Changing Contours of Air Threat and its Implications in our Scenario

Lt Gen (Dr) V K Saxena (Retd), PVSM,AVSM,VSM, Visiting Fellow, VIF

“Air power may either end war or end civilisation”.¹ - Winston Churchill, House of Commons, 1933

Since the raison d’etre for the existence of air defence, be it on land, sea or in the air, is to counter the air threat from the adversary, an assessment of the same in terms of quality and quantum must, therefore, become the ab-initio of all deliberations concerning the air defence.

The Cause-Effect Relationship

The term 'air threat' essentially implies the cumulative potential danger which the adversary holds as his capability to cause damage and destruction to our vulnerabilities through the use of aerial threat vehicles and munitions in furtherance of, or in support of his war effort on land and sea. This danger is basically assessed in two dimensions. First is the qualitative dimension which includes the lethality, severity and technological advancement of the adversary's air threat vehicles. Whereas, the second is the quantitative dimension that relates to the numbers which constitute the air threat punch. Accordingly, the defender aims to put together such resources on land, sea and air that can counter the threat defined as above. Thus, the air threat on one side and the air defence means on the other are tied to each other in an eternal cause-effect relationship.

The Two Verticals of Metamorphosis

The multi-dimensional growth of the air threat over time has mainly taken place along two major verticals. The first of these is the multiplicity of air threat vehicles. In that, the erstwhile duo of aircrafts and helicopters as main threat vehicles, are today joined by a multidimensional strike punch consisting of attack helicopters (AHs), unmanned aerial systems/vehicles (UAS/UAVs), Tactical Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs), Anti Radiation Missiles (ARMs) and the now emerging soft-kill offensive weapons. The other vertical is the spatial growth of the threat in all its three dimensions of range, reach (implying altitude) and hours of applicability. Starting from early 1970’s, when the air threat was prosecuted mainly in the visual domain of the defenders using mostly short range guns and a small arsenal of unguided rockets and missiles, today the capability is to strike deep with precision and accuracy from long ranges standing off hundreds of miles away from the defenders visual domain; also to strike with multiple vehicles any time of the day or night, remain nearly invisible to defenders' radars, employ the unmanned with its multiple combat virtues and hit both with hard and soft kill munitions.

Manifestation of Metamorphosis over Threat vehicles

The revamping-transformation of the air threat over time as stated above is spread over the multiple threat vehicles, most prominently on today’s aircrafts. These 4th and 5th generation war machines are truly multi-role, structurally lighter, detection resistant, carry an array of on board sensors with a packaged electronic warfare (EW) suit for survivability and sustainability, and are armed to the teeth with smart and intelligent munitions including the PGMs. The AHs have become all weather with avionics providing the technological muscle for nap-of-the-earth operations. The unmanned revolution has taken over with its unmatched capability of all weather, all terrain operations with incredible endurance and no crew fatigue. Multiplicative affects are being achieved by manned and unmanned teaming (MUMT) and the missiles, both in the surface-to-surface (SSM) and Air to Surface (ASM) modes are scaling new dimensions in range, reach and kill probabilities. The soft kill weapons are emerging in three domains, viz, laser, charged particle beams (CPBs) and high power microwaves (HPM).

A brief analysis of air threat from Pakistan and China follows.

Pakistan

The mission of Pakistan Air Force (PAF) is to provide in synergy with the other Services the most efficient, assured and cost effective aerial defence of Pakistan.² PAF has an inventory of some 450 combat aircrafts organised into 20 front line squadrons. It operates four main types of combat aircrafts, namely, the French Mirage V attack aircrafts (90), Mirage III interceptors (90), the Chinese J-7 fighters (39), JF 17 multirole aircrafts (86) and the US F-16 multirole strike aircrafts (76). It is reported that by 2025, PAF will only operate two multirole aircrafts namely F-16 and JF-17³. Over a period of time, the old and obsolete aircrafts (A5, F6, Super F7, FT7P,) have been phased out. The F-16s have undergone major upgrades to include NATO compatible Link 16 communications, GPS/INS flying, weapon upgrades to include high speed ARMs, PGMs, Stand Off weapons and wind corrected munitions dispensers. JF-17 has been operationalised with high grade weaponry, night flying capability and electronic warfare package. Similarly, Mirages have been put through systems and weapon pack upgrades.

Talking of attack helicopters (AHs), PAF has a fleet of AH 1F Huey Cobras (2 squadrons), 32 helicopters and the Chinese K-8 (one squadron 28 numbers). AH IFs have seen upgrades involving Forward Looking Infra Red (FLIR) night sights and TOW missiles. Besides AHs, PAF operates a small fleet of UAS to include ASN 105, 106 from China, Snipe and Streak from UK and Luna from Germany. In September 2015, Pakistan became the ninth nation in the world to develop and use an armed UAS named Burraq. It is armed with Barq, an ASM with pin-point precision.

Under the Armed Forces Development programme (AFFDP 2006-2019), PAF, besides procuring some modern combat aircraft from the US and China, has also acquired several cutting edge systems. These include PGMs for J-17 aircraft (LS-6 and LS-6P and SD-10A Beyond Visual Range Missiles). Other known PGMs and ASMs with PAF are Shrike Anti Radiation Missiles (ARM), laser guided bombs (LGBs), Maverick missile and AS 30 ASM useable with Mirages (III&V) and F 16 aircrafts. As regards the cruise missile, Nasr (HATF IX) is a solid fuelled tactical ballistic missile developed as short range (60 km) high accuracy low yield battle field deterrent. On 19 Sep 2017, PAF announced that it will acquire three new Saab 2000 Erieye Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircrafts. This will join the three existing Erieye and four Y-8600 based ZDK-03 AEW&Cs, taking a total of such aircraft to 10 by the end of the decade⁴. The first of these aircrafts is likely to be delivered by December 2017 and the balance two by December 2018. This will provide a tangible enhancement in the airborne surveillance and targeting capability of PAF. It has also been reported that Pakistan is in talks with China to acquire 30-40 J F31 stealth fighters. This will add a totally new qualitative dimension to its strike capability.

In the unmanned category, while the Burrack represents the front edge, UAVs from China (ASN 105A, ASN 206, B2B,) UK (snipe Mk II), Germany (Luna), Italy (Falcon), South Africa (Seeker) besides the indigenous (Bravo, Ababeel, Baaz, AWC Mk I & II, Vision I, Shaper, Vector, Huma 1 and Thunder) constitute the unmanned fleet .

Some implications from the PAF capability, which needs be factored into our quality and quantum calculation of air defence resources on a tri -service format, is covered below:-

• 20 combat squadrons of PAF comprising of 17 strikes, four multi-role and three air defence aircraft squadrons.
• There has been a continuous qualitative up gradation wherein the dead weight of old and vintage aircrafts are being done away with sharp focussing the fleet to four major front line strike aircraft types (F-16 series, Mirage III/V, J7/JF17).
• There has been a continuous attempt to re-vamp the threat beyond aircraft in terms of AH, Cruise Missiles, ARMs, SSMs, UAS, and PGMs.
• A limited ni/AW attack capability and a tangible mix of EW capability stands inducted in front line aircrafts.
• Limited induction of AWACs and AAR capability provide the force multiplier effect.
• The front edge of the strike force now features the stealth threat which needs to be addressed by the defenders.
• The known radii-of-action of the front line combat aircrafts provides the capability to PAF to strike up to India's hinterland making our rear areas strategic assets vulnerable.

China

In keeping with China's high growth trajectory, the Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has followed an impressive growth profile. From a near antiquated status in around 1990-91, PLAAF is more operationally able today than any time in its past. As a part a major revamp of its air power, its earlier inventory of some 5000+ aircrafts that included some 2000 obsolete aircrafts stands right-sized to about 3000 aircrafts (2755-3010⁵), in which the combat edge is held by J-7 (fighter-388), JH-7 (fighter bomber-70), H6 (strategic bomber-120), Su 30 (air superiority fighter- 76), J-8 (Interceptor 96), J-10 (multi role fighter- 237), J-11 (air superiority fighter- 196), Q5 (strike aircraft- 118) aircrafts.

Taking pride in flying the first prototype of its latest Stealth Fighter (J-20) in January 2011, ostentatiously at a time when the US Secretary of Defence, Mr Robert Gates was in Beijing, the PLAAF is steadily modernising. Predictions on future PLAAF fleet indicate that it will consist of large quantities of Chengdu J-10 and Shenyang J-11 as mainstay platforms and JH-7A as the PLAAF’s backbone precision strike fighter. J-20 is likely to enter PLAAF around 2018. ^6,7

The mainframe of future transport fleet is likely to be anchored around Y-9 medium range transport aircraft duly supported by the IL fleet. The AH inventory is likely to be populated by WZ-10, WZ-9 and Z-11. The AWACS fleet is likely to have refined variants of KJ-2000 and KJ-200 and a reported (50, unconfirmed) numbers of similar platforms are likely to be imported from Russia. Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) is reported to be working on six developmental combat aircraft programmes. These include the significantly enhanced Chengdu J-10B multirole fighter, Shenyang J-11B5 heavyweight strike fighter, Shenyang J-15 carrier- borne fighter and Chengdu J-20 fifth generation fighter demonstrator. There is at least one more fifth generation fighter project yet to be publically reported. Besides this, continuing enhancement of current frontline types such as the JH 7A and H-6 bomber family is in progress⁸.

PLAAF has a very strong muscle in UAVs. Besides the existing inventory of UAVs (Xianglong, WZ-9, Yi Long, CH-3, Anjian, etc) some additional inputs are as under:-

• Chinese UAV experiments have shown impressive levels of innovation by building and flying unmanned vehicles of every conceivable design and genre. These include stealthy UAVs, morphing UAVs, annular wing Vertical Take off and Landing (VTOL) UAVs, micro-UAVs, unmanned airships, flying wings, modified light aircraft and sailplanes, UFO-style flying discs and even orinthopters (utilising flapping wings). Innovators both professionals as well as, greenhorns/ debutants have been allowed to run free and explore almost every UAV configuration.

• Two other features are very visible in Chinese UAV development, namely, arming of the UAVs and equipping them with enabling sensor payloads. China has followed a logical process in arming its UAVs by first adapting existing air-to-surface weapons and then developing purpose-built small light weight munitions. In each case, the weapons involved are relatively new. Weapon-vehicle matching has been thoughtful. Some examples are Wing-Loong and CASIC UAV.

Besides the conventional payloads, the PLAAF is emphatically present in the field of smart, intelligent and precision ammunition with surgical strike capability. Way back in 2007, China developed a powered smart bomb (KD-88) having an IR TV guidance system. The estimated range is about 110 km with a capability to hit small targets⁹. The other state-of-the art arsenal in use are the supersonic Russian and Chinese made ARMs (KH 31P, YJ-91) for operational use with SU-30, JH 7A and J-11; LASER- guided and satellite-guided bombs (on board Q-5 aircraft). ¹⁰ It is now estimated that almost all the modern aircrafts of PLAAF today are capable of carrying the PGMs.¹¹

Chinese Build up in Western Theatre Command

In February 2016, the erstwhile seven Military Regions (MRs) of China have been reorganised into theatre Commands (Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern and Central). Western Theatre Command (WTC) is opposite India. This Command has been created by merging the erstwhile Chengdu and Lanzhou MRs. In WTC what is of special significance is the build up in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) that directly adjoins India. Tibet Military Command (TMC) under WTC is responsible for operations in India¹². As regards PLAAF, there are three Fighter Divisions (6, 33 and 37) one Bomber Division (36) and one Transport Division (4) in the WTC.

Apart from a nuclear missile base in Quinghai province which clearly targets India, China has built five fully operational air bases [Gongar, Pangta, Linchi, Hoping and Gar Gunsa) and an exclusive rail network and over 58000 km of roads in TAR¹³. In 2015, another full-fledged air base at Kashgar located 600 Km north of Srinagar was operationalised. Open source reported in April 2017 about the construction of Nyingtri airport close to borders of India and Myanmar. This civilian airfield is reported to be capable of dual use. Construction of new airfields and upgradation of Advance Landing Ground (ALG) is a continuous process in TAR¹⁴. The limitations of high altitude operations with combat aircrafts of yesteryears stands diluted to a large extent with the induction of modern aircrafts of the likes of SU-27 and J-10. To add to this, are the other 'enablers' like air-to-air refuelers, AEW aircrafts and a strong ground based air defence/ Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) cover centred around S-300/400 and a hierarchy of air defence missiles.

While weapon by weapon analysis of the Chinese air threat across the entire spectrum is beyond the scope of this paper, what needs to be done by the defenders in countering the said threat is covered below:

• Capability to carry out effective surveillance of the TAR region with sensor efforts integrated across ground/shore/space mediums resulting in a comprehensive air situation picture.
• A seamless Air defence Battle Management System anchored on auto/real-time data transmission on satellite media with due redundancy.
• Wherewithal and capability to carry out all weather Counter air Operations (CAO), interdiction and Counter Surface Force Operations (CSFO) operations across the border both in pro-active/pre-emptive, as well as, retaliatory mode.
• Building a degree of survivability in air defence command, control and communication centres both electronically, as well as, through equipment redundancy.
• Building an integrated family of ground, air and shore-based Air Defence Weapon Systems to ensure continuous and successive punishment to the air threat right through its ingress into own territory.

For ground based air defence, the above capability must result in the following:-

• Modernised and technologically-enabled gun-missile deployments to cover the entire range-height spectrum from long range to terminal weapons along with their sensors and associated support systems.
• Capability to take on contemporary, as well as, futuristic threat from PLAAF in including stand-off threat and the threat of a slew of smart/intelligent weapons and PGMs.
• Futuristic kill capability in the form of directed energy (laser, charged particle beam, high power microwave) weapons and fielding a counter for stealth aircrafts, ARMs and cruise missiles. and building BMD capabilities at the national level to take on the threat of SSMs.

References

1. https://www.skygod.com>quotes>airpower. Accessed on 22Aug 17.
2. Pakistan Air Force - Official Website at https://www.paf.gov.pk. Accessed on 30 Aug 17.
3. Pakistan Air Force Sqadrons at https://wwwGlobalsecurity.org. Accessed on 31 Aug 17.
4. Pakistan will acquire three new Saab Erieye AEWC&S at https://www. quwa.org>2017/05/21 accessed on 19 Sep 17.
5. Peoples Liberation Army Airforce at https://www. en.m. wikipedia.org . accessed on 10 Oct 17.
6. http://en.m.wikipedia.org Chengdu J 20.
7. http://www.popsci.com stealthier stealth? Seventh upgraded chinese stealth fighter.
8. IHS Janes’ International Defence Review, vol-45, Feb 2012.pp 45.
9. www.strategy page.com/htmw/ht air w/20070516.aspx.
10. Roger Cliff, John Fei, Jeff Hagen . " Shaking the Heaven and Splitting the Earth' Chinese Air Force.
11. Indian Defence Review Vol 30.4 (Oct-Dec 15).

12. https:// Western Theatre Command at https://www.global security.com. accessed on 13 Oct 17

13. https://www.times of India.indiatimes.com/2011-03-08/india/28668105

14. China's Infrastructure development in Tibet evaluating trend lines at https://wwwclaws.in/images/publication.pdf/1317312941MP%2032%20inside.pdf. Accessed on 14 Oct 17.

(Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the VIF)

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Image Source: http://www.wallpaperup.com/373991/Chengdu_J-7_China_Air_Force_Jet_Fighter_Aircraft_Vehicle_4000x2500_(3).html

Interaction on Indo-Israeli Cooperation Prospects and Issues

On 29 March 2013, VIF welcomed Ambassador Alon Ushpiz, Israeli Ambassador to India, and the delegation from Galilee International Management Institute (GIMI), Israel for an interaction on Indo-Israeli cooperation. The session was chaired by Ambassador P. P. Shukla, Joint Director VIF, who introduced Amb Ushpiz, welcomed Lt. Gen (retd) JFR Jacob, one of the Indian War Heroes, and pitched the agenda for discussion.

Amb Ushpiz addressed the distinguished participants by giving a holistic overview of the Indo-Israeli bilateral relations and at the same time candidly assessed the realities and practicalities. Amb Ushpiz mentioned that the Indo-Israeli relations are based on common democratic values; and that we have a vast set of common interests. India and Israel also have similar challenges, that of energy security, water security, and a “cocktail” of failed states in the neighbourhood. However, Amb Ushpiz also highlighted that there are basic differences between India and Israel, some of them being size and population, different political alliances after Independence, etc.

Amb Ushpiz affirmed that Israel attaches very high value to its bilateral relations with India. Highlighting the sectors of Defence, Agriculture, Civilian Trade, etc., Amb Ushpiz asserted that the scope of strengthening of the bilateral relations in the mentioned sectors is huge and is likely to expand exponentially in the coming decades. He underlined that Israel wishes to provide India with technology and invest highly in R&D programmes in affiliation with the Indian Government, private sector firms, and universities.

Addressing the security concerns of India, Amb Ushpiz also reassured that Israel has never and will never sell any military technology to any of India’s adversaries. Amb Ushpiz also focussed on Palestinian issue, militarily-nuclear Iran, and Afghanistan post-2014.

The talk was followed by a series of comments made and questions raised by members of VIF and GIMI. They broadly covered the Indo-Israeli relations and its positions on the broader geo-politics of West Asia, Israeli security concerns, Indian security concerns, and the marginalized visibility of the strong Indo-Israeli bilateral relations.

Why Non-alignment 2.0 does us a Disservice

Satish Chandra
Distinguished Fellow,VIF

The document, prepared by an eminent 8-member group, has attracted both criticism and praise. The latter is mainly for drawing attention to India's innumerable foreign policy challenges and for generating debate thereon. On the negative side, a major shortcoming in the document is the failure to clearly spell out a vision for what India should aspire to be and how precisely should these aspirations be realised, says Satish Chandra.

Non-alignment 2.0 -- unveiled in January -- is a 60-page document which purportedly outlines the principles that should guide India's foreign and domestic policy over the next decade.

Over a year in the making the document is the handiwork of an eight-member group comprising some well known Indian intellectuals like Shyam Saran, Sunil Khilnani, Nandan Nilekani, and Pratap Bhanu Mehta. 

The authors are at pains to claim that the document represents only their views and that it is, therefore, an independent product. This is open to question because Shyam Saran, a former foreign secretary, heads a government-funded think tank and another author, General Prakash Menon is military advisor with the rank of secretary in the National Security Council Secretariat. Moreover, the National Security Advisor and his deputy actively participated in some of the deliberations of the group to which administrative support was provided inter alia by the National Defence College. 

Nonalignment 2.0 has attracted both criticism and praise. The latter is mainly for drawing attention to India's innumerable foreign policy challenges and for generating debate thereon. The document is, of course, also studded with several nuggets of wisdom some of which may be enumerated as follows:

India must retain maximum strategic autonomy in order to enable it to pursue its developmental goals;

Since its economic growth requires deepened economic engagement with the world, India must strive to maintain an open global order;

It is unlikely that there will be enduring coalitions: these would require artful management;

India's great advantage is that, barring in its immediate neighbourhood, it is not seen as a threatening power;

Engaging with the Asian theatre will be a key concern for India with South Asia being the most vital; 

India must put in place operational concepts and capabilities to deter China since the latter will be a significant foreign policy and security challenge for it;

Progress in India-Pakistan ties can only be incremental;

While seriously pursuing the complete elimination of nuclear weapons on a non discriminatory basis, India must beef up its nuclear weapon capability in particular the maritime leg.

On the negative side, a major shortcoming in the document is the failure to clearly spell out a vision for what India should aspire to be and how precisely should these aspirations be realised. In the absence of such on overarching unity of purpose Nonalignment 2.0 flounders and lacks coherency.

Many have also found fault with the title of the document on the grounds that it is backward looking rather than forward looking. The argument that the title was selected as 'strategic autonomy' was a core element of non-alignment as earlier practiced by India, cuts no ice as such autonomy is something which any self respecting country would like to exercise and as the non-alignment of yester year had many shortcomings.

Given the standing of the authors, one would have expected a much more tautly conceived and constructed document. It, however, disappoints. It is flabby, marred by inaccuracies, and on occasion displays a disquieting naivete. In this context, consider the following propositions contained in it:

India's internal development will depend on how well we manage our global opportunities. Comment: is not the converse truer? In the ultimate analysis progress is dependent more on management of internals than of foreign policy;

The fundamental source of India's power is its example. Comment: comprehensive national power rather than example is what counts for in the real world;

The main thing that can hold India back is India itself. Comment: This is a cliché applicable to all countries;

South Asia is holding India back at many levels and places fetters on its ambitions. Comment: While a fractious neighbourhood is a cause of concern it cannot subvert Indian ambitions as long as India is strong;

India has been granted Most Favoured Nation treatment by Pakistan. Comment: This is incorrect. Pakistan has only moved from a positive to a negative list in respect of its imports from India.

India should engage in cooperation with Pakistan on energy and water, leverage its economic relationship with China for political concessions and persuade the latter to seek reconciliation with the Dalai Lama. Comment: Even a nodding acquaintance with the dynamics of the polity of Pakistan and of China and their relationship with India would indicate that these propositions are non-starters. 

Finally, perhaps the most serious flaw in Nonalignment 2.0 is that it reeks of pusillanimity. For instance, it suggests that India should continue to remain engaged with Pakistan even if there are further Mumbai like attacks. All that it contemplates in such eventualities is stand-off punitive operations and goes so far as to argue against deep thrusts into Pakistani territory for fear of nuclear attack missing the point that we have a nuclear deterrent. 

Similarly, while suggesting that there can be no proportionate response to a Chinese attack on India it makes a case for an asymmetric response inter alia based upon the creation of insurgencies in areas occupied by China thereby acknowledging defeat even before battle has been joined. It also argues that India should focus more on accretion of its military capability at sea rather than on land. Indeed, the paragraphs relating to China are permeated by an unseemly fear and the thought that India should do nothing which may increase its anxieties, to the extent that we maintain equidistance between China and the US. 

Even in respect of our South Asian neighbours the document would have India make unilateral concessions to them. The learned authors appear to have learnt no lessons from the fact that the countless unilateral concessions made by India to China, Pakistan and even Sri Lanka, have not earned it any positive results in terms of improved ties with those countries and only encouraged recalcitrant behaviour. 

Ironically, while the document is mindful to a fault of Chinese sensitivities all such caution is thrown to the winds when addressing India. Indeed, it goes so far as to suggest that we need to build a credible state, promote inclusive governance and a political culture attuned to defusing conflict. 

These homilies are not only quite out of place in a foreign policy related document but much more applicable to China and Pakistan than to India. Indeed our record on this count is better than that of many countries. The fact that they have found place in such a document is, therefore, not only unwarranted but also a singular disservice to the nation. 

Implications of US Defence Secretary’s Visit to New Delhi

Arun Sahgal & Vinod Anand

The two days visit of US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta to India generated considerable interest both among the political circles and strategic community. Major interest was in the new American defence strategy the chief element of which was re balancing towards Asia – Pacific Region.

The visiting Defence Secretary outlined three broad perspectives in his interaction with Indian political leadership, these included, shared challenges of ensuring an open access to maritime, air space and cyber space domains as also challenges posed by radical ideologies, piracy and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The fundamental thrust of the Secretary’s discourse was that in addition to upgraded US military presence in the region, US was keen to encourage and assist regional states in developing capabilities to deal with shared challenges. India was sought to be projected as the lynch pin of this strategy being the biggest and most dynamic. Towards this a commitment of sorts was made to upgrade the current buyer and seller relationship to a more substantial one in which US will share important cutting edge technologies, enter into substantial co-production relationship which would eventually transgress to high technology joint research and development.

An interesting point was the underplaying of outstanding agreements sought by the U.S such as CISOMA, BECA and the LSA, outlining that these will not be allowed to be a dampener in building strong positive defence relationship with India. The message was clear, US is ready to do business on terms that India may find both politically and economically comfortable. In an interesting initiative Mr. Panetta mentioned that he has asked his Deputy Secretary to engage with Indian counterparts to streamline bureaucratic procedures on both sides to make them simple, responsive and effective.

It is apparent that US is keen in drawing India into a much stronger defence partnership and provide technologies and capacities that will enhance India’s defence capabilities and preparedness. The fundamental challenge for India is how to respond to these overtures. We have a drawn out acquisition process, which is based on global Request For Proposals from which sound technological products at best possible costs are sought to be acquired. That this procedure is cumbersome and does not provide top of the line technologies is given, however government ridden by corruption charges cannot hope to give up apparent transparent procedures only to build relationship with the US. Mere induction of cutting edge technological inputs cannot help India build indigenous defence industrial base. Although not spelt out, US assertions of best technological products are based on Foreign Military Sales route, with at best limited technology transfer. In evaluating US offer India will need to carefully calibrate this cooperation to its advantage, most importantly in terms of technology transfer and even more importantly after weighing the capacity for industrial absorption.

On strategic and geo political plane the visiting Defence Secretary shared his views on Afghanistan making two critical points. One, the US was on top in the war on terror and Taliban has been pushed onto the defensive. Second, US is on course in its disengagement schedule and handing over security control to the Afghan Security Forces, who going by the Secretary’s calculations will be in control, of nearly seventy five percent of their territory by the end of 2012. He also outlined US commitment to ensure stable and secure Afghanistan, which could over time make its own democratic choices.

Subsumed in the remarks was a clear nuance of India assuming the role of an important stake holder in security and development of Afghanistan by both upgrading its training commitments and development efforts. The key to Indian greater engagement was hinted in improved bilateral relationship with Pakistan, in terms of resolving differences (Siachen?) and economic cooperation to help in Pakistani economic recovery. A sort of grand bargain appeared to be nuanced as part of greater Indo – US defence relationship, in which India would help the US in providing regional stability through greater economic and military engagement (training of Afghan Security Forces) in Afghanistan and helping Pakistan through economic and political gestures. The basic issue for Indian security concerns is that will it bring lasting peace and stability or will this be one more unilateral concession? There is a need for India to critically evaluate its policy options, vis a vis both Afghanistan and Pakistan, time for which appear to be running out.

There was also an exchange of views on tensions in South China Sea, North Korean nuclear weapons proliferation among concerns that it was close to testing fission – fusion device at the behest of Pakistan on Chinese insistence. Discussions also centred on new asymmetric challenge of nuanced cyber attacks against both strategic and economic entities in both the countries.

On China a somewhat cautious approach was adopted highlighting the need to strengthening of bilateral relationship by both countries while welcoming China’s rise. Hope was expressed of a strong China playing by the international norms as its regional and global roles expand in particular not do anything that could upset the six decades of peace and stability in the region. Nuance of the Secretary’s remarks were clearly towards, at one level to draw the Chinese in as a responsible stake holder in maintaining peace and stability by not resorting to coercion and assertive behaviour, on the other to drive home the credibility of US power and its attempt to build regional security capabilities to deal with Chinese aggressiveness.

Is there any wonder that Chinese have reacted sharply to the American attempts to tilt regional balance in its favour, by what they claim attempting to create a semi circle of alliances against China from the South (Global Times, June 8, 2012). Chinese statement also carried a nuanced message for India; warning it not to get entrapped in a US led anti Chinese alliance. The analyst from Chinese Institute of International Studies a government sponsored foreign policy think tank highlighted that ‘India was unlikely to get involved in any such containment policy on somebody else’s behalf, as it has “its own agenda in the region," noting that India wants to be independent in making its own foreign policies while maximising its national interests. As an example it outlined how India has refrained from becoming deeply involved in the South China Sea rows because it viewed any friction with China as being against its fundamental national interests, underscoring that India's interests lie in wider economic and cultural cooperation with China. In a veiled attempt to woo India it added that “this is China's opportunity to break up the US intention to contain China”.

India is unlikely to fully countenance the America’s ‘re- balancing strategy’ given its likely impact on balance of power in Asia. there is no doubt that there are concerns in New Delhi about China’s rise, its military modernization, infrastructural developments in Tibet and growing foot prints in South Asia and SE Asia and even more importantly forays into the Indian Ocean. However despite these overt Chinese moves there is, growing realization that given the prevailing power differential it is imperative to engage China, lower tensions and build a win-win transactional relationship that underscores cooperation and downplays competition. A senior Indian policy maker put it succinctly when he declared that India is absolutely committed to a pragmatic approach in dealing with sensitive bilateral issues. India doesn’t want any fights with China. We want to develop a relationship further and faster, but we want to assure that our pride is not hurt in the process because China has risen and India is, still, rising. The unequal space of development, he adds should not cast a shadow on mutual treatment which has to be based on the spirit of equality and respect. Both India and China will have to find ways to preserve mutual pride and move ahead on the journey of development and growth. The Indian dilemma therefore is how to play its politico – military cards in the evolving strategic order in Asia.

Given the aforementioned perspective, the nature of Indian engagement will be dictated by how Indian policy elites perceive their role in the region and above all its impact on the overall India’s China policy. The issue that will drive India’s policy options will essentially the nature of engagement with China and the US as also broader Asia – Pacific region. Will India act as a swing state, i.e. balancing Chinese assertions with close political and military relations with United States? Alternatively with China enjoying increasing influence in SE and South Asia, bandwagon with, Southeast and East Asian states like Japan and South Korea (littorals along the Asian Rimland) to balance, Chinese power.

Different pathways for India could be:

a) India’s geo-political, energy, economic and maritime interests force it to get into a security understanding with US allies and partners like Vietnam, Japan, South Korea and Australia. There is a marked enhancement in her defence self reliance capabilities which is boosted by US technology transfers and military hardware support. It develops strong maritime capability and nuclear triad backed by significant space and cyber capacities with large C4ISR foot print over its region of strategic interest. Andaman and Nicobar transform in to a strong ‘iron choke’ to counter Chinese ‘string of pearls’. India puts in place an effective anti access and area denial strategy in the Indian Ocean as also along its land borders.

b) India attempts to balance Chinese assertion and US interests. Towards this, on one hand, it boosts its economic relationship with China, while simultaneously developing close political and economic linkages with the US but without any overt security understanding. To foster its regional economic interests boosts trade and economic relationships with ASEAN. It buttresses these initiatives through; close strategic relationship with Russia, Central Asia while taking effective steps to enhance its bilateral relations in South Asia and moves toward resolution of India -Pak differences. It simultaneously uses this period to build up its comprehensive national power while ensuring economic progress.

c) Third pathway could be sustained economic development and military modernization to build credible dissuasive capability. To foster regional peace and stability, it could reach political and economic understanding with China through conciliatory gestures e.g. South China Sea, membership of SCO, undertaking joint development and infrastructure projects in South and SE Asia. Opens up dialogue to address Chinese fears in IOR. In short attempt to upgrade its bilateral arrangements with China, prevent falling into China containment trap. Thus there is an attempt to build peaceful periphery without being a so called ‘swing ‘state.

Conclusion

Indian strategic options in forging a grand strategy vis a vis China are restrained by a new euphuism of maintaining strategic autonomy. As a result there is talk of unexceptionable strategic risks in proximate relationship with the US, which could mortgage India’s strategic options.

Notwithstanding above India needs a strategy that helps it balance military challenge posed by China’s military modernization, persistent adversarial stances and increasing forays at India’s doorsteps in the North East, Western and North Western peripheries and in the Indian Ocean. Given the aforementioned perspective is there a case for closer strategic understanding with the US on terms which both find comfortable? What this essentially entails is a strong and purposeful hand shake and not a bear hug.

A Force Multiplier for The Indian Naval Capability

Radhakrishna Rao

Research Fellow, VIF

In a major technological breakthrough for the Defence Research and Development Organisation(DRDO) and a significant boost to the strike capability of the Indian Navy, the naval variant of India’s home grown fourth generation fighter aircraft Tejas LCA had its successful debut flight on April 27.

The 20-minute long maiden flight Tejas naval at Bangalore has been described as “outstanding success” by the DRDO chief V.K.Saraswat. As envisaged now, the two seater Tejas naval is expected to get Initial Operational Clearance(IOC) by the middle of this decade. According to DRDO, Tejas naval has catapulted India into the elite league of countries capable of design, development and production of four plus generation carrier borne fly by wire fighter. Indeed, the design and development of the Tejas naval involved many formidable technological challenges since it was required to operate under saline and humid environment with restricted availability of deck run for launch and recovery of high operating load conditions. Many new and novel technologies including Leading Edge Vortex Control(LEVCON) surface fitted at the front end of the aircraft wing operated by a concealed rotary actuator with aerodynamic profiling to ensure low landing speed, ground controllability and better vision for the pilot were developed for the first time in the country.

Moreover, Tejas naval has the distinction of being the only carrier borne fighter aircraft in the light category and the second STOBAR (Ski Take off but Arrested Recovery) carrier borne aircraft in the world. Not surprisingly then DRDO points out that Tejas naval fighter will provide a complete marine force multiplier that will help the Indian Navy to position itself as a blue water, maritime force. In yet another boost to the Indian Navy, Defence Minister A.K.Antony informed the Parliament that an exclusive naval satellite for dedicated communications will be launched during 2012-13. The GSAT-7 satellite which will be launched by means of the three stage Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle(GSLV) will help Indian Navy provide secure and reliable communications channel to link up its “resources and assets” for an integrated operational strategy.

On another front, the induction of the nuclear powered Nerpa class submarine Chakra that Indian Navy has taken on lease from Russia is also expected to enhance the fighting fitness of the Indian Navy. With INS Chakra in operational trim, India has become the sixth country in the world to operate a nuclear submarine. The submarine, considered one of the stealthiest and deadliest in the world, can carry four 533-mm torpedoes and four 650-mm torpedoes. Defence analysts say that with a diving speed of 30-35 knots, INS Chakra will be able to outrun any Chinese or Pakistani submarine.

In a related development, with Russia planning to hand over 45,000 tonne class augmented aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya with forty years of service life to the Indian navy by 2012 end, the sixty years old Indian navy, the youngest of the three services, can look forward to boost its strike capability . There is no denying the fact that aircraft carriers hold a key to expand the reach and boost the strike capability of a naval force. Indeed, early this year Admiral Nirmal Verma, Chief of the Indian Navy, had stressed on the importance of an aircraft carrier in augmenting the capability of the navy to take care of the Indian interests in the Indian ocean area and beyond.

“Carrier building is very expensive but it is certainly there in our long term plans,” observed Verma. Giving an inkling into the futuristic aircraft carrier that the Indian Navy is keen on operating, Verma pointed out that the navy was firming up the design of a future aircraft carrier by taking into account the emerging advances in the field of aviation and the potentials of unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs) in the scheme of the naval warfare. “There would be far more capable aircraft and far more expected of an aircraft carrier by the late 2020,” observed Verma. As envisaged now, Indian Navy is keen on operating three aircraft carriers by the end of this decade. The idea is that at any given time, two aircraft carriers should be in full operational trim.

As part of the growth strategy of Indian Navy, Verma has also hinted at deploying UAVs(Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) on INS Vikramaditya sometime in the future. Currently, the INS Viraat, whose refurbishment has resulted in its life being extended upto 2015, is the only aircraft carrier in service with the Indian Navy. And India’s 40,000-tonne home-grown aircraft carrier being built by the Cochin shipyard at Kochi in South India is expected to join the Indian naval fleet by the middle of this decade. Indian navy has also a clear cut plan for a vastly improved second generation indigenous aircraft carrier for deployment by 2018.

Though youngest of the three services, the Indian Navy has been ahead of two other wings in getting its requirements met from the indigenous sources to the maximum extent possible . Indeed, Indian Navy continues to play a pro active role in encouraging the shipyards and industries in the country to take up the development of complex systems involving advanced technological elements. As it is, the allegation of kickbacks associated with German HDW submarine deal in early 1990s had seriously dented Navy’s modernisation plan with a large indigenous contribution. Like the spectre of Bofors which continues to haunt Indian army’s artillery modernization programme, the HDW scandal did seriously sap Indian navy’s combat readiness plan for many years. “After the lost decades, we are now able to place orders and acquisitions are happening; only that our ship yards are unable to deliver at globally competitive rates. But notwithstanding that in the next five years, we would be commissioning on an average five ships or submarines a year,” noted Verma. According to Verma, today Indian Navy is poised for a very good growth path.

In a development of significance to meeting the needs of the Indian Navy, private shipyards such as Pipavav, ABG and Larsen and Toubro(L&T) have invested heavily in technology up-gradation and are more than willing to take up the challenge of building advanced ships, submarines and other systems for the Indian navy. While L&T has made a significant contribution to the construction of India’s first home grown nuclear submarine INS Arihant, Pipavav shipyard, rated as the country’s best shipyard, is building six offshore patrol vessels for the Indian Navy. The state owned Garden Reach Ship Builders and Engineers(GRSE), which has on hand order for building six fast attack craft, has delivered first of the craft well before the deadline, thereby signalling the maturity of the Indian ship building industry. To meet the growing and diverse needs of the Indian Navy, the Ministry of Defence has cleared the participation of private shipyards in the bids along with the public sector shipyards. Mazagaon Dock which is now building three advanced Delhi class destroyers, three Shivalik class stealth frigates and six Scorpene submarines, is focussing on the modular ship design, which is one of the components of the programme for the up-gradation and modernization of shipyards in the country.

In another development of significance, the Ministry of Defence has taken over the Hindustan Shipyard from the Ministry of Shipping with a view to transform it into a hub of nuclear powered submarines. However, the lack of proper ground work and foresight resulted in Government being forced to withhold the joint venture plan between Mazagaon Dock and Pipavav shipyard. Certainly, this would have been a win-win combination, making for a formidable technological base to take up the challenging assignments from the Indian navy. Pipavav is considered one of the most sophisticated shipyards with the largest dry dock in the world and as such has a potential to contribute to self reliance in a big way.

Indian Navy is also working towards boosting its aviation assets aimed at positioning itself as a formidable maritime force. It has already ordered 49 deck based Mig-29K combat aircraft from Russia .Some of the aircraft that navy is planning to acquire in the near future will be designed to operate in the contemporary and futuristic electronic warfare environment with cutting edge technological features. Similarly, Indian Navy is looking at acquiring a range of state of the art helicopters to realize its long term strategic goals. Indeed the plan to acquire six P-81 Boeing long range maritime surveillance aircraft is quite relevant and timely to enhance Indian Navy’s situational awareness domain in the Indian ocean region where the menace of sea pirates has assumed a serious dimension. When Boeing hands over the first P-81 sometime next year, India will become the first non-US operator of this aircraft that will ultimately replace Soviet vintage Tupolev-142 M and Illyushin-38 long range patrol aircraft. Indian navy is also interested in acquiring four more of P-81.

In the ultimate analysis, the accretion plan of the Indian Navy, the forth largest maritime force in the world, looks at operating 150 plus warship of various categories and 500 aircraft including fighter jets, helicopters and maritime reconnaissance aircraft by 2027. Indian Navy’s strike capability will stands enhanced by a substantial extent when Long Range Surface to Air Missile(LRSAM), a guided weapon that the state owned Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is building in tie up with Israel Air Force Industries(IAI) gets ready for operational use. With a range of 70-km and weighing around 275-kg, the LRSAM with a high performance guidance system will be a force multiplier and game changer for the Indian navy. The trump card of the Indian Navy is the Indo-Russian supersonic cruise missile BrahMos which has already been inducted into some of its warships. The 290-km range BrahMos with a phenomenal destructive power has been described as the “most powerful and most formidable ”naval missile of its kind.

In a related development, Arihant is now poised for extensive sea trials as a prelude to make it fully operational by early 2013. Incidentally, over 6,000-tonne Arihant equipped with a dozen K-15 ballistic missiles will constitute the robust undersea leg of the Indian nuclear triad. As India has a policy of no “first use” of nuclear weapons, survivable retaliatory strike capability is dependent on the this nuclear powered submarine .

Chakra in tandem with Arihant will give Indian Navy a greater manoeuvrability to hoodwink the enemy’s surveillance system and strike hard as they can remain submerged indefinitely . Meanwhile Pakistan, which is, trying to match the Indian Naval capability has said it will build nuclear submarine to meet its defence requirements. “The nuclear submarine would be built in the country” said a government official and added “it would take 5 to 8 years to build the nuclear submarine after which Pakistan would join the list of countries that have a nuclear submarine.”

With China rapidly expanding its naval capability to realize its long standing ambition of challenging the might of American naval fleets moving across the high seas of the world, Indian navy is not willing to be left behind in the race to take care of the Indian interests across the vital global sea lanes. For realizing this vision, Indian Navy would need to strengthen its submarine fleet by a substantial extent. However, right at the moment the submarine asset of the Indian navy, leaves much to be desired. According to India’s public audit watch dog Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), navy’s submarine fleet is aging fast and by 2012, 63 percent of the vessels would have completed their operational life. The Navy which currently operates just 14 submarines has a submarine strength much below the envisaged force level. All the six Scorpene submarines being built with French assistance at the Mumbai based Mazagaon Dock under Project75 will be delivered between 2015 and 2018. The Scorpene production programme has been marred by delays and cost overruns. Indian Navy is also planning for a new production line of the next generation diesel electric submarine with Russian technology. This project has been cleared by the Defence Ministry.

The Indian Navy is fully well aware of the implications of the rights secured by China’s Ocean Mineral Research and Development Association(COMRA)from the International Seabed Authority for exploring poly-metallic nodules in the Indian ocean region. Indeed, this could serve as a cover to strengthen Chinese naval presence in this vital oceanic body. “The world has anxieties over the rise of China but the two countries that should watch out are India and Japan as China has the capacity to cast a shadow on them,” says Geir Lundestad of Norway’s Nobel Institute. For China, India’s joining hands with Vietnam for oil exploration in South China Sea, over which China claims total and absolute rights, has become a hard nut to crack.

However India’s endeavour to build Chabahar port at the mouth of the Persian Gulf in Iran close to Pakistan’s coastal stretch has entered a phase of stalemate presumably owing to international pressure in the wake of Iran’s vow to continue with its nuclear programme. “If India accelerates the work, the port of Chabahar will come up in record time because the Iranian side is fully equipped and willing to help India in completing the project,” says Mostafa Dolatyar of Teheran’s Institute for Political and International Studies, “For India, access to central Asian oil and gas is entirely dependent on its use of the Iranian ports and Chabahar will be a port dedicated to the Indian needs”.

On his part, Verma is clear in perception, “the Indian Navy’s current perspective level planning is driven by a conceptual shift from numbers of platforms—that is from the old bean counting philosophy to one that concentrates on capacity”.Giving details, Verma points out “In terms of force accretions in the immediate future, we are acquiring ships in accordance with Navy’s Maritime Capability Perspective Plan. Our preferred choice of inducting ships and submarines has been through the indigenous route and of the 49 ships and submarines on order, 45 are from Indian shipyards.”

For with China enlarging its footprint all over the Indian Ocean region through what is being viewed as its aim of creating a “string of pearls” of listening posts around India, Indian navy cannot afford to remain idle. China has already constructed an ultra modern port in Hambantota in Sri Lanka in addition to a number of maritime projects in Myanmar. And to India’s discomfiture, China has also bagged a project to build a deep sea harbour at Sonadiya near Chittagong in Bangladesh. Of course, for geo-political and strategic reasons, China has not obliged Pakistan in so far building a naval base at Gwadar is concerned.

Against this backdrop Indian Navy’s strategy to transform itself into a satellite augmented, network centric three dimensional force, assumes significance. As it is, the Indian Navy has drawn up an ambitious plan to acquire a range of satellites for a variety of end uses in the years ahead. To begin with, it would get GSat-7, a multi band communications satellite built by the Indian Space Research organisation(ISRO). GSAT-7 will help the Indian Navy link up its long range missiles , radar and air defence networks to a central room through a dedicated satellite communications network. The most striking advantage of GSAT-7 is that it would provide secure, reliable and hassle free communications channel. GSAT-7 which will encase the rich and varied experience of ISRO in building INSAT series of communications spacecraft will help smoothen naval plan for a robust net centric war platform. This satellite with 600-100 nautical miles footprints over the Indian Ocean will enhance maritime domain awareness of the Navy over the Indian ocean region which India considers to be the primary area of responsibility in terms of maritime security.

Not even sky seems to be the limit for Indian navy’s ambitions to acquire space assets. Looking ahead, it is keen on acquiring dedicated satellites for applications such as navigation, ocean watch, reconnaissance and surveillance, electronics intelligence and weather prediction in addition to communications and data transfer . The ultimate objective of the Indian Navy is to create and sustain a three dimensional, technology enabled, satellite augmented network centric system to transform itself into a forward looking, formidable sea power. Indian Navy’s radical shift in its strategic outlook is clearly exemplified by the fact that it is aiming for a global reach from being a just regional sea power worried about the threats from China and Pakistan. That Navy is looking well beyond China and Pakistan to position itself as a maritime force capable of taking care of Indian interests across the high seas of the world augurs well for India’s long term strategic vision of attaining the status of a major military power.