The Evolving Indo-Myanmar Defence Relationship: an Analytical Perspective

Brig (retd) Vinod Anand 

(Senior Fellow, VIF)

It was only in early 1990’s that India realized that it was fast loosing strategic ground to China due to its lack of engagement with Myanmar. Not only security and stability in the border regions was crucial to India from internal security point of view but also constructive engagement with Myanmar and connectivity through it was very important for India to realize its ‘Look East Policy’ unveiled in early 1990s.

The military to military relations between the India and Myanmar gained traction with the goodwill visit of the then Chief of Army Staff, General B.C.Joshi to Myanmar (May 1994). Supply of some military hardware followed. Momentum to the defence relationship was further imparted when in January 2000 when a military delegation led by the then Indian Army Chief, Gen. VP Malik visited Myanmar and met Myanmar’s senior military elite to forge a military to military relationship which over the years has proved very fruitful. Since 2000, after the return visit of Gen. Maung Aye to India, bilateral annual border meetings between the two armies have been taking place regularly. India has also supplied a range of military hardware since then.

The Indian Prime Minster during his visit to Myanmar in April 2012 had also stressed on the need for maritime security cooperation and observed that both India and Myanmar need to “expand our security cooperation that is vital not only to maintain peace along our land borders but also to protect maritime trade which we hope will open up through the sea route between Kolkata and Sittwe.” In February, 2012 Myanmar Navy had taken part in joint naval exercises conducted by India with the participation of 14 nations’ navies (Milan series of naval exercises).

The recent visit of Mr. Antony to Myanmar (20-21 January, 2013) was a continuation of trend that has marked the growing defence cooperation between the two countries. After a degree of democratic reforms that were ushered in 2010, many military dignitaries from both sides have exchanged visits to enhance military to military cooperation and address mutual border security threats and challenges. In fact, in last two years or so the three Indian services chiefs have visited Myanmar to forge a closer defence relationship with Myanmar. This time the Defence Minster was accompanied by Army Commander of Kolkatta based Eastern Command and Vice Chief of Indian Navy which highlighted the fact that India was keen to further address its concerns regarding land and maritime security concerns in coordination with Myanmar armed forces.

It is important for India to build up capacities of the Myanmar’s armed forces especially in relation to developing its prowess in fighting the insurgents. Since the year 2000 there have been off and on coordinated operations along the borders to flush out the insurgents. The insurgents take advantage of the difficult terrain along the borders and lack of adequate controls along the borders to carry out attacks and then cross over to Myanmar.

The Defence Minister’s visit last month also came in the background of clashes between the Kachin insurgents and the Myanmar armed forces; Kachins remain the only group with which the Myanmar government has not been able to conclude a lasting ceasefire. Kachin Independent Organisation has been known to have cross-border linkages with Indian insurgents groups like ULFA in the shape of having provided shelter and advance military training to ULFA cadres. It was reported that there was a base of Indian insurgents in Kachin areas across the border. Last November, a high level 12-member team from Myanmar led by their Naga administration zone chairman U R Sanchyu and Pangsau sub-township representative had held a meeting with the Indian delegation at Jairampur in Arunachal Pradesh's Changlang district for discussions on cross-border crime, insurgent activities and other connected issues.

Further, NSCN is another active insurgent group which has trans- border affiliations with Myanmarese Nagas of Sagaing division opposite Indian states of Manipur and Nagaland. There were also reports early last year that a variety of North Eastern insurgents groups have joined together to coordinate their anti-India activities. ULFA, NSCN-K and PLA of Manipur seemed to have played key role in bringing these groups on a common platform. Sharing of information on operations and sources of weapons, facilitating training and providing mutual support and shelter along the Indo-Myanmar borders were some of the other objectives to be achieved by the so called “United Front’ composed of 14 anti-India insurgent groups.

In addition, the signing of a ceasefire agreement with Myanmarese Nagas of Sangaing division by the Myanmar government in May 2012 holds the prospects of the Indian Naga insurgent groups and their affiliates finding shelter and succor in their training bases. India was not informed about such an agreement and thus there was a certain degree of disappointment among the Indian security forces. With the Myanmar armed forces engaged in putting down the Kachin insurgency, it is quite possible that they were not willing to open another front that would have compounded their problems.

India has been providing training facilities to Myanmar armed forces in professional and technical courses; the vacancies in such courses for the Myanmar defence forces are being regularly enhanced. Maintenance of some Russian origin equipment is also being provided by the Indian defence forces. Building of defence infrastructure in the border areas has been another proposition which may fructify soon. This would facilitate quick movement and deployment of Myanmar forces to tackle insurgents and maintain law and order in border areas.

Even though the sector commanders on both sides are in touch with each other on a regular basis, India wants to intensify engagement so that insurgent groups are choked of arms supplies and cadre in the north-eastern states.

While for long Myanmar army has been pleading a lack of capacity in tackling the varied insurgent groups along the border, there is a view that Myanmar lacks the political will to act against some of these groups especially the Nagas’ insurgent outfits.

During his visit to Myanmar Mr. Antony met both the President of Myanmar and their Defence Minister. He conveyed the importance placed by India on enhancement of bilateral ties in all fields, including defence. He noted that the recent exchanges of visits between both countries at political and other levels had imparted a new momentum to the bilateral relationship.

Both the Defence Ministers deliberated on the following points:-

(a) Improvement of mechanisms for coordinating patrolling by the army along the land borders to prevent infiltration of insurgents

(b) Similar arrangements for patrolling maritime boundaries to curb activities of insurgent groups

(c) Ensuring that neither side allows the insurgents to use their territory for activities detrimental to each others’ security.

(d) Additional vacancies for training of Myanmar army personnel in Indian training academies

(e) Repair and training cover for Myanmar defence forces equipment of Russian origin

The visit also came at a time when China has expressed ‘grave concerns and dissatisfaction’ regarding some of the Myanmar army’s shells landing on their side of the border during the ongoing Kachin conflict. At the time of Indian Defence Minister to Naypidaw, a Chinese high level military delegation led by Lt-Gen Qi Jianguo, the deputy chief of general staff in the PLA met with Burma’s President Thein Sein in Yangon for strategic security consultations between the armed forces of China and Burma. However, the Indian and Chinese dignitaries’ visits seem to be unrelated.

Despite the recent opening up to the U.S. and the West due to its nascent democratic and economic reforms China’s strategic influence in Myanmar is considerable. India’s engagement with Myanmar and the western interest in Myanmar would contribute to moderating China’s influence. However, China due to its proximity and nature of relationship with the dispensation in Myanmar is unlikely to give free run to others. The multimodal linkages from Yunnan to Indian Ocean are critical to its energy security and economic growth.

It is quite evident that Tatmadaw would continue to remain the most important element for quite some time to come due to the nature of power distribution in Myanmar despite the baby steps towards democracy. Strengthening of defence relationship with Myanmar should proceed in congruence with political and economic engagement. Strategic imperatives can be underscored by the fact that India can ill afford to have another Pakistan on our East.

China’s Involvement in India’s Internal Security Threats

Dr. N. Manoharan
Senior Fellow, VIF

Unlike Pakistan, the involvement of China in meddling with India’s internal security is not a simple story of ‘sub-conventional warfare. It is more nuanced and complex. Under Mao Zedong, China supported revolutionary insurgencies throughout the world. The spirit of Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai pervaded between India and China and the former was tagged as “neutrals” in the initial years. Yet, what made China to take interest in “national self-determination struggles” in various parts of India? Partly it was due to Beijing’s perception that its southern neighbour had been turning into an “anti-China base”. Nor did the Chinese take lightly Indian sympathy to Tibetan refugees, who were fleeing the state repression. China also suspected Indian covert hands in Khampas rebellion in Tibet. But, the actual support by China to rebel movements of India gradually commenced after the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict when bilateral relations between the two countries hit rock bottom. For Beijing, patronage to insurgent groups in the northeast India looked ideal not only because of geographical proximity, but also due to the region’s isolation from the Indian mainland, and the existence of external support network created and sustained by the then East Pakistan.

From 1966, China started training several batches of rebels from the northeast. Incidentally, the ‘Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution’, popularly known as the ‘Cultural Revolution’ commenced in the same year in China. The first to reach out to the Chinese help were the Nagas. China was considered as the “only hope for revolutionaries”. Taking cue from Nagas, other groups in the region, especially Mizos and Manipuris, got hooked to China. Pakistan had already been in the job of supporting insurgent groups of the northeast since the mid-1950s. The infrastructure and methodology was there to imbibe. And it became easy for China to take on. The China-returned guerillas not only fought better, but were also not amenable to come to negotiating tables even when the time was ripe for resolving conflicts. However, when it came to China’s involvement in Naxalism, it was more of inspirational than any sort of direct material support. Charu Mazumdar, one of the pioneering leaders of the Naxalite movement, famously remarked: “China’s Chairman is our Chairman and China’s path is our path”. Naxals saw Maoism as the right template for making a revolution in India.

After 1978, Deng Xiaoping put Chinese economic, security and foreign policies on a new footing. His policy of “reform and opening” subordinated the revolutionary and anti-imperialist elements of China's foreign policy to the overriding imperative of economic development. The Cultural Revolution was severely condemned for having obstructed and delayed China’s economic and technological progress, and for the divisions it brought about in both its ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ worlds. China’s support to Northeast insurgency dwindled in the late 1970s, if not dried out completely. At around the same time, it should be noted that there was gradual normalisation of Sino-Indian relations. During this period, the northeast militant groups got an alternative support base in Bangladesh, Bhutan and Myanmar.

The revival of Chinese involvement in India’s internal security threats commenced roughly in mid-1998 when Sino-Indian relations witnessed strains in the wake of nuclear tests by India. And Beijing had been looking at the developments in the strategic landscape, especially India-US relations with utmost concern and suspicion. More than the Indo-US Nuclear Deal, China was far more concerned about the increasing defence cooperation between India and the United States. China’s role in India’s internal security threats during this phase has been wide-ranging: clandestine support to militant groups, not objecting to Indian insurgent leaders taking asylum in its territory, turning blind eye to Chinese arms flows into India and cyber warfare.

The rebels of the northeast, apart from their nuisance value to the Indian security forces deployed in the region, are also amenable to motivation by the Chinese to target key Tibetan leaders in exile based in India and to gather vital intelligence information about Indian force deployments along India-China borders. In the present period, Chinese intelligence agencies have taken over the role of Mao’s CPC. Apart from reviving contacts with old militant groups like NSCN and PLA, China’s linkage has now extended to touch new groups like United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF). On linkage with Indian Maoists, there is no evidence to suggest China’s direct support.

But, China did not wish to do anything overtly. Since indirect involvement is hard to prove a retaliatory response is more remote. Also, such involvement draws less international stigma. Most importantly, it provided China ‘plausible deniability’. On cyber warfare, the methodology is simple: use a network of cultivated and loosely controlled “patriotic” and mercenary hackers that allows the state to deny responsibility something similar to the method used in the case of small arms.

From time-to-time, India has taken up the issue with Beijing both diplomatically as well as through the aegis of counter-terror cooperation. However, China has categorically denied giving any help to insurgent groups, particularly the ULFA, UNLF, NSCN (I-M) and PLA. But, what surprises is the low level of confidence at which the issue is raised and discussed with the Chinese. India’s official position on the entire gamut of China’s involvement has been soft. One agrees that opinions and assessment on the state of China’s involvement should be expressed after careful judgment based on the long-term interests of building a stable relationship between the two countries. But, there is nothing wrong in having a structured mechanism to discuss this issue specifically. Simultaneously, all routes of Chinese interactions with Indian militant groups should be blocked. This requires enhancement of India’s border security apart from cooperation of India’s other neighbours like Myanmar, Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan. Except Bhutan, none of India’s neighbours are serious or consistent in cooperating with India to tackle insurgents in the region.

India’s Myanmar Policy Gains Momentum

Brig Vinod Anand

Senior Fellow, VIF

Indian Prime Minister’s visit to Myanmar after a gap of 25 years was recognition of the fact that the positive changes occurring on Myanmar’s political firmament had created conditions for enabling such a high level visit.

Though India had been engaging Myanmar earlier also for strategic and security reasons, raising the level of political exchanges highlights the fact that the Indo-Myanmar relations have reached a turning point and are poised for an exponential expansion. A dozen Memoranda of Understanding signed after the visit also indicate the diverse fields in which India is engaging Myanmar.

Politically, reestablishment of formal relations with Aung Suu Kyi can be seen as one of the major gains of the visit. While she had close linkages with India in the past including active support by the Indian government to the democracy movement in the 1980’s, there was a break in this relationship due to geopolitics of the region. Though there were informal linkages and India had been pressing both sides, the military junta of the past and Suu Kyi led NLD to reconcile their differences, Suu Kyi had maintained a public distance from New Delhi. She was no doubt encouraged by support that she got from the West including public statements at the highest level, for instance from President Obama who in the Indian parliament had called for support to democratic forces in Myanmar. However, finally it was India’s proposal for reconciliation that possibly led to political rapprochement and transition which is now reasonably well established. This was confirmed during the Prime Minister’s visit and his joint statement with Aung Suu Kyi. The common platform was a strong message to India’s past detractors and this could be seen as the biggest political gain for New Delhi.

Myanmar’s strategic salience as a land bridge to China on the one hand and to the South East Asia on the other hand can not be over emphasised. While approaches from China through Myanmar are important from military, security and economic point of view the connectivity to South East Asia is relevant from the economic point of view. Security and stability in the border areas is an imperative for overall development and establishment of multi-modal corridors linking India and Myanmar and beyond. Both Indian and Myanmar leaders have assured each other that territories of either country would not be allowed to be used for activities inimical to the other, including for training, sanctuary and other operations by terrorist and insurgent organisations and their operatives. This is relevant because recently a ceasefire agreement has been signed between NSCN (K) between the local government of Sangaing division of Myanmar which had been viewed negatively in Indian strategic circles. However, Indian PM gave a positive interpretation to the agreement saying that it would be useful for ushering in peace.

India has also sought to support border regions by providing monetary assistance and open border haats (markets for trade) to develop the area. Evidently, where Indian officialdom needs to pay attention is in implementation of the decisions taken on some of the projects and schemes. The record so far in respect of execution of projects has not been very satisfactory so far.

Strengthening of relations with the Myanmar military particularly in the field of training is another gain in this field though this was not as much reflected in the joint statements.

Major gains were also made on trade and economic front. India is developing major interests in energy, minerals, and iron ore in particular as well as hydro power sector of Myanmar. The target of bilateral trade to $3 billion, by 2015 is modest and achievable. India’s offer of soft loan of $500m could be a driver towards expansion of bilateral trade. Trade and economy related MOUs will add to impetus in this direction and include, Memorandum of Understanding regarding US$ 500 million Line of Credit, Air Services Agreement between India and Myanmar and Memorandum of Understanding on Establishment of Joint Trade and Investment Forum.

The visit will provide impetus to the Look East Policy. It needs to be noted that the year 2012 is being commemorated as two decades of India’s Look East Policy and comprehensive engagement with Myanmar would impart impetus to the realization of such a policy. Further Myanmar is scheduled to take over as the Chairman of ASEAN in 2014 and both leaders reached an understanding to coordinate and cooperate in making the forthcoming ASEAN-India Commemorative Summit successful.

Some of the initiatives in relation to major vectors of Look East policy are as follows:-

(a) Communication Linkages. Agreement to expand road linkages from India to Myanmar and Thailand by 2016 would improve connectivity to South East Asia exponentially. India is also implementing Kaladan multimodal transport project that involves upgrading the Sittwe port and constructing a highway to connect the town of Paletwa in Chin state to the Indian border in Mizoram state by 2015.

(b) Support to Regional Role. Support to Myanmar’s role in ASEAN, Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) has been affirmed. Myanmar is the current chairman of BIMSTEC and can play a very useful role in furthering the objectives of this grouping.

(c) Diverse Engagement. India is expanding engagement in diverse sectors, including science & technology, tourism, transport & infrastructure, information communication technology, agriculture and energy.

(d) Tourism. Opening up air service to Myanmar and road linkages would not only promote tourism but would also intensify people-to- people exchanges.

(e) Education. The number of training slots for Myanmar under technical assistance programme has been increased from 250 to 500 every year. An agreement on the setting up of the Myanmar Institute of Information Technology will boost capacity in the ICT sector in Myanmar.

Chinese official reaction to Indian PM’s visit was on expected lines as the Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Weimin told a press briefing that China welcomes the engagement. "Both India and Myanmar are China's friendly neighbours. China is happy to see the development relations between them. We hope such development of friendly relations is conducive to the stability and prosperity of the whole region". However Chinese media has been less considerate and has clearly stated that India is making up for lost time after it finds itself left out by Chinese and Western initiatives in Myanmar. The truth may however be somewhere in between.

China’s overall policy on Myanmar is likely to remain unaffected by these developments both Indian and Western entry to Myanmar. China’s deep political linkages with Myanmar would be evident by Beijing recently hosting a delegation from Myanmar’s largest political party the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) comprising of military junta loyalists which had an audience with Vice President Xi Jinping.

While there was a setback seen with suspension of work on the Myitsone dam, indications are that this is likely to be limited and some say that on the ground work is continuing. Thus China’s policy of trade routes and transportation corridors to the Indian Ocean through Myanmar is unlikely to be impacted.

India has been one of the last few major states to engage with the new regime in Myanmar including the emerging political order where Aung Suu Kyi despite her official status as only a parliamentary MP has a major role to play in the future. However India could be said to have made up for this lost time by establishing multi dimensional engagement covering all essential facets during the visit of Dr Man Mohan Singh. It is only effective implementation of the MOUs which have been reached with Myanmar that need to be monitored and executed.