India Must Choose the Right Strategic Partner

Mohan Kumar S

Current Scenario

It has been rightly stated that, as a nation we can change our friends, but not our neighbours. We have been destined to live in the most dangerous part of the world with two nuclear armed countries, China and Pakistan in our immediate neighborhood. India also faces the problem of state sponsored terrorism or proxy war from Pakistan. China after annexing so much of our land during the 1962 war, still lays claim over large Indian territory. They also support Pakistan in building their defence, nuclear weapon and missile programmes, which are wholly India centric. China is also involved in building up the so called string of pearls strategy by bringing into their fold, countries like Bangladesh, Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives in our neighbourhood, to encircle and choke our country. The recent emergence of ISIS in Syria and Iraq and the threat it may pose to us also in the not too distant future is another cause of worry. The situation in Afghanistan is also not appearing promising in the long run, after the pull out of US forces.

Pakistan has created terrorist groups as a tool for its geostrategic agenda. Pakistan had long been accused by India, and now understood by western nations like the United States and the United Kingdom for its involvement in terrorist activities in India and Afghanistan. Pakistan's tribal region along the border of Afghanistan has been claimed to be a "haven for terrorists" by western media also. According to an analysis published by the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings Institution in 2008, Pakistan was, perhaps the world’s most active sponsor of terrorist groups. Many nonpartisan sources believe that officials within Pakistan’s military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) sympathise with, and aid Islamic terrorists, saying that the ISI has provided covert but well-documented support to terrorist groups active in Kashmir, including the al-Qaeda affiliate Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar. US intelligence officials claim that Pakistan's ISI sponsored the 2008 Indian embassy bombing in Kabul. The attack was carried out by Jalaluddin Haqqani group, which runs a network that Western intelligence services say are responsible for a campaign of violence throughout Afghanistan, including the Indian Embassy bombing. Pakistan has been playing both sides in the fight against terror, on the one hand, pretending to help curtail terrorist activities and availing grants worth billions of dollar from America while on the other hand, covertly promoting it. The ISI is also accused of supporting Taliban forces, recruiting and training Mujahideen to fight in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

In the above scenario, we have to be extremely cautious and strengthen our defence forces by keeping their morale high and providing them with the best, state of the art weapons which can be made available. It has also to be supplemented with well planned infrastructure like all weather roads, rail links, air fields, communication net works stretching to our borders, so that we can quickly mobilize adequate troops and equipments to the required areas, at short notice. Till the beginning of the last decade, we were having very good relationship with Russia from whom we met most of our weapon requirements. This was mainly due to the extremely warm relation and mutual trust we enjoyed with them. With the breaking down of the old Soviet Union, their defence sector also was not able to cope up with the challenges posed due to financial crunch and lack of strategic support from their government. There was also a lag in meeting deadlines and quality. Compelled by the situation, we started looking for alternate sources for meeting our strategic needs to countries like Israel, France, Sweden and USA. From our point of view, it was justifiable also to have diversified sources for procuring our legitimate defence requirements for reducing risk and to have better flexibility.

Indo-Russian Ties

Despite being one of the pioneers and founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement, India developed a closer relationship with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. During that period, India's relatively cooperative strategic and military relations with Moscow and strong socialist policies had a distinctly adverse impact on its relations with the United States. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, India began to review its foreign policy in a unipolar world, and took steps to develop closer ties with the European Union and the United States. During the Cold War, India and the Soviet Union (USSR) enjoyed a strong strategic, military, economic and diplomatic relationship. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia inherited the close relationship with India, even as India improved its relations with the West after the end of the Cold War. India is the second largest market for the Russian defence industry. In 2004, more than 70% of the Indian Military's hardware came from Russia, making Russia the chief supplier of defence equipment. The relationship began with a visit by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to the Soviet Union in June 1955 and Khrushchev's return trip to India in the fall of 1955. While in India, Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union supported Indian sovereignty over Kashmir. The Soviet Union declared its neutrality during the 1959 border dispute and the Sino-Indian war of October 1962, although the Chinese strongly objected. The Soviet Union gave India substantial economic and military assistance during the Khrushchev period, and by 1960 India had received more Soviet assistance than China had. This disparity became another point of contention in Sino-Soviet relations. In 1962, the Soviet Union agreed to transfer technology to co-produce the Mikoyan MiG-21 jet fighter in India, which they had earlier denied to China.

Defence relations between India and the Russian Federation have a historical perspective. The Soviet Union was an important supplier of defence equipment for several decades, and that relationship was inherited by Russia after the break-up of the Soviet Union. In 1997, Russia and India signed a ten-year agreement to further military-technical cooperation. Today, the co-operation is not limited to a buyer-seller relationship but includes joint research and development, training, service to service contacts, including joint exercises. Energy sector is an important area in Indo-Russian bilateral relations. In 2001, ONGC-Videsh acquired 20% stake in the Sakhalin-I oil and gas project in the Russian Federation, and has invested about US $1.7 billion in the project. The Russian company Gasprom and Gas Authority of India have collaborated in joint development of a block in the Bay of Bengal. Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project with two units of 1000 MW each is a good example of Indo-Russian nuclear energy co-operation.

Indo US Relations

Our relation with US after the assassination of Kennedy in 1963 deteriorated gradually and hit an all time low under the Nixon administration in the early 1970s. Richard Nixon established a very close relationship with Pakistan, aiding it militarily and economically, as India, under the leadership of Indira Gandhi, was seen as leaning towards the Soviet Union. He considered Pakistan as a very important ally to counter Soviet influence in the Indian subcontinent and establish ties with China, with whom Pakistan was very close. The frosty relationship between Nixon and Indira Gandhi worsened the relations further. During the 1971 Indo-Pak War, the US openly supported Pakistan and even deployed its aircraft carrier USS Enterprise towards the Bay of Bengal, which was seen as a show of force by the US in support of the West Pakistani forces. Later, India conducted its first nuclear test, Smiling Buddha in 1974, which was opposed by the US, In the late 1970s, with the anti-Soviet Janata Party leader Morarji Desai becoming the Prime Minister, India improved its relations with the US, led by Jimmy Carter, despite the latter signing an order in 1978 barring nuclear material from being exported to India due to the latter's non-proliferation record. But with Indira Gandhi returning to power in 1980 and India supporting the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, the relations between the two countries weakened again in the 1980s. Until 1997 there was any significant effort by both countries to improve relations with each other.

Soon after Atal Bihari Vajpayee became Indian Prime Minister, he authorised nuclear weapons testing at Pokhran. The United States strongly condemned this testing, and initiated sanctions, and voted in favour of a United Nations Security Council Resolution condemning the tests. President Bill Clinton imposed economic sanctions on India, including cutting off all military and economic aid, freezing loans by American banks to state-owned Indian companies, prohibiting loans to the Indian government for all except food purchases, prohibiting American aerospace technology and uranium exports to India, and requiring the US to oppose all loan requests by India to international lending agencies. However, these sanctions proved ineffective - India was experiencing a strong economic rise, and its trade with the US constituted a small portion of its GDP only. Japan joined the US in imposing direct sanctions, while most other nations continued to trade with India. The sanctions were soon lifted. India emerged in the 21st century as increasingly vital to core US foreign policy interests. India, a dominant actor in its region, and the home of more than one billion citizens, is now often characterised as a nascent great power and an "indispensable partner" of the US, one that many analysts view as a potential counterweight to the growing clout of China.

Since 2004, Washington and New Delhi have been pursuing a "strategic partnership" that is based on shared values and generally convergent geopolitical interests. Numerous economic, security, and global initiatives - including plans for civilian nuclear cooperation - are underway. Also in 2005, the United States and India signed a ten-year defence framework agreement, with the goal of expanding bilateral security cooperation. The two countries now engage in numerous and unprecedented combined military exercises, and major US arms sales to India are under way. The value of all bilateral trade tripled from 2004 to 2008 and continues to grow, while significant two-way investment also grows and flourishes. During the tenure of the George W. Bush administration, relations between India and the United States were seen to have blossomed, primarily over common concerns regarding growing Islamic extremism, energy security, and climate change. On 8 November, Obama also became the second US President to ever address a joint session of the Parliament of India. In a major policy shift, Obama declared US support for India's permanent membership on the UN Security Council. Calling the India-US relationship "a defining partnership of the 21st century", he also announced the removal of export control restrictions on several Indian companies, and concluded trade deals worth $10 billion, which are expected to create and/or support 50,000 jobs in the US.

In March 2009, the Obama Administration cleared the US$2.1 billion sale of eight P-8 Poseidons to India. This deal, and the $5 billion agreement to provide Boeing C-17 military transport aircraft and General Electric F414 engines for our Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project announced during Obama's November 2010 visit, makes the US one of the top three military suppliers to India (after Israel and Russia). Indian has raised concerns about contract clauses forbidding the offensive deployment of these systems. India is trying to resolve performance-related issues on the Boeing P-8I that have already been delivered to India. The India–United States Civil Nuclear Agreement also referred to as the "123 Agreement", signed on 10 October 2008 is a bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation which governs civil nuclear trade between American and Indian firms to participate in each other's civil nuclear energy sector. For the agreement to be operational, nuclear vendors and operators must comply with India’s 2010 Nuclear Liability Act which stipulates that nuclear suppliers, contractors and operators must bear financial responsibility in case of an accident. The US is one of India's largest trading partners. In 2011, the US exported $21.50 billion worth of goods to India, and imported $36.15 billion worth of Indian goods.

The United States is also India's largest investment partner, with a direct investment of $9 billion. Americans have made notable foreign investments in power generation, telecommunications, ports, roads, petroleum exploration and processing, and mining industries. Key recent developments include the rapid growth of India's economy and bilateral trade, the close links between the Indian and American computer and Internet industries, a geopolitical coalition to balance the rise of an increasingly assertive China, the weakening of U.S.-Pakistan relations over various ongoing disputes, and the 2008 reversal of long-standing American opposition to India's nuclear program. Today, India and the US share an extensive cultural, strategic, military, and economic relationship.

Indo-US Ties- Recent Irritants

India, in July and November 2013, demanded that the US respond to revelations that the Indian UN mission in New York City and the Indian Embassy in Washington had been targeted for spying. In December 2013, the arrest, strip-search and temporary detention of an Indian diplomat in New York following a domestic labour dispute caused uproar in India. Deputy Consul General Devyani Khobragade was arrested by US State Department Police on allegations of visa-fraud and handed over to US Marshals for detention.

The female consular official was subjected to repeated handcuffing, stripping and cavity searches, DNA swabbing, and placement in a hold-up alongside common criminals and drug offenders. Another issue was the 2010 document leaked by Edward Snowden and published by the Washington post revealed that US intelligence agencies had been authorised to spy on the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). In July 2014, U.S. diplomats were summoned by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs to discuss allegations that the National Security Agency had spied upon private individuals and political entities within India.

Prior to Narendra Modi becoming the Prime Minister of India, the US Government had made it known that Modi as Chief Minister of Gujarat would not be permitted to travel to the US. Sectarian violence during the 2002 Gujarat riots damaged relations between the US Government and Narendra Modi, the then Chief Minister of Gujarat. American based human rights activists accused Modi of fostering anti-Muslim violence. The Obama administration maintained the 2005 decision taken by the George W. Bush administration to deny Narendra Modi entry into America. In 2012, a Special Investigation Team (SIT) appointed by the Indian Supreme Court found no “prosecutable evidence” against Modi. The Supreme Court of India absolved Narendra Modi of any criminal wrongdoing during the 2002 Gujarat riots. The US Government completely failed to anticipate the political rise of Narendra Modi to the office of Prime Minister of India. Now the US Government is of the view that Modi can circumvent the USCIRF sanctions regime by visiting Washington as heads of government on A1-visa as long as he is the Prime Minister of India.

India’s Defence Ties with Russia vis a vis US: An Analysis

Neglecting our time tested friend Russia, and before making a strategic shift in our defence procurements from US, we have to evaluate our long term security risks and issues like availability of spare parts, technology transfer etc. Russia was more than willing to supply India their latest weapons as per our wish list in the earlier decades and even now. However, we cannot conclude the same about America. For example, Russia was willing to agree for joint development of 4plus generation fighter Su30 MKI, 5th generation fighter Sukhoi/HAL FGFA, Ilyushin/HAL tactical transport aircraft, lease of TU22 M3 bombers. We cannot expect America to sell us their best fighter F22 Raptor. Although we had recently acquired C - 130 J Super Hercules and Boeing C-17 Globemaster III strategic lift aircrafts, Boeing P-8i Poseidon multi mission maritime aircraft etc from US, we have to consider factors like their prohibitive cost, future supply of spare parts, technology transfer possibility etc:.

It may be noted that we are reconsidering our plan to procure ultra light weight M777 Howitzer artillery gun from US because of their prohibitive cost. Factors like denial of technology, spare parts/information during hostile situation like what we faced during Kargil incursion by denying the satellite data required by us has strengthened our decision to go for our own IRNASS (satellite navigation system). Moreover, India had always taken a principled stand on non interference in other countries’ internal affairs, respecting the sovereignty of other nations. America cannot be judged to have followed these principles when they had interfered in countries like Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Libya in recent times. The result of such military interference had caused internal turmoil and chaos in those countries and instability in that region. The acts of our strategic partner should also be such that it is fair, justifiable and based on sound principles acceptable to us and the world community, since we may also have to support its acts in world forums like United Nations.

There are still areas or defence equipments which Russia have an edge or upper hand like S - 500 long range aircraft and anti ballistic missile defence system, new state-of-the-art Novorossiysk submarine etc, which show that they are still a force to reckon with. Joint development of Brahmos supersonic cruise missile which is under induction with our tri services, leasing of their powerful Akula II class nuclear submarine, sale to India of their Aircraft carrier (our INS Vikramaditya), their long time association with us in nuclear technology, space, developments in the cryogenic engine technology, cooperation in our development of Arihant class nuclear submarines etc, we owe much to Russia. Of course, there has been long delays and cost overrun in the aircraft carrier deal. However, during their difficult times, if we reciprocate by supporting them with offers to coproduce and in research for developing next generation weapons, which will in turn help them also to tide over their present crisis, set a new vigor to their industries, our strategic interest is also protected in the long term. It will also ensure that Russian made weapons do not go to countries which are inimical to us. A stronger Russia will ensure a multipolar world which will be in Indian interest also and for promoting world peace.

Meanwhile, let us hope that our DRDO, HAL, our shipyards and our other indigenous industry take up this challenge and make us self sufficient to meet the requirements of our defence forces by absorbing the latest technology available and providing us with next generation weapon systems so that we can reduce our dependence on foreign sources. Policies and recent statements made by our new government to substantially increase our domestic defence research activities, to cut delays in executing the ongoing projects and to evolve new technology and weapons instead of trying to emulate what other countries had already developed, are rightly in this direction. Till such substantial changes are visible on the ground, we will have to judiciously balance our external defence procurements in a way which will promote our strategic interest. Indian foreign policy should be based on maintaining strategic autonomy to promote and safeguard our long term national interest.

(The author is a Dubai-based observer of Strategic Affairs)

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Published Date: 19^th September 2014, Image source: http://ibsindia.org

China’s Pakistan Syndrome and India

Sushant Sareen, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

As two giant countries sharing a common border, India and China have a host of issues between them that they need to sort out and work together. From border disputes to concerns over river waters, from trade imbalances to safety of investment and market access, from freedom of navigation in the maritime space to ensuring energy security, from mutual suspicions over containment policies and strategies being pursued for counter-balancing to building on mutual interests in bilateral, regional and global security, including the issue of terrorism, it is an endless list of things that both countries have to deal with. Many of these will come up for discussion when the Chinese President Xi Jinping visits India. But there is one major irritant, or if you will, fly in the ointment – Pakistan – which if addressed will go a very long way in lowering many of India’s concerns and suspicions regarding China.

For around fifty years now, China’s Pakistan Syndrome has been a red rag for India. The way India sees it the glue that has bound China with Pakistan has been India. There is enough evidence on record to back India’s assessment that both China and Pakistan embraced each other in order to contain and constrain India. For China, Pakistan was a perfect tool to keep snapping at India’s heel, and for Pakistan, China served as the big guy on the block to keep a check on India. Other than this, there is little that China has to gain from Pakistan, except perhaps for the fact that it serves as a dumping ground for many of its products and technology coupled with the benefit that China gets from the sort of neo-colonial economic and strategic relationship it has built with Pakistan. The icing on the cake is not only the massive commissions that accompany the deals with Pakistan, but also the ease with which anything that China sells is accepted by Pakistan in order to preserve and buttress its ‘all-weather friendship’ with China.

While a cynical case – enemy’s enemy is a friend – could have been made for China-Pakistan compact fifty years back, that time is now long gone. Persisting with this sort of a strategy is now only going to yield diminishing returns, more for China than for Pakistan. Today the dictum that China needs to follow is “a wise enemy [in case of India, a competitor and not enemy] is better than a foolish [and destructive] friend”. To put it differently, China has far more to gain – diplomatically, strategically, and economically – from engaging India than from remaining wedded to Pakistan. The choice before China is to either play for the small benefits it gets from its neo-colonial relationship with Pakistan or to make a pitch for the big game and benefits that will come by engaging India and disengaging from Pakistan.

With India’s economic, diplomatic and strategic options opening up in terms of its budding relationship with the US, Japan and other countries on China’s rim, China will need to make a call on whether Pakistan even serves any useful purpose anymore, more so in light of the steady slide of Pakistan towards failure and extremism, something that forced President Xi Jinping to ‘postpone’ the Pakistan leg of his tour. Despite the heartburn and embarrassment that the ‘postponement’ caused in Pakistan, and notwithstanding the reassuring words uttered by Mr Jinping about China’s commitment to its relationship with Pakistan, this is as good a time as any for China to re-evaluate its Pakistan policy.

For a couple of years now, there are some indications and pointers that there is growing concern in China about Pakistan. There is also some sort of an incipient rethink underway in Beijing, which is borne out by the fact that the Chinese are now engaging India to talk about both Afghanistan and Pakistan (something that they never did before). The reasons for this are clear. There is growing disquiet in China over the export of radical Islam and terrorism from Pakistan into China. Although the Pakistanis are ostensibly leaning over backward to address Chinese concerns – the Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan is partly aimed to reassure China – the Pakistanis are known to play double-games, especially where it involves the Jihadists. Even if these double-games do not have China in the cross-hairs, there is bound to be a spill-over of Pakistani flirtation with Jihadism in China’s restive Xinjiang province and beyond. Questions are also starting to be asked about how secure Chinese investments in Pakistan will be, especially if Pakistan continues to slide towards chaos and anarchy. This is a question that acquires even greater salience in light of ambitious plans involving an investment of anywhere between $30-50 billion to develop an Economic Corridor from Gwadar to Kashgar.

Apparently, the Chinese believe that they need to pump in money in Pakistan in order to stabilise that country. This is quite similar to the misplaced arguments that are often made by the Americans who have consistently bought the nonsense that they could change Pakistan's rank bad behaviour and alter the trajectory of its inexorable slide by artificially propping it up through infusion of money. Of course, there is a big difference between how the Chinese and Americans pump in funds into Pakistan. Ironically, the Americans who don’t believe that there are any free lunches have been giving only free lunches to Pakistan; the Chinese, on the other hand, because of their socialistic pretensions subscribe to free lunches at least ideologically, but have never given any free lunch to Pakistan. They have always managed to extract their pound of flesh on the cheap from Pakistan. But with plans like the Economic Corridor, it seems that the Chinese too are starting to tread the beaten path of the Americans. But here’s the thing: if the Americans have got nothing to show for the treasure they have expended in Pakistan, the Chinese too will end up with nothing, for such is the nature of the beast that they are trying to sustain.

Given Pakistan's adherence to the ideology of political Islam and jihadism, it should be clear to the Chinese that Pakistan can never reconcile to an infidel China. India, on the other hand, has neither any civilizational conflict nor any other fundamental strategic conflict with China. The border dispute is in many ways a minor issue when seen in light of all the other areas in which India and China stand to gain from a closer relationship and even partnership. Even if resolving the border issue will take time, it can be easily managed until a mutually acceptable resolution is worked out.

On the economic front, apart from the sheer volume of trade between India and China (which dwarfs anything that Pakistan can offer), India is a safe, secure and profitable destination for Chinese investments (once again much more than Pakistan can ever hope to be). Chinese investments in India will be a win-win because they will not only address some of the problems emanating from the huge trade imbalance that exists between the two countries, but also fulfil India’s needs for rapid growth, which in turn will make Chinese investments even more productive and profitable.

Even in terms of connectivity, India can offer a better and safer Corridor to the Arabian Sea from China’s north-west than Pakistan can. India already has a railway line in the Kashmir valley and is working on connecting this to the rest of the railway network. Perhaps, this same line can be extended to China, at a fraction of the cost it will take to rebuild and restore the broken down Pakistan railway network. After all the geographical challenges in Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir are not much more than what China faces in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir. Perhaps, if the Kashmir route is not feasible, there are other areas which can be explored to provide connectivity from Kashgar to Kandla or Shigatse to Surat. Of course, any such project will only take off if there is sufficient confidence and trust, something that China will need to build with India.

Despite problems with China in the past, India has neither any intention nor any policy to contain China. But this may still happen, not by design but by default, if China is unable to adjust itself to the new emerging realities in the region. India has no choice but to work closely with the US and Japan, not so much with an eye on China but for its own development. India’s partners know that India will never become a pawn in their hands against China and there are enough reasons to believe that they are not even aiming for this. As far as they are concerned, India’s development will serve as a natural counter-balance to a rising China. This however isn’t a challenge for China but more of an opportunity to engage India in a mutually beneficial and profitable relationship. If however China remains wedded to the past and to Pakistan, this opportunity will be missed. China now needs to take a call on whether it wants India as a bridge to both the far-east and middle-east, or it wants India as an uncomfortable neighbour.

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Published Date: 16^th September 2014, Image source: http://img.tradeindia.com

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

India and Japan: Asia’s Best Friends

Aftab Seth

India’s relations with Japan reach back over 15 centuries. The Tokyo Declaration issued on September 1^st 2014, on the occasion of the meeting of the two Prime Ministers, echoed this connection in the following words:

”Conscious that from time immemorial whenever Japanese and Indians have come together, they have struck a deep chord in each other…..” [para 37, Tokyo Declaration of 1^st September 2014]. This sentence epitomizes the trouble- free, cordial and vibrant relationship between the two countries that has grown steadily over the centuries. As former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori said on the occasion of the PM’s visit, “I was the first Prime Minister to visit India in a decade“; in August 2000 he and PM Vajpayee established the Global Partnership between India and Japan. Mori ,now the Chairman of the Japan India Association, which celebrates its 111^th anniversary this year, was referring to a ten year long hiatus between the visit of PM Kaifu in 1990 and his own historic journey to India in 2000 August. I was then Ambassador in Vietnam and was called by the government to attend the Mori -Vajpayee talks, since my posting to Tokyo as Ambassador had already been announced. Mori’s visit was historic; it was also courageous, because many in his establishment were still sore about our nuclear tests of May 1998 and were opposed to his going to India.

Building on that visit of Mori, PM Vajpayee paid a return visit to Japan in December 2001. PM Junichiro Koizumi came to India in 2005 April and during his visit, inter alia, the flagship project of the Delhi Mumbai corridor was launched. In December 2006 in Tokyo, PM Man Mohan Singh and PM Shinzo Abe, during the latter’s first administration, expanded the Partnership to make it a “Global and ‘Strategic’. Since that visit in 2006, our Prime Ministers have been meeting every year, alternately in India and Japan .This practice of annual visits Japan does not follow with any other country; not even the USA, with which Tokyo has been linked by a security treaty for six decades. The uniqueness of this summit level exchange between India and Japan is further reinforced by annual exchanges of Foreign, Defence, Commerce and Energy Ministers. Modi and Abe decided to expand the dialogue to a 2+2 format, bringing the Defence and Foreign Ministers and the Defence and Foreign Secretaries together annually.

In the last ten months, the bilateral relationship has seen some historic landmarks. Most importantly Their Majesties the Emperor and Empress of Japan visited India from November 30th till the 5th of December 2013. They had returned to India after an interval of 53 years; in 1960 they had come as Crown Prince and Princess! The visits of Their Majesties abroad are carefully chosen by the Imperial Household and Foreign Office to underscore the importance that Japan attaches to the country to which the Imperial couple travel. The message to India was thus clear; Japan believes this is a most important bilateral relationship. Republic Day 2014 saw PM Abe as our Chief Guest. He was the first Japanese PM to be so honoured. His attendance at the parade where India’s military hardware was on display, was well noted by all observers of both countries and their foreign policies. The presence of the Japanese Prime Minister on such an occasion was symbolic of the fact that our relationship has grown immensely in the last 14 years. In the defence and security field in particular, PM Abe has shown that he is willing to make bold departures from past policies. In April 2014, Abe amended the ban then in place on the export of weapons. It is in this context that PM Modi and Abe in their joint declaration [para 9] spoke of the need to transfer technology and promote the production of defence equipment in India. Special reference was made to the US-2 amphibian aircraft which was also discussed in January 2014. In the light of PM Modi’s effort to promote the production of defence material in India, the willingness of Japan to assist in the process and transfer technology is most significant.

In a similar vein, both Prime Ministers stressed on the need to keep the global maritime and civil aviation commons free of interference ; the reference was clearly to the recent postures adopted by China in its assertive policies towards Vietnam , Philippines and Japan. [para 10]

During Modi’s visit, a Memorandum of Cooperation and Exchanges in the field of Defence was signed. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to holding joint naval exercises and to continue the trilateral naval exercises with the USA, the Malabar series. Interestingly, the trilateral naval exercises were first held in April 2007 in the waters off Okinawa, during Abe’s first administration. In August of that year, Abe paid a visit to India and addressed the Indian parliament speaking of “The Confluence of the Two Seas”; the Indian and Pacific Ocean, which made India and Japan natural partners. In September of 2007, India, Japan and the USA were joined by the navies of Singapore and Australia for joint naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal. It would thus be seen that Abe has had a deep interest for many years in enhancing defence cooperation with India and like- minded countries such as the USA and Australia. Australian PM Abbot’s visit to India soon after Modi’s visit to Japan and the agreement to sell us uranium, fits in well with Abe’s vision of democracies in Asia working together to secure sea lanes and ensure freedom of commerce.

The Japanese press paid attention to the defence and security aspect of the Modi visit, as also to the fact that talks on civil nuclear cooperation will continue. As a symbol of Japan’s determination to do away with all obstacles in the way of nuclear cooperation, Japan removed six of India’s space and defence related industries, from Japan’s ‘End User’ list. The list had been in force from May 1998 when India carried out the nuclear tests. In doing so, Japan has given evidence that it trusts India under PM Modi to refrain from using defence technologies transferred from Japan for delivery systems for Weapons of Mass Destruction. [Modi in his extempore remarks to the Indian community in Tokyo on September 2nd made a special reference to this mark of confidence in India] The decision to remove the ban on these six Indian entities comes on top of Japan’s promise to continue working with India to make it a full member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group. As a corollary to this reaffirmation of Japan’s’ commitment to deal in high technology exchanges, was the agreement to work together in the field of Rare Earths. Indian Rare Earths Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Department of Atomic Energy, will work with Toyota Tsusho Corporation for the production of rare earth products. The Press headlined this as “Japan turns to India as supplier of –important rare earth metals.” [Japan Times 29/8/14] The Japanese press highlighted this in the background of heavy arm twisting by China, the biggest producer of such products, some two years ago, when they banned the export of rare earth products to Japan. The reason for the ban was entirely political and had to do with the territorial disputes between China and Japan. Japanese high tech industry was thrown into considerable confusion by the Chinese action. It was realised then that over dependence on China for such products was not in Japan’s interest. Para 20 of the joint declaration, therefore, views this agreement on rare earths as a “significant step in the Japan India Strategic and Global Partnership.”

Similarly, over dependence on China for trade and investment has, in recent times, come in for increasing criticism in business and government circles in Japan. Modi and Abe agreed to double Japanese investment in India over the next 5 years to 3.5 trillion yen, about $ 35 billion. The money from ODA and private sources would help build our infrastructure, Smart cities, cleaning of rivers and for cold chains in agriculture. [During PM Vajpayees’s visit in 2001, PM Koizumi had made similar pledges to clean the Ganga.] The level of Japanese financing for our development has, therefore, been raised to a great extent as a result of Modi’s visit.

In strategic terms, Modi’s visit gave concrete shape to an idea mooted in January 2014, when Abe came to India. This relates to the North East of India where there are certain sensitivities relating to China’s claims on Arunachal Pradesh. The agreement has spelled out the steps by which Japan will assist in the development of these areas. The Japan Bank of International Cooperation [JBIC] and the Export Import Bank of India will collaborate in enhancing connectivity in our North East and between India and neighbouring countries. In view of the Free Trade agreement between ASEAN and India, the seamless flow of goods from our north east to Burma and beyond, linking up eventually with Hanoi in Vietnam, will give a boost to our trade with this important region which already stands at around $ 100 billion . The measure of trust reposed by India in Japan is clearly seen by this collaboration in an area of strategic importance to our country. JBIC will look at roads, water supply and forestry projects in Manipur and elsewhere in the region. Overall this can be seen as a major enhancement in the level of our strategic relationship.

The two Prime Ministers reached agreements in several other areas, including continued mutual help through the G-4 to obtain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council for both countries; to intensify the Energy dialogue in Clean Coal Technologies and LNG; to intensify Human Resource cooperation; to further enhance work on the Delhi Mumbai Infrastructure Corridor, in clusters such as Neemrana and to further develop the Bangalore–Madras corridor where Japanese companies have shown much interest .

There was an agreement that the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science will work with our universities to increase the level of student exchanges especially in the field of science.

There was a clear personal chemistry between PM Abe and PM Modi. Their private walk, all on their own, through the gardens of the temples of Kyoto showed the nature of the personal bond that has been established. PM Modi has agreed with Abe that the historic city of Kyoto, the capital of Japan till 1868, will be linked with Varanasi, our ancient city. Both cities have some of the most beautiful temples in the world and their linkage would further underscore the historical connections between us. The first sermon of the Buddha at Sarnath had a resonance in Japan almost 1000 years after it was delivered; but that in no way lessened the impact of that message of brotherhood, compassion and peace which went out from India to Asia and the world.

Some press editorials in Japan spoke of “Japan and India’s China challenge” while others made a reference to PM Modi’s speech where he spoke of European imperialism in the 18^th Century and the modern examples of such behaviour. Such press comments concluded that the PM had referred to China in his remarks about the 18^th century.

But apart from such occasional comments, overall there was a clear understanding that both Japan and India have to deal with their territorial and maritime problems with China in their own respective ways. They would, of course, continue to share intelligence with each other and they would continue to work together to build up each other’s economies and defence preparedness. Above all, these two great democracies share values relating to the rule of law, freedom of the individual ,freedom of the media and a desire to contribute to the peace and stability of Asia and the world at large. These shared values make Japan and India natural partners. This is the clear message that emerged at the end of PM Modi’s discussions with PM Abe which concluded in early September. The visit from all points of view has been a successful one for both India and Japan: one learned commentator, in fact headlined his piece; “Asia’s best friends shape an axis.” While some may question the ’axis’, no one can deny that we are indeed Asia’s best friends.

(The author is a veteran Diplomat and Academic. He is Visiting Professor at the Kenichi Ohmae Institute of Management in Tokyo)

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Published Date: 15^th September 2014, Image source: https://www.scmp.com

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

Will President Xi Jinping’s Visit change the Contours of Sino-Indian Ties?

Brig Vinod Anand, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

The coming visit of President Xi Jinping is being viewed as a visit that could define the next decade of engagement between the two Asian giants. It is generally accepted that Sino-Indian relationship could turn out to be more important than the Sino-US engagement if leadership of both the countries were to cooperate and give substance to the conception that the locus of global economy and power has shifted to Asia. Notwithstanding the fact that there is dissonance between the two countries on a number of issues, both nations do share common perceptions on many of the international issues and especially so on the nature of the emerging world order.

Further, the visit also needs to be seen in the backdrop of the unprecedented two summit meetings between PM Li Keqiang and Manmohan Singh last year, recent visit of Vice President Hamid Ansari to China to celebrate 60 years of Panchsheel and not to be left behind the visit of Indian Army Chief Gen. Bikram Singh to China in first week of July (after a gap of 9 Years). All these engagements were topped by Xi and Modi meeting on the sidelines of BRICS where both leaders established a good rapport. These multifarious engagements have already brought to fore the Indian concerns and have indicated the direction in which both countries want to proceed further. One thing which is certain is that no dramatic breakthroughs in the relationship should be expected.

Modi’s mantra is development and growth and that has been the basis on which he has come to power. Having had firsthand experience during his visits to China as Gujarat Chief Minister, he has been thoroughly impressed by the development and economic growth of China and especially its infrastructure in terms of roads, ports, highways and some of the new cities and towns. Therefore, he is keen to conclude agreements with the visiting President regarding Chinese infrastructure companies undertaking projects in India. India is looking for infusion of China’s surplus funds in Indian infrastructure and in other avenues of investment. Though an MOU for setting up an Industrial Park has been signed by our Trade and Commerce Minister during Vice President Ansari’s visit to China, it is just a small step; Modi is looking for a framework agreement on investment by China. Modi is keen to push infrastructure development by the Chinese in Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Tamil Nadu.

India’s requirements of funds are a huge one trillion US dollars as per its current Five Year Plan and it is hoped that China can contribute possibly 30 percent of such requirement over a period of time. But a Sino-Indian agreement for anything closer to 30 billion USD or even somewhat lesser amount in the coming visit could be a game changer. There would be some problems like the absorption capacities and many other difficulties connected with the local environment but all such issues can be overcome provided the political will is there from both sides. Recently, a country like UK offered 1 billion pounds (around 1.75 billion USD) for infrastructure development in India. Obviously, China’s capacities are much beyond this amount.

Second agreement that could give a positive momentum to Sino-Indian ties needs to be in the field of trade and commerce. The trade imbalance between the two nations is now to the tune of around 35 billion USD which needs to be addressed. In all the previous top level political engagements, while promises have been made to come to grips with the issue, no substantial progress has been made. Therefore, in the coming visit, New Delhi is looking forward to an agreement that grants greater access of Indian goods and services to the Chinese market, for instance Indian pharmaceutical products, IT enabled services, cotton textiles & home furnishings etc. There are many non-tariff barriers on Indian exports of goods and services. Removal of these would enable India to close the trade gap; though it is also not expected that the trade should always be balanced yet another way is that China invests in India. Under the present circumstances, it appears unlikely that the projected bilateral trade figure of 100 billion USD by 2015 can be achieved.

Thirdly, whenever a bilateral visit takes place, there is a pattern of behavior from China’s side which needs to be avoided. Such a behavior has been exhibited with regularity on the eve of all previous political visits. Before the Indian Vice President’s visit, a controversial map was released by China besides transgression by PLA troops in Pangong Lake. Last year before PM Li Keqiang’s visit to New Delhi, there was the Depsang valley intrusion. In fact, it is difficult to recall any visit where before the event there has been no negative incident. Largely, the perception is that such events/incidents are deliberately planned to put Indian decision-makers on the back foot and in order to test their resolve.

Though it may not be necessary to have any written agreement on the above aspect, both leaders can reach an understanding that such incidents should be avoided in order to give positive atmospherics to the bilateral meets.

While many agreements have been signed culminating into Border Area Development Cooperation (BADC) agreement of 2013, the border incidents continue to take place. Several incursions in Ladakh sector by Chinese troops have taken place since January 2014. PLA’s posture has become increasingly very assertive and it has been attempting to expand its claimed areas (which are in any case ill-defined). After the signing of BADC, such incidents should have been a rarity; both leaders need to reach an understanding on the same and need to enforce their writ; any fresh formal agreement on the issue would not be of any avail if the previous agreements are not adhered to in their true spirit. There is a need to arrive at a mutual modus vivendi on the issue. Peace and tranquility along the border remains an important element for growth and development. This has been recognized so in the previous agreements.

Fourthly is the question of lack of Chinese sensitivity to India’s core concern of Kashmir issue. Since nineties till 2005, China had been following somewhat of a neutral approach but after 2005 or so, there has been perceptible difference in China’s approach with its tilt towards Pakistan. China’s developmental and other activities in Pakistan occupied Kashmir have a negative impact on India’s security. It also needs to be remembered that even Pakistan considers Kashmir as disputed therefore; if China wants to reduce dissonance with India, then China’s return to a neutral stand would add to positivity of Sino-Indian relationship.

Fifth is the Tibet question. This year is being celebrated as the 60th year of Panchsheel Agreement. India is not much enamored with the Panchsheel Agreement as it recognized China’s suzerainty over Tibet without any concession to India in the bargain. It is considered as a lack of strategic vision on part of Nehru. While the Five principles of peaceful coexistence are quite all right, it was the preamble of the agreement that became more significant than the clauses in the main text. The fact that India was represented at the celebratory event in China by its Vice President is also some kind of message that Panchsheel does not hold that level of significance. In the bilateral summits for last three years or so, even though India has been adhering to one China policy, the same is not being mentioned in the Joint Communiques issued after the summits. This has been largely as a response to China’s failure to recognize Jammu & Kashmir as part of India. There have been many other irritants like the stapled visas issue to residents of Arunachal Pradesh.

Further, the presence of Lobsang Sangay, Kalon Tripa / Sikyong of Tibet Administration at Modi’s swearing ceremony also indicates the current government’s stance in some measure though there is no change in Indian government’s policy that Tibetans cannot carry out any political activities in India etc.

Another significant issue that needs further discussions is the damming activities on Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra River; some discussions took place during VP Hamid Ansari’s visit to Beijing; the two governments signed an implementation plan on provision of hydrological information on the Brahmaputra River in flood seasons by China and India. Expansion in areas of cooperation in this field has to take note of the interests of lower riparian nations like Bangladesh and India. So far Chinese policies on the issue are not conducive to good relationship.

Coming to the regional situation, the most important issue would be that of Afghanistan post 2014. Both sides largely share similar perceptions on the emerging scenario and have common concerns on the security implications of the unfolding scenario. There is a JWG on the subject; both sides are expected to explore practical ways of cooperating in Afghanistan so that peace and stability is brought to that nation. However, on the question of terrorism, China still continues to see through Pakistani prism. While the Americans, the Western nations and possibly the Chinese have seen through the double game of Pakistan, they feel constrained to take any action against Pakistan for a number of geo-strategic reasons. The negative role of Pakistan needs to be recognized by China otherwise peace and stability in the region including in Xinjiang would remain elusive.

While at the international level, both nations largely identify with each other’s aims, objectives and interests in the multilateral forums, on climate and trade issues, WTO etc. yet, China is yet to endorse India becoming a permanent member of UNSC as also a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Meanwhile, China led by President Xi Jinping has become increasingly aggressive and assertive in Asia both militarily and economically indicating that it aspires for leadership role in Asia. Promotion of a number economic corridors and silk roads, offering funding by establishing Asian Infrastructure Development Fund, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Development Fund and many other economic initiatives by China are aimed to enhance its strategic presence.

On the other hand, China needs India on its side for the success of its view of the new Asian security architecture where according to Chinese perceptions the US and the others have no role. India favours a strategic equilibrium in Asia whereas China is anti-status quo aspiring to dominate the Asian firmament. Thus, Modi’s visit to Japan, Australian PM Abbot’s visit to India before President Xi’s visit and later Modi’s visit to the US need to be seen in the context of India attempting to balance the emerging strategic equations.

Overall, the forthcoming visit of President Xi is unlikely to change the fundamental nature of Sino-Indian relationship as China is not ready to relent on issues considered by India to be part of its core national interests. Some advances on economic and connected issues are possible. Modi’s approach includes management of the conflict areas between the two nations while at the same time striving to have enhanced economic, political, diplomatic and people to people engagements.

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Published in Vivek: Issues & Options, July-Aug 2014

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

India-Japan Ties: Tokyo Must Move Forward on Nuke Deal to Realise Strategic Potential

Kanwal Sibal, 

Dean, Centre for International Relations and Diplomacy, VIF

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s just concluded visit to Japan has been successful on various counts. Politically, the India-Japan relationship has been solidified; economically, prospects of major Japanese investments in India have improved; on the security front, enhanced understandings should give substance to defence cooperation in the future. Above all, the visit has been a public relations success, with Modi revealing a capacity to engage even foreign audiences with ease, dexterity and aplomb, and presenting a captivating image of an Indian Prime Minister that for long the public is not familiar with.

Japan, even if stagnating economically for over two decades, is still the world’s third largest economy. Despite India being the large recipient of Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA), Japan’s trade with India has been a modest $16 billion and its investments in the country since 2000 have been equally unimpressive at around the same figure. Even South Korea has done better in India than Japan, while with China our bilateral trade, however skewed in China’s favour, is four times more.

With Modi giving primacy to development, the economic part of the visit was obviously uppermost on his mind. Japan has the funds and technology, apart from the political will under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, to help Modi realise his development goals for India. No other country combines all these three attributes to the same degree. Indeed, Abe’s vision of an economically and politically resurgent Japan fits in with the reinforced relationship that Modi seeks with that country. Japan is already involved in major infrastructure projects in India, such as the Delhi-Mumbai and Chennai-Bengaluru Industrial Corridors and the Western Dedicated Freight Corridor, apart from the Delhi Metro project.

Modi’s five-day visit has produced a commitment by Abe to invest $33.5 billion in India in the next 5 years, a sum apparently much higher than what Japan announced in the past during the visit of a foreign leader. The target areas are smart cities, electronics industrial parks, high speed rail lines, Ganga clean-up, clean energy, skill development, water security, food processing, agricultural cold chains etc. To develop India’s manufacturing base and upgrade its poor infrastructure, which, in turn, is necessary for its economic growth and competitiveness, Japan’s partnership becomes vital.

As India and Japan are major oil and gas importers, the intention to explore a higher level of “strategic collaboration” in the global gas and oil market, including joint procurement of LNG and promoting flexible LNG markets, including relaxation of destination clauses, is important for India to deal with the differential prices that Gulf suppliers charge Asian and western buyers.

Naturally, announcements are one thing, translating them into concrete outcomes is another. The latter would require an overhaul of our internal decision making processes, with improved coordination under more effective leadership. Modi has promised the Japanese a red carpet instead of red tape, but, more importantly, going beyond rhetoric, he has promised a management team in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), with two Japanese nominees, to facilitate processing of projects. Now that the target has been set, the follow-up will be watched closely by all sides.

While there are no contentious political issues between India and Japan, the political backdrop of Modi’s visit was important at various levels. The serious deterioration of Japan-China ties over the Senkaku islands, which is an outcome of China’s increasing assertiveness and has stoked tensions with other Asian countries too, is clashing with Abe’s ambitions to restore Japan’s global standing. On the other hand, China seeks to subdue Japan with the aim of steadily exposing the “unreliability” of the US-Japan defence ties and forcing the region to reconcile to its eventual hegemony over it.

US’s economic and financial melding with China constrains its ability and desire to contain China. While still relying on the US for protection, Japan has to build protective walls in conjunction with other Asian countries that also feel threatened by China’s rise. India, with its own serious territorial issues with China which the latter is disinclined to resolve, has a community of interest with Japan in putting constraints on China’s erratic behaviour through defensive dispositions. Neither country wants a confrontation with China: Japan has, in fact, a far deeper economic relationship with China than we would forge even if all of Japan’s proposed investments in India materialises.

Modi’s visit has thrown up many indications of ‘a meeting of minds’ with Japan on security issues, signified in particular by the announcement of a Special and Global Strategic Partnership between the two countries. Japan has wanted to upgrade the strategic relationship with India to a higher level and India has responded, even though Japan is a US ally. The only other country with which India has a “Special and Privileged Partnership” is Russia, but the political context of that is altogether different. The Tokyo Declaration carries many significant messages that China would have noticed, saying, for example, that “a closer and stronger strategic partnership between India and Japan is indispensable…for advancing peace, stability…, in particular, in the inter-connected Asia, Pacific and Indian Ocean Regions.”, or, that “Prime Minister Modi supported Japan’s initiative to contribute to peace and stability of the region…”, or, further, that “The two Prime Ministers affirmed their intention to engage with other countries in the region and beyond to address the region's challenges…”. These are precisely the points on which China is hostile to Abe.

The nods towards the US in the Tokyo Declaration are apparent in the expression of satisfaction “with progress in official level trilateral dialogue among India, Japan and the United States” and the hope “that this would lead to concrete and demonstrable projects to advance their shared interests and that of other partners”. This is clearly signalling a community of interest among not only these three countries but others in the region too. The Japanese wanted this dialogue to be raised to the Foreign Minister’s level, but India has agreed only to “explore” this possibility, not wanting to go too far too quickly. The willingness to “explore the possibility of expanding, at an appropriate time, their consultations to other countries in the region” suggests a revival of a Quadrilateral Plus dialogue in the future with Australia, Vietnam and others as participants.

The Tokyo Declaration also says India and Japan 'affirmed their shared commitment to maritime security, freedom of navigation and overflight, civil aviation safety, unimpeded lawful commerce, and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law”, in a clear allusion to China’s claims in the South China and East China Seas. Importantly, India has agreed to “regularise” Japanese participation in the India-US Malabar naval exercises that Japan has been seeking. The Declaration also speaks of Japan's cooperation for enhanced connectivity and development in Northeast India and linking the region to other economic corridors in India and to Southeast Asia- which would be a competitive project with the Bangladesh-India-China-Myanmar (BCIM) corridor that China is pushing.

Modi telling a Tokyo symposium that “Everywhere around us, we see an 18th century expansionist mindset -- encroaching on another country, intruding in other's waters, invading other countries, and capturing territory”, has invited some criticism as unnecessary China-baiting. Modi had, in fact, chided China for expansionism during his election campaign in Arunachal Pradesh, and to that extent he was being consistent. More to the point, however, he also told the Japanese journalists that his government was resolved “to utilise the full potential of our Strategic and Cooperative Partnership with China” and that he intended to use the relationship forward. He modulated the talk about rivalries by adding that “India, Japan and China, as major countries in Asia, have many common interests and we need to build on them to convert ours into an Asian Century by working together.” The totalities of his statements have to be seen, and this will not escape the Chinese. In any case, to be so defensive about China’s sensitivities is unnecessary given China’s relationship with Pakistan that remains deeply injurious to our strategic interests, besides its own assertive claims on Indian territory.

China is attacking Japan for revived militarism under Abe. India, however, has a different view, and is interested in forging closer defence cooperation with it. An MOU on defence cooperation and exchanges was signed during the visit. In this connection, the decision by Japan to remove six of India’s space and defence-related entities from its Foreign End User List was appreciated by Modi, with both sides looking forward to enhanced trade and collaboration in high technology. Japan is keen to sell its amphibious aircraft US 2 to India as a civilian platform, whereas India seeks a military platform, but on this Japan continues to hedge because of its self-imposed restrictions on export of defence equipment. A Joint Working Group will continue to examine the proposal.

On the sensitive issue of a civilian nuclear deal with India, Japan continues to drag its feet for unconvincing reasons. Japan may have special sensitivities in matter nuclear but has no compunction in accepting nuclear weapons protection from the very country that used such weapons against it. If Japan can overcome this order of sensitivity, then India-related sensitivities seems more a question of fixed mindsets, especially in the Japanese bureaucracy. There is clear incompatibility between the forging of a “special and global strategic partnership” and the reluctance to lift civilian nuclear sanctions on India. This puts India in an inferior position vis a vis China, more so as China continues to violate its (Nuclear Suppliers Group) NSG commitments by engaging in nuclear cooperation with Pakistan that has neither signed the (Non-Proliferation Treaty) NPT nor the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Unfortunately, the American non-proliferation die-hards, unhappy with the Indo-US nuclear deal under President Bush, seek to use the Japanese to extract additional concessions from India on testing and reprocessing. Until Japan moves on the nuclear deal, the strategic potential of our relationship will remain inhibited. The Tokyo Declaration merely repeats past formulations by asking the officials of the two sides “to further accelerate the negotiations with a view to concluding the Agreement at an early date”. One hopes that by the time of the next India-Japan summit in 2015, this outstanding issue will be finalised. On the positive side, the Japanese have committed “to work together for India to become a full member in the four international export control regimes: Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement and Australia Group”.

Abe made extraordinary personal gestures to Modi during the visit, the significance of which should not be underestimated. Modi voiced his “confidence, excitement and optimism” about India-Japan relations, signifying that beyond the personal chemistry between the two leaders, tangible national interests are bringing the two countries together.

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Published Date: 11^th September 2014, Image source: http://en.prothom-alo.com