Brajesh Mishra: India's First Intelligence Tsar

Satish Chandra
Distinguished Fellow, VIF

Many before him have exercised great influence on an Indian prime minister but no one's influence has been so extensive particularly in foreign policy and security related areas. This was, perhaps, an inevitability given his close personal friendship with Vajpayee dating back to the latter's days in the opposition, his simultaneous occupation of the key offices of principal secretary to PM and the National Security Advisor, his foreign policy expertise, and, of course, his aforementioned qualities of head and heart.

Mishra was no ideologue but was rather the supreme pragmatist. Accordingly, he could easily accommodate the imperative for a better relationship with the United States with the requirement of a modus vivendi with China. That India under the Vajpayee regime was able to make much progress in revamping our relationship with both the USA and China, and that too after our nuclear tests which were distasteful to both, is testimony to Mishra's diplomatic skill.

Not being a rigid ideologue Mishra had the propensity to zero in on the best possible outcome on any issue that the political leadership could collectively live with and to manoeovre a decision in that direction.

This may not have been the ideal solution or even his own preferred choice but was one which carrying near consensus was the most practicable under the prevailing circumstances.

The three areas in which Mishra left an indelible imprint were India's nuclear policy, its security systems and its foreign policy.

Given the fact that as the Bharatiya Janata Party's foreign policy spokesman, Mishra had unequivocally made known that if elected to power the BJP would make the bomb, it is no surprise that he presided over the nuclearisation of India. It is tribute to him that he ensured that India's nuclear tests were successfully conducted within weeks of the NDA government's assumption of office and that the veil of secrecy so necessary to facilitate their conduct was duly maintained and not lifted till completion of the tests.

Having tested, it was Mishra who oversaw the country's nuclear weaponisation and put in place viable systems and structures not only to manage this process but also to ensure the effective use of these weapons, should the need arise, in accordance with prescribed policies and directives. Indeed, India's nuclear doctrine, its nuclear command and control system and its increasingly more effective deterrent are to no small extent due to Mishra's exertions.

Being the prime minister's pointman on security, in his capacity as the NSA, Mishra was inevitably involved in all security related issues both internal and external. One of his most important contributions in his role as NSA was to build a host of new security related institutions and structures. It was thus under his direction that the National Security Council system (comprising the National Security Council, the National Security Council Secretariat, the Strategic Policy Group, the National Security Advisory Group, and the office of the National Security Advisor) was set up designed to cope with both existing and emerging security challenges as well as to fuse and coordinate intelligence.

In addition, an Intelligence Coordination Group was created to task the intelligence agencies and ensure their accountability, a National Information Board was established for national level policy formulation on information warfare and information security and an apex techint agency was set up.

All these newly created entities and structures were assiduously nurtured by Mishra and had begun to find their feet by the time he demitted office. He, however, candidly admitted that while the NDA government had embedded these entities in the Indian security firmament they would take years to fully establish themselves and accordingly their future would depend upon whether or not succeeding governments would continue to similarly support them.

It may be mentioned that by virtue of his position as the NSA and his heading the Intelligence Coordination Board, Mishra in effect became India's first intelligence tsar who regularly interacted with all the intelligence agencies and sought to exercise effective oversight over them and to ensure proper intelligence sharing.

In the realm of foreign policy, Mishra's role, given his background as a professional diplomat, was considerable. It is, therefore, not surprising that after having gotten over the downturn in our ties with the USA and China following our nuclear tests India generally had good ties with countries all across the globe during the NDA regime.

As mentioned earlier improved ties with the USA coincided with better relations with China, relations with countries like Russia and France were refurbished, and we had robust links with both Iran and Israel at the same time.

Both Mishra and Vajpayee showed little hawkishness on either Pakistan or China and presumably there was no perceptible difference of approach between the two. Nevertheless it is significant that former Pakistan President Musharraf declared a ceasefire across the LoC and in the India-Pakistan joint statement of January 2004 negotiated by Mishra provided an assurance that he would "not permit any territory under Pakistan's control to be used to support terrorism in any manner." It is also significant that it was during the NDA regime that the Chinese authorities shared maps pertaining to their claims in the middle sector.

Mishra also deserves unqualified credit for the upturn in India-US ties. After the damage done to the relationship as a result of the US reaction to our tests had been arrested, Mishra made it plain to his US interlocutors that ties between the two countries would never be able to achieve their full potential unless there was cooperation on the trinity issues notably high technology commerce, civilian nuclear energy cooperation and civilian space collaboration. To its credit the US in turn recognized the substance of this argument and sought to rectify the situation which led to the blossoming of ties between the two countries.

All those privileged to work closely with Mishra would testify to the fact that he was an ideal boss. Always accessible his decisions were quick and instructions precise and clear cut. While not one to suffer fools easily he was quite willing to permit one to take a position not in consonance with his own. He was big enough to take an honest difference of opinion in his stride and not allow it to come in the way of a productive professional relationship geared to promoting the national interest.

All this taken together with the complete backing and support provided by him to those who worked with him in fulfillment of their mandate explains the unflinching loyalty and trust that he inspired from them and helped him in achieving as much as he did.

Why Non-alignment 2.0 does us a Disservice

Satish Chandra
Distinguished Fellow,VIF

The document, prepared by an eminent 8-member group, has attracted both criticism and praise. The latter is mainly for drawing attention to India's innumerable foreign policy challenges and for generating debate thereon. On the negative side, a major shortcoming in the document is the failure to clearly spell out a vision for what India should aspire to be and how precisely should these aspirations be realised, says Satish Chandra.

Non-alignment 2.0 -- unveiled in January -- is a 60-page document which purportedly outlines the principles that should guide India's foreign and domestic policy over the next decade.

Over a year in the making the document is the handiwork of an eight-member group comprising some well known Indian intellectuals like Shyam Saran, Sunil Khilnani, Nandan Nilekani, and Pratap Bhanu Mehta. 

The authors are at pains to claim that the document represents only their views and that it is, therefore, an independent product. This is open to question because Shyam Saran, a former foreign secretary, heads a government-funded think tank and another author, General Prakash Menon is military advisor with the rank of secretary in the National Security Council Secretariat. Moreover, the National Security Advisor and his deputy actively participated in some of the deliberations of the group to which administrative support was provided inter alia by the National Defence College. 

Nonalignment 2.0 has attracted both criticism and praise. The latter is mainly for drawing attention to India's innumerable foreign policy challenges and for generating debate thereon. The document is, of course, also studded with several nuggets of wisdom some of which may be enumerated as follows:

India must retain maximum strategic autonomy in order to enable it to pursue its developmental goals;

Since its economic growth requires deepened economic engagement with the world, India must strive to maintain an open global order;

It is unlikely that there will be enduring coalitions: these would require artful management;

India's great advantage is that, barring in its immediate neighbourhood, it is not seen as a threatening power;

Engaging with the Asian theatre will be a key concern for India with South Asia being the most vital; 

India must put in place operational concepts and capabilities to deter China since the latter will be a significant foreign policy and security challenge for it;

Progress in India-Pakistan ties can only be incremental;

While seriously pursuing the complete elimination of nuclear weapons on a non discriminatory basis, India must beef up its nuclear weapon capability in particular the maritime leg.

On the negative side, a major shortcoming in the document is the failure to clearly spell out a vision for what India should aspire to be and how precisely should these aspirations be realised. In the absence of such on overarching unity of purpose Nonalignment 2.0 flounders and lacks coherency.

Many have also found fault with the title of the document on the grounds that it is backward looking rather than forward looking. The argument that the title was selected as 'strategic autonomy' was a core element of non-alignment as earlier practiced by India, cuts no ice as such autonomy is something which any self respecting country would like to exercise and as the non-alignment of yester year had many shortcomings.

Given the standing of the authors, one would have expected a much more tautly conceived and constructed document. It, however, disappoints. It is flabby, marred by inaccuracies, and on occasion displays a disquieting naivete. In this context, consider the following propositions contained in it:

India's internal development will depend on how well we manage our global opportunities. Comment: is not the converse truer? In the ultimate analysis progress is dependent more on management of internals than of foreign policy;

The fundamental source of India's power is its example. Comment: comprehensive national power rather than example is what counts for in the real world;

The main thing that can hold India back is India itself. Comment: This is a cliché applicable to all countries;

South Asia is holding India back at many levels and places fetters on its ambitions. Comment: While a fractious neighbourhood is a cause of concern it cannot subvert Indian ambitions as long as India is strong;

India has been granted Most Favoured Nation treatment by Pakistan. Comment: This is incorrect. Pakistan has only moved from a positive to a negative list in respect of its imports from India.

India should engage in cooperation with Pakistan on energy and water, leverage its economic relationship with China for political concessions and persuade the latter to seek reconciliation with the Dalai Lama. Comment: Even a nodding acquaintance with the dynamics of the polity of Pakistan and of China and their relationship with India would indicate that these propositions are non-starters. 

Finally, perhaps the most serious flaw in Nonalignment 2.0 is that it reeks of pusillanimity. For instance, it suggests that India should continue to remain engaged with Pakistan even if there are further Mumbai like attacks. All that it contemplates in such eventualities is stand-off punitive operations and goes so far as to argue against deep thrusts into Pakistani territory for fear of nuclear attack missing the point that we have a nuclear deterrent. 

Similarly, while suggesting that there can be no proportionate response to a Chinese attack on India it makes a case for an asymmetric response inter alia based upon the creation of insurgencies in areas occupied by China thereby acknowledging defeat even before battle has been joined. It also argues that India should focus more on accretion of its military capability at sea rather than on land. Indeed, the paragraphs relating to China are permeated by an unseemly fear and the thought that India should do nothing which may increase its anxieties, to the extent that we maintain equidistance between China and the US. 

Even in respect of our South Asian neighbours the document would have India make unilateral concessions to them. The learned authors appear to have learnt no lessons from the fact that the countless unilateral concessions made by India to China, Pakistan and even Sri Lanka, have not earned it any positive results in terms of improved ties with those countries and only encouraged recalcitrant behaviour. 

Ironically, while the document is mindful to a fault of Chinese sensitivities all such caution is thrown to the winds when addressing India. Indeed, it goes so far as to suggest that we need to build a credible state, promote inclusive governance and a political culture attuned to defusing conflict. 

These homilies are not only quite out of place in a foreign policy related document but much more applicable to China and Pakistan than to India. Indeed our record on this count is better than that of many countries. The fact that they have found place in such a document is, therefore, not only unwarranted but also a singular disservice to the nation.