India - Pakistan Relations: Lessons of History, Perils in the Present

Sushant Sareen
Senior Fellow, VIF

Folklore, if not history, has it that the King of Delhi, Prithviraj Chauhan, worsted in battle the Afghan invader, Mohammed of Ghor, some 17 times. After each victory, Prithviraj acted graciously and with typical, if also entirely misplaced, Rajput chivalry and spared the adventurer from Ghor his life. Unfortunately, the ruler (and as increasingly seems to be the case post-independence, rulers) of Delhi never understood the driving force that prompted, nay compelled, the attacker from the North-West to keep trying his luck. Nor for that matter did the latter appreciate, let alone acknowledge, the gesture that was shown to him. That Mohammed of Ghor had no use for such senseless displays of chivalry became clear after he defeated Prithviraj. Not only did he carry Prithviraj into captivity as a trophy of war but also subjected him to the worst sort of torture. What followed was a sordid tale of ceaseless invasions and conquests for the next millennium.

Today, the rulers of Delhi are once again faced with a close to Prithviraj Chauhan like moment. The question is whether the historical blunders of the last millennium will once again be repeated, as it wasnot too long back in Shimla in 1972. Under the mistaken pretext that the time is ripe to reach out to the legatees of Ghor (after all doesn’t Pakistan still swear by the Afghan invaders, so much so that it has named its missiles Ghori, Ghazni and Abdali), the Indian leadership is being inveigled to make far reaching concessions and grand gestures in the fond hope that this will help in normalising relations with Pakistan. Alternatively, will the Indian leadership press home the advantage afforded by fortuitous circumstances and events (almost all of them the result of a blowback of Pakistan’s monumental folly of using terrorists as an instrument of state policy) and drive a hard bargain that secures India’s economic and political interests, guarantees its security, settles its borders, enhances its strategic outreach, and rids it of the constant needling and irritation that Pakistan has caused for the last 65 years. In other words, will India fall for the nonsense of not forcing a Versailles on Pakistan?

If the track record of the Manmohan Singh government is anything to go by, India will probably go the Prithviraj Chauhan way, ignoring not just the lessons of history but also cavalierly disregarding the continuing hostile actions emanating from Pakistan which are aimed at undermining India’s security and its economy. Quite aside the irony that even as the Pakistani foreign minister Hina Rabbani Khar underscored the need to ‘let bygones be bygones’ and ‘forge ahead without being held hostages to the past’ (alluding to the 26/11 terror attacks in Mumbai four years ago) she couldn’t resist mentioning the ‘K’ word (a 65 year old issue), the fact remains that Pakistan’s State and non-State actors have continued with their inimical actions against India. From pushing in narcotics (which is destroying an entire generation in Indian Punjab) to infiltrating terrorists and jihadists, from smuggling fake Indian currency notes (FICN) to recruiting young Indians to carry out Pakistan's murderous agenda, from instigating and inciting communal violence through its proxies to sponsoring anti-India and anti-Hindu propaganda, from providing sanctuary and support to anti-India groups to attacking Indian targets and development projects in Afghanistan, from trying to sabotage India’s diplomatic initiatives at the UN to using India’s neighbours like Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka to forge a front against India, Pakistan hostility towards India is unrelenting.

And yet, the Indian leadership’s unfathomable quest to embrace Pakistan, knows no limits. Admittedly, over the last few months, the Pakistanis have gone out of the way in talking sweetly to India. Statements of top Pakistani leaders – President Asif Zardari, Prime Ministers Yusuf Raza Gilani and Raja Pervez Ashraf, foreign minister Hina Rabbani Khar, leaders of parties which are partners in the ruling coalition as well as senior opposition politicians – have all been expressing their desire to improve relations with India. There has even been a softening in the line taken by the Pakistan army, as was evident in the statement of the army chief Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani during a visit to the Siachen sector. But notwithstanding all the nice words being mouthed, there is little on the ground to show that Pakistan has made a strategic shift.

When judged against the metrics that will actually demonstrate a paradigm shift in Pakistan's attitude and approach towards India – namely, handing over the most wanted terrorists who have been given refuge in Pakistan, ending the export of narcotics and FICN, providing India transit rights to Afghanistan and beyond, ensuring the end of ceasefire violations along the LoC, supporting India’s entry into the UN Security Council, dismantling the infrastructure of jihadist terrorism, reforming the school curricula by indoctrinates young children against India and Hindus, ceasing hostile propaganda and baseless allegations against India, and last but not the least, ending their irredentist claims on the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir and stopping the recruitment and incitement of Indian Muslims against their country – there is practically nothing that would indicate that indeed Pakistan has changed course on relations with India.

The only positive development has been trade front with Pakistan moving from the restricted positive list of tradable items to a negative list (comprising some 1200 products) and holding out the assurance of granting India MFN status by the end of the year. But even this move needs to be qualified. First and foremost, trade is not a concession, especially not if the side relaxing trade stands to gain much more. The most optimistic projections of Indo-Pak trade estimate that bilateral trade will touch $ 10 billion in the next five years or so. By this time India’s total foreign trade will be around $ 700-800 billion. In other words, trade with Pakistan will constitute a miniscule portion of India’s foreign trade, just around 1.5%. But in Pakistan’s case, trade with India will be over 10% of its total foreign trade. Secondly, and more importantly, by projecting trade as a huge concession, Pakistan is pushing India to make ‘concessions’ on issues like Sir Creek and Siachen as a quid pro quo. In fact, there seems to be a certain desperation on part of Pakistan to get India to abandon Siachen. Since there has been little give so far on these two issue from India, despite turn-the-other-cheek liberals pressing the government to give in, Pakistan has stalled all further progress on the trade front.

Clearly, the thinking in Pakistan was that it would be able to get the best of both worlds by liberalising trade with India – it would benefit from the trade and at the same time beguile India into surrendering territory. To an extent, the Pakistanis seemed to have been vindicated in this belief of theirs by the unnecessary euphoria that the opening up of trade generated among not only the Indian businessmen but also among a host of political leaders cutting across the political divide. Partly to keep Pakistan engaged and partly to oil the wheels of this trade, India has tried to generate goodwill by relaxing the visa regime making it easier for certain categories of people to travel across the Radcliffe line. Indian officials insist that proper safeguards have been built into the new visa regime, and that the introduction of business visas, tourist visas, spouse visas and visa on arrival for senior citizens and children will not compromise the security interests of the country. But given the state of affairs and the sort of pulls and pressures that are brought to bear on officials to grant visas to Pakistanis, the new visa regime doesn't inspire too much confidence. Quite simply, there is really no failsafe method of ensuring that undesirable elements dont come into India using the relaxed visa regime. For instance, it is an open secret that many Pakistani businessmen who are keen on trade with India are also big financiers of terror groups like the Jamaatud Dawa, Sipah-e-Sahaba, Jaish-e-Mohammed etc. Keeping an eye on all these characters and stopping their entry into India is easier said than done.

Much of the bonhomie on display by both India and Pakistan is aimed at paving the way for the visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Pakistan. His visit to his ancestral village Gah is being touted as a landmark in Indo-Pak relations and the spin doctors of the government are busy churning out a prodigal-son-returning-home sort of narrative. But given that no Napoleonic feat will be achieved during this visit, why anyone should be going so gaga over his visit to Gah is rather mind-boggling. If anything, it would seem that Manmohan Singh will go to the land of his birth bearing gifts that the land that gave him refuge after he was unceremoniously thrown out from what is now Pakistan (and as many Hindus today are being hounded and forced out) can ill afford to give. For their part, the Pakistanis are quite clear that India will have to compromise on issues like Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek and water for any forward movement in bilateral relations. None other than arguably the most well-informed Pakistani journalist, Najam Sethi, insisted on this in his TV talk show a day after the Indian foreign minister returned from his visit to Pakistan. And Sethi is supposed to be the liberal, modern, moderate voice in Pakistan!

Quite clearly, until Pakistan can get over its compulsive hostility of India, normalisation of relations between the two countries will remain a pipedream. But breaking with the past will require a complete overhaul of Pakistan, something that appears practically impossible. While India must keep lines of communication open, there is absolutely no reason for it to push for a negotiated settlement and that too on Pakistan’s terms, even less so at a time when Pakistan is on the ropes. Let India follow the Chinese maxim that if you sit long enough on the banks of a river you will watch the body of your adversary float by. At the same time, if Pakistan forsakes the use of Islamist terror and other forms of sabotage and subversion as an instrument of state policy against India and accepts the reality and existence of India, then it will find India a more than willing partner, one that will go the extra step like it has done in the case of Bangladesh.

Defence Reforms and Naresh Chandra Task Force Review

Vinod Anand
Senior Fellow, VIF

In May last year the government appointed a Task Force lead by Naresh Chandra and composed of 14 members to go into the recommendations and reassess the reforms required for improving the national security system. Over a decade back Kargil Review Committee had made many recommendations regarding defence reforms, revamping of India’s intelligence set up, internal security and border management. A large number of recommendations have been implemented over the years. However, some of the key recommendations like creating a Chief of Defence Staff have not been implemented; other recommendations like integrating Service HQs with the Ministry of Defence have only been paid a lip service to. The impetus for the defence reforms and some other reforms connected with intelligence and internal security had petered out when another strategic shock in the shape of Mumbai terror attacks of 26/11 was delivered. The Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence (SCD) in their report of February 2009 had lamented upon the lack of unified concept of command and lack of integration of intelligence effort besides making a host of other observations.

It also needs to be noted that the government has as yet not declassified the Naresh Chandra report. However, brief details of some of the recommendations made by the panel have appeared in the media.

Is Permanent Chairman of COSC an optimal Solution?

The Naresh Chandra panel has recommended a permanent chairman for the Chiefs of Staff Committee which is expected to bring a certain degree of stability to this post as the senior most chief used to be in the chair with, on many occasions, a limited tenure in his job. The post is to be staffed by a four star general for two years. This recommendation is definitely a climb down from the earlier GOM recommendation of the Chief of Defence Staff. The UPA government has been mentioning that a political consensus is being obtained after having written to all the political parties regarding instituting the post of CDS. The SCD of 15^th Lok Sabha in their second report (2009-2010) had again dwelt upon the need for CDS. Some relevant excerpts from the report are given below:

“ In the light of the fact that the Chairman of the COSC has no command and control authority over the Services other than his own, the Committee had expressed doubts over the efficacy of the system in emergent situations by ensuring quick response and coordinated action…. The Committee had recommended to take timely and appropriate steps to revise the composition of the COSC by creating a post of CDS to act as Chairman of COSC by evolving consensus on the issue. .. The Committee had also recommended to give appropriate authority to the Chairman COSC in the present set up to command and control the resources of the Defence Services whenever the situation so demands till such time the post of CDS is created.”

Therefore, it is quite evident that Naresh Chandra report’s recommendation should be treated only as an interim recommendation as the ultimate goal as suggested by SCD and earlier GOM report is to install a CDS. On the other hand there is also a view that due to lack of political consensus the recommendation for CDS can not be implemented in times to come and a permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee would be an optimal solution. However, as the Naresh Chandra report is not in the open domain and it is not clear as to what powers would be entrusted to the incumbent of the new post. Unless the permanent Chairman has appropriate budgetary and certain other command, control and coordination powers, giving a fixed tenure of two years may not serve much purpose. Further, the SCD had also observed that merely writing of letters by the Defence Minister to political parties was not enough; the issue could also be deliberated in the Parliament through various mechanisms available under the rules.

Integration of Services with the MOD merely Cosmetic

The Naresh Chandra Committee (NRC) has also recommended deputation of Army, Navy and Air Force officers to the MOD. This is by no means a new suggestion; this suggestion was given by the GOM Report and has been time and again pushed by the SCD. However, the record for the implementation such a recommendation has been less than satisfactory. For instance, the SCD of 14th Lok Sabha (currently it is 15^th Lok Sabha) had ‘strongly’’ recommended the change in MOD staffing patterns to ensure armed forces were ‘‘intrinsically involved in national security management and apex decision-making process’’.

Further, even the new SCD (of 15^th Lok Sabha) in its first report of December 2009 (after the current UPA government had taken over) had passed strictures against the non-representative nature of the cross-staffing pattern in the structure of HQ IDS which too is non-represented from Department of Defence (DoD), DRDO and MEA.

The staffing pattern in the MOD was recommended to be suitably modified so that the Armed Forces personnel of requisite expertise at the level of Joint Secretary/ Additional Secretary could be appointed. This was to ensure so that the Service HQs become intimately involved in national security management at the apex decision making processes. Thus NC report has merely repeated what has been earlier recommended many times. The moot point is whether the ‘babudom’ would implement this recommendation in letter and spirit. It also needs to be noted that a MOD official deposing before the SCD had categorically remarked that “Renaming of Army and Naval Headquarters as Integrated Headquarters is merely cosmetic, in the absence of posting of DoD cadre officers to Service Headquarters and vice versa, for participation in policy formulation.”

The NC panel has also stressed on the need for IAS and other officers running the MoD, the National Security Council and other departments responsible for internal and external security being specially trained for the purpose. The practice of generalist officers running everything under the sun needs to be stopped. This recommendation is full of merit and needs to be seriously put into practice.

Defence Planning; the Problems Persist

The NCR has made a number of recommendations regarding defence procurement, defence preparedness and connected issues, however most of the details of such suggestions have not been revealed to the public as yet. In April 2012, the Defence Acquisition Council headed by the Defence Minister, for the first time had approved the 12^th Services Capital Acquisition Plan (SCAP) and 15 years Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTTIP, 2012-2027) for the modernization of the armed forces. It needs to be noted that 10^th and 11^thFYDP had lapsed without being approved and the LTIPP approvals were also not forthcoming. Since the previous Army Chief brought to notice the lack of defence preparedness to include deficiencies in equipment and ammunition, the government shifted gear and embarked on plan approvals and has planned for fast track acquisitions of artillery guns, helicopters and other equipment and ammunition. The pressure on the government was also felt in the Parliament when both the Opposition Leader and ruling party leaders expressed similar views on the need for shoring up the national security and defence acquisitions.

However, the above measures do not absolve the government/MOD from the charge of resorting to ad hocism in defence planning. The SCD in its report of August 2011 had expressed its unhappiness over the adhocism in the whole planning process in Defence Ministry; the Committee had strongly recommended that LTIPP should be finalized without any further delay.

Further, the Defence Minister and MOD had averred that a National Security Strategy document would be made from which would flow out Defence Guidance and thereafter a National Military Strategy would be formulated that would be reflected in our defence plans. But this promise remains only on the paper; the SCD of 14^th Lok Sabha had deliberated on the issue however, now even the current SCD of 15^th Lok Sabha has gone silent on it.

Another issue which has not been paid attention to is the question of an ‘integrated’ perspective plan as it is well known that LTIPP is not an integrated plan but merely an aggregation of different services’ plans. Integration would mean sacrificing one service’s budget perhaps for the other service which cannot really happen given the current organizational structures. That is why a CDS with suitable authority has been talked about. As mentioned earlier, even the NC report’s recommendation of permanent COSC could be useful if he was given appropriate budgetary and coordination powers. For instance, a proposal for raising a Mountain Strike Corps in the North East by the Army has been recently sent back (after one year of consideration at the MOD/government level) for reappraisal by the COSC so that requirements of other services can also be taken into account. Under the present system there is bound to cause further delay and again delay would be further compounded by the fact that there is no common view on NSS and threat perceptions; every service considers its own media to be important and it is only in some rare case that there could be some via media or agreement.

Defence Procurement: Bedevilled by Delays

Our defence procurement system which has been modified and improved many times without resulting into any appreciable improvements on the ground. Our procurement system, organisations, procedures and mechanisms have not been able to fast track the acquisitions which the armed forces need to narrow the capability gap which exists with our potential adversaries. Last year, Comptroller and Auditor General castigated the entire arms procurement process and cited several incidents of inordinate delays. There have been unacceptable delays in obtaining critical air defence equipment and spares for damaged Israeli aerostat radars; the weapon packages for MIG-29Ks meant for our aircraft carrier were not finalised as a result they were delivered without weapon systems and because of poor monitoring and inadequate attention to contracts clauses additional problems arose in acquisition of Low-Level Transportable Radars.

As mentioned above the SCAP and LTIPP have been approved in April this year along with enhancing of financial powers of acquisition authorities in order to inject speed and flexibility in the procurement process. Defence Minister has also stated on the floor of Parliament that functionaries at Service HQ level have been delegated with financial powers to process procurement cases upto Rs.50 crore, Capital Cases above Rs.50 crore and upto Rs.75 crore are approved by Defence Secretary. There is a proposal also to increase the amount further

It is yet to be seen how the above proposals will fast track the proposed acquisitions.

However, in one of the controversial recommendations by the Naresh Chandra Committee it was proposed that the practice of blacklisting firms of suppliers should be discontinued. It has also suggested that the Prevention of Corruption Act be modified to give a certain degree of protection to officers dealing in defence purchases as there are possibilities of making 'an error of judgement'. This flies in the face of the procurement procedures which are based on the principles of probity, integrity and transparency and so on. Without doubt there is a need to streamline the procedures but including the above provisions would only add to more flaws and possibilities of wrong doing in the defence purchases.

NC Task Force has also recommended that situation where we need to import 70 percent of our military hardware needs to be rectified. These include a greater role in indigenous production of the private sector. The Defence Research and Development Organisation should work in closer cooperation with the armed forces than is the case at present. Not that these are original recommendations but nevertheless being a report to the government reiteration of such requirements possibly would motivate the decision makers earmark funds and efforts for achieving such long term goals.

Special Operations Command

Naresh Chandra panel has also recommended forming of a Special Operations Command to take under its wing the special forces of Army, Navy and Air Force. The objective is to have a synergetic application of forces for strategic tasks by bringing them together in a unified command and control structure; the SOC would be placed under the COSC. NC panel is of the view that India needs to enhance its unconventional and special warfare capabilities to execute poitico-military and connected operations to meet unconventional challenges. According to the report the full potential of the Special Forces is not being utilised, there fore the need for bringing them together and employing them for effective covert operations including counter-terror tasks. After the raid by the American Navy Seals on Osama Bin Laden’s hideout some of our military leaders had mentioned that similar raid could be carried out by our Special Forces. Perhaps with better training, technical and special equipment, weapon systems and ISR support our forces would be in a position to carry out such tasks.

Revamp of Intelligence and Cyber Space Protection

Coordination of intelligence and presenting one joint intelligence picture to the to the apex decision makers has been the bane of our intelligence processes, procedures and organizations. Naresh Chandra report has recommended a post of intelligence adviser to assist the National security Adviser; in addition it has recommended a National Intelligence Board (NIB) for coordination of intelligence. It needs to be noted that erstwhile Joint Intelligence Committee had been merged with the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS). The moot point is how would the functioning of new NIB be different from the existing set up in the NSCS?

Another issue which is acquiring alarming proportions is the question of cyber security with our critical infrastructure and other systems having already faced many cyber attacks over the last one year or so. The National Technical Research Organisation, Defence Intelligence Agency and Computer Emergency Response Teams at various levels need to be strengthened to face the challenges of Cyber War which goes on even during peace time. Cyber Jihad launched by some of the Pakistani based militant and terror groups in July-August 2012 to spread hate campaign against the people of North-East working in rest of India created panic and turmoil. Our response was slow and limited. While the need for a Cyber Command (on the similar lines to that of U.S. Cyber Command) to look after the military aspects of Cyber warfare has been felt there is also a requirement of a central entity/organization to coordinate the civilian efforts to protect the cyber space. At present there are over a dozen entities/organizations like Ministry for Home Affairs, Ministry of Communications and information Technology, the National Disaster Management Authority, National Information Board and Computer Emergency Response Teams at various levels besides some other have been tasked with looking after cyber security. They are inadequately staffed and insufficiently funded; needless to say there are turf battles and their mandate is inadequately defined. Thus, coordination of their efforts would lead to efficient management of and timely response to challenges in the cyber space.

Other Recommendations by Naresh Chandra TF

The report recommends many other measures to be taken to improve the internal security mechanisms. For counter terrorism it has recommended a National Counter Terrorism Centre (already recommended by the MHA), a National Intelligence Grid, strengthening of policing and distributed deployment of NSG.

The TF has emphasized on early setting up of much delayed project of establishing India’s National Defence University (INDU) and creation of a separate think-tank for internal security. Kargil Review Committee and GOM Report had also made similar recommendations for INDU; despite allotment of funds and land for the project nothing substantive seems to have been achieved so far even after lapse of over a decade.

Conclusion

Largely the Naresh Chandra Committee has made recommendations which have already been made by either the KRC or GOM or by the Standing Committee on Defence. Possibly there are other recommendations which are new but as the report is not in the public domain it would be difficult to evaluate the new aspects included in the report. However, the record of implementation of the recommendations by the government has been mixed. The report does serve the purpose of bringing into focus once again the inadequacies in our national defence and security system and thus the imperatives to rectify them. At the geo-political and geo-strategic level it does talk about challenges being posed by China and Pakistan on the military and security front and thus the need to be fully prepared to meet such challenges and threats arising from that direction. Periodical review of our defence preparedness and formulating our National security Strategy, Defence Planning Guidance and National Military Strategy in a formalized manner along with reappraisal of all the processes, structures and associated aspects is a must. Strengthening our military capabilities and internal security efforts are intricately linked with our broader political and economic objectives. If India has to survive as a modern and progressive nation that wishes to achieve its long-cherished goal of strategic autonomy, defence and security reforms have to be ushered in at a faster pace than hitherto before.

Granting PAK The Upper Hand

Kanwal Sibal
Member Advisory Board, VIF 

Another round of the India-Pakistan dialogue has been completed with External Affairs Minister Krishna’s visit to Islamabad on September 8. The agreement on relaxing the visa regime and holding the meeting of the Pakistan-India Joint Commission after a gap of 5 years seems consistent with our policy of making progress step-by-step in normalising our relations with Pakistan.

Dialogue

Pressing Pakistan again at Islamabad to expeditiously bring to justice those responsible for the Mumbai massacre apparently conveys that we are not relenting on this key demand for determining the pace at which our relations will move forward.

In reality, rather than this implying that India has the upper hand in dealing with Pakistan, it is actually the reverse. Pakistan has put us on the defensive, certainly vis a vis its own public opinion, by claiming that it has taken several steps to reach out to India, that it has moved away from its traditional positions in significant ways, but that it is India that is not reciprocating. This explains Pakistani Foreign Minister’s spurious talk about “serious signals”, “breaking away from many positions we have held” and “big leaps forward” and the “need to change the mindset”. The sub-text of such pronouncements is that India has entrenched attitudes.

Such claims by Pakistan are without substance. With its parliamentary resolution in April this year, Pakistan has retreated to its old mantra that the Kashmir issue should be resolved on the basis of UN resolutions. Pakistan wants us to withdraw from Siachen, it will not agree to a rational compromise on Sir Creek and it will not end its decades old opposition to the Wullar Barrage. It covers up its uwillingness to act against the anti-India jihadi groups on its territory by the phony argument that it is itself a victim of terrorism. It will not put curbs on Hafiz Saeed as sufficient evidence to arraign him in a law court is supposedly lacking. Its record of legal inaction against the perpetrators of the Mumbai carnage is there to see.

The irony is that barring India’s demands on terrorism, the agenda of normalisation rests on India satisfying Pakistan’s demands. Pakistan wants us to demonstrate our commitment to peace by conceding what it wants, failing which the “naysayers” in Pakistan will presumably continue to consider India a threat. We should ask Pakistan to act on the basis of the glib statement by Foreign Minister Khar at Islamabad that “whatever has happened today is the past”. Pakistan should, accordingly, cease making untenable territorial claims on J&K and stop calling for- in the face of India’s known position- associating the “Kashmiri people” with the Indo-Pakistan dialogue on Kashmir. One would hope that the next time she or the Pakistani Foreign Secretary comes to Delhi she will, abiding by her own sane advice, shed past habits of confabulating provocatively with Hurriyet leaders in Delhi.

The joint statement says, somewhat cryptically, that the two sides reaffirmed the importance of abiding by the provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). Pakistan would have wanted this inclusion, but India seems to have worked on the language to deflect any finger-pointing in its direction. Pakistan has created an impression amongst its public that India is depriving it of its due share of water, making the issue another focal point of hostility towards India. It is determined to prevent India from constructing run of the river projects on the Jhelum provided for by the IWT by seeking international arbitration on the Kishenganga project. Again, it is Pakistan that is objecting to what India is legally doing, not India raising contentious issues with Pakistan about its projects on the rivers allocated to it.

Terrorism

India is legitimately asking Pakistan to curb terrorism from its soil directed at India. It is right in asking Pakistan to prove the anti-terrorist credentials it claims for itself by not endlessly delaying the trial of those responsible for the Mumbai attack. It is truly astonishing that the pert Pakistani Foreign Minister should be “appalled” when told terrorism continues to be an issue, that this is “old time” stuff, that “terrorism was a mantra of the past”, not of the future and that India should view the Mumbai attack trial “realistically” and “not emotionally”. Equally extraordinarily, she spoke about terrorism as a dated issue on the day the US declared the Haqqani group sheltering in Pakistan and linked to the ISI as a terrorist outfit.

PM Visit

The disconnect at the political level in Pakistan between the reality of the country’s terrorist affiliation and any honest recognition of it is staggering. She, of course, failed to mention the word terrorism in her joint press conference with Minister Krishna, laying bare the scant regard Pakistan pays to our claim that we raise the issue at “every conceivable opportunity”.

Minister Khar’s position on terrorism hardly opens the door for PM’s visit to Pakistan, as he wants Pakistan to make credible progress on trying those guilty of Mumbai, besides some substantive results such as an agreement on Sir Creek. While the trade opening has occurred because of Pakistan’s dire economic situation and the visa regime relaxation benefits Pakistan much more, progress in both areas should be welcomed. Time is not, however, ripe for PM’s visit, as Pakistan wants to close the terrorism and Mumbai chapter without real delivery. Minister Khar’s egregious statements make this abundantly clear. Even with regard to PM’s visit, by pressing for it Pakistan has put us on the defensive. We are now squirming to explain why, despite his keenness to visit Pakistan; he cannot do so for the moment. We are both laying conditions for the visit and denying any are being laid.

Genuflecting before Pakistan

Satish Chandra
Distinguished Fellow, VIF

The Indian external affairs minister’s visit to Pakistan from September 7-9 epitomised India’s composite re-engagement with Pakistan. It flies in the face of the assurances provided by the prime minister in his address to the Lok Sabha on July 29th that India “can have a meaningful dialogue with Pakistan only if they fulfil their commitment, in letter and spirit, not to allow their territory to be used in any manner for terrorist activities against India.”

Krishna’s visit to Pakistan marks the culmination of two rounds of comprehensive talks between the two countries decided upon during the February 2011 foreign secretary-level talks in Thimphu. During his visit to Islamabad Krishna not only had discussions with his counterpart but also had meetings with the president, the prime minister, the interior minister and with leaders of political parties like the MQM, ANP and the PMLN. The visit was also marked by the signing of a liberalised visa agreement, a cultural agreement and a meeting of the India-Pakistan Joint Commission that was last held in 2007. The joint commission identified areas of cooperation in the fields of agriculture, education, environment, health, information, Information Technology and telecom, science and technology, and tourism. A series of measures were also agreed upon for easing travel and trade across the line of control. It was further decided that the next round of the secretary-level comprehensive dialogue process be launched that will come up for ministerial level review in New Delhi in 2013.

The lengthy 28 paragraph joint statement states that the talks were held in a ‘cordial, candid and constructive atmosphere’ and that there were ‘substantive discussions on the whole range of issues within the framework of the dialogue process’ with the ministers ‘expressing satisfaction over the progress achieved since their last review meeting in July 2011’. While there may have not been forward movement on many important issues like terrorism, Sir Creek and Siachen, the talks were cordial and wide ranging which is inexplicable in the light of the assurances given by PM in the Lok Sabha and given Pakistan’s continued hostility towards India.

Evidence of Pakistan’s inimical attitude towards India after the 26/11 attacks is borne out not only by its failure to make any serious efforts to bring to book the perpetrators but also by continued involvement in terrorist actions against India, like the Pune bombings of February 13, 2010 resulting in 17 deaths, the Mumbai serial blasts of July 13, 2011 resulting in 18 deaths and the Delhi High Court bombings of September 7, 2011 resulting in 11 deaths. Indeed, Abu Jindal’s debriefings confirm that Pakistan continues to plan similar terrorist actions against India. The resumption of cross-LoC firing by Pakistan, which had been stopped by Musharraf, continued terrorist infiltration from across the LoC, the relentless and massive pumping in of fake currency by Pakistan into India, the revival of its support to the Babbar Khalsa, its refusal to hand over to India any of the nearly 50 wanted terrorists, like Dawood Ibrahim, to whom its provides shelter, and its unwillingness to shut down the infrastructure of terror are proof that it means to continue to use terror against India in a ‘business as usual’ mode.

To add insult to injury the Pakistan foreign minister in an interview just before our external affairs minister’s visit urged that India should look at the 26/11 attacks “unemotionally”, drawing a parallel between them and the attacks on the Samjhauta Express and the 1971 conflict. This insensitivity was further reinforced in the joint press conference addressed by the two foreign ministers when she asserted that the two sides “should not be held hostage to history” but should look to the future.

Instead of challenging the Pakistan foreign minister at the joint press conference for the aforesaid comments and underlining the critical importance of addressing our terrorism-related concerns Krishna not only complimented the Pakistani leadership for bringing about “a positive change in the atmosphere” but echoed her thinking by stating “let us not look back, as you have very rightly said; let us not be held hostage to whatever has happened earlier…….Let us look to the future”. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Pakistani media has drawn the conclusion that India no longer attaches the importance it earlier did to bringing to book those involved in the Mumbai attacks.

It is logical to assume that it is only a matter of time before the PM who is “keen” to visit Pakistan will do so. Though prior to his departure in an interview to the Express Tribune the external affairs minister had stated that the “right atmosphere” would have to be created for it and that it should have a “substantive outcome” in Pakistan, in the joint press conference in Islamabad while not indicating any date for the visit he asserted that there was no question of progress on the 26/11 attacks being a condition for PM’s visit to Pakistan. Clearly, the government seems to have given up all pretence of pressurising Pakistan to give up the use of terror as an instrument of foreign policy against us.

PM’s visit to Pakistan irrespective of whether or not Pakistan addresses our concerns on terrorism is supported by some in India on the grounds that it would provide an impetus to the current upturn in ties and would strengthen the hands of the civilian set up in that country. In this context, it may be mentioned that the upturn in ties is an illusion based on sweet nothings mouthed by Pakistan and our failure to retaliate against its many provocations. It tactically suits Pakistan to maintain this illusion as it is isolated and as this illusion deflects the pressure on it to shut down the infrastructure of terror.

Forward movement on trade by Pakistan, which is acclaimed as a sign of its positivity, has been long delayed and tardy and is, primarily, in its own interests. To date it has not accorded us the MFN status, which we did in the mid 1990s. It still maintains a negative list of nearly 1,200 items, allows movement of only about 200 items through land, and does not permit us transit rights for overland exports to Afghanistan. As regards the civilian government in Pakistan, our investing in it is pointless since it does not exercise real power, it will have to demit office latest by March 2013, and, in the ultimate analysis, it is also imbued with an anti-Indian mindset.

A Relook at the Three Pillars of the State: Wisdom by Hindsight

Dr. M.N. Buch

Visiting Fellow, VIF

Of the three pillars of the State, the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary the task of the Executive is perhaps the most arduous. The Legislature is answerable only to itself and to the electorate. The Legislature can make and break a government and when this is done by due process it is legitimate. When, however, this is done through dubious means which have come to prevail since 1967, when for the first time legislators were purchased and thus induced to defect, resulting in the legitimately elected governments falling and power passing to those who had purchased it by arranging defections, it is totally reprehensible. The entire history of corruption as it affects us today dates back to that fateful period in 1967 when in States such as Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh governments were bought and sold. The legislators suddenly found that they command a price and this could only be paid through the wholesale corruption which became possible only by subverting the State and its institutions. The process brought the legitimacy of government itself into question and it certainly brought the Legislature, both at the Centre and the States, under a cloud which is refusing to lift.

The judiciary is in the happy state of enjoying total autonomy in which whereas there is a hierarchical judicial accountability, there is very little internal administrative accountability up to the level of District Judge and virtually no internal or external administrative accountability so far as the High Courts and the Supreme Court are concerned. Because the process of impeachment of a judge ultimately rests in Parliament, as was proven in the Justice Ramaswami case even a judge found guilty of various misdemeanours by a properly constituted tribunal could not be removed because the Congress Party played foul and the requisite majority for passing of the impeachment motion could not be mustered. Theoretically even if a judge is convicted of a heinous offence and sentenced to a long term of imprisonment he will continue in office if the necessary majority cannot be ensured in Parliament to have an impeachment motion carried. Therefore, the conscience of the judges apart, there is no one on earth to whom a judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court is accountable.

This brings us to the Executive. At the political level the Executive, that is, the Council of Ministers, is collectively responsible to the House of the People under Article 75 (3) of the Constitution, with the House having the power to remove the government by adopting a motion of no confidence. The Council of Ministers advises the President on how the Executive government will be conducted and the Executive government itself then functions as per the Rules of Business approved by the President under Article 77. Incidentally, under Part VI of the Constitution whatever applies to the Central Executive also applies mutatis mutandis to the State Executive. The Executive power vests in the President and he exercises this power through officers appointed by him under Article 53 of the Constitution and Part XIV of the Constitution. The permanent Executive, that is, the officers who implement the decisions of government, is organised into Services under Part XIV of the Constitution, with selection to the Services being done as per the provisions of Chapter 2 of Part XIV. The structure of the Services is hierarchical and, therefore, every official is accountable to his immediate superior and through him right up to the senior most person in his Service or his department. For the organised Services this accountability is virtually daily and continuous and an official who is unable to discharge his duty is liable to disciplinary action. The Conduct Rules, Disciplinary Rules, etc., are all framed to provide a framework within which the Services will act and be called to account for their actions. These officials, therefore, are accountable to their superiors and the ministers and can lose their jobs if they are found to be guilty of misdemeanour after a proper departmental enquiry. Neither the Legislature nor the Judiciary is subjected to this type of accountability, especially at the level of the higher Judiciary.

What are the functions of the Executive government? Under the definition given in the Chambers Twenty-first Century Dictionary one meaning given to the Executive is “the branch of government that puts laws into effect”. This is an excellent definition of the Executive. The implementation of laws, therefore, is the primary function of the Executive and whereas it is the Legislature which gives the framework of laws, it is the Executive which takes all the necessary decisions to implement the laws. A start has to be made with the Constitution itself, which is the fundamental law of the country. Therefore, the Executive has to take action to ensure social, economic and political justice and zealously guard the liberty of the citizen and ensure him equality of status and opportunity. The Executive has to take action to ensure that no citizen is discriminated against on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. It has to ensure that untouchability is not practised and that the protection under Article 19, especially to move freely throughout the territory of India, to reside and settle in any part of India and to practise any lawful profession and carry on any lawful trade or business is fully available to all citizens. The Executive must also strive to make the Directive Principles of State Policy an integral part of the business of government, which means that the Executive must secure a social order for the promotion of the welfare of the people. In other words, the protection of the people and the promotion of their welfare becomes a fundamental duty of the Executive. All this is possible only if there is an environment of law and order, public security and freedom of the citizen from fear. It is the duty, constitutionally and legally, of the Executive to ensure that such a climate of security is created. If one single citizen of India lives in fear then the State has failed in its duty.

Every business house functions with the objective of maximising profit and obtaining the highest possible return on investment. There is nothing intrinsically wrong or immoral in maximising profit, but in business terms it means an excess of income over expenditure. Everything in business is amenable to a cost benefit analysis in monetary terms and that activity which does not yield a monetary profit would come within the definition of bad business practice. The objective of government is to maximise welfare. Welfare entails the health, comfort, happiness and general well-being of people at large, welfare economics means equitable distribution of the Gross Domestic Product to the best advantage of people at large and the promotion of welfare uses welfare economics to maximise the welfare of the citizens. Health care of citizens, provision of social security, development of an educational system which extends the benefit of quality education to the least privileged child, elimination of malnutrition and hunger, providing directly or facilitating gainful employment, providing adequately for the defence of the country against foreign aggression and internal disturbance are all the legitimate concerns of the State in general and the Executive in particular. Many of the measures which are to be undertaken for this purpose will not pass a commercial cost benefit analysis. Quite often welfare is not quantifiable, though there are objective and subjective tests which can help us in determining whether maximum benefit is being delivered by the Executive.

Let us take a few examples Tamil Nadu pioneered the mid-day meal programme and is running the only successful example of this programme in India. Because the programme is being run efficiently over a million children in school get a nutritious diet, the school drop-out rate has substantially reduced and level of nutrition in Tamil Nadu is better than in any other State. It a fully subsidised programme, ultimately paid for by the tax payer. No private business establishment would take up such a programme because it does not yield monetary profit. But what about the social benefit which flows from it? Should not that be taken into account when assessing the programme?

Let us take another programme, that of providing housing and house sites to the poor. The jhugi- jhopdi resettlement scheme of the Delhi Development Authority is an example of providing a house site, with some services to, the squatter population of a city. Certainly the opportunity cost of land given to the squatters is not taken into account and in purely monetary terms people with no legal entitlement are thereby given a house site whose present value is a multiple of what that land cost when it was initially developed. Why only squatter colonies? Almost the entire programme of providing housing for the economically weaker sections, lower income groups and middle income groups, who were provided land and built houses at minimum, affordable cost throughout India has always been a welfare programme. Whole cities have developed because the State provided the development inputs to the cities. The present value of land in these cities and towns and of the land under the areas colonised for EWS, LIG, MIG beneficiaries would run into absolutely astronomical figures before which the estimates of CAG of losses in 2G Spectrum allocation and allotment of coal blocks would pale into insignificance. Are we to apply commercial norms to these welfare decisions of the Executive, ex post facto and to indict them for causing loss? Not if one looks at the duty of the Executive as one to promote welfare.

Let us take another example and that is industrial development. When the process of planning began one of the objectives of government was to create an environment and to provide the land and infrastructure which could promote the development of industry in India. Our major hydro electric and thermal power projects, the huge new capital industries of steel, aluminum, fertilisers, machine tools, etc, were heralded as the new temples of India. All over the world industrial area and estates were developed where land, power, water, roads and other infrastructures were provided to industry at highly subsidised rates. Prior to 1947 India had some industries but was not an industrial power. After 1951 there was no holding back of industry. Would that have been possible if the State had not provided? Would that have been possible had the State not formulated an appropriate policy and the Executive not provided the base on which industry grew?

Our great institutions of learning -- the Indian Institutes of Technology, Indian Institutes of Management, the Agriculture Universities, our magnificent Medical Colleges such as AIIMs, PGIEMR, Chandigarh and Pondicherry, the Indian Institutes of Information Technology, the Central Universities and the State Universities -- would not have come into being if the State had not invested in them and the Executive not created the necessary infrastructure. The intervention of the State and the process of Executive decision making have given India the foundations of a higher educational system which is as good as anything which can be found anywhere in the world. Commercially these decisions may not be viable but the national assets that we have created are beyond valuation.

Let us now go to the other end of the spectrum. Rural electrification by itself, especially in remote areas, is not a commercially viable proposition. However, rural electrification has certainly transformed the agricultural scene because with availability of power lift irrigation throughout the country has become both feasible and viable. Crores of pump sets are lifting water to bring irrigation to fields which would otherwise have remained dry. A subsidy is paid to the farmer by way of cheap power and the State is bearing the subsidy. Can such an Executive decision be faulted because it is probably costing State a great deal on a daily basis? What about the fundamental change which it has brought about in agriculture and the prosperity that it has extended to rural masses in far flung areas?

Very early under British rule, especially after the Crown took over the Government of India from the East India Company and assumed direct rule, it was decided that it was the duty of the government to look after the people in times of famine and scarcity. The Famine Code was drawn up sometime in the 1860s, to be succeeded by the Scarcity Manual which operates even today. The Collector of the District would do an annual or seasonal crop review and determine whether it was a year of scarcity or not. Thereafter relief works would be started and employment provided to indigent rural people. Today the programme is supplemented by such schemes as the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, now renamed after Mahatma Gandhi, the Watershed Management Programme, the Integrated Rural Development Programme and other schemes aimed at improving the rural economy, providing better health care, promoting women and child development and various other schemes for the welfare of the people. These are all programmes mandated at the political level but implemented by the Executive. Are we to stop such programmes because the Executive thereby causes a drain of the public exchequer which is not recouped by commercial means? Even in a purely capitalist, free market economy such as the United States, when the economy began to collapse the government intervened and virtually nationalised banks, investment companies and various financial institutions in order to protect the people. The Executive will continue to take decisions and must continue to do so for promoting the welfare of the people even if it means that valuable land is virtually gifted away and budgetary support for welfare schemes is increased. To bring every decision of the Executive under the scanner of commercial viability is to sound the death knell of effective Executive government.

Even in the two worst cases for which government is facing so much opposition, the 2G Spectrum allocation and coal block allotment, we need to objectively bring the matter into a more balanced perspective. The argument that at a certain stage in the development of our telecommunication system allotment of spectrum without auction was appropriate because if that had not been done mobile telephony would not have achieved the present heights has validity. This issue needs to be looked at objectively and not necessarily through the prism of the audit report. If there is wrongdoing then let us punish the guilty, but let us not reject the policy without understanding all its implications. In the matter of coal block allotment two issues have to be separated. If it is decided to have coal based thermal power generation, then the proposed power station must have captive coal mines. Government through a transparent process can determine the tariff for coal, but no loss as such can be assumed merely because the mine was not auctioned. Without the coal power plants could not have been made operational at Sasan and Chittarangi and there is evidence to believe that these power plants will soon be operational. Every allotment made to a power company or an industry in which coal is an important input, in which the industry has taken all the necessary steps to go into production in the near future, should be deemed to be a valid allotment. Coal blocks allotted to dubious companies which have taken no obvious steps to activate the mine and to use the coal for productive purposes must be cancelled. In every single case where a coal block is allotted on political considerations the allotment should be cancelled. In every case where there is collusion punitive action must be taken, but if as a result of this government stops developing the coal sector it would be a tragedy.

The following lessons have to be learnt from the recent development in which CAG has been active, Parliament is not allowed to function, the press and electronic media have a field day and the Executive has become so scared of its own shadow that government has virtually ceased to function. That is what the Washington Post article literally states. Instead of being annoyed with a newspaper for writing something which is largely true the Government of India should now do a great deal of introspection and take all the necessary steps needed to activate the Executive and to make it function boldly but honestly. Let us cut all favouritism and nepotism out of the system and let the Executive perform its function of promoting welfare and governing firmly and purposefully.