI subversion being used to camouflage (largely proven) paramilitary action occurred in Mumbai in 1993. A spate of rioting plunged Hindu-Muslim relations in the city into a downward spiral. With innocent Muslims having suffered disproportionately, some of their co-religionists within the criminal underworld plotted retaliation. Led by Dawood Ibrahim, they organized eleven synchronized blasts across the city in March 1993, targeting Hindu-majority areas. The explosive material used was military-grade, suggesting a state supplier. A detonator recovered by Indian investigators from one of the blast sites was traced to Pakistan army ordnance stores.

What is interesting is that the pre-blast riots had occurred in two distinct waves. The first, in December 1992, was spontaneous; a symptom of country-wide religious polarization following the Babri Masjid demolition. The second wave, in January 1993, appeared to have been planned: it began with knife fights in the Mumbai docks, which expanded into pitched battles across the city. Investigators noted that the docks were a stronghold of Dawood Ibrahim, whose smuggling operations were based there. Although a causal relationship was difficult to prove, circumstantial evidence indicated that Ibrahim’s men had deliberately triggered the second round of rioting. If true, this hypothesis would suggest that the January 1993 riots were a classic intelligence provocation operation.

Ibrahim himself is believed by this time, to have come under ISI influence. Defectors from his group later revealed that the Pakistani government had impounded his shipping fleet, thus gaining leverage over him. The men who actually planted the bombs were trained in explosive-handling in Pakistan, but their passports contained no stamps by Pakistani immigration authorities. Surmising on this, one reputed American commentator has noted that such free movement could only have been facilitated by powerful elements within Pakistani state institutions. ¹ The ISI is the logical suspect.

The third case is Mumbai 2008. It is now known that the ISI was aware of Lashkar-e-Toiba’s plan to attack Mumbai. Testimony from Zabiuddin Ansari, one of the planners, even states that the agency provided the weapons and ammunition used in the attack and that two ISI officers personally supervised its implementation from a control room in

Karachi. The Indian prime minister and national security advisor have long asserted that the Mumbai 26/11 attacks bore signs of state support. Even if the Pakistani government as a whole was not involved, highly influential elements within it appear to have been.

This brings the context of the attacks into sharp focus. During the fall of 2008, alarm had been growing in India about a possible terrorist threat from Hindu extremists. These concerns were exploited by members of the political class, to deflect attention from the government’s failure in preventing jihadist attacks. The Mumbai gunmen played to this discourse, forging identity cards under Hindu names and wearing saffron wristbands. The attack planners had calculated that once the gunmen were killed by Indian police, these ‘clues’ would mislead the subsequent investigation and media commentary.

In this regard, it is important to note that the initial reaction from Islamabad was to reject any possibility of Pakistani involvement. The killings in Mumbai were projected as an outcome of domestic instability within India. Seen from hindsight, such discourse (later discredited by theconfession of AjmalKasab, one of the gunmen) seems to fit the thesis that the ISI masks its paramilitary activities with calibrated propaganda offensives.

The Logic of Pakistani Psyops

Reacting to claims made over the Assam crisis, Pakistani officials have accused Indian authorities of evading responsibility. They insist that India address its own domestic problems rather than attribute culpability to Pakistan. Such demands would be credible, if they were not preceded by episodes such as Kargil ’99 and Mumbai ‘08. On both occasions, Pakistani diplomats had initially ridiculed charges of cross-border involvement and accused India of spoiling bilateral relations. However, once the immediate crisis had subsided and international attention had drifted elsewhere, Islamabad found it expedient to quietly admit to such involvement. It did so in order to claim ownership over a spoiling action that had disrupted bilateral relations and driven up the price of further engagement.

Therein lies the real ‘core’ issue that bedevils India-Pakistan relations. It makes sense for the Pakistani security establishment to occasionally bring bilateral rapprochement to a shuddering halt. There are three reasons for this obstructionist stance:

1. Spoiler actions derail grassroots-level peace initiatives and stop them from assuming an independent forward momentum, which Islamabad might later not be able to regulate. Civil activism for friendly bilateral ties is thereby held in check.
2. These actions also drive a political wedge between India and its main security partners. They compel countries such as the US and UK to abandon New Delhi and instead assume a neutral refereeing posture on Indo-Pak tensions – one which invariably glosses over past jihadist transgressions against India.
3. Lastly, spoiler actions cement the Pakistan army’s domestic image as protector of the people against a vengeful Indian government and public. Certain actions such as Mumbai ‘08 are also meant to serve narrower objectives, such as deflecting domestic Islamist militancy onto a foreign (and thus ‘legitimate’) target.

In each of the cases outlined above, Pakistani officials loudly proclaimed that terrorist attacks in India resulted from domestic tensions. This consistency in emphasizing India’s internal fissures is revealing: it implies that at the governmental level, Pakistan views India as an artificial state, riddled by identity-based conflicts. Such views, if they actually do dominate official Pakistani thinking, would represent a colonial inheritance from the British Raj. During the 1940s, Raj officials had derided secular Indian nationalism as a doomed experiment. They predicted that, post-independence, India would fragment under the centrifugal influence of its own diversity. Building a common polity from a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious population was thought to lie beyond the capabilities of the country’s native leaders. So far, this prediction has been proven wrong, but continuing societal rifts provide hope to some ISI officers that it might yet come true.

Thus, while Pakistani writers claim that Indian elites have never accepted the logic of Partition, the same can be said of Pakistani elites. If India refuses to endorse the principle of religious exclusion that underwrote Pakistan’s formation, Pakistan has also refused to recognize the legitimacy of the secular nationalism that keeps India together. The ISI, if it orchestrated the hate campaign that prompted thousands of northeastern Indians to flee to their home states, was merely acting in conformity with Pakistani ideological dogma.

What Indian security forces now have to prepare for is the more serious possibility that this might not be the end of it. As might have occurred previously in Punjab, there is a chance that ISI operatives shall create a communal flashpoint through agent provocateurs. Reports suggest that the Pakistani agency is keen to erase international memories of the Mumbai ’08 attack. It hopes to achieve this by facilitating a major act of domestic terrorism in India, using only local assets. Islamabad could then argue, with all apparent reasonableness, that even if the Mumbai attack had featured Pakistani involvement, India still needs to put its own affairs in order. Towards this, ISI officials have already met with leaders of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) in Dubai, to discuss possible collaboration. The Maoists have allegedly asked for military-grade explosive, and the ISI is believed to have asked in turn that the Maoists use these explosives to attack economic targets, such as oil refineries, so as to attain maximum strategic impact.

Even if the ISI were to support the Maoists however, the main focus of its psyops would still be on identity-based conflicts rather than ideology-based ones. The agency has plenty of experience in exploiting ethnic and linguistic fault lines to its own advantage. One example would be the East Pakistan civil war (1971), when the ISI organized Bihari Muslims into vigilante groups to fight Bengali separatists. Another would be its covert support for Mohajir militancy in Karachi during the 1980s – a tactic intended to contain Sindhi and Pashtun nationalism. However, the agency has little insight into ultra-leftist discourse, having never confronted a communist insurgency. Its ability to relate to the peasant and tribal revolution in central India is likely to be quite limited. Moreover, class struggle is not an issue that ISI strategists would want to publicize, as it might backfire on Pakistan, given the country’s own quasi-feudal social structure. For these reasons, it would make sense if the agency focused on Hindu-Muslim/Bodo-Bengali tensions.

Further ‘Rogue’ Operations Likely

Following the Mumbai ’08 attack, the then ISI chief told US officials that rogue officers from the agency might have been involved. This same argument had previously served Pakistan well in 1993, when ISI involvement with Dawood Ibrahim had attracted American queries. Basically, the ‘rogue operative’ thesis capitalizes on the tendency of Western listeners to equate such operatives with ‘enemies of the state’. Western analysts assume that if individuals within the ISI support terrorist attacks, Pakistani authorities would seek to identify and pursue them. Instead, India’s experience has so far belied this paradigm – although some ISI paramilitary activities might have been carried out without express sanction from above, these have not resulted in punitive measures against the officials involved. Rather, the immediate consequence tends to be a reshuffling of agency postings, to throw off Indian and Western counterintelligence efforts against the ‘rogues’.

There is a strong possibility that ‘rogues’ within the ISI will plan and assist a major act of terrorism in India, using local proxies as the triggermen. Such a scenario may not occur in the short term (i.e. the next three months), since the renewed India-Pakistan dialogue has not yet made much progress. A major improvement in atmospherics however, such as a summit between civilian politicians of the two countries, would likely set attack preparations afoot. By a spoiler action, the Pakistan army and ISI would want to emphasize their veto rights over any political process that bypasses them. Given the ongoing instability in India, caused by poor governance and communal polarization, they are likely to have many opportunities for combining psychological and paramilitary operations. The Bodo-Bangladeshi conflict shall probably be just one among these.

Dr. Prem Mahadevan is working with Centre for Security Studies, Zurich

Endnotes

1. Jessica Stern, ‘Pakistan's Jihad Culture’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2000, accessed online at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/jstern/pakistan.htm, on 20 August 2012.