China’s Evolving ASAT Capabilities: Implications for India

Brig (retd) Vinod Anand, Senior Fellow, VIF

China has carried out a ground-launched anti-satellite missile test on May 13 which according to reports was disguised as space exploration rocket firing. China’s National Space Science Center claimed that a sounding rocket was used in a high-altitude scientific exploration test. The missile fired from Xichang Space Launch center has been identified as Dong Ning-2 ASAT missile. However, in this case apparently there was no target to be engaged like the disused Chinese weather satellite in low-earth orbit in the first Chinese ASAT test of January 2007, the debris of which is still causing problems. It was the very same Xichang Space Launch center from where ASAT test of 2007 was carried out. Apparently, the existence of this new ASAT missile was discovered sometime in October last year. The Chinese spokesman, however, did not directly confirm or deny the conduct of such a test.

The DN-2 is a high-earth orbit attack missile which is part of PLA’s plans to build asymmetric warfare capabilities that could be used against the US and regional competitors. According to some reports China possesses an arsenal of at least a dozen ASAT missiles. Such a counter space capability which is being viewed seriously by the US would also pose a threat India’s communication and soon to be placed Global Positioning Satellites besides a wide variety of critical civilian infrastructure that is dependent on communication and navigation satellites. Possibilities of ‘Unrestricted Warfare’ scenarios outlined by two senior colonels of PLA in their book published in 1999 cannot be ruled out.

Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has plans to launch first of a series of seven satellites of Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) starting from June 2013; the system will provide positioning timing and navigation facilities. All the satellites are expected to be in place by 2015. The satellites will provide facilities to both authorized civilian and military users with inbuilt secrecy devices.

In addition, a dedicated military communications satellite GSAT-7/INSAT-4F is expected to be launched in August and GSAT-7A for use of the Indian Air Force is scheduled to be launched next year. Further, CARTOSAT-3 series of satellites that will give image resolution of .25 meters will replace the earlier ones have their slots for launch between 2016 and 2018. Further, Indian space programme is also very ambitious with plans to launch a variety of satellites in the coming years for collecting data, intelligence and for carrying out detection, reconnaissance and surveillance activities. All such space assets would be vulnerable to an adversary’s ASAT capabilities.

Therefore, the moot point is how can India protect its increasing number of assets in the space? India’s rising ballistic missile warfare capabilities including its ballistic missile defence would be of no use without concomitant support from a variety of space based assets. Thus, a deterrence capability in space becomes a necessary condition for our long range precision strike of a strategic nature. In addition the entire structure of C4ISR is largely dependent on space-based assets. It can be easily surmised that we need an ASAT capability.

Last year in April after the successful test of Agni V, DRDO Chief VK Sraswat claimed that "Today, we have developed all the building blocks for an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability". In fact, China’s ASAT test of 2007 had given impetus for undertaking such a project as India’s space infrastructure (worth over 12 billion US dollars) had become vulnerable. Agni V's launch in addition to substantively strengthening our strategic deterrence has spin off benefits as the ASAT weapon would largely be based on Agni V's propulsion system with the AD-2 interceptor missile becoming the kill-vehicle that is being developed as part of India’s ballistic missile defence system. As the military satellites operate in Low Earth Orbit (up to 2000 km) such a capability would deter any adversary that seeks to neutralise our satellites. According to DRDO projections the development of an ASAT capability is expected to be completed by end 2014. DRDO says that there are no plans to carry out an actual test; only simulation tests to verify the effectiveness of the ASAT weapon system are likely to be carried out.

However, the question remains whether a demonstrated ASAT capability would be more credible and effective as a deterrent than an untested capability based merely on claims. After all deterrence is a mind game or a psychological process and a demonstrated capability followed by articulation of doctrine or even in some cases in the absence of a doctrine would have more telling effect on adversary’s mind. It was only after Pokharan nuclear tests of May 1998 that India was taken seriously as a nuclear weapon power. Thus conducting a physical ASAT weapon test rather than a simulated one would pay much more dividends in a world which according to realist theory of international relations remains largely anarchical.

Another development which needs to be kept in mind is that plans are afoot to impose restrictive regimes in the space like the ones which were imposed in the case of nuclear weapons and missile controls. Such regimes have been largely favourable to the existing players in the respective fields and especially the P-5. While China’s conducted ASAT test in January 2007 the US seems to have reacted to this by conducting its own ground launched ASAT test in 2008 against an unused satellite. Both the US and Russia have carried out a variety of ASAT weapons tests earlier commencing from 1950’s onwards but of late such efforts were at low key. There have been indications that the US and some other powers were moving towards instituting a framework that would restrict the use of such kind of weapon systems against space based assets.

Currently, a proposed ‘Prevention of An Arms Race in Outer Space’ (PAROS) Treaty is under discussion in the Conference on Disarmament of the UN. For the time being there appears to be a deadlock in the negotiations. In 2008 China and Russia had put forward a draft of the PAROS treaty which was shot down by the US as an attempt by both the countries to gain military advantage. Russia-China proposals did not include restrictions on ground based ASAT weapons. A PAROS treaty is expected to be in consonance with the spirit of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which aims to preserve space for peaceful uses by prohibiting the use of space weapons, the development of space-weapon technology, and technology related to “missile defense.” Having already gained military advantage it would be natural for the ‘haves’ to deny the same to ‘have-nots’ like India.

Another parallel UN initiative on the issue is the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures (TCBMs) in Outer Space Activities which was formed in 2011. Its origins lie in UN General Assembly Resolution 63/68 which was sponsored by major space-faring nations, such as Russia and China. Though the US declared its support for the process, it abstained from voting on the resolution, objecting to its mention of the Chinese-Russian draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Object (PPWT). The objectives of the initiative are to improve international cooperation and reduce the risks of misunderstanding and miscommunication in outer space activities and ensure strategic stability in the space domain. The GGE naturally consists of P-5 powers and ten other members; India is not represented in this forum. There is also another UN initiative of formulating an ‘International Space Code of Conduct’ which is based on a draft put forward by the EU in Conference on Disarmament. Though the efforts are to move towards a consensus on peace and security in the outer space domain the mutual suspicions and distrust remain.

From Indian perspective it needs to be seen is whether any such space regime would prevent it from exercising its strategic options. So far India’s experience has not been very happy with most of such international regimes/treaties which are unequal and have been engineered in a manner so that benefit generally goes to the P-5 nations.

Therefore, before a strategic restraint regime places a bar on ASAT tests it is imperative for India to conduct such a test to demonstrate its capabilities in this sphere. Such a counter space capability is required to defend our space assets and deter any adversary. Of course, there is a need to take care to ensure that debris fallout from an ASAT test is either very little or negligible to assuage international concerns on this aspect. If space debris is to be avoided altogether then ASAT missile could be fired with an inbuilt offset to the designated target which would result in a near miss but validate the resulting test data. According to some experts this is possibly what has been done by China when it fired space exploration rocket on May 13.

Agni V: A Positive Step on Security

Kanwal Sibal

India has taken a substantial step forward in acquiring a credible nuclear deterrent capability with its successful Agni V test on April 19. The security threats to India are almost unique in that we have two nuclear neighbours who have had military conflicts with us in the past, who even now lay claims to our territory, whose seek to corner us strategically and who have long colluded in nuclear and missile matters.

Despite the acuteness of our security challenges our response has lacked a sense of urgency. While aware of their source and nature, we have not been able to make up our minds on the size and scope of our response and the manpower and funds to be allocated to develop the technologies and capacities to meet these threats.

Approach

We have tended to discount any large scale military threat from either adversary. We have felt confident about coping with any Pakistani military adventurism with the strength we possess. In China’s case, our assessment has been that with the existing border agreements on peace and tranquillity and sundry CBMs that reflect the desire of both countries to avoid military tensions on the border, coupled with political level efforts to set up a mechanism for border negotiations, the danger from China was more long term than immediate. China, in our thinking, would also want to preserve the myth of its peaceful rise and would therefore avoid an unnecessary military conflict with us, particularly as India poses no military threat to its control over Tibet.

We have also been able to dodge taking hard national security decisions by avoiding a military response to Pakistani provocations and a robust poitical response to those from China. We have not allowed tensions to escalate, preferring dialogue and engagement instead. If Pakistan does a Mumbai our answer is dialogue; if China questions our sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh or Kashmir, far from picking up the challenge, we look for a compromise formula to resume military contacts and gratuitously bolster the image of Sinkiang’s political head by inviting him to India despite the public upheavel there against Chinese rule. Even as we are concerned about Chinese strategic inroads into the Indian Ocean, we endorse maritime cooperation with them in these waters.

Thus, we reinforce our proclivity not to take hard decisions by making believe that our security dilemmas can be managed through diplomatic engagement rather than accelerating our strategic military programmes. In reality, while self-restraint and attachment to peace mark do our policies, we choose soft options also because we are conscious of our weakness and lack of military preparedness.

Comparison

The Agni V test needs to be seen in this broad context. Our Integrated Missile Development Programme began in 1983 but it is only now that we have successfully tested a real strategic delivery capability. Compared to China, our progress has been slow, either because of technical hurdles or inadequate committment of resources to the task. If the Chinese needed to develop capabilities to counter the exercise of US power in their neighbourhood, we needed to counter the exercise of combined Chinese and Pakistani power against us, without entering into an arms race with China just as the latter has not entered into one with the US.

The delay in developing our strategic delivery capability compounds our political difficulties. China is now a mature missile power with ICBM capability. Its new ballistic missile capable of hitting US naval assets at a long distance has attracted attention, but otherwise the upgradation of its long range missiles proceeds quietly. Russia too is developing a powerful new missile but this too hardly makes news. India’s missile programme will take some more years to mature and will therefore continue to be in the public eye, making India, that wants to project the image of a peaceful and responsible power, look like pursuing threatening and regionally destabilizing capabilities of the kind North Korea and Iran are accused of. We have repeated the mistake we made in acquiring nuclear capability much later than we could and should have.

Response

While the China dimension of Agni V will not escape expert commentary, the way our media has played this up reflects our immaturity as a society in handling sensitive strategic matters. If the Chinese media were to graphically report how Chinese missile deployments in Tibet are intended to bring major north Indian cities into their destructive range, the outcry in India will be huge. Because of our lack of discretion we have provoked unnecessary polemics against us in the Chinese media, though the Chinese government, to its credit, has reacted with maturity.

In actual fact Agni V should have caused no surprise to the Chinese as India has been transparent about its Agni missile programme and the planned range of 5000 kilometers. China, in any case, possesses missiles with even longer range. Earlier it was India that was vulnerable to Chinese missiles and now the reverse will be true, creating a better balance in deterrence.

US’s reaction to Agni V is noteworthy as it reflects the new quality of India-US bilateral relations even in areas that were highly problematic in the past. In the 90s and early 2000s, the US was pressing india to curb its missile programme because it was seen as destabilizing. Even ISRO had been sanctioned because of US missile-related concerns. The thinking today is entirely different. While avoiding any specific disapproval of India’s step, the US has lauded India’s non-proliferation credentials and underlined its no-first use policy, whch would suggest that India’s missile advance is actually seen as serving US interests too in creating a better Sino-Indian strategic balance in the years ahead.

Author is Member Advisory Board at Vivekananda International Foundation and Former Foreign Secretary