Showing posts with label Sri Lanka. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sri Lanka. Show all posts

Thursday, June 14, 2012

Why Non-alignment 2.0 does us a Disservice

Satish Chandra
Distinguished Fellow,VIF


The document, prepared by an eminent 8-member group, has attracted both criticism and praise. The latter is mainly for drawing attention to India's innumerable foreign policy challenges and for generating debate thereon. On the negative side, a major shortcoming in the document is the failure to clearly spell out a vision for what India should aspire to be and how precisely should these aspirations be realised, says Satish Chandra.

Non-alignment 2.0 -- unveiled in January -- is a 60-page document which purportedly outlines the principles that should guide India's foreign and domestic policy over the next decade.

Over a year in the making the document is the handiwork of an eight-member group comprising some well known Indian intellectuals like Shyam Saran, Sunil Khilnani, Nandan Nilekani, and Pratap Bhanu Mehta. 

The authors are at pains to claim that the document represents only their views and that it is, therefore, an independent product. This is open to question because Shyam Saran, a former foreign secretary, heads a government-funded think tank and another author, General Prakash Menon is military advisor with the rank of secretary in the National Security Council Secretariat. Moreover, the National Security Advisor and his deputy actively participated in some of the deliberations of the group to which administrative support was provided inter alia by the National Defence College. 

Nonalignment 2.0 has attracted both criticism and praise. The latter is mainly for drawing attention to India's innumerable foreign policy challenges and for generating debate thereon. The document is, of course, also studded with several nuggets of wisdom some of which may be enumerated as follows:

India must retain maximum strategic autonomy in order to enable it to pursue its developmental goals;

Since its economic growth requires deepened economic engagement with the world, India must strive to maintain an open global order;
It is unlikely that there will be enduring coalitions: these would require artful management;

India's great advantage is that, barring in its immediate neighbourhood, it is not seen as a threatening power;

Engaging with the Asian theatre will be a key concern for India with South Asia being the most vital; 

India must put in place operational concepts and capabilities to deter China since the latter will be a significant foreign policy and security challenge for it;

Progress in India-Pakistan ties can only be incremental;

While seriously pursuing the complete elimination of nuclear weapons on a non discriminatory basis, India must beef up its nuclear weapon capability in particular the maritime leg.

On the negative side, a major shortcoming in the document is the failure to clearly spell out a vision for what India should aspire to be and how precisely should these aspirations be realised. In the absence of such on overarching unity of purpose Nonalignment 2.0 flounders and lacks coherency.

Many have also found fault with the title of the document on the grounds that it is backward looking rather than forward looking. The argument that the title was selected as 'strategic autonomy' was a core element of non-alignment as earlier practiced by India, cuts no ice as such autonomy is something which any self respecting country would like to exercise and as the non-alignment of yester year had many shortcomings.

Given the standing of the authors, one would have expected a much more tautly conceived and constructed document. It, however, disappoints. It is flabby, marred by inaccuracies, and on occasion displays a disquieting naivete. In this context, consider the following propositions contained in it:

India's internal development will depend on how well we manage our global opportunities. Comment: is not the converse truer? In the ultimate analysis progress is dependent more on management of internals than of foreign policy;

The fundamental source of India's power is its example. Comment: comprehensive national power rather than example is what counts for in the real world;

The main thing that can hold India back is India itself. Comment: This is a cliché applicable to all countries;

South Asia is holding India back at many levels and places fetters on its ambitions. Comment: While a fractious neighbourhood is a cause of concern it cannot subvert Indian ambitions as long as India is strong;

India has been granted Most Favoured Nation treatment by Pakistan. Comment: This is incorrect. Pakistan has only moved from a positive to a negative list in respect of its imports from India.

India should engage in cooperation with Pakistan on energy and water, leverage its economic relationship with China for political concessions and persuade the latter to seek reconciliation with the Dalai Lama. Comment: Even a nodding acquaintance with the dynamics of the polity of Pakistan and of China and their relationship with India would indicate that these propositions are non-starters. 

Finally, perhaps the most serious flaw in Nonalignment 2.0 is that it reeks of pusillanimity. For instance, it suggests that India should continue to remain engaged with Pakistan even if there are further Mumbai like attacks. All that it contemplates in such eventualities is stand-off punitive operations and goes so far as to argue against deep thrusts into Pakistani territory for fear of nuclear attack missing the point that we have a nuclear deterrent. 

Similarly, while suggesting that there can be no proportionate response to a Chinese attack on India it makes a case for an asymmetric response inter alia based upon the creation of insurgencies in areas occupied by China thereby acknowledging defeat even before battle has been joined. It also argues that India should focus more on accretion of its military capability at sea rather than on land. Indeed, the paragraphs relating to China are permeated by an unseemly fear and the thought that India should do nothing which may increase its anxieties, to the extent that we maintain equidistance between China and the US. 

Even in respect of our South Asian neighbours the document would have India make unilateral concessions to them. The learned authors appear to have learnt no lessons from the fact that the countless unilateral concessions made by India to China, Pakistan and even Sri Lanka, have not earned it any positive results in terms of improved ties with those countries and only encouraged recalcitrant behaviour. 
Ironically, while the document is mindful to a fault of Chinese sensitivities all such caution is thrown to the winds when addressing India. Indeed, it goes so far as to suggest that we need to build a credible state, promote inclusive governance and a political culture attuned to defusing conflict. 

These homilies are not only quite out of place in a foreign policy related document but much more applicable to China and Pakistan than to India. Indeed our record on this count is better than that of many countries. The fact that they have found place in such a document is, therefore, not only unwarranted but also a singular disservice to the nation. 

Thursday, March 29, 2012

A Wrong Move on Lanka


Kanwal Sibal

Many arguments can be made against our decision to vote against Sri Lanka in the Human Rights Council in Geneva, a decision highly questionable from the foreign policy point of view. Domestic compulsions seem to have outweighed foreign policy considerations in this case.

India and the West have been at odds on how best to address the issue of human rights internationally. India shares the view that the West uses the issue to embarrass, destabilise or topple politically uncongenial governments.
During the Cold War the Soviet Union was succesfully destabilized through the human rights basket of the Helsinki Accords. Cuba has been a favourite target year after year.

After the Cold War ended many countries have come under the West’s scanner on human rights issues, ranging from Libya, Iraq and erstwhile Yugoslavia to Iran, China and Russia. Belarus is under pressure on this count and so is Syria. India, until recently, has been under stress too.

Hypocrisy

With improved India-US ties the US government now disregards periodic reports from international human rights organizations on our alleged human rights infringements in J&K in particular, but the issue has not disappeared.
Because the West uses the issue of human rights selectively, targetting adversaries and protecting allies, India has taken a principled position all these years at Geneva to oppose or abstain on human rights resolutions against individual countries in the Human Rights Commission and its re-incarnation under US pressure as the Human Rights Council.

India has not believed in this name and shame game played for cynical ends by powerful countries who claim the high moral ground on humanitarian issues, but whose own international actions, often hugely costly in human terms, are shielded from any formal censure because of their dominant position.

India also believes that the principle of sovereignty of states and non-interference in their internal affairs should be respected. While India shares the values of democracy, pluralism and human freedoms with the West, it differs with it on the degree of activism to spread these values world-wide.
In India’s thinking promotion of values should not be a cover for an aggressive promotion of self-interest. India does not want to be in the business of shaping the global order according to the values it espouses as a country, as that entails passing judgments on how countries run their internal affairs and assuming burdens on behalf of the citizens of a foreign country that rightly fall within the purview of national governments.

In the case of the vote on Sri Lanka, irrespective of the reality of the human rights situation there, we have departed from our principled position on these matters. The irony is that in the past we have stood on the side, explicitly or implicitly, of China, Sudan, Belarus, Zimbabwe, Turkmenistan, North Korea, Iran, Syria and so on by voting against or abstaining on resolutions.
Are these countries closer to us than Sri Lanka? If we had to move from principle to pragmatism on human rights issues, should we have begun with Sri Lanka, where bilateral sensitivities are far more acute than in any other case?

Once we drift from our moorings of principle at Geneva, we will not be able to escape taking up positions on human rights issues involving specific countries.

Tomorrow how will we justify not voting against Iran, or for that matter China? And, if for delicate political reasons we do not want to rock our relations with these countries by joining others in indicting them, how will we justify in retrospect our vote against Sri Lanka?

In voting against Sri Lanka on a western sponsored resolution, have we now concluded that the West’s treatment of human rights issues has become universally acceptable and even-handed in its treatment of friends and adversaries?

Diplomacy

Our vote against Sri Lanka in a multilateral forum should have followed a public hardening of posture bilaterally with our neighbour. We should have appeared to have exhausted bilateral diplomacy before joining the West at Geneva to summon Sri Lanka to assume its human rights responsibilities towards its own population. We have, however, maintained an intensive dialogue with Sri Lanka on the Tamilian question and are undertaking rehabilitation and reconstruction operations in the North.

We have not given any impression of a diplomatic impasse with Sri Lanka even as we have continued to press it to discard triumphalist thinking and move forward on reconciliation and devolution.

That we amended the US/EU sponsored resolution to make it less intrusive, more balanced and more respectful of Sri Lankan sovereignty is not sufficient justification for joining with distant powers to pick on Sri Lanka at Geneva.
We should be in control of our relationship with Sri Lanka instead of following the lead of others or seeking to achieve our own political ends through them. Those in India advocating that we should have taken the lead at Geneva to move against Sri Lanka are implicitly endorsing the manipulative dimension of western human rights policies, while forgetting that this instrument has been used against us in the past and can be in the future. Those who argue that in censuring Sri Lanka India has shown its readiness to act as a responsible power subscribe to demeaning criticism of India in western circles as well as the fiction that western policies are inherently responsible.

While democracies have to be sensitive to public opinion, should our foreign policy be held hostage to coalition politics? Should individual states be allowed to dictate to the centre foreign policy decisions whose implications go beyond immediate domestic political equations? Our foreign policy risks becoming erratic and capricious if domestic pulls become overly influential in shaping its direction.