VIF Delegation’s Visit To Israel

A VIF delegation led by Gen (Retd) N C Vij, former Chief of Army Staff and Dean, Centre for Defence Studies, VIF; Lt. Gen. (Retd) R. K. Sawhney, former Deputy Chief of Army Staff and Distinguished Fellow, VIF and C D Sahay former Secretary, R&AW and Distinguished Fellow, VIF visited Israel from August 27-30, 2013 at the invitation of Galilee International Management Institute (GIMI) to participate in a security seminar.

The GIMI delegation was led by Chairman Maj. Gen. (Retd) Baruch Levy and the Institute Director Joseph Shevel and included a range of experts on strategic issues, Middle East and Gulf/ West Asian affairs. The VIF delegation focused its formal presentations on the Security Scenario in South and South East Asia, developments in Afghanistan and implications of growth of Islamic fundamentalism/ global terrorism as well as security and economic challenges in the Indian Ocean and Asia Pacific regions.

Besides attending the seminar at the GIMI, the VIF delegation also had extremely useful discussions with a team of professional at the Center for Policy Research, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with the Director General, Ministry of International Affairs and Strategy in the office of the Prime Minister. The discussions were extremely interesting and informative.

It may be recalled that earlier in April 2013, a delegation of GIMI had paid a similar visit to VIF.

Should the Indian and Pak PMs meet in New York?

Kanwal Sibal, 

Dean, Centre for International Relations and Diplomacy, VIF

Whether the Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, should meet his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, in New York in September has become a politically controversial issue. The government is being cautious in not ruling in or out such a meeting at this stage, hoping that between now and late September, the surrounding circumstances may change for the better, making the meeting politically less risky in the background of the public agitation over the killing of five Indian soldiers on the Line of Control, and the government’s shaky handling of the Defence Minister’s statement on the incident in the Lok Sabha.

Clearly, the minister’s first statement, casting doubts on whether the regular troops from Pakistan were involved in the killing, was intended to keep open the doors not only for the New York meeting but also the resumption of the composite dialogue prior to that, for which suitable dates were being considered. The second statement accusing Pakistan’s military of direct involvement, followed by giving the Indian military a free hand in responding to Pakistan’s cease-fire violations, has, naturally, complicated the political choreography of dialogue resumption, with the postponement of some envisaged secretary level-meetings as the first casualty.

It is apparent that Nawaz Sharif’s election raised hopes of better relations with Pakistan, especially as improvement of ties with India figured in his party’s election manifesto and his post-election statements on expanding economic cooperation and expediting the trial of those involved in the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks struck the right chords. These positive perspectives evidently prompted our Prime Minister to send his special envoy to meet Nawaz Sharif even before he formally took office, a gesture reciprocated by the latter through sending his special envoy to Delhi with the message that all stake-holders in Pakistan — meaning the military — were on board on improving ties with India.

The positive momentum of these early moves has, however, been reversed by subsequent developments. They have raised the question of whether the early optimism on our side was justified in the light of our frustrating experience of decades in dealing with Pakistan, the structural impediments that exist there in normalizing ties, and the long-standing links of Nawaz Sharif and his party with jihadi organizations. To this must be added the region’s changing geo-political scenario with American overtures to the Taliban and its renewed recognition of the Pakistan military’s crucial role in facilitating an orderly American withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Already, under Nawaz Sharif’s very brief watch, many negative events have occurred, raising questions of whether we can count on him to control sufficiently the various elements in the body-politic of Pakistan in disagreement with his perceived positive agenda towards India: his political support base, extremist religious organisations, the military and the bureaucracy. For over a decade, Pakistan has been accusing our consulate in Jalalabad of supporting the insurgency in Balochistan. The Pakistani foreign office’s reaction to the Ramban incident in Kashmir was deliberately couched in religiously provocative terms in demanding an Indian inquiry into reports of desecration of the Quran.

Nawaz Sharif has been saying repeatedly that he intends to focus on resolving the Kashmir problem, describing Kashmir as Pakistan’s “jugular vein” in his first address to the nation and equating it with the economy as the two priority issues. Such rhetoric cannot but fire up popular anti-Indian sentiments and demands of “progress” on Kashmir to Pakistan’s satisfaction. In June, the numbers for infiltration across the LoC and of terrorists killed went up considerably. The political atmosphere has been worsened by Pakistan’s parliament passing two anti-Indian resolutions in the last few days on cease-fire violations, countered by an Indian parliamentary resolution declaring that the whole of the state of Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India, with Pakistan illegally occupying a part of it.

On top of it, Pakistan’s finance minister has announced that the grant of ‘Most Favoured Nation’ (MFN) status to India is not under consideration. Pakistan was supposed to grant it last December, but decided to delay formalizing the decision till after the elections. Nawaz Sharif’s declared commitment to expand economic ties with India would have gained credibility if he had quickly closed the MFN chapter. That the Urdu translation of MFN makes the issue politically sensitive is a dishonest excuse. The latest Pakistani strategem to gain time is to leave business bodies on both sides to discuss the issue and allay the concerns of sectors in Pakistan that fear competition from India, following which the way would have been paved for the grant of MFN status. The issue could well get tagged to the resumption of the dialogue process, which means that it will get further complicated politically.

To cap it all, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa has received sizable funding from the Punjab government headed by Nawaz Sharif’s brother for charitable works, even though it and its leader, Hafiz Saeed, are on the United Nations list of terrorist organizations. Showing disdain for Indian sensitivities about his persona, his anti-India tirades and his involvement in the Mumbai attacks, Hafiz Saeed was allowed to lead the Eid prayers in Lahore in the Gaddafi stadium. Nawaz Sharif has also failed to initiate any new step to bring to justice those responsible for the Mumbai attacks.

When these facts are mentioned by a group of experts to advise the government not to show undue anxiety for a meeting at the prime-ministerial level in New York and for resuming the composite dialogue, as we would be playing into Nawaz Sharif’s hands and giving him in advance what he wants without any positive action on his part to set the stage for a renewed engagement, a former media adviser to the Prime Minister, representing the most puerile position of professional peaceniks in India, descends to a new low in making personal attacks against what he calls the “Punish Pakistan” school, questioning their professional integrity instead of refuting their arguments.

The fact is that Nawaz Sharif has presided over several negative developments, which, if overlooked, would signal that India is once again willing to tolerate Pakistan’s provocations without any dissuasive diplomatic or other response. If such indulgence has not produced any significant result so far, why persist in failed policies? When this is said, the ideological peaceniks distort the debate with imaginary accusations that those advocating a tougher approach to Pakistan are advocating war and that the call for thrashing Pakistan as an errant schoolboy will make India just like Pakistan — home to jingoism, xenophobia and rough patriotism.

This kind of intellectual chicanery is deplorable, as postponing the proposed meeting of the prime ministers at New York, delaying the resumption of the composite dialogue, seeking an end to state-sponsored terrorism and legal action against the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks, restoring the link between dialogue and terrorism, pressing for curbs on Hafiz Saeed, insisting on MFN status as a gauge of Pakistan’s readiness to normalize trade ties, retaliating locally against Pakistan’s ceasefire violations are the many steps in our panoply that can be taken. These are not acts of war against Pakistan, and only those with no grounding in diplomacy can be so obtuse to think that they are.

Biden’s India Visit – Points to Ponder Over

Prabhat P Shukla 

(Joint Director, VIF)

Vice President Joe Biden was in India for four days in July, visiting Delhi and Mumbai. The visit got less than the usual level of media exposure than high-level visits from the US normally attract. This was effectively the second visit at this level since Independence, not counting the visit of Hubert Humphrey for Shastri’s funeral, and therefore a purely protocol affair. Then it was Vice President George HW Bush who visited India in 1984. And now, after a gap of almost three decades, Vice President Biden came visiting.

Whatever the reason for the low-key treatment of the visit, it deserved more attention, not so much for the discussions in Delhi, but for a noteworthy speech he delivered in Mumbai. This was made before a gathering of business persons, but covered more than the normal fare at business gatherings.

Two important points were made by Biden, among several others of course, that need attention, both in the public discourse and among the officials dealing with the US. For some time now, the dominant one-word summation of the Indo-US relationship has been stagnation. There appears to be a resignation, on both sides, that nothing more can happen until a new Government takes office in Delhi. This is probably true, but not because of any calculations or policies, or even compulsions – it is more a function of this Government being unable to muster up the intellectual energy to address the emerging opportunities in the India-US relationship.

And that is what the two openings mentioned by Biden are about. The first was about the “rebalance” towards Asia, and the second was about the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Both of these require some elucidation.

Biden was up-front in telling the audience that India was an indispensable element in the rebalance. This is something we have been hearing from American leaders for some time now. What is not clear – at least in the public domain or even in Track II exchanges – is what this means in terms of detail or action. But first, it is important also to note that Biden waded into the internal debate here by adding that there was no contradiction between strategic autonomy and strategic partnership. This is an important practical point, because in India, the view seems to dominate that nonalignment – 1.0 or the new, improved version 2.0 – is the key to strategic autonomy.

In point of historical fact, this is not true; Indira Gandhi enhanced her strategic autonomy by signing the Indo-Soviet Treaty in 1971. Without that, India would have been restricted in its actions even as events hurtled towards war in the subcontinent. Of course, we all made statements that nonalignment was not affected by the Treaty, but for that brief period of 1971-72, India was aligned with the Soviet Union – and a good thing it was too. The Treaty formally ran on until 1991, but had lost much of its strategic value by the mid-1970’s. Similarly, Nehru was all too willing to jettison nonalignment in the face of the Chinese aggression in 1962, by asking for not just US military equipment, but even personnel to man the weaponry. It was, in fact, so much the subject of controversy within Indian political circles that many of the Americans, who visited India with different missions to extend military and other aid, were plied with this very question – was America bent upon India giving up nonalignment?

To the fear that the US was keen to steal the nonaligned crown jewels under the guise of military assistance, the US Ambassador in India then, JK Galbraith, put his thinking with his characteristic mix of frankness and acerbity. He wrote the following passage to his President and repeated it to any questioner from the Indian press, though this last he did with a little more finesse:

If the Chinese should really come down the mountain in force, there will be more political changes here. Much so-called nonalignment [has already gone] out the window... Popular opinion and our military assistance has worked a further and major impairment. The problem in face of a really serious attack would be how we would react to the prospect of a new, large and extremely expensive ally. I personally hope the Chinese do not force this choice. The Indians are busy worrying about the end of nonalignment. It is we that should be doing the worrying on this. [Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal; letter to President Kennedy on 13 November 1962]

These are home truths that we need to ponder even today, for we seem to be agonising over the same issues. Putting aside the question of nonalignment, what really needs an answer is – just how much autonomy does India have at the moment? It is unable to take even basic measures in defence of its own security in the face of Chinese and even Pakistani provocations. This is what Galbraith meant when he described India as an “extremely expensive” ally. And we really ought not to have too many illusions regarding continuity and change since those times. In the polite terms employed in the Asia-Pacific Region, the code word for the same syndrome is that India needs to be a “net provider of security”. But that can only happen once we have the means and the will to provide for our own security. The bitter reality is that there is not much strategic autonomy we are exercising in producing dossier after dossier on the Mumbai terror attacks, only to have them rejected with disdain by the recipient.

This should be the basis of the dialogue with America on the issue of the rebalance. Whereas America is seeing India as the indispensable partner in adding to the economic and military strength in the Western Pacific, we have serious issues on our land frontiers where we are facing military and sub-conventional pressure simultaneously on two fronts. A serious partnership would need to address these concerns of ours just as much as the concerns of our putative partners in the Pacific.

To spell this out in some detail: one small step that can quite easily be taken by our partners, for which the US would have to provide the lead, would be to adopt clear positions on the Indian territorial claims vis-a-vis both China and Pakistan. In 1962, at the height of the war, the US made a formal declaration through the Embassy in Delhi that it recognised the McMahon Line. It is time now to come down on India’s side in the western sector – Aksai Chin – as well.

Similarly, the Line of Control with Pakistan needs to be extended from beyond where it was left off in 1949 – Pt NJ 9842. It is time for America to extend recognition to the Actual Ground Position Line along the Saltoro Ridge. This is both the legally correct position, and accurate from the viewpoint of the ground reality. And yet, American maps continue to depict the line as joining the current end point of the LoC to the Karakoram Pass – for reasons that nobody can explain.

Understanding on these issues is important for India, and it is to be hoped that it is also important for those in America who believe that India needs to be part of their Asia-Pacific strategy. And to be blunt about it, it is not any atavistic attachment to nonalignment that is holding India back, but the fact that our security concerns are not being addressed in the framework of this pivot.

The second major point in the remarks by Biden concerns the Trans-Pacific Partnership. This proposal has been under discussion for some years now, and most of the large economic players in the region are in it. Japan, Canada, and Mexico have all signed on in recent months, while China is out. The project looks well set to become a reality, though it will take time for the negotiations to be completed.

First, of course, we need to be certain as to what the remarks made by Biden actually portend. The formulation used by Biden falls short of inviting India to join, but that could be a conscious decision to couch it in terms that do not embarrass India into taking a position – just as the pivot appears to be doing. But they were sufficiently clear for the Chinese press to take note and to conclude that India was being invited to join the TPP. Nonetheless, the burden of comment in the Chinese press maintains, India will not abandon its nonalignment and become a strategic ally of America, in part because it also fears that America will abandon the pivot and set up a G2 with China.

None of this is to say that the TPP will make easy progress. And as far as India and America are concerned, we have not even been able to work out an investment treaty so far. Moreover, American positions on outsourcing and visas for Indians are incomprehensible, especially for a country that touts the benefits of free trade. The known clauses of the proposed TPP – for the details are closely held – also suggest that India will have difficulties with some of the commitments on labour standards, on environmental obligations and on intellectual property issues. Granting all of this, it is still at least worth India’s while to take the dialogue forward. Several of the current negotiating members of the TPP began by becoming observers in the dialogue. This should certainly be something for India to consider favourably too.

We also need to understand that our current economic slow-down is not one that will be fixed easily or quickly, notwithstanding the positive assertions being made at the official level. The days when we took a 6-7 percent GDP growth rate as a given are gone, and it will take careful policy planning to get back to a steady and high rate of growth. We are going to need all the leverage that the world’s largest economy can provide. America is clearly fashioning a new economic strategy, the twin pillars of which are the TPP and its mirror in the Atlantic region. The obvious exclusions are the BRICS countries, and they will lose out on economic opportunities if these strategies come to fruition. Not surprisingly, Goldman Sachs, the originator of the term BRIC, has recently stated that the judgement on them was mistaken.

For the doubters, Biden had a word of caution – it is not a good idea to bet against America. This piece of advice is particularly valid for Indian audiences, who have largely convinced themselves that America is yesterday’s story, and China is tomorrow’s. Judging by the kind of writing that we are seeing in the Chinese press, this latter conclusion needs very careful examination. As does the theory of America’s decline – and here Biden’s admonition was on the mark.

Thus, the visit of Vice President has left much of substance for the Indian policy makers to chew on. Although it was largely projected as a visit to prepare for Prime Minister Singh’s visit to the US, it went well beyond this, as it should have done. And to the extent that it was a curtain-raiser for the visit of the Prime Minister, it would be good if our side did have well-argued positions on the issues discussed above. They do not, of course, exhaust the agenda, which is full of urgent and operational matters of concern, not the least to do with Afghanistan. But there are longer-term currents flowing globally and across the Asia-Pacific region that will affect us materially in the coming years. It would be good if we were to move with serious intent on these issues.

National Interests should Guide India’s Afghan Policy

Kanwal Sibal, 

Dean, Centre for International Relations and Diplomacy, VIF

2014 will be a turning point in Afghanistan. Power will be handed over to a new President after elections. The US military will complete its withdrawal. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will take over the security responsibility for the country.

The prospects for all these transitions do not look promising. The new President will have to be a Pashtun in order to ensure broad-based ethnic support. President Karzai was parachuted to the presidency without elections in post-war circumstances in which the US and the West could impose their will. His re-election was mired in controversy, created primarily by his western supporters. Despite many levers at their command, the US and the West have not been able to manage Karzai. This shows how difficult it has been for the US and others to oversee the political process in Afghanistan even under military occupation. With the impending withdrawal, their control over politics will become even less. The larger question is whether a new Pashtun leader can emerge who can assure cross ethnic support? Will he able to deliver political stability and a degree of economic development in the very difficult circumstances that his country will be facing?

The US has signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement with Afghanistan, but the follow-up agreement- the Bilateral Security Agreement- on the status of the residual US forces that will remain in military bases has not been finalized. The US has failed to secure a suitable agreement in Iraq. If it fails in Afghanistan, it is threatening a “zero option”. Whether this is pressure tactics or is a veritable option is not clear. In any case, the fact that this is being considered shows that the US has no clear answer for the future. “Zero option” has the air of a “zero answer”!

The ANSF may have numbers and reports that they are performing well does not guarantee they will be able to operate successfully in a post-US withdrawal environment, especially if the US leaves in a scenario that is politically unsatisfactory for all sides. The ANSF lacks heavy weaponry, air power and sophisticated intelligence capability. Will they be able to really cope as a cohesive force?

The economic prospects in Afghanistan are not very reassuring despite the pledges of assistance made at Tokyo and the announced longer-term commitments made by countries not to abandon Afghanistan. If the US exercises a zero military option, will that be compatible with a major economic commitment prolonged in time, especially in a tight economic situation in the US and the Eurozone? Plans by countries to invest in Afghanistan not only depend on internal stability but also will take some years to yield results, enough to make a difference on the ground.

Adding to the problem is the general instability around Afghanistan. The internal situation in Pakistan is fraught despite recent elections. Iran has a new President but the nuclear dossier remains problematic and sanctions on Iran have been further tightened. The Arab world is in turmoil, with the so-called Arab Spring having withered very rapidly. Religious extremism is spreading and this gives political oxygen to such forces battling in Afghanistan.

India has to cope with the situation as it develops. We have faced the worst when the Taliban took over Afghanistan in the mid-90s. We know of course what the dangers are ahead and have tried to play our limited role in preventing untoward conditions from developing through our political and economic engagement with Afghanistan.

India is pursuing a very responsible policy in Afghanistan. We want a sovereign, stable, democratic and prosperous Afghanistan, one that is free from extremism and where human rights, especially those of women are respected. India is doing nothing contrary to the achievement of this objective in Afghanistan.

We are maintaining friendly relations with Afghanistan based on equality and respect for sovereignty. We are not interfering in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, arming any particular group or providing safe-havens for terrorists or anti-government political groups to carry on violent activities against the legitimate government of Afghanistan.

We have legitimate interests in Afghanistan as a neighbouring country and every right to be present there. The international community cannot accept the curtailment of Afghan sovereignty by endorsing the principle that the Afghan government should give precedence to the interests of any particular country over that of any other. It is for the Afghan government to take independent decisions in a responsible way. India has no intention to occupy the legitimate space that other neighbouring countries of Afghanistan seek there.

India has established a strategic relationship with Afghanistan. This is anchored in a longer-term bilateral and regional perspective. India has geo-political, strategic interests in this entire region that forms a part of our strategic neighbourhood. Afghanistan borders Central Asia and Iran, apart from China and Pakistan. India has had intimate age-old ties with Afghanistan, Central Asia and Iran, with the history of our country linked to this region over centuries.

Central Asia is landlocked and so is Afghanistan. The development of this region faces a particularly difficult challenge because of this. This entire region needs the broadest possible choices for its development. It is natural for it to look for enhanced ties with India as the biggest economy in Southern Asia that can substantially contribute to this objective. We are wiling to respond.

Afghanistan has huge mineral resources that await exploitation. India is ready to invest large sums in this sector, beginning with iron ore extraction. Afghanistan is ready to offer to India a natural resources corridor for development. For realizing this objective, India needs better access to Afghanistan, as Pakistan is not as yet willing to provide transit facilities through its territory to Afghanistan.

India is looking at the Chabahar port in Iran as an access route to Afghanistan as well as Central Asia. We have recently committed $100 million to this project. US/EU sanctions on Iran are a complication for such efforts to give Afghanistan alternative options for its trade and facilitate foreign investment there. The US government should take a positive view of Indian investments in Iran that are specifically directed at easing Afghanistan’s difficult situation, which will be important for stimulating the Afghan economy, at present too dependent on foreign assistance and income derived from the presence of foreign troops on its soil.

In developing trade and energy ties between Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent, a project that the US favours as part of the New Silk Road project, Afghanistan is a critical hub. We support the TAPI pipeline project that will bring Turkmenistan gas to Pakistan and India through Afghanistan. India can fruitfully participate in projects to increase electricity grids in the region to alleviate regional energy-related problems.

India is participating in several international efforts to contribute to development in Afghanistan, whether it is the Istanbul Process and the Heart of Asia conferences in Kabul in June 2012 and in Istanbul in April 2012, or the initiative we took ourselves to organize a Delhi Investment Summit on Afghanistan, also in June 2012, followed by the Tokyo Conference on aid to Afghanistan in July 2012.

India’s own bilateral aid to Afghanistan has reached $2 billion. Some see in this an effort by us to seek undue influence in Afghanistan. If India’s foreign assistance programme and the billions Indian companies are investing abroad are considered, this is not a very big sum. There is full participation of the Afghan authorities in selecting Indian assistance projects that are infrastructural as well as geared to meeting the basic requirements of people and localities spread over the country. A large number of our projects are in the Pashtun areas. India has earned great popularity because of the manner in which we have conducted ourselves.

Economic development in Afghanistan and the region is essential to check-mate the growth of extremist ideologies in the region and associated terrorist activity. These concerns are uppermost in India’s mind as we are most exposed as a country to terrorism and supporting ideologies. As a secular, multi-religious state, we are particularly sensitive to such threats. Any boost given to these extremist forces, even unwittingly, should be unacceptable as our security is threatened.

It is with concern therefore that we view the outreach by US, Britain and others to the Taliban. We are not against any genuine attempt at reconciliation if all sides want it on a basis that respects the red lines drawn by the international community for a dialogue with the Taliban. We find that these red lines are being blurred by NATO’s anxiety to withdraw from Afghanistan by 2014, whatever the ground situation.

Such a strategy gives the upper hand to the Taliban groups in Pakistan in negotiations as they know time is on their side.

The rhetoric remains that the reconciliation process should be Afghan-led and Afghan-owned, but the manner in which the dialogue is being structured does not suggest that it will be an independent intra- Afghan process. President Karzai has already distanced himself from the US initiative. We feel that nothing should be done behind the back of the Kabul government. Latest statements from persons close to President Karzai express the deep concern of the Kabul government about understandings that the US may have reached with Pakistan and the possibility of south and eastern Afghanistan being handed over to the Taliban, which could divide the country and trigger an all-out conflict.

The end-game in Afghanistan is being played out in an atmosphere of great suspicion and bickering amongst the principal parties involved. The manner in which the Doha office of the Taliban was opened has made matters worse. The conduct of the Taliban in declaring themselves the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan made their own end-game clear.

The link between the Taliban and Pakistan is evident. One will have to wait and watch whether the declared US position that no single country will be allowed to dominate post-2014 Afghanistan can be sustained by it when its intention to withdraw from Afghanistan is so clear.

India has not been kept adequately in the picture about the dialogue with the Taliban, despite India’s vital concerns being involved. India suffered when the Taliban came to power in 1996. That was the only time India had no diplomatic relations with Afghanistan and terrorists were being trained on its soil for attacks against India. If the Taliban were to be accommodated again, India has reason to be concerned.

We find that the policies of our western friends in Afghanistan are neither sufficiently steady nor transparent.

The argument that the Taliban has various currents in it and there are “moderate” Taliban has been exposed as hollow by what has transpired in Egypt where the same arguments distinguishing between various strands in the Muslim Brotherhood and welcoming their assumption of power have proved devoid of worth.

India does not want conditions of ethnic conflict to be created again in Afghanistan. The international community must safeguard against it. The post 2014 situation in Afghanistan remains very uncertain as the country will be faced with a political and military transition even when the external danger to the country has not been neutralized.

Establishing democracy in Afghanistan by integrating forces into the polity that are currently threatening the country will be a most difficult enterprise.

The root of the problem must be dealt with, which is external support for Afghan extremists and their instrumentalization for achieving the military ambitions of a third country. So long as there are safe havens for extremists outside Afghanistan, the problems will not go away. If the Taliban retain influence in eastern and southern Afghanistan, it is because their staging grounds are outside.

India’s traditional ties have been with the Pashtuns in Afghanistan. A large number of our development projects are in Pashtun areas, which have been very well received by the local people. We support ethnic harmony in Afghanistan, with the Pashtuns adequately represented in governance, but this has to emerge through a democratic process, without the shadow of externally supported violence.

Our strategic partnership with Afghanistan is not directed against any third country. The primary element in this strategic relationship is not military. India is willing to contribute to the capacity building of the Afghan national security forces through training and supply of non-lethal equipment so that they can better provide security to the people after the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country. Our goals are primarily economically oriented. We do not want to supplant NATO.

In principle, however, India could provide a limited amount of combat equipment too, as sought by the Afghan government. The concerns of Pakistan should be irrelevant in this regard. Pakistan is having a military relationship with Sri Lanka unbothered by our sensitivities. China is arming Pakistan, providing it even strategic capabilities, without any one advising Pakistan to defer to Indian sensitivities about the security threat posed to us. The US is arming Pakistan too, disregarding our sensitivities.

For elements in the US to caution us against increasing our military engagement with Afghanistan because of Pakistani sensitivities is inconsistent with the policy choices they make in our region in their national interest. India could argue, as the US does, that our arms assistance to Afghanistan will not change the balance of power between it and Pakistan. Pakistan is a nuclear capable state with large and well-equipped armed forces, whereas Afghanistan has a fledgling, ill equipped force that is no match for the Pakistani military. Our decision on the question should be based on our judgment on how far we want to or can go in giving arms assistance to Afghanistan, not what Pakistan or the US thinks. In our own interest, we should be prudent.

It is a hugely perverse notion that the real problem in Afghanistan is India-Pakistan rivalry. Those who feel that their intervention in Afghanistan has not worked to stabilize the situation to the extent that they may have wanted and now want to cut costs at all costs, should not seek to transfer the responsibility for their failure on India’s shoulders.

India was not responsible for the rise of religious extremism in the region; it was not responsible for the civil war in Afghanistan after the Soviet departure; it did not put the Taliban in power in Kabul; it had no hand in the presence of Al Qaida and Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan; it had no responsibility for US/NATO military intervention in Afghanistan; the Taliban groups or the Haqqani group are not in India; NATO soldiers have not been killed by groups operating from Indian soil. If the US has had to resort to drone attacks against terrorists in Pakistan, it is not because of India.

We seek a friendly relationship with Afghanistan. We seek no exclusive relationship. Afghanistan should have friendly relations with all its neighbours. We are willing to work with all of them. India and China are already talking to each other on Afghanistan. There should be no problem in discussing Afghanistan with Pakistan in a constructive way that opens up the doors for transit facilities eventually. The new government in Pakistan should think along those lines, rather than allowing Pakistan’s policies to be guided by the ambitions of its armed forces.

We have been very constructive in our dealings with the US on the Afghan issue. We have supported the international military intervention in Afghanistan and the ouster of the Taliban regime from power. We have been sensitive to US equities and concerns in Afghanistan despite serious provocations from Pakistan, including the terrorist attacks against the Indian Embassy in Kabul and India-related targets there. We continue to be willing to work with the US in a positive and mutually beneficial way in Afghanistan.

On June 27, US Special Envoy for Afghanistan Ambassador Dobbins, sent to India to re-assure us about the US initiative to negotiate with the Taliban, did not convey the impression that the US was playing a sure hand, was confident about its strategy and had alternative options in view.

He said the US hoped for presidential candidates in Afghanistan that have cross-ethnic appeal. The US was not entering the dialogue with the Taliban with any certainty that it will start, how it will develop, whether progress will be made and whether it will result in diminished violence and peace. The Taliban had to say whether they will accept the conditions and meet the US and the Afghan High Peace Council. The issue of terrorism had to be directly addressed and that a pre-condition for starting talks was a statement that the Taliban will begin to distance themselves from the Al Qaida, but reaching an agreement will require concretely severing all ties. Ending violence was not a pre-condition for talks, but an agreement had to include cessation of hostilities and respect for the Afghan Constitution. He concluded by stating that it was not certain that negotiations will end the war but that it was worth trying.

Such a tentative and uncertain reading of the situation, without a clear and confident road map, justifies our concerns about the wisdom of taking a step to politically accommodate such a retrograde and obscurantist force as the Taliban with the assistance of the Pakistani military whose disruptive strategic ambitions in Afghanistan are in fact at the root of the problem.

(Based on a talk recently delivered on the Capitol Hill, Washington)

How All India Are The All India Services?

Dr M N Buch, 

Dean, Centre for Governance and Political Studies, VIF

Article 1 of the Constitution makes India a Union of States and the Seventh Schedule framed under Article 246, by containing List 1, the Union List, List 2, the State List and List 3, the Concurrent List prescribes the legislative bounds of Parliament and the State Legislatures in what is basically a quasi federal structure. Part XI, which refers to the relations between the Union and the States, whether legislative or administrative, defines the extent to which the legislative and administrative jurisdictions of the Union and the States extend and to what extent the Union writ prevails over the States. The Union, while giving constitutional autonomy to the States within their respective executive and legislative competence, is centripetal in that under Article 248 residuary powers of legislation vest in Parliament.

The quasi federal structure of India is somewhat different from that of the constitutional structure of other Federations, for example, the United States of America. In the United States, separation of powers between the Federal Government and State Governments is complete in that in matters legislative, executive or judicial, the Federal Government functions through federal officers and federal judges, as also Congress in matters within the federal competence and the State Governments function through their own set up in matters within State competence. The Federal Government has its own civil servants who administer the areas which come within the legislative competence of Congress and the States have their Civil Services which operate in areas within the competence of the State Legislature. However, the Indian Constitution has a unique structure embodied in Article 312 which permits Parliament to make laws for the creation of what are known as All India Services. The same Article states that the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service which predate the Constitution would be deemed to be created under Article 312. The same Article also permits the creation of an All India Judicial Service, though none has been constituted so far. The All India Services are covered by the All India Services Act, 1951 and rules have been framed under the Act, including the Cadre Rules, the Conduct Rules and the Discipline and Appeal Rules. Under the Cadre Rules, posts in the Central Government and the State Governments in the two initially constituted All India Services, the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) and the Indian Police Service (IPS) and the subsequently created Indian Forest Service (IFS) are prescribed and against these posts only an IAS, IPS or IFS officer can be appointed. There is provision for lateral entry by promotion from State Services or by induction through limited special recruitment, but the fact remains that the senior posts in the General Administration, which include Revenue and Development Administration, the Police and the Forests, including wildlife, can only be held by an officer of the IAS, IPS or IFS respectively. The uniqueness of this constitutional provision is that whereas India is a Union of States, it is a union or federation in which the senior Civil Service posts, including the Police and the Forest Department, are held by officers who are under the direct rule making control of the Union Government. The officers are assigned to a State Cadre and normally serve under the State Government, but they are liable to transfer either for service under the Union Government or, under certain circumstances, on deputation to other State Governments, public sector undertakings and as the rules stand today, to international bodies or even to private undertakings.

An All India Service officer is appointed by the President and can be removed from Service or awarded a major penalty only by the President. An All India Service officer is recruited through the Union Public Service Commission, his promotion through a departmental promotion committee even within the State is done through such a committee, which has representatives of the Union Public Service Commission and of the Government of India. The State Government’s authority over the All India Service officers is limited by the provisions of the rules framed under the All India Services Act.

One need not discuss in detail why the All India Services were thought necessary and were created in a quasi federal structure, but some knowledge of the background does help. British India was governed as a unitary state in which for administrative purposes, the country was divided into Provinces, each headed by a Governor. Elements of federalism were there even under the 1919 Government of India Act and were strengthened under the 1935 Government of India Act and the Provinces did enjoy a fairly high degree of autonomy because a country as large as India cannot be administratively managed from one power centre alone. In fact, in those days of poor communication links, the districts were fairly autonomous and the D.C. and S.P. were required to take decisions on the spot, which government invariably supported. Therefore, the provincial governments had considerable freedom of action, including the setting up of provincial services, but the country was held together by what were known as the Imperial Services of which the Indian Civil Service, or ICS was at the apex. The other major Imperial Service was the Indian Police or IP, but there was an Indian Forest Service, Indian Service of Engineers and an Indian Medical Service of all India nature. The Imperial Services were appointed by the Crown and not by the Viceroy and Governor General. When India became independent and the provinces became States which had constitutional legitimacy, the Indian Civil Service was carried forward as the Indian Administrative Service. In some ways, the legal provisions of the Government of India Act 1935 were carried forwarded into the Constitution, with cast iron constitutional autonomy being enshrined in lieu of the surrogate autonomy of the provinces granted by the Government of India Act 1935.

The reason why we provide for an All India Service in a quasi federal constitution, apart from the need to have continuity in the administrative set up in India after we became independent, was Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel’s clear understanding that India had major fissiparous tendencies which needed to be controlled and countered by building into the Constitution centripetal features which would hold the country together. A unified judicial hierarchy, the All India Services, a single independent audit organisation under the Comptroller and Auditor General, with constitutional power of the Central Government to give directions to the States under certain circumstances and the power of the President to take over the administration of the States under Article 356, are all parts of the centripetal features of our Constitution. Sardar Patel was firmly of the opinion that if the executive government of the States and the Union was carried out through officers of All India Services, who were protected and immunised from arbitrary action by the political class, then not only would we have a nonpartisan administration where officers work without fear or favour but a united India would also be ensured through these Civil Services whose ultimate rule making control is vested in the Central Government. Hopefully this would eliminate political whimsicality from the administration.

Upto 1967, the system worked extremely well and this was possible because, by and large, the Governments, both at the Centre and in the States, were formed by the same party. In 1967, suddenly the politics of defection through purchase of power was introduced and now power was up for grabs. Thus began an era of political uncertainty in which the politicians, in order to remain in power, had to use bribery as a major weapon. Money for bribes can only be made by misusing the instrumentality of State power and obviously an impartial and fearless Civil Service would be an obstruction in obtaining such money. The Civil Service had to be tamed and the politicians proceeded to do this with vim and vigour, using the instrument of posting and transfer as a major weapon. In 1975, when Indira Gandhi declared a state of Emergency and concentrated all power in herself, a new slogan of a committed Civil Service was added to our administrative lexicon. A committed Civil Service meant that civil servants would no longer necessarily be servants of the law and would be prepared to carry out the will of the political masters, even if it meant that the administration became partisan. At this stage, intimidation of civil servants was added to the armoury of the politicians and not only were honest, impartial civil servants sidelined, many of them were subjected to humiliation through suspension and worse. So long as the Central Government continued to be under a single party, some element of protection was available to the civil servants, especially the All India Services.

However, when the Central Government became weaker and we entered into an era of unprincipled coalitions, narrow political interests very often overtook the legal provisions relating to the All India Services and in many States the local satraps arbitrarily decided the fate of civil servants because the ruling coalition in the centre needed their support in order to remain in power and hesitated to protect the civil servants. In some States, the politicians went berserk and Uttar Pradesh and Bihar are two glaring examples of how the All India Services were hounded, bullied and bludgeoned into virtual servility by totally arbitrary actions of Chief Ministers such as Mulayam Singh Yadav, Lalu Prasad Yadav and Mayawati. In West Bengal and in Kerala, the Left Front Governments did not act in a crude manner but they did take political decisions whereby in areas of interest to the party in power, the civil servants were rendered helpless. Industrial unrest is one area where the police and the magistracy were reduced to impotence where the interests of the Left Front were concerned. Here it is what the party dictated which mattered and not the law. In Tamil Nadu, whereas both the DMK and the AIADMK Governments left the cutting edge level of the district administration more or less alone because the Collector was used for efficient delivery of such services as were politically ordained, at senior levels the All India Services were made subservient.

This was a total negation of Sardar Patel’s ideal of an impartial Civil Service, immunised from undue political influence and, therefore, in a position to give advice without fear and favour and to administer without bias. Over the years, the position has worsened. The standard joke in Uttar Pradesh is that the Annual Confidential Report of an IAS or IPS officer serving in the districts is seldom written because hardly any officer serves for even three months in a district before being transferred and the ACR must span at least a three months tenure. There is total whimsicality in such transfers. The Queen of Hearts in the book ‘Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland’ was in the habit of going around shouting, “Off with his head”. That is how Mayawati behaved, that is how Mulayam Singh Yadav operated. It is unfortunate that senior officers at the level of Chief Secretary and D.G. Police have been silent spectators to the virtual destruction of the Civil Service hierarchy and have not had the courage to open their mouths in protest.

I have a theory about this which is based on my own experience. After I was removed from the Delhi Development Authority towards the end of 1979, I spent a whole year without a posting in Delhi and somehow the impression was created that I was dissatisfied or disgruntled. The fact is that I was being paid my full salary without having to do a stroke of work and was personally very comfortable, but it is true that being on the shelf is never a good feeling. There were several of us who were similarly placed, including Hari Pillai and Ved Marwah of the IPS and JC Jaitley of the IAS. Krishnaswamy Rao Sahib, who was then Cabinet Secretary, sent for me and wanted to know why some IAS officers were disgruntled. I asked him whether he wanted an honest answer and when he said that that was what he wanted, I told him that the real reason why there was some dissatisfaction is because a whole succession of Cabinet Secretaries had not put their heads on the chopping block. He was a little taken aback and wanted to know why I said this. I told him that there were a number of us without a posting for no fault of our own except that some politicians were annoyed with us and that even for postings at junior level, officers were being informally advised to find a political godfather. I said that successive Cabinet Secretaries were probably looking for their governorship on retirement and, therefore, were hesitating to stand up for these Services. In my view, the Cabinet Secretary should have told the Prime Minister that personnel management was his job and not that of the politicians, whose job was to frame policy. Anyway, the meeting ended inconclusively, though to give the Cabinet Secretary his due, he did not hold my acerbic remarks against me.

Recently, a young IAS officer with two years service, Durga Shakti Nagpal, has been placed under suspension by the Uttar Pradesh Government because she took on the powerful political and commercial interests behind illegal sand mining. There are innumerable decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Courts calling upon government to control illegal mining and it is the duty of civil servants to implement these orders. If, however, the politicians are to harass civil servants doing their duty, how will the rule of law prevail? Javed Usmani, the Chief Secretary of Uttar Pradesh, should have stood up to the Chief Minister and opposed the suspension of this young officer. Instead, he has become a party to framing a false and frivolous charge-sheet against the officer to try and justify the suspension. Durga Nagpal’s case is one of many in which civil servants of the All India Services are being harassed. The IPS is a major target because politicians want to use the police for furthering their own ends. I remember a case in which Mayawati, because she was annoyed with the SSP of Lucknow, suspended him and transferred the DG Police, Zonal IG and the Range DIG and this happened in the presence of the Chief Secretary. Did that worthy protest at these totally irrational orders? He preferred to be a silent spectator. This weakened his own position also. What a contrast with RCVP Noronha, the then Chief Secretary of Madhya Pradesh, who not only resisted the wholly unjustified suspension of R.S. Khanna, the then Sales Tax Commissioner, by P.C. Sethi, Chief Minister, but refused to issue orders and when Sethi asked whether or not orders would be issued, replied, “They probably will be issued, but by my successor”. It is P.C. Sethi who stepped back.

How do we remedy the situation? The Supreme Court, in a writ petition filed by Prakash Singh, IPS (retired), has been pressing the Central Government and the State Governments to immunise the police from undue political influence. The Supreme Court wants the Police Act to be amended to give the police autonomy, to provide tenure for officers from the rank of Station Officer up to DG Police and to protect officers from arbitrary action by government. Why is the Supreme Court suo motu not extending this to all the Civil Services and in particular the two other All India Services? It is about time that we put in place a set of laws and rules which, whilst accepting that it is the elected representatives through the Council of Ministers which will have the final say in all matters relating to policy of governance, the Civil Services are also be given due protection against arbitrary action by the politicians so that they can perform their task of implementing lawful orders without fear or favour. One set of rules which need immediate amendment is the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1969. Rule 3 relates to suspension. Under this rule, a State Government may suspend an All India Service officer serving in that State Cadre. The opening words of Rule 3 are important and they read, “If, having regard to the circumstances in any case, and where Articles of Charges have been drawn up, the nature of the charges, the government of a State or the Central Government, as the case may be, is satisfied that it is necessary or desirable to place under suspension a member of the Service, against whom disciplinary proceedings are contemplated or are pending, that government may, if the member of the Service is serving under that government pass an order placing him under suspension…” The same rule, however, says that if there is a difference of opinion between the Central Government and the State Government about the suspension order, then the opinion of the Central Government shall prevail. In the Durga Nagpal case, the order of suspension and the grounds of suspension are so flimsy and so obviously contrived that the Central Government should have treated this as a case of disagreement with the State Government and should itself have quashed the suspension order. It is not necessary to wait for ninety days, within which period a charge sheet has to be served.

Considering the fact that there are many State Governments which are misusing the power of suspension, we need to amend the rules on the following lines:-

The State Government should have no power to suspend an All India Service officer except on the following grounds:-

(a) The officer’s conduct is under investigation in a criminal case, in connection with which the officer has been arrested and remanded to custody in excess of forty-eight hours.

(b) The officer’s actions are so prejudicial to public safety or national integrity that he must be neutralised without delay. However, in every such case, the State Government must submit a report within forty-eight hours of the order to the Central Government, which may then decide whether or not to continue the suspension of the officer.

(c) In every other case, if the government feels that the suspension of an officer is in the public interest it must make a report to the Central Government, which may decide whether or not the officer is to be placed under suspension.

Other than this, the State Government should have no power whatsoever to place an All India Service officer under suspension. This is all the more so because the power to impose a penalty on an All India Service officer vests in the Central Government and can be imposed only in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission. This would go a long way in ensuring that the All India Service officers function without fear and favour.

There is another set of reforms that we need if we have to make the All India Service truly national in character. At present there are many officers who, after allocation to a State Cadre, never serve outside that State. This must immediately end. In the approximately thirty-five years span of service, an All India Service officer should serve outside his cadre for at least ten years. Every All India Service officer should have one stint of five years of service in a cadre other than the one to which he is allotted, that is, he must serve under a State Government other than the one to which he is allotted. He must also put in an additional five years stint in any post under the Central Government. Thus, in his thirty-five years of service, at least ten years will be spent outside his parent cadre. The idea is that an All India Service officer must serve anywhere in India and not be confined to just one State. This would widen his horizon and give him an all India perspective, which is very necessary if our All India Services are to have a national character.

There is another suggestion I have to make, which is that the All India Services must be made to realise that they are servants of the law and not the personal servants of a politician. Therefore, if a civil servant has acted in a manner which promotes the interests of a politician or a political group and in doing so has been in violation of the law, then, if the State Government does not take action, the Central Government must charge-sheet the officer and take disciplinary action against him. Every All India Service officer must be made to realise that if in order to curry favour with State politicians, he acts in a manner prejudicial to law, he will have to face the consequences because the Central Government will intervene. This is the only way to curb the whimsicality of wayward Chief Ministers who are under the false notion that they are above the law and can, therefore, expect senior civil servants to even ignore the law to serve the interests of the Chief Minister. If condign punishment is awarded in a few such cases, it would have a salutary effect in reminding the All India Services where their duty lies.