Showing posts with label Afghanistan post-2014. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Afghanistan post-2014. Show all posts

Thursday, November 27, 2014

Afghanistan Post-2014: The Pashtun Factor

Prabhat P Shukla, 
Distinguished Fellow, VIF

There is an effort among some western commentaries – taken up and amplified by the Pakistanis - to try and project the situation in Afghanistan as a proxy war between India and Pakistan. The drumbeat of this thesis grows as the draw-down of western forces from Afghanistan draws near. Such a view sounds strange to Indian ears, for we were labouring under the belief this last decade that it was a straight, though covert, fight between the US and Pakistan.

And that is how, moreover, people like Negroponte and Mullen projected it too – and you would expect them to know. However, it is important to understand the reality of what is happening in Afghanistan, and for that, the narrative must begin some decades back.

To anticipate the conclusions of this essay: one, the fight is not between India and Pakistan. Ever since 1947, India has kept out of Afghan-Pakistan affairs, and Afghanistan has kept out of Indo-Pakistan affairs.

Two, the fight is between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and has its own logic, going back to the dispute over the Pashtun issue, with Baluchistan also steadily in focus. It has acquired an additional facet in recent years, since Afghanistan has no interest in becoming any other country’s “strategic depth” – indeed, deeply resents the idea, and rejects the Pakistani military push behind the concept.

Three, Afghanistan has become a battleground indeed, between Pakistan [aided occasionally by outside powers] on the one hand, and the USSR, the US, and Afghan nationalism by turns.

And four, and most important, there is a coded message behind this analysis. The message is that Pakistan is going to continue to meddle in Afghan affairs, and seek once more to inject the Taliban, in their newest iteration, into Afghanistan, and no one should oppose this. India is simply shorthand for the fact that all the neighbours of Afghanistan – Iran, the Central Asians, and countries like India and Russia – are concerned at the ceaseless sponsorship of terror and extreme groups by Pakistan. If they oppose Pakistan, that becomes a proxy war.

The Afghans themselves want none of this Pakistani interference, but that is also conveniently skipped over. The truth is, if Pakistan does not promote the extremist Islamic groups, there will be no push-back from the Afghans or anybody else; it is entirely emblematic that in all this lofty talk about avoiding a proxy war, the Pakistanis refrain from mentioning anything about their solemn, repeated – and repeatedly broken – promises of non-interference.

The history of the face-off is well-known: Afghanistan never accepted the Durand Line which divided Pashtun from Pashtun, and this was made clear to the British authorities from the 1920’s onwards. By 1944, when it was clear that the British were to withdraw from India, the Kabul authorities asked the British Government in London to allow the Pashtuns in British India to choose to accede to Afghanistan or opt for independence as well; instead, they were only given the choice to accede to India or Pakistan. The number of registered voters was a fraction of the total population, and even among them, the support for accession to Pakistan was barely above 50 percent. The hill tribes, who are in the centre of the fighting today, were not allowed to vote because they were not considered part of the administered territories.

Pakistan showed its militant colours within a few months of its independence – it sent “raiders” in September 1947 to the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir [violating the stand-still agreement it had signed earlier with the state] from the Pashtun areas. Already, as early as 1947, Pakistan was seeking to portray this operation as an Islamic campaign, a jihad. Afghanistan was opposed to the use of the Pashtun tribes for this purpose, and the Afghan ulema responded with a fatwa denying that there was any need for a jihad against the Indians and denying any religious sanction for the campaign. This was done in the context of preventing Pakistan from exercising influence over the mountain tribes in the North-West Frontier Province, which was not Pakistani territory in their eyes.

The subsequent two decades saw frequent tensions over the Pashtun question between the two countries, and even saw a limited skirmish in 1963. As a result of this last, King Zahir Shah dismissed his Prime Minister and cousin, Mohammed Daoud Khan. In turn, Daoud overthrew the King a decade later in 1973, and thus began a new era in South Asian history – not only because it ended the Durrani monarchy, but also because it saw the first formal launch of jihad in the subcontinent.

This happened in the summer of 1973 itself, and it was declared by Jalaluddin Haqqani – of the now-famous Haqqani network - against the government of Daoud, which had taken a high-profile position on the Pashtun question. The call to jihad was given practical shape by a Pakistani, Naseerullah Babar, himself a Pashtun, who was then serving as the Inspector-General of the Frontier Corps. It was he who advised Zulfikar Ali Bhutto that the solution to the Pashtun problem lay in overwhelming Afghan irredentism by using the Islamic card. He sprang some of the important Islamic leaders from Kabul, whose names read like a who’s who of the anti-Soviet war of the 1980’s: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani, Ahmed Shah Massoud, Noor Mohammed Mohammedi, and others. At this stage, the Islamists were not all Pashtuns – the heavy reliance particularly on Ghilzai Pashtuns was to come later, under Gen Zia-ul-Haq. But the idea of using Islam as a weapon to blunt the Pashtun nationalist issue both internally and vis-à-vis Afghanistan was born at this time. In part, this was based on Pakistan’s use of the Islamic card to motivate the tribes in the north-west; in part, it was based on the experience of 1971 in the former East Pakistan, when the Islamists had remained loyal to Pakistan, while the Bengali nationalists were motivated by their regional identity.

This group launched an uprising against Daoud centred in Panjsher in 1975, though it covered other parts of the country too. Daoud was shaken by the event, and gradually began to re-think his strategy towards Pakistan, including on the Durand Line. In his interaction with the Americans, he indicated a willingness to seek an accommodation with Pakistan. The Shah of Iran, flush with petrodollars and as suspicious of the Soviet Union as Bhutto and the Americans, also helped by offering economic assistance to both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The only fly in the ointment was Daoud’s fear that the USSR would seek to destabilise him if he tried to change course. In a long and serious conversation with Secretary of State Kissinger in Kabul in August 1976, he informed the latter that he and Bhutto were close to a settlement of the Pashtun and Baluch questions. The only guarantee he asked for – and was assured of by Kissinger – was support against internal subversion by the supporters of the Soviet Union, especially the Soviet-trained officers in the Armed Forces. A quick exchange of visits took place between Bhutto and Daoud in 1976, and there was indeed every prospect of a settlement.

Before a deal could be settled, Bhutto called for elections in 1977 and, in the turmoil that followed the rigged elections, the Pakistan Army stepped in once again, in July 1977, and Gen Zia became the military ruler. Although he seemed to be inclined to pick up the threads where they had been left off by Bhutto, he did not have the time to do anything substantive: Daoud himself was overthrown in April 1978, and the US guarantees proved unavailing.

The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan [PDPA], which came to power, was indeed propelled into power by Soviet-trained officers from the Armed Forces, and once again raised the Pashtun issue as a high priority. And once again, Pakistan responded by unleashing the Islamic forces – this time with a heavy reliance on the Pashtuns, and the Ghilzai Pashtuns in particular. The USSR responded to the worsening situation in Afghanistan by sending in its own troops into the country in December 1979, and a new Afghan war began, pitting the Soviet forces against pretty much all the regional and global powers.

Through the 1980’s, the Pakistanis controlled and guided the anti-Soviet campaign. It was one of the conditions that they imposed on the Americans that the ISI would control the funds, arms and training of the insurgents. This is worth analysing in substantive terms, because it showed that the Pakistanis were clear that the ultimate winners would have to be beholden to them and to no one else, not even the Americans. Further, because they had suffered bad relations with the Durrani Pashtuns – Zahir Shah and Daoud were both Durranis, as were the earlier Kings since Abdur Rehman signed the first agreement on the Durand Line – they were determined to do their utmost to block the emergence of any Durrani to power in Kabul.

An interesting incident illustrates this Pakistani attitude of mind: in March 1979, before the Soviet invasion, a group led by Gul Mohammed, a Barakzai [a Durrani] had made significant progress against the PDPA forces in Herat. The Soviets and the Afghan Army hit back with ferocity against the fall of Herat, and the rebels turned to Pakistan for help, but were rebuffed. Pakistan was building up the Ghilzai to oppose the Soviets, and almost the entire top leadership of the Seven Party Alliance belonged to this branch of the Pashtuns.

Shortly before he died in August 1988 in a plane crash, Gen Zia stated that Pakistan had earned the right to have a friendly government in Kabul. “We won’t permit it to be like it was before, with Indian and Soviet influence there and claims to our territory." This was said as the Geneva accords were being worked out, and reflected one of the most important motivations behind the Pakistani strategies towards Afghanistan. No longer would Pakistan permit, to the extent possible, any claims on its Pashtun lands by the rulers in Kabul.

This approach survived Zia; in fact, it reflects the current national consensus, public demurrals notwithstanding. Naturally, therefore, as early as 1989, Pakistan made its bid to capture power and pushed Hikmatyar into a pitched battle in Jalalabad. The widely-held expectation, and not just in Pakistan, was that the Najibullah government would crumble, but it fought off the Hizb forces of Hikmatyar. In retrospect, this was not surprising, because Hikmatyar’s record during the 1980’s was quite patchy, whereas the PDPA forces were well-trained and -equipped. The Soviet Union had also continued to provide financial aid amounting to $3 billion annually to Najibullah even after 1989, and it was only after the collapse of the USSR and the rise of Yeltsin as Russian President that the financial aid was stopped. Within three months of this, Najibullah was gone.

Even then, the replacement was not the kind of government that Pakistan would be satisfied with, for the two pillars of the new regime were Massoud and Dostum. Both had stayed away from Pakistan during the war against the Soviets, so neither was beholden to Pakistan in any way. Moreover, neither was a Pashtun, and this too was unacceptable to the Pakistani leaders, especially to the security establishment.

The story of the rise of the Taliban from 1994 onwards is well-known, and the only point worth emphasizing is the role of the self-same Naseerullah Babar, now the Interior Minister under Benazir Bhutto. It was he who put together the Taliban force in 1994, with the intention of capturing the western parts of Afghanistan. The aim at this stage was to have a swathe of territory under their control which would allow Pakistan, in cooperation with the Central Asian hydrocarbon-rich countries, to set up trading links with the rest of the world. A US hydrocarbon company, Unocal, also contributed to this effort. The strategic objective was to block Iran and Russia from any role in this trade. This was despite the fact that, as far as Russia was concerned, all the existing pipelines ran through Russia or Russian-controlled territory. This was also despite the fact that, apart from Russia, Iran was the most economical route for evacuating the oil and gas from Central Asia.

What we see thus is that the stakes in Afghanistan have changed since the days of the Soviet occupation. For the US, it was initially the need to beat back the Soviet Union, and to undermine the unity of that country, and they succeeded in their strategy. For this purpose, they were willing to use the obscurantist forces that Pakistan had nurtured, even though they were aware that at least some of them were anti-West and specifically anti-US as well. But they felt then that they could control the fallout, especially with a friendly Pakistan to keep things under control. The Chinese feel the same way today, and are comfortable seeing the US humiliated in Afghanistan.

However, by the 1990’s, with the destruction of the USSR complete, the stakes had changed, and the US strategy was to impose a double blockade for trade and strategic purposes – against Russia and Iran. This was conceived and driven by the US, and embraced willingly by Pakistan in the South and Central Asian regions. It is worth emphasising that India had virtually no role in any of this. Its hands were full dealing with internal security issues, the need for ensuring economic growth, and later, addressing the diplomatic fallout of its nuclear tests.

India got involved only after the rise of the Taliban and the fall of Kabul, and in this it was not alone; this was an issue that touched nearly every country both in the region, and in the wider world. It is worth emphasising one important aspect of the militant movements in what has now come to be called the AfPak region: this is the growth of extremism, from generation to generation. The Taliban of the 1990’s made the mujahideen of the Rabbani-Mujaddidi type look reasonable. The TTP and the other militant groups of today have similarly outflanked the Afghan Taliban and are making the Quetta Shura look comparatively weak and peaceable. And now we have the ISIL. This point is worth exploring in some detail.

The current militant movement is more ideologically motivated than any of the earlier groups. The growth of this new ideology has been well-documented, and it is recognised as the fastest-growing among all the competing terrorist threats in the world. Their belief, which is widespread in several Muslim countries, especially Pakistan, derives from the Hadith regarding end-times. According to this, the war in Afghanistan is the prophesied Battle for Khorasan, and of course, they believe that their armies will be victorious. This Battle will embrace not just today’s Afghanistan, but also Iran and Central Asia. This will be followed by the Ghazwa-i-Hind – the campaign for India – which will cover today’s India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, as well as parts of the surrounding countries. This will be followed by the battle to liberate the Holy Places, Mecca, Medina, and al-Quds [Jerusalem]. And that will lead to the restoration of the true world-wide Caliphate.

Such is the new ambition among the terrorist groups, and many of their spokesmen – inevitably men, of course – are willing to speak publicly about the contemporary relevance of these prophecies. What it means for them, and their patrons in Pakistan, who are playing this dangerous game with themselves and the entire region, is that there is an enormous amount of warfare to come. This suits Pakistan very well. These fighting forces are mainly Pashtuns, who would otherwise be looking to settling the Pashtun question. However, as long as they are doing what they see as Allah’s work in subduing lands that rightfully belong to Him, they will not look to issues such as their own national and territorial rights. And in this, they will continue to enjoy the support of the Pakistan Army and the ISI. The growth of violence and extremism within the country is a price worth paying for keeping these forces oriented outward.

The Pashtuns, along with the Kurds, are the two largest, most populous tribes in the world that have no homeland of their own. It is estimated that there some 45 million Pashtuns in the world, and they have all the attributes of a nation. They have the language, tradition and culture of nationhood, and recent memory of having ruled large parts of the region. This is what Daoud and the PDPA rulers were playing on; simultaneously, the Pakistanis were turning them towards Islam and jihad, with the calculation that this would raise their sights above narrower Pashtun territorial demands. In this, Pakistan has been successful, perhaps too successful. The Islamist forces they have let slip have become increasingly disenchanted with the Pakistani state, and regard it as un-Islamic, hence itself a target for jihad.

This is why it would be ahistorical to expect the Islamist forces to come to a negotiated settlement with the Afghan Government. The Taliban have, for example, in fact, declared that the new Afghan Government is unacceptable to them, and they will not accept anything less than a truly Islamic Government, which will follow Sharia in its true form.

For its part, Pakistan, especially in its current debilitated shape, cannot afford to let the Islamists lower their ambition, for then the Pashtun Question will be back in an even more aggravated form, and this time led by well-trained, and motivated fighters who will pose a serious challenge to the Pakistani state and its security forces. It will, therefore, have no interest in a negotiated settlement. What is more, these jihadi forces are the only asset Pakistan has in the politics of the region; if they were to give this up, they would have no value left. They do not have the financial or diplomatic wherewithal, or the soft power, to play any positive role in the neighbourhood.

This also explains why the Pakistanis are opposed to any arms for the ANSF beyond those that a constabulary would have. The Islamists must be able to make the military breakthroughs they need to expand north into and west into all parts of Afghanistan, and from there, into Xinjiang, Iran and Central Asia. Only a strong and well-trained ANSF can thwart these strategies. For exactly obverse reasons, the rest of the world needs to ensure that the ANSF is capable of defending the country.If there were any doubts about this analysis, recent events in Iraq should quell them.

Iraq provides an illustration of the kind of problem that may arise if the ANSF turn out to be under-equipped for the coming tests of strength. The way the Iraqi Army melted away in the face of the ISIL should be an object lesson for the rest of the world. The western and Arab countries were forced back into the fight, and the same will happen in Afghanistan if adequate preparation is not made for the coming trials.

What this narrative has shown is that Pakistan has been nurturing and promoting Islamic extremist forces since the early 1970’s, and not because it was fighting any proxy war with India. The reason was, and remains, the unsettled Pashtun question, for which Pakistan sought an Islamic answer. In the bargain, it has had to resort to growing extremism, and it has to continue to fan it the interests of its own survival. Therefore, any statement that it is willing to moderate its outlook, or to curb the extremists it has nurtured needs to be discounted completely.

Further, the threat posed by these forces is to all the neighbours of Afghanistan, including Russia and China. It is thus no India-Pakistan face-off. To the extent that Indian interests are affected, it will, of course, defend them. But as Iraq again has shown, the interests of the wider world community are also going to be hit, and the other affected countries need to be prepared for this.

Pakistan knows all this well enough, as do the puzzling, though dwindling, number of its supporters in the west. The real message behind this kind of writing is preemptive: Pakistan is going to make another bid for its proxies to gain complete dominance over Afghanistan once again, and countries like India should not stand in the way. That is the true meaning of the talk of a proxy war. It overlooks the reality that the war against Pakistani attempts to dominate Afghanistan will be fought by the Afghans themselves. And in this, they will be supported not only by India, but all of the near and distant neighbours.

Published Date: 25th November 2014, Image source: http://www.geourdu.com
(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

Monday, April 8, 2013

Interaction on Indo-Israeli Cooperation Prospects and Issues


On 29 March 2013, VIF welcomed Ambassador Alon Ushpiz, Israeli Ambassador to India, and the delegation from Galilee International Management Institute (GIMI), Israel for an interaction on Indo-Israeli cooperation. The session was chaired by Ambassador P. P. Shukla, Joint Director VIF, who introduced Amb Ushpiz, welcomed Lt. Gen (retd) JFR Jacob, one of the Indian War Heroes, and pitched the agenda for discussion.

Amb Ushpiz addressed the distinguished participants by giving a holistic overview of the Indo-Israeli bilateral relations and at the same time candidly assessed the realities and practicalities. Amb Ushpiz mentioned that the Indo-Israeli relations are based on common democratic values; and that we have a vast set of common interests. India and Israel also have similar challenges, that of energy security, water security, and a “cocktail” of failed states in the neighbourhood. However, Amb Ushpiz also highlighted that there are basic differences between India and Israel, some of them being size and population, different political alliances after Independence, etc.


Amb Ushpiz affirmed that Israel attaches very high value to its bilateral relations with India. Highlighting the sectors of Defence, Agriculture, Civilian Trade, etc., Amb Ushpiz asserted that the scope of strengthening of the bilateral relations in the mentioned sectors is huge and is likely to expand exponentially in the coming decades. He underlined that Israel wishes to provide India with technology and invest highly in R&D programmes in affiliation with the Indian Government, private sector firms, and universities.

Addressing the security concerns of India, Amb Ushpiz also reassured that Israel has never and will never sell any military technology to any of India’s adversaries. Amb Ushpiz also focussed on Palestinian issue, militarily-nuclear Iran, and Afghanistan post-2014.

The talk was followed by a series of comments made and questions raised by members of VIF and GIMI. They broadly covered the Indo-Israeli relations and its positions on the broader geo-politics of West Asia, Israeli security concerns, Indian security concerns, and the marginalized visibility of the strong Indo-Israeli bilateral relations.

Joint VIF – GIMI, Seminar on Response to Terrorism and Situation in West Asia


On 28 March 2013, VIF welcomed a delegation from the Galilee International Management Institute (GIMI), Israel for a seminar on Response to Terrorism and Situation in West Asia. The seminar began with opening remarks given by Ambassador P. P. Shukla, Joint Director VIF and Maj. Gen (retd) Dr. Baruch Levy, GIMI. The Seminar was divided into four sessions with specific focus on “Global Terrorism: Response”, “Arab Spring: Implications and Ramifications”, “Af-Pak Post-2014 Scenario: Global and Regional Implications”, and “Geopolitics and Iran”.

Session I- Global Terrorism: Response

The Session was chaired by Ambassador Shukla and had Dr. Levy and Dr. Ajay Sahni as the key speakers. Dr. Levy spoke on the Israeli experience and concepts of global terrorism. Dr. Levy described Israel as an Island in the Middle East with inimical countries surrounding it and asserted that it, therefore, has a pro-active concept of national security where deterrence is achieved by early warning and military performance. Assessing the present situation in Israel and the entire region, Dr. Levy underlined the fact that the threat posed by religious extremism and the weakness of democracies in coping with terror are critical challenges. He asserted that intelligence and security agencies have to conduct both offensive and defensive operations to degrade terrorist organisations. Meanwhile, he also highlighted the need to prepare for handling energy, space and cyber terrorism, which will present new security challenges in the coming years.


Dr. Ajai Sahni focused on state-sponsored terrorism. He argued that all enduring terrorist movements in the world are state-sponsored or state-supported; everything else is tactical. The spectrum of state sponsorship of terror is wider and includes the provision of weapons, training, safe havens, ideological mobilisation, etc. Assessing the situation in India, Dr. Sahni mentioned that more than 62,000 people have lost their lives due to acts of terrorism sponsored by external support. He stressed on the need of open acknowledgement of state sponsorship of terrorism, while, at the same time, continuing to persist in other patterns of engagement with them. Dr. Sahni also stressed on the need to de-legitimise any cause behind an act of terrorism. This inflexible approach would force states away from tactical advantages that terrorism offers.

Session II – Arab Spring: Implications and Ramifications

The second session was chaired by Dr. Joseph Shevel, GIMI, and included Ambassador Kanwal Sibal and Admiral Shabtai Levy as the two key speakers. Amb Sibal spoke on India’s perspective on Arab Spring. He said that the term Arab Spring is a misnomer. It was basically the overthrowing of a regime whose sell-by date had expired. However, Amb Sibal argued that there can be no democracy unless there is a genuine break between religion and politics. He highlighted that there is an anti-thesis between Islam and secularism; they both are incompatible. Amb Sibal said that India is not comfortable with the overthrow of secular regimes and the coming to power of extremists like the Salafists and Muslim Brotherhood. The erstwhile regimes, despite their despotic nature, exercised control over the extremists. He reassured that an Arab style revolution cannot take place in India as the Muslims here are empowered and part of the democratic system.

Adm. Levy began his talk by assessing whether it was an Arab Spring or Winter? The domino effect of the fighting and instability in Syria can reach Israel’s borders. He argued that freedom of navigation is central to Israel’s economic and security interests. Israel has tremendous experience in countering terrorism due to continuous involvement for the past 40 years. Today, Adm. Levy argued, the terrorists are greatly deterred by Israel’s actions and they refrain from touching its aviation systems for hijackings because they know there would be repercussions. He also expressed his hope that the Israel’s peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan will remain intact. Israel has good relations with India, Turkey and Jordan which needs to be strengthened further. The developments in Iran and Afghanistan and the question whether they go into the Salafist/extremist/Al Qaeda fold needs to be observed closely.

Session III – AF–PAK 2014: Regional and Global Security Concerns

The session was chaired by Ambassador Satish Chandra and included Dr. Joseph Shevel and Lt. Gen. (retd) Ravi Sawhney as key speakers. Dr. Shevel began his talk by introducing the work which GIMI has been doing across the globe. Bridging gaps through education and capacity building programs has been the mission of GIMI. Dr. Shevel insisted that through cooperation in higher education and capacity building programs, Afghanistan’s growing instability can be cured. Also, on the Afghanistan’s security aspect, Dr. Shevel argued that a well educated and technically trained Afghan National Army (ANA) would be much more capable of ensuring Afghanistan’s safety post-2014.

Lt. Gen. Sawhney began his talk by describing a well captured image, depicting the ground realities as they were before 2001 and at present. The Afghanistan before 2001 was in rumbles, with no infrastructures like schools, hospitals, etc and no doctors and teachers. However, Lt. Gen Sawhney highlighted that Afghanistan has seen remarkable progress in many aspects of life. Assessing the sense of nationalism in Afghanistan, while Lt. Gen. Sawhney recognized the vast number of tribes and ethnic groups which constitute the nation, he, however, stressed that there is a sense of strong nationalism which holds them together.

On the prospects of Afghanistan post-2014, Lt. Gen. Sawhney addressed certain questions which would be central to the security of Afghanistan and the entire region. First was the question of the extent of forces of the US and NATO which would be left behind post 2014. The second question was on the process of reconciliation between the Afghan Government and the Taliban. Lt. Gen. Sawhney assessed the possibility of any successful reconciliation to be remote as Taliban insurgents do not seem to be willing for any reconciliation at all. The third question was of the Presidential elections which are to be held in April 2014. Lt. Gen. Sawhney argued that it would be absolutely necessary to see that the elections are held before the withdrawal and that the newly elected government gets sufficient time to establish firm control over the country.

SESSION IV – Geopolitics and Iran

The fourth session was chaired by Ambassador R. Rajagopalan and included Maj. Gen. (retd) Dr. Baruch Levy and Dr. Arvind Gupta as the key speakers. Dr. Levy, firstly, mentioned the long civilization history of Israel and Iran, describing how the two civilizations have, in fact, had periods of friendly relations. However, Iran, since 1979, has gone deep into fundamentalism and instead of becoming a liberated society, Iran has become an oppressed one. Iran has also taken up terrorism and has lead in sheltering, training and investing in terrorism and terrorist activities. Dr. Levy also expressed his concerns on Iranian nuclear program. Discussing the upcoming elections in Iran, Dr. Levy argued that a new President could bring about a policy change in Iran.

Dr. Arvind Gupta analyzed the much broader concept of geopolitics in context of Iran. It is an ancient civilization which gives its people tremendous depth and insight; it has an exceptional geographic location, dominating the Persian Gulf; it connects with Eurasia, South Asia, and controls an important Strait of Hormuz; it is the largest Shia country; and its ongoing nuclear program affects the security concerns of the West, GCC, etc. As far as the nuclear program is concerned, Dr. Gupta argued that Iran may survive the economic sanctions which have been put to stop Iran from pursuing the development of nuclear weapons. While affirming that the sanctions have hit the economy badly, there are doubts whether the sanctions will bring down the current regime. As Dr. Gupta rightly pointed out, Iran and its people have faced tough conditions in the past and they will readily cooperate with the regime, considering the fact that the nuclear project is a matter of national pride.


On the speculation of an attack on Iran, Dr. Gupta underlined the fact that Iran has a strong air defence system. He also highlighted that their nuclear projects and military establishments are underground and spread across vast lands, thus any ground military action will be too expensive. On Indian relations with Iran, Dr. Gupta asserted that it is highly speculative. Iran has not forgotten India’s vote against it in a resolution passed by the IAEA. Yet, considering the issues of energy security, India would need oil supplies from Iran, despite the tremendous amount of cut down which India has already introduced on Iranian-oil imports.

Ambassador Shukla concluded the seminar, thanking all the chairs and speakers. He thanked the delegation from GIMI and expressed his hope for more exchanges with specific focus on the agenda of Afghanistan post-2014 and Israel’s role in it.

Tuesday, December 4, 2012

The Right Balance in Asia


Kanwal Sibal 
(Advisory Board, VIF)

What impact will President Barack Obama’s re-election have on the United States of America’s strategic ties with India? It needs recalling that the US defines its strategic partnership with India very broadly, not limiting it only to hard security issues.

Cooperation in the priority areas of energy, agriculture, science and technology, education, health and information technology is viewed as generating the building blocks of the strategic partnership. The US’s stated objective is to build Indian capacities in various sectors so that India’s role in global affairs can be enhanced. The thrust of US policy in Obama’s second term should remain this.

Work on large parts of the ambitious India-US bilateral agenda remains unfinished. India’s nuclear liability legislation continues to hinder nuclear energy cooperation. The US spokesperson has identified this issue for a solution after Obama’s win. In agriculture, issues pertaining to genetically modified crops remain unsettled; in education, legislation allowing foreign universities to play a greater role in India has not yet been enacted.

With regard to obtaining easier access to US high technologies, including dual use technologies, with the loosening of export controls, Indian expectations haven’t been fully met. The hike in visa fees and denial of visas to Indian service providers are adversely affecting our information technology sector. We have moved on allowing foreign direct investment in multi-brand retail, but significant reforms in the financial and labour sectors sought by the US are awaited. Obama, who had commented critically some months ago on the reforms slow-down in India, is likely to return to the theme, particularly as his focus on economic issues in his second term might become sharper in order to bolster flagging US economic growth.

The US’s efforts to obtain a larger share of our defence procurements will continue in Obama’s second term. Already in the last seven years, the US has obtained orders worth $9 billion. This has had a political impact on our defence relations with Russia whose pre-eminent position as supplier is being eroded. India’s strategic challenge would be to keep both the Russians and the Americans reasonably satisfied.

On terrorism and homeland security, improved Indo-US cooperation will continue. Obama had begun his first term as president with uncongenial views on terrorism, Kashmir and our relations with Pakistan. His experience of Pakistani duplicity has changed the US official discourse on Pakistan’s links with terrorist groups. After declaring the Lashkar-e-Toiba a terrorist organization earlier, the US has now declared the Haqqani group as such, exposing Pakistan to the application of the US’s anti-terrorism legislation. Obama will continue to sanction drone attacks on Pakistani territory notwithstanding the strong public reaction in Pakistan. This suits our interests.

On Kashmir, Obama moved to a non-interfering position; while on Afghanistan, after initially discouraging any prominent India role there in deference to Pakistani sensitivities, the US now openly supports higher Indian engagement with that country, and co-operatively with the US where possible. In US strategic thinking today, India is seen as the economic anchor of the whole Central Asian-South Asian region, which the Americans want to integrate economically through the New Silk Road concept. In this scheme of things, the US will continue to be interested in improved India-Pakistan ties, especially economic, as this has an important bearing on the situation in Afghanistan. The US wants to lower its economic burden in maintaining stability in Afghanistan post-2014 through more trade and investment from within the region. The US will therefore continue to play hot and cold with Pakistan as the latter cannot be alienated beyond a point. This approach is reflected in the recent waiver given to Pakistan to enable economic and military aid to flow. Nevertheless, with the heightened attention the US is giving to India’s regional role, the US factor in our relations with Pakistan will continue to make easy the situation strategically for us.

Unlike China, which owes its economic and financial strength to US strategic choices in the 1970s to counter the former Soviet Union and is now seen as threatening US interests, India’s rise is not seen as a threat by the US. The flourishing US-China economic partnership has not been translated into shared political values and security understandings, which the US would have wanted for an enduring alliance of interests. India, on the other hand, shares the values of democracy, pluralism and human freedoms with the US, without as yet developing a matching level of economic collaboration. The US therefore believes India’s ascent with increased economic muscle will only strengthen the cause of democracy globally.

The US has tried to enlist India as a major component of its re-balancing policy towards Asia. China is being recognized increasingly as a strategic competitor by the US. China’s relations with its neighbours, some of whom are major allies of the US, have become tense. Its position on the South China sea reflects, apart from territorial aggrandizement, its naval ambitions. The US wants to signal its intention to maintain a balance of power in Asia, but, constrained by its financial and economic problems — which would inevitably require a reduction in its massive defence expenditure — it would rather not assume solely the burden of this strategic enterprise. It would prefer spreading it by co-opting partners like India which have their own reasons to be wary of China’s growing strength and the bilateral imbalance that has consequently emerged.

It is significant that the US’s approach to the two biggest adversaries of India has evolved positively for us. India, however, is unwilling to actively exploit this to its advantage, both because it recognizes the limits to US countervailing actions or strategies towards these two countries and India’s own independent interest in engaging them in order to dilute tensions and friction. Which is why, even as the US’s relations with China and Pakistan deteriorate, India is seeking to improve relations with both. Notwithstanding this, India gains passively from the downturn of US ties with these two countries and the simultaneous improvement of US-India relations because India’s strategic profile increases, compelling China and Pakistan to take cognizance of the new equations. This positive strategic advantage should get consolidated in Obama’s second term if we play our cards astutely.

The problem areas ahead are Iran and Syria, where it is not as yet clear how far Obama redux will go to effect a regime change through direct or indirect military action. Logic would dictate against another war with an Islamic country for geo-political reasons. But Obama has repeatedly said that Iran will not be allowed to acquire nuclear capability come what may. On Syria, he has declared that President Bashar al-Assad must go. The second term gives him political flexibility as he is not constrained to make bad choices under electoral pressure. The Iranian regime is under stress because of sanctions and may search for an honourable compromise. The beleagured Assad regime may yet collapse through stepped-up external support to the insurgency. India has distanced itself from the American position without serious bilateral contention. But if Obama decides on coercion, the US-India strategic partnership will come under some strain.

On the whole, however, Obama’s re-election will move the US’s strategic engagement with India forward.