Showing posts with label nuclear. Show all posts
Showing posts with label nuclear. Show all posts

Tuesday, July 10, 2012

Yet Another Round of Platitudes


Kanwal Sibal
Member Advisory Board, VIF


For those cynical about the dialogue process with Pakistan, the lack of substance in the joint statement issued after the latest round of Foreign Secretary level talks (July 4-5) confirms our neighbour’s unwillingness to fundamentally revise its thinking on core bilateral differences.

For those who remain hopeful about normalising relations with Pakistan despite decades of bitter experience, the platitudinous joint statement offers no peg on which to hang their optimism.
The talks were held in the same “frank and constructive atmosphere” prevailing in all past encounters, without, however, yielding much result. While we are committed to a “dialogue process”, the Pakistanis insist it should be “purposeful and result-oriented”- which, decoded, means India should make concessions. We accommodate Pakistan’s preferred but, in effect, harmless phraseology.

The issue of Peace and Security, including CBMs, has been discussed in the same “comprehensive manner” as before, but without comprehensive outcomes. Both sides have “emphasized the need to promote greater trust and mutual understanding through constructive dialogue”, repeating piously the hope expressed many times earlier. This trust and understanding refuses to materialize despite repeated “constructive” dialogues.

The issue of Nuclear and Conventional CBMs is complicated because India attaches importance to nuclear CBMs while Pakistan favours conventional CBMs. Pakistan continues to expand its nuclear arsenal and delivery capability with single-minded determination, even in a situation of mounting internal instability and financial stringency. It seeks to introduce tactical nuclear weapons as a counter to India’s “Cold Start” doctrine which it has studiously hyped.

Whether it talks of a conventional balance of forces or a strategic balance after both countries became nuclear, Pakistan omits from the equation India’s need to factor in the superior Chinese nuclear and conventional capability it must contend with. Pakistan, as China’s closest strategic partner, naturally refuses to take cognizance of this compulsion in India’s defence preparedness.

India’s interest in Nuclear CBMs is to make Pakistan accept a no-first-use agreement in order to raise Pakistan’s low threshold of nuclear weapon use. Pakistan, which has employed state terrorism against India under cover of its nuclear capability, is hardly likely to agree to a no-first use agreement until it decides to genuinely bury the hatchet with India. In that case India’s larger conventional strength, commensurate with its geographical size, large coast line and China’s menace, would pose no threat to it.

The source of conflict between India and Pakistan, it needs remembering, is its territorial claims on India and the use of jihadi terrorism to back them, and not any terror-backed Indian claims, territorial, water-related or religious on Pakistan.

On the issue of terrorism we have eschewed, to our credit, the absurd formulation conceded earlier that both countries are victims of terrorism, elevating Pakistan thus from a perpetrator of terrorism against us to a partner in arms against it.

Some equivalence has been conceded though in the formulation that both countries “affirmed the strong commitment...to fight and eliminate terrorism in an effective and comprehensive manner so as eliminate the scourge in all its forms and manifestations”, but having lost ground massively earlier it is not possible now to retrieve it diplomatically. Pakistan’s prevarications on the Mumbai terror attack, its give-me-more-and-more-evidence-which-I-will-ignore approach, its unwillingness to act against Hafiz Saeed and suppress the jihadi groups, and dismissal of Abu Jundal’s testimony as an “insinuation” hardly supports the above affirmation.

The formulation on Jammu and Kashmir is neutrally worded, with both sides prepared to “continue discussions in a purposeful and forward looking manner with the view to finding a peaceful solution by narrowing divergences and building convergences”. Given Pakistan’s claims about the centrality of the Kashmir issue and its reversion to its traditional position of resolving it on the basis of relevant UN resolutions, as confirmed in its parliamentary resolution earlier this year, this exercise of “narrowing differences and building convergences” is more an effort at verbal crafting than any serious political commitment.

Unsurprisingly, the Pakistani Prime Minster has, after the talks, promptly re-affirmed Pakistan’s full support for the Kashmiri cause till the UN resolutions are implemented.

The emphasis on cross LOC CBMs reflects our desire to win over public sentiment in the valley and Pakistan’s hope that these will eventually erode India’s sovereignty and give it a say in J&K affairs.
Pakistan, had in any case, made up for the tempered J&K formulation in the joint statement by its Foreign Secretary repeating the affront his Foreign Minister administered to us when he, like her, met the separatist Kashmiri leaders even before he held official discussions. Our displeasure conveyed to her then, which she dismissed with hauteur, has gone unheeded.

It is unacceptable that even Pakistani bureaucrats should be meeting Indian separatists in India’s capital, but we cannot now easily extricate ourselves from the web of our past mistakes. A right riposte would be to openly meet dissidents from J&K’s Northern Areas either in India or in third countries as Pakistan will not allow us to meet them in Islamabad.

The intention to promote more people to people, media and sports contacts, parliamentary exchanges etc is to be welcomed, even if the delay in signing the finalized revised bilateral Visa Agreement which would facilitate this remains unexplained.

The joint statement reflects the stalemate in ties- neither conspicuously improving nor notably deteriorating. Its ritual phraseology gives the text length but not any depth. Just as well, as we clutch at straws of peace with Pakistan as if we are drowning and end in making one-sided concessions to make the dialogue look meaningful. We should wait for drowning Pakistan to clutch at opportunities of peace with India.

Monday, June 11, 2012

Implications of US Defence Secretary’s Visit to New Delhi


Arun Sahgal & Vinod Anand
The two days visit of US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta to India generated considerable interest both among the political circles and strategic community. Major interest was in the new American defence strategy the chief element of which was re balancing towards Asia – Pacific Region.

The visiting Defence Secretary outlined three broad perspectives in his interaction with Indian political leadership, these included, shared challenges of ensuring an open access to maritime, air space and cyber space domains as also challenges posed by radical ideologies, piracy and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The fundamental thrust of the Secretary’s discourse was that in addition to upgraded US military presence in the region, US was keen to encourage and assist regional states in developing capabilities to deal with shared challenges. India was sought to be projected as the lynch pin of this strategy being the biggest and most dynamic. Towards this a commitment of sorts was made to upgrade the current buyer and seller relationship to a more substantial one in which US will share important cutting edge technologies, enter into substantial co-production relationship which would eventually transgress to high technology joint research and development.

An interesting point was the underplaying of outstanding agreements sought by the U.S such as CISOMA, BECA and the LSA, outlining that these will not be allowed to be a dampener in building strong positive defence relationship with India. The message was clear, US is ready to do business on terms that India may find both politically and economically comfortable. In an interesting initiative Mr. Panetta mentioned that he has asked his Deputy Secretary to engage with Indian counterparts to streamline bureaucratic procedures on both sides to make them simple, responsive and effective.
It is apparent that US is keen in drawing India into a much stronger defence partnership and provide technologies and capacities that will enhance India’s defence capabilities and preparedness. The fundamental challenge for India is how to respond to these overtures. We have a drawn out acquisition process, which is based on global Request For Proposals from which sound technological products at best possible costs are sought to be acquired. That this procedure is cumbersome and does not provide top of the line technologies is given, however government ridden by corruption charges cannot hope to give up apparent transparent procedures only to build relationship with the US. Mere induction of cutting edge technological inputs cannot help India build indigenous defence industrial base. Although not spelt out, US assertions of best technological products are based on Foreign Military Sales route, with at best limited technology transfer. In evaluating US offer India will need to carefully calibrate this cooperation to its advantage, most importantly in terms of technology transfer and even more importantly after weighing the capacity for industrial absorption.

On strategic and geo political plane the visiting Defence Secretary shared his views on Afghanistan making two critical points. One, the US was on top in the war on terror and Taliban has been pushed onto the defensive. Second, US is on course in its disengagement schedule and handing over security control to the Afghan Security Forces, who going by the Secretary’s calculations will be in control, of nearly seventy five percent of their territory by the end of 2012. He also outlined US commitment to ensure stable and secure Afghanistan, which could over time make its own democratic choices.

Subsumed in the remarks was a clear nuance of India assuming the role of an important stake holder in security and development of Afghanistan by both upgrading its training commitments and development efforts. The key to Indian greater engagement was hinted in improved bilateral relationship with Pakistan, in terms of resolving differences (Siachen?) and economic cooperation to help in Pakistani economic recovery. A sort of grand bargain appeared to be nuanced as part of greater Indo – US defence relationship, in which India would help the US in providing regional stability through greater economic and military engagement (training of Afghan Security Forces) in Afghanistan and helping Pakistan through economic and political gestures. The basic issue for Indian security concerns is that will it bring lasting peace and stability or will this be one more unilateral concession? There is a need for India to critically evaluate its policy options, vis a vis both Afghanistan and Pakistan, time for which appear to be running out.

There was also an exchange of views on tensions in South China Sea, North Korean nuclear weapons proliferation among concerns that it was close to testing fission – fusion device at the behest of Pakistan on Chinese insistence. Discussions also centred on new asymmetric challenge of nuanced cyber attacks against both strategic and economic entities in both the countries.

On China a somewhat cautious approach was adopted highlighting the need to strengthening of bilateral relationship by both countries while welcoming China’s rise. Hope was expressed of a strong China playing by the international norms as its regional and global roles expand in particular not do anything that could upset the six decades of peace and stability in the region. Nuance of the Secretary’s remarks were clearly towards, at one level to draw the Chinese in as a responsible stake holder in maintaining peace and stability by not resorting to coercion and assertive behaviour, on the other to drive home the credibility of US power and its attempt to build regional security capabilities to deal with Chinese aggressiveness.

Is there any wonder that Chinese have reacted sharply to the American attempts to tilt regional balance in its favour, by what they claim attempting to create a semi circle of alliances against China from the South (Global Times, June 8, 2012). Chinese statement also carried a nuanced message for India; warning it not to get entrapped in a US led anti Chinese alliance. The analyst from Chinese Institute of International Studies a government sponsored foreign policy think tank highlighted that ‘India was unlikely to get involved in any such containment policy on somebody else’s behalf, as it has “its own agenda in the region," noting that India wants to be independent in making its own foreign policies while maximising its national interests. As an example it outlined how India has refrained from becoming deeply involved in the South China Sea rows because it viewed any friction with China as being against its fundamental national interests, underscoring that India's interests lie in wider economic and cultural cooperation with China. In a veiled attempt to woo India it added that “this is China's opportunity to break up the US intention to contain China”.

India is unlikely to fully countenance the America’s ‘re- balancing strategy’ given its likely impact on balance of power in Asia. there is no doubt that there are concerns in New Delhi about China’s rise, its military modernization, infrastructural developments in Tibet and growing foot prints in South Asia and SE Asia and even more importantly forays into the Indian Ocean. However despite these overt Chinese moves there is, growing realization that given the prevailing power differential it is imperative to engage China, lower tensions and build a win-win transactional relationship that underscores cooperation and downplays competition. A senior Indian policy maker put it succinctly when he declared that India is absolutely committed to a pragmatic approach in dealing with sensitive bilateral issues. India doesn’t want any fights with China. We want to develop a relationship further and faster, but we want to assure that our pride is not hurt in the process because China has risen and India is, still, rising. The unequal space of development, he adds should not cast a shadow on mutual treatment which has to be based on the spirit of equality and respect. Both India and China will have to find ways to preserve mutual pride and move ahead on the journey of development and growth. The Indian dilemma therefore is how to play its politico – military cards in the evolving strategic order in Asia.

Given the aforementioned perspective, the nature of Indian engagement will be dictated by how Indian policy elites perceive their role in the region and above all its impact on the overall India’s China policy. The issue that will drive India’s policy options will essentially the nature of engagement with China and the US as also broader Asia – Pacific region. Will India act as a swing state, i.e. balancing Chinese assertions with close political and military relations with United States? Alternatively with China enjoying increasing influence in SE and South Asia, bandwagon with, Southeast and East Asian states like Japan and South Korea (littorals along the Asian Rimland) to balance, Chinese power.

Different pathways for India could be:

a) India’s geo-political, energy, economic and maritime interests force it to get into a security understanding with US allies and partners like Vietnam, Japan, South Korea and Australia. There is a marked enhancement in her defence self reliance capabilities which is boosted by US technology transfers and military hardware support. It develops strong maritime capability and nuclear triad backed by significant space and cyber capacities with large C4ISR foot print over its region of strategic interest. Andaman and Nicobar transform in to a strong ‘iron choke’ to counter Chinese ‘string of pearls’. India puts in place an effective anti access and area denial strategy in the Indian Ocean as also along its land borders.

b) India attempts to balance Chinese assertion and US interests. Towards this, on one hand, it boosts its economic relationship with China, while simultaneously developing close political and economic linkages with the US but without any overt security understanding. To foster its regional economic interests boosts trade and economic relationships with ASEAN. It buttresses these initiatives through; close strategic relationship with Russia, Central Asia while taking effective steps to enhance its bilateral relations in South Asia and moves toward resolution of India -Pak differences. It simultaneously uses this period to build up its comprehensive national power while ensuring economic progress.

c) Third pathway could be sustained economic development and military modernization to build credible dissuasive capability. To foster regional peace and stability, it could reach political and economic understanding with China through conciliatory gestures e.g. South China Sea, membership of SCO, undertaking joint development and infrastructure projects in South and SE Asia. Opens up dialogue to address Chinese fears in IOR. In short attempt to upgrade its bilateral arrangements with China, prevent falling into China containment trap. Thus there is an attempt to build peaceful periphery without being a so called ‘swing ‘state.

Conclusion

Indian strategic options in forging a grand strategy vis a vis China are restrained by a new euphuism of maintaining strategic autonomy. As a result there is talk of unexceptionable strategic risks in proximate relationship with the US, which could mortgage India’s strategic options.

Notwithstanding above India needs a strategy that helps it balance military challenge posed by China’s military modernization, persistent adversarial stances and increasing forays at India’s doorsteps in the North East, Western and North Western peripheries and in the Indian Ocean. Given the aforementioned perspective is there a case for closer strategic understanding with the US on terms which both find comfortable? What this essentially entails is a strong and purposeful hand shake and not a bear hug.

Monday, May 28, 2012

The Normal Socialist

Kanwal Sibal
Member Advisory Board, VIF



What does Francois Hollande’s victory in the French presidential election mean for India, Europe and the rest of the world?

We know very little about him in India. Hollande’s political career has been confined to domestic politics, but without any governmental experience even though he has headed the French Socialist Party from 1997 to 2008. Foreign affairs have not been his forte so far, though now he will be deeply involved in them as the French President has traditionally a privileged role in conducting the country’s foreign policy. It is not too important if we do not know his views about India because Indo-French relations have matured sufficiently and do not await new leaders to discover mutualities of interest hitherto indiscernable. Personalities can make some difference in increasing levels of engagement with specific countries based on personal inclinations and judgment, but we may not expect notched-up attention to India from Hollande.

Nicolas Sarkozy, who had no known interest in India before becoming President, turned out to be very good for India-France relations. He consolidated the positive momentum of bilateral ties under Jacques Chirac, reinforcing French support for India’s membership of the UNSC and international civilian nuclear cooperation with India and fortifying the strategic dialogue between the two countries. India may have selected the Rafale jet fighter for technical-commercial reasons, but Sarkozy’s contribution to creating a congenial political atmosphere for the deal cannot be disregarded. Given Hollande’s background, it is enough if he maintains Sarkozy’s level of interest in India.

In the case of France the perception is that the Gaullist political spectrum is better for India than the Socialists. This is partly because, barring Mitterand, no Socialist has been president in the Vth Republic. When the socialist Lionel Jospin was Prime Minister in the “co-habitation” period from 1997-2002, it is President Chirac’s empathy for India that guided the conduct the Jospin government. Hollande’s success may not therefore automatically comfort India because an unknown entity succeeds a known one, but the strong foundations of existing bilateral ties provide sufficient reason to be at ease about the electoral result.
Naturally, we should establish contact with Hollande quickly at high level and invite him to India, with a halt by our Prime Minister in Paris on one of his westwards journeys in the interim, not to mention early visits by our Foreign and Commerce Ministers to France.

Evidently, Hollande’s election has the greatest significance for Europe because France, along with Germany, has been at the centre of the European project, and this project is in crisis, to the extent that the survival of the Euro is threatened and the weaknesses of the much-vaunted European enterprise are being openly acknowledged. Hollande is questioning the German nostrum of austerity and strict budgetary balance to address Europe’s sovereign debt malady. He is proposing instead a strategy of growth, investment and job creation that would involve higher spending and budget deficits. German Chancellor Merkel’s preference for Sarkozy over Hollande and the latter’s frontal challenge to German financial prescriptions for Europe and his intention to re-negotiate the EU’s fiscal discipline pact sets the stage for crippling policy tussles between the two key pillars of Europe. France and Germany will eventually find a modus vivendi as both have vital stakes in Europe, but any prolongation of the Eurozone crisis because of basic policy differences that Hollande is signalling would be costly for Europe and others.

The hyperactive Sarkozy, always looking for a leadership role, increased France’s visibility on the international stage. He made mediatory moves in the Russia-Georgia conflict, punched Iran diplomatically, led the military action against Libya and adopted an uncompromising language against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. He stood by his obligations in Afghanistan and has been forthright on terrorism, including on Pakistan’s role.

Hollande’s more moderate personality may temper this hyper-activism. His intention to withdraw all French troops from Afghanistan by 2012-end may require some US-France parleys. On Islamic radicalism his stance may reflect his party’s softer view on France’s Muslim problem. His misgivings about globalization and unfair external competition may incite more protectionist tendencies in Europe which worry India and others. His lack of enthusiasm for nuclear energy may impact on the scope of Indo-French plans in this area.
Hollande has won as expected, but with a margin narrower than anticipated. Sarkozy lost more because of his personality flaws than his performance failures. Hollande will be, as he says, a more “normal’ president.

Tuesday, May 1, 2012

Carry Forward The Legacy of Agni-5


Radhakrishna Rao
Research Fellow, VIF
The flawless, twenty minute long maiden flight of India’s most advanced and longest range Agni-V missile capable of hitting targets at a distance of 5,000-kms on April 19 has given a big boost to the nuclear deterrence and long range strategic strike capability of India. Going beyond the debate whether the three-stage Agni-V really deserves the tag of ICBM (Inter Continental Ballistic Missile) or not, India should carry forward the legacy of this most powerful three-stage, solid fuel driven missile to develop a range of missiles capable of hitting targets beyond 10,000 kms. For such a capability alone can help transform India into superpower besides providing parity with China to some extent in long-range missile strike capability. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Agni-V launch, an editorial in the pro-Beijing Global Times had observed, “India should stand no chance in an overall arms race with China.” Going further, it warned New Delhi against relying on its relationship with US and implied the possibility of India joining hands with the West to curb China’s growth. ” India should also not overstate the value of its Western allies and the profits it could gain from participating in a containment of China. If it equated long-range strategic missiles with deterrence of China, and step-up further hostilities, it could be sorely mistaken,” noted the Global Times editorial. There were also reports to suggest that China may pressurize countries to drop exporting critical components used in missile systems to India.

Not surprisingly, the total turnaround of US stance in so far as its muted reaction to Agni-V launch was concerned was on the expected lines. The cryptic response of US which had left no stone unturned to prevent India from testing the Agni-II missile in late 1990s was “all nuclear capable states should exercise restraint regarding nuclear capabilities.” Added to that, following India’s 1998 twin Pokhran nuclear blasts, Washington had blamed India for “proliferation” and brought India under the technology embargo. Obviously, USA which is hard selling its defence hardware to India, cannot afford to offend India at this critical juncture. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was right in his observation: “The successful Agni-V test launch represents another milestone in our quest to add to the credibility of our security and preparedness to continuously explore the frontiers of science.”

The new generation Agni-V missile with a formidable strike capability and state of the art technological elements marks a massive strategic leap for India as it becomes the sixth nation in the world to capable of delivering warhead across the continents. Clearly and apparently, Agni-V, which has helped India expand its missile foot print far beyond China and Pakistan, has altered the global geo-political scenario in all its manifestations. “Agni-V gives strategic deterrence parity as it provides the same range and clout as Chinese missiles have,” says Bharat Karnad, Professor at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi.

Indeed, the decision to equip Agni-V with MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle) would help India strike multiple targets spread across a vast geographical swath at one go. “The versatile capability of this missile will enable India to leapfrog into the area of MIRV, anti-satellite weapons and the capability to launch satellites on demand. This will usher in a new era of missile development in India,” says Avinash Chander, Chief Controller (Research and Development) of missiles and strategic systems at DRDO. Indeed, DRDO would need to build its own launch capability to take care of the growing space defence needs of the country. For ISRO with its limited infrastructure, a single operational launch vehicle in the form of PSLV (Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle) and a solitary launch complex on India’s eastern coast is clearly not in a position to build and launch satellites – at short intervals and on a regular basis – required by the three wings of the Services. Indeed, it would be in the fitness of things for DRDO to modify the Agni range of ballistic missiles to hurl satellites into orbit at a short turnaround time. Moreover, DRDO can position Agni range of missiles as one of the key components of India’s space weaponization programme the need for which the country’s political leadership should recognize without any loss of time. For in the context of China’s highly motivated plans for perfecting the techniques space warfare, India cannot afford to remain a silent spectator.

As it is, the plan to equip Agni-V with MIRV capability has been hailed by strategic experts. “MIRV is the right way to go,” says Rajaram Nagappa, Professor of Strategic and Security Studies at National Institute of Advanced Studies(NIAS) in Bangalore. Nagappa who had earlier worked on solid fuel driven motor systems at the Thiruvananthapuram-based Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre(VSSC) of ISRO says “Reduction of structural mass and maximising of fuel efficiency was another important area which the defence scientists have solved.” According to DRDO sources, an MIRV payload would be significantly heavier since it would consist of several nuclear warheads, each of them weighing about 400-kg. “The primary modules of MIRV are in an advanced stage of development. Realization and integration of them into a weapon is just a question of threat perception and the need as it arises,” says Chander.

Incidentally, the MIRV capability of Agni-V has its parallel in the multiple launch of capability of the four-stage Indian space workhorse PSLV, which in April 2008, had created a sort of record by hoisting as many as ten satellites into space in one go. “The MIRV technology is similar to ISRO’s multiple satellite injection technology. The defence scientists have to miniaturize it and install better guidance systems to ensure that warheads hit the targets,” says Karnad. As pointed out by DRDO, the focus of the new generation Indian missiles is on weight reduction and improvement in velocities with high payload capability.

Agni-V featuring many advanced technology elements including state of the art guidance and navigation, stealth features, canister launch capability and carbon composite rocket motor casing, could very well serve as a platform for a robust Indian ICBM programme. According to Zhang Zhaozang, a Professor with PLA (Peoples Liberation Army) University in China, “the Agni-V range could be further enhanced to become an ICBM.” But then, as stated by Avinash Chander, “As of now, most of India’s perceived and potential strategic threats are localized within 5,500-km range. Agni-V will take care of this concern.”

For India the biggest advantage of Agni-V is that it can be launched from any location within the country, in any direction and at any time. DRDO has already hinted that the range of Agni-V can be enhanced through the use of improved materials and enhanced fuel loading capability. According to V. G. Shekaran, Director of the Hyderabad-based Advanced Systems Laboratory (ASL) of DRDO which designed and developed Agni-V “A great advantage of the configuration of Agni-V is that we can further enhance and expand its range. We would upscale Agni-III with a range of 3,500 km to Agni-V in a short time. On similar lines, we can go beyond Agni-V. That is the beauty of Agni-V’s configuration. Its up-scaling and mobility is high.” Interestingly, among the new technologies used for Agni-V are ring laser gyro-based inertial navigation system, micro inertial navigation system, high speed on-board computer based on power PC design, light weight composite motors and 100% home-grown software. Research Centre Imarat (RCI), a DRDO laboratory based in Hyderabad, has made significant contribution to the development of advanced inertial navigation, guidance and control systems which went into Agni-V.

As envisaged now, Agni-V will help India boost its second strike capability in the context of India’s national policy of the no first use of nuclear capability. The short-range Agni-I equipped to strike a target at a distance of 700-kms and medium range Agni-II designed to hit a target at a distance of 2,500-kms have already been inducted into service. The programme for developing improved performance Agni range of missiles – Agni-III, Agni-IV and Agni-V—owes its origin to Agni-I and Agni-II missiles developed as part of the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) spearheaded under the guidance of the former Indian President Dr. A. P. J. Abdul Kalam who as the head of DRDO had consistently striven to put the Indian missile development programme on a sound footing. Incidentally, during his stint with ISRO(Indian Space Research Organisation), Kalam had played a key role in the development of India’s first civilian launch vehicle SLV-3 which had its successful debut flight in 1980. Against this backdrop, US think tank have been alleging that the Agni range of missiles have benefited enormously from the solid fuel technology developed for the four stage, 17-tonne SLV-3.

Two more tests of Agni-V need to be carried out before its induction into services hopefully by the middle of this decade. DRDO has already revealed that the development of the naval variant of Agni-V which can be launched from under sea platforms is on hand. This nuclear capable, road mobile missile can reach out to almost entire Asia, East Europe upto the Russian coast in the north and close to the coastline of Australia and South Africa. The target range however, varies depending on the launch site. Agni range of missiles form the mainstay of India’s nuclear deterrence capability based on the no first use of nuclear weapon policy. With the Indo Russian supersonic cruise missile BrahMos already inducted into the army and the navy, the Akash surface-to-air area defence system in service with the IAF and the indigenous nuclear powered submarine Arihant boosting the K-15 underwater launched missile, DRDO claims that India has now a complete range of missiles to take care of multifarious threats emanating from a variety of directions.

By all means, the smooth debut flight of Agni-V exemplifies India’s growing technological self-reliance that stands out as a challenge to technology denial and trade sanction regime. As stated by DRDO chief, V. K. Saraswat “Agni-V is a game changer and India is a major missile power now.” Saraswat drives home the point that the biggest advantage of Agni-V is its short reaction time and high mobility. Agni-V can easily be stored in hermitically sealed canister and quickly transported atop launcher trucks by road to the required destination. This would give armed forces tremendous flexibility to pick and choose from where to launch the missile.

“Three major gains from Agni-V are the technology of MIRV, the capability to launch mini satellites and the capability to engage satellites in its orbit,” says Saraswat. According to Saraswat, Agni-V gave the ability to take a “kill vehicle” instead of a payload to high altitude of about 800-km. This kill vehicle can be used to smash a rogue satellite to ensure the safety of Indian space resources. ”Besides the kill vehicle, one should have some guidance to hit the satellite. We can put advance seekers that are built in the country itself. Satellite position will be given to the kill vehicle that will then inflict the desired change,” said Saraswat. Saraswat, who has all along been stressing on the need for the developing the building blocks of Indian space weaponization programme, views Agni-V as a key anti satellite device.

Incidentally, Prithvi, a tactical battlefield system, happens to be the first missiles developed under IGMDP which was initiated in 1983 by DRDO. Following the successful launch of Prithvi-1 liquid fuel driven missile in February1989, the US and other developing countries imposed technology embargo on India under MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) adversely affecting the availability of advanced electronic devices such as computer processor chips, radio frequency devices, electro hydraulic components, maraging steel and composite materials such as carbon fibre. But then unfazed by technology denial regime, DRDO chose to develop the critical components and hardware through consortium approach involving national laboratories, universities and private industries. Thanks to the vision of DRDO India became self sufficient in the development of components including phase shifters, magnesium alloys ,servo valves, resins and carbon fibres. Today around 80% of the components and hardware going into the Indian missile systems are produced within the country.

There is no denying the fact that the nuclear capable Agni range of missiles along with the supersonic cruise missile BrahMos developed by India in partnership with Russia makes for a win-win combination in taking care of the possible misadventure from across the Himalayan border. The plan to deploy both these missiles, which are formidable in their own way, in India’s north eastern sector, has the potential to give Indian defence forces a tremendous strategic advantage .Similarly, DRDO’s well conceived plan to put in place a two layered ballistic missile defence shield in place seeks to protect the Indian skies with two interceptor missiles—Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) missile for high altitude interception and the Advanced Air Dfence (AAD) missile for lower altitude interception—assumes significance. With a number of other home grown missile systems—Nirbhay intermediate range subsonic land attack missile now awaiting its debut flight, Prahar quick reaction battlefield missile currently being weaponised for use by the Indian army and Astra air to air beyond the visual range missile awaiting firing from Su-30 MKI combat aircraft--- Indian defence forces will have no reason to worry about defending the country against the evil design of the potential aggressors.

The unqualified success of Agni-V clearly demonstrates that DRDO means business and it can no longer be considered a laggard in so far as developing a range of advanced missiles of different class is concerned. Indeed, as stated by Saraswat, nowhere else in the world does a single agency has so many on-going programmes. DRDO which not long back was at the receiving end for its shortcomings , now stands transformed into a centre of excellence in state of the art missile technologies. And for the Indian Defence Minister A. K. Antony who has all along been urging DRDO to take a leaf out of the success story of ISRO, the Agni-V successful flight cannot but be the “happiest moment of his life”.

Tuesday, April 24, 2012

Agni V: A Positive Step on Security



Kanwal Sibal

India has taken a substantial step forward in acquiring a credible nuclear deterrent capability with its successful Agni V test on April 19. The security threats to India are almost unique in that we have two nuclear neighbours who have had military conflicts with us in the past, who even now lay claims to our territory, whose seek to corner us strategically and who have long colluded in nuclear and missile matters.

Despite the acuteness of our security challenges our response has lacked a sense of urgency. While aware of their source and nature, we have not been able to make up our minds on the size and scope of our response and the manpower and funds to be allocated to develop the technologies and capacities to meet these threats.

Approach

We have tended to discount any large scale military threat from either adversary. We have felt confident about coping with any Pakistani military adventurism with the strength we possess. In China’s case, our assessment has been that with the existing border agreements on peace and tranquillity and sundry CBMs that reflect the desire of both countries to avoid military tensions on the border, coupled with political level efforts to set up a mechanism for border negotiations, the danger from China was more long term than immediate. China, in our thinking, would also want to preserve the myth of its peaceful rise and would therefore avoid an unnecessary military conflict with us, particularly as India poses no military threat to its control over Tibet.

We have also been able to dodge taking hard national security decisions by avoiding a military response to Pakistani provocations and a robust poitical response to those from China. We have not allowed tensions to escalate, preferring dialogue and engagement instead. If Pakistan does a Mumbai our answer is dialogue; if China questions our sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh or Kashmir, far from picking up the challenge, we look for a compromise formula to resume military contacts and gratuitously bolster the image of Sinkiang’s political head by inviting him to India despite the public upheavel there against Chinese rule. Even as we are concerned about Chinese strategic inroads into the Indian Ocean, we endorse maritime cooperation with them in these waters.

Thus, we reinforce our proclivity not to take hard decisions by making believe that our security dilemmas can be managed through diplomatic engagement rather than accelerating our strategic military programmes. In reality, while self-restraint and attachment to peace mark do our policies, we choose soft options also because we are conscious of our weakness and lack of military preparedness.

Comparison

The Agni V test needs to be seen in this broad context. Our Integrated Missile Development Programme began in 1983 but it is only now that we have successfully tested a real strategic delivery capability. Compared to China, our progress has been slow, either because of technical hurdles or inadequate committment of resources to the task. If the Chinese needed to develop capabilities to counter the exercise of US power in their neighbourhood, we needed to counter the exercise of combined Chinese and Pakistani power against us, without entering into an arms race with China just as the latter has not entered into one with the US.

The delay in developing our strategic delivery capability compounds our political difficulties. China is now a mature missile power with ICBM capability. Its new ballistic missile capable of hitting US naval assets at a long distance has attracted attention, but otherwise the upgradation of its long range missiles proceeds quietly. Russia too is developing a powerful new missile but this too hardly makes news. India’s missile programme will take some more years to mature and will therefore continue to be in the public eye, making India, that wants to project the image of a peaceful and responsible power, look like pursuing threatening and regionally destabilizing capabilities of the kind North Korea and Iran are accused of. We have repeated the mistake we made in acquiring nuclear capability much later than we could and should have.

Response

While the China dimension of Agni V will not escape expert commentary, the way our media has played this up reflects our immaturity as a society in handling sensitive strategic matters. If the Chinese media were to graphically report how Chinese missile deployments in Tibet are intended to bring major north Indian cities into their destructive range, the outcry in India will be huge. Because of our lack of discretion we have provoked unnecessary polemics against us in the Chinese media, though the Chinese government, to its credit, has reacted with maturity.

In actual fact Agni V should have caused no surprise to the Chinese as India has been transparent about its Agni missile programme and the planned range of 5000 kilometers. China, in any case, possesses missiles with even longer range. Earlier it was India that was vulnerable to Chinese missiles and now the reverse will be true, creating a better balance in deterrence.

US’s reaction to Agni V is noteworthy as it reflects the new quality of India-US bilateral relations even in areas that were highly problematic in the past. In the 90s and early 2000s, the US was pressing india to curb its missile programme because it was seen as destabilizing. Even ISRO had been sanctioned because of US missile-related concerns. The thinking today is entirely different. While avoiding any specific disapproval of India’s step, the US has lauded India’s non-proliferation credentials and underlined its no-first use policy, whch would suggest that India’s missile advance is actually seen as serving US interests too in creating a better Sino-Indian strategic balance in the years ahead.

Author is Member Advisory Board at Vivekananda International Foundation and Former Foreign Secretary