Myanmar’s Armed Forces (Tatmadaw)

Maj Gen (Retd.) P K Chakravorty

Historical Perspective

Myanmar historically had three distinct periods. The monarchy which lasted from the 9th to the 19th century comprised, chronologically, the Pagan Dynasty, the Toungoo Dynasty and the Konbaung Dynasty. The army during this period was a powerful one in the South East Asia, which was ultimately defeated in 1824 by the British after a 60 years struggle. The Army during this period was based on conscription and consisted of infantry, elephants, cavalry, artillery and naval units. Weapons were initially procured from the Chinese which had become integrated by the end of the 14^th Century. 16^th Century witnessed the introduction of special musket, the Portuguese matchlocks and cannons. Technological gap compelled the Army to buy arms from the Europeans. The Army could defeat the Portuguese and the French in the 17^th and the 18^th centuries respectively but failed against the British in the 19th century. They lost the three wars against the British and finally Burma was in the latter’s control by 1824.

The British did not trust the local army and initially used the Indian Army to secure the country. Later a few units were formed of the Karens, Kachins and Chins. The Burmese population’s loyalty was doubted and was kept out of the security structure. Just before the beginning of the First World War, the only indigenous military regiment which comprised Myanmar citizens were the 70th Burma Rifles made up of Karens, Kachins and Chins. It was during the First World War that the British relaxed the ban, raising a Burmese battalion in the 70^th Burma Rifles, a Burmese Company in the 85th Burma Rifles and seven Mechanical Transport Companies. In addition, three companies of Burma Sappers and Miners, made up of mostly Burmese, and a Company of Labour Corps, made up of Chinese and Burmese were also raised. It is interesting to note that all these units began their overseas engagement during the First World War. The 70th Burma Rifles served in Egypt for garrison duties while the Burmese Labour Corps served in France. One company of the Sappers and Miners distinguished themselves in Mesopotamia at the crossing of the Tigris.

The British knew the fighting capabilities of the Burmese and their ability to challenge authority with regard to their employment against the domestic population. Accordingly, the British practically abolished all Burmese units after the First World War. They consolidated their position and made Burma a separate colony on 01 April 1937. At this juncture they decided to permit Burmese citizens to join the Army but the citizens did not respond as they could feel the mutual lack of trust. It is pertinent to note that prior to the Second World War, the British Burma Army comprised 27.8 percent Karens, 22.6 percent Chin, 22.9 percent Kachin, just 12.3 percent of the Burmese and the remaining British.

In December 1941, the Burma Independence Movement gathered momentum and a group of Burmese activists formed the Burma Independence Army (BIA) with Japanese assistance. This was led By General Aung San who happens to be the father of the current political counsellor Ms Aung San Suu Kyi. The Army had strength of about 23000 and there were internal disturbance between the Burmese and Karens. This organisation was soon transformed into a ‘Burma Defence Army’ on 26 August 1942 and later into the ‘Burma National Army’ on 01 August 1943. General Ne Win became the Commander when the Japanese occupying forces allowed Burma to gain nominal independence in 1943. After the defeat of the Japanese and disillusioned with their occupation, the Burmese Army joined the Allies on 27 March 1945. This brings us to the third period which relates to the post independence era.

Tatmadaw post-Independence

Myanmar became an independent republic on 04 January 1948 with U Nu as the first Prime Minister. Unlike other British colonies, it did not become a member of the Commonwealth. At this time the Tatmadaw (the Army) was weak and lacked organisational cohesiveness. Prior to independence, in September 1945, the Tatmadaw was reorganised by incorporating the British Burma Army and the Patriotic Burmese Force. The British also decided to form class battalions based on ethnicity. There were total of 15 rifle battalions out of which six were Burma Rifles, three Karen Rifles, two Kachin Rifles, three Chin Rifles and one Gurkha Rifles Battalion. The British held important appointments till 1955 and on 01 January 1956 the Ministry of Defence was formed with General Ne Win as the head of the Tatmadaw.

The political situation deteriorated in 1957 and General Ne Win was invited to form a Caretaker Government by Prime Minister U Nu on 28 October 1958. Elections were conducted under the care taker Government in 1960 and U Nu was re-elected as the Prime Minister. On 02 March 1962, General Ne Win staged a coup and formed the Union Revolutionary Council which ruled the country. He formed the Burma Socialist Programme Party whose members were mainly military personnel. There were uprisings again in 1988 which was controlled by the military. Aung San Suu Kyi emerged as a national icon and the only way was to have a reorganised military organisation known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) which permitted elections in 1990. Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) swept the elections but SLORC refused to recognise the results and placed Suu Kyi under house arrest. The Tatmadaw drafted the Constitution in 2008 and allotted 25 percent of the seats in the Parliament to the Armed Forces. Elections were held in 2010, followed by another in 2015. The NLD swept the elections and Htin Kyaw was made the President while Ms Aung San Suu Kyi was made the State Counsellor. A slow transition to democracy is likely to take place in the near future. Aung San Suu Kyi is the defacto head of the Government.

Military Aspects

The Tatmadaw had its first test immediately after independence was granted to Burma (now Myanmar). The first step was to consolidate the borders in the difficult terrain. At the beginning of 1950, Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) troops under General Li Mai with support from United States, invaded Burma. Their aim was to use Burmese territory to attack the People’s Republic of China. Units of Tatmadaw attacked but failed to remove the attackers due to logistic reasons. The KMT held on till they were finally evicted by joint military operations by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Tatmadaw. The area occupied by the forces was 30000 square kilometres. The operations commenced on 22 November 1960 and concluded on 09 February 1961. The KMT fought in small columns dispersed over a large area. They were able to escape in large numbers due to jungle terrain and their ability to fight in small teams. The Tatmadaw got their territory liberated and consolidated their gains and it has been friendly with the PLA ever since.

As per Military balance 2017, strength of Tatmadaw is 406,000. The strength of the Army is 375000. The Army’s Order of Battle is as under:-

• 14 Regional Military Commands organised in six Bureau of Special Operations,
• 7 Regional Operational Commands,
• 20 Military Operational Commands (Divisions),
• 10 Light Infantry Divisions,
• 10 Armoured Battalions,
• 7 Artillery Battalions and 37 independent Artillery Companies,
• 7 Air Defence Battalions,
• 40 Intelligence Companies,
• 45 Advanced Signal Battalions,
• 54 Field Engineer Battalions,
• 4 Armoured Engineer Battalions,
• 14 Medical Battalions,
• Equipment comes from China, Russia, Ukraine and other countries.

The Myanmar Navy is small in size and has strength of 16000 personnel. It has two stealth frigates, four frigates, and a large fleet of fast attack crafts capable of firing missiles and torpedoes, patrol boats and river craft which make them a versatile force of a total of 122 vessels. It is comparable to the Bangladesh Navy and is mainly trained by the Chinese and Russians. The Navy defends the coastline and participates, where required, in counter-insurgency operations.

The Myanmar Air Force is the aerial branch of the Tatmadaw. The primary mission of the Myanmar Air Force, since its inception, has been to provide transport, logistical and close air support to the Myanmar Army in counter-insurgency operations. It is also used in relief missions. The strength is 15000 personnel and it has 229 aircraft. The main combat aircraft are:

• Mig-29 - 31,
• A-5 of China - 21,
• J-7 of China – 24,
• JF -17 of China – 16, on order.

The Tatmadaw has tremendous political clout in Myanmar.

Tatmadaw and the Rohingya Crisis

The current crisis with the Rohingyas in Rakhine province is being calibrated by the Tatmadaw. The Rohingyas on their part have remained isolated and made no effots to have peaceful relations with other communities in Myanmar. They have formed the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) also known by its former name Haraqah al Yaqin which is an insurgent group operating in the Rakhine province. The group was possibly formed in 2013 following the riots which have intermittently been taking place since 1978. As per authorities in Myanmar, the group is assisted by foreign Islamic terrorist groups. The ARSA is led by Ata Ulla, a Rohingya who was born in Karachi, Pakistan, and grew up in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The Tatmadaw has stated that the group is linked to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

The Tatmadaw was compelled to intervene in the Rakhine Province after the ARSA launched concerted attacks on a large number of police posts. The ARSA however, despite their Islamist connections, have denied being a Jihadist outfit, though on 25 August 2017, the Myanmar Government has formally categorised the group as a terrorist organisation. It is recently reported that China has working out a plan between Myanmar and Bangladesh for return of the Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh back to Myanmar. The plans are currently being worked out and as of now concrete action is yet to start. In this scheme of the Myanmar Government led by State Councillor Aung San Suu Kyi Tatmadaw would be a principal player. Therefore, the Myanmar Government is careful in dealing with the Tatmadaw.

Tatmadaw and India

India is a good friend of the Tatmadaw. On 07 July 2017, the Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing undertook an eight days visit to India. India sees Myanmar as a land bridge to the South East Asia. It would also like to offer an alternative to the Chinese support to the Tatmadaw. To this end, in the July 2015 Joint Consultative Commission meeting, the framework for military cooperation was laid down. India stands committed to support modernisation of the Tatmadaw and assist in building a professional Myanmar Navy. India is also grateful to Myanmar for its assistance in counter-insurgency operations in the North Eastern states.

Myanmar has evinced keen interest in Indian defence equipment. Myanmar has purchased artillery guns, rocket launchers, rifles, radars, mortars, bailey bridges, night vision devices, war gaming software, naval gun boats, sonars and acoustic domes, and there is a separate deal to supply torpedoes. Navies of both the countries have undertaken joint patrolling and the Indian Army has started training their personnel. As per the Shillong Times dated 21 November 2017, ‘15 Officers from the Myanmar Army and 16 Officers of the Indian Army were training together at the Umroi Cantonment from 20 to 25 November under the Red Horns Division in a Bilateral Exercise IMBAX- 2017’. The focus of the training was on tactics, procedures, expertise and methodology required by the contingents of the member nations serving in United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO).

Partnership with China
India is reaching out to Myanmar in a big way to balance China’s influence in this region. China is equally active and is leaving no stone unturned to woo Aung Sang Suu Kyi. Myanmar is an important component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with numerous projects being planned in Myanmar. The most important one among these is the development of the port at Kyaukpyu. China is planning to use the port as a source for its pipeline leading to Yunnan. It is reported that China has invested $7.3 billion in this project. China also mediates with the warring groups in Myanmar, particularly with the United Wa State Army in the Shan state. India has no such leverage. But the visit of the Myanmar Commander-in–Chief to India is possibly a signal that India is an important partner in Tatmadaw’s calculus.

Conclusion

Tatmadaw has played a historic role in shaping Myanmar. Post independence, since 1948, it has been governing the country. They have drafted a New Constitution in 2008 which has resulted in a slow transition to Democracy. With 25 percent of the seats in Parliament and retaining the important portfolio of Defence, the Tatmadaw remains politically important even then. The military focus of Tatmadaw has been on internal security, particularly in fighting with Karen, Kachin, Mon, Shan and other ethnic minority groups.

The Tatmadaw is undergoing modernisation with help from China, Russia and India. It has been able to aptly balance its relations with the PLA and the Indian Armed Forces. The Tatmadaw will remain an important component of the Myanmar political structure in the short term. India should continue to strengthen Tatmadaw and build bridges of friendship with Myanmar.

(Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the VIF)

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Image Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_the_Myanmar_Army.svg

The Evolving Indo-Myanmar Defence Relationship: an Analytical Perspective

Brig (retd) Vinod Anand 

(Senior Fellow, VIF)

It was only in early 1990’s that India realized that it was fast loosing strategic ground to China due to its lack of engagement with Myanmar. Not only security and stability in the border regions was crucial to India from internal security point of view but also constructive engagement with Myanmar and connectivity through it was very important for India to realize its ‘Look East Policy’ unveiled in early 1990s.

The military to military relations between the India and Myanmar gained traction with the goodwill visit of the then Chief of Army Staff, General B.C.Joshi to Myanmar (May 1994). Supply of some military hardware followed. Momentum to the defence relationship was further imparted when in January 2000 when a military delegation led by the then Indian Army Chief, Gen. VP Malik visited Myanmar and met Myanmar’s senior military elite to forge a military to military relationship which over the years has proved very fruitful. Since 2000, after the return visit of Gen. Maung Aye to India, bilateral annual border meetings between the two armies have been taking place regularly. India has also supplied a range of military hardware since then.

The Indian Prime Minster during his visit to Myanmar in April 2012 had also stressed on the need for maritime security cooperation and observed that both India and Myanmar need to “expand our security cooperation that is vital not only to maintain peace along our land borders but also to protect maritime trade which we hope will open up through the sea route between Kolkata and Sittwe.” In February, 2012 Myanmar Navy had taken part in joint naval exercises conducted by India with the participation of 14 nations’ navies (Milan series of naval exercises).

The recent visit of Mr. Antony to Myanmar (20-21 January, 2013) was a continuation of trend that has marked the growing defence cooperation between the two countries. After a degree of democratic reforms that were ushered in 2010, many military dignitaries from both sides have exchanged visits to enhance military to military cooperation and address mutual border security threats and challenges. In fact, in last two years or so the three Indian services chiefs have visited Myanmar to forge a closer defence relationship with Myanmar. This time the Defence Minster was accompanied by Army Commander of Kolkatta based Eastern Command and Vice Chief of Indian Navy which highlighted the fact that India was keen to further address its concerns regarding land and maritime security concerns in coordination with Myanmar armed forces.

It is important for India to build up capacities of the Myanmar’s armed forces especially in relation to developing its prowess in fighting the insurgents. Since the year 2000 there have been off and on coordinated operations along the borders to flush out the insurgents. The insurgents take advantage of the difficult terrain along the borders and lack of adequate controls along the borders to carry out attacks and then cross over to Myanmar.

The Defence Minister’s visit last month also came in the background of clashes between the Kachin insurgents and the Myanmar armed forces; Kachins remain the only group with which the Myanmar government has not been able to conclude a lasting ceasefire. Kachin Independent Organisation has been known to have cross-border linkages with Indian insurgents groups like ULFA in the shape of having provided shelter and advance military training to ULFA cadres. It was reported that there was a base of Indian insurgents in Kachin areas across the border. Last November, a high level 12-member team from Myanmar led by their Naga administration zone chairman U R Sanchyu and Pangsau sub-township representative had held a meeting with the Indian delegation at Jairampur in Arunachal Pradesh's Changlang district for discussions on cross-border crime, insurgent activities and other connected issues.

Further, NSCN is another active insurgent group which has trans- border affiliations with Myanmarese Nagas of Sagaing division opposite Indian states of Manipur and Nagaland. There were also reports early last year that a variety of North Eastern insurgents groups have joined together to coordinate their anti-India activities. ULFA, NSCN-K and PLA of Manipur seemed to have played key role in bringing these groups on a common platform. Sharing of information on operations and sources of weapons, facilitating training and providing mutual support and shelter along the Indo-Myanmar borders were some of the other objectives to be achieved by the so called “United Front’ composed of 14 anti-India insurgent groups.

In addition, the signing of a ceasefire agreement with Myanmarese Nagas of Sangaing division by the Myanmar government in May 2012 holds the prospects of the Indian Naga insurgent groups and their affiliates finding shelter and succor in their training bases. India was not informed about such an agreement and thus there was a certain degree of disappointment among the Indian security forces. With the Myanmar armed forces engaged in putting down the Kachin insurgency, it is quite possible that they were not willing to open another front that would have compounded their problems.

India has been providing training facilities to Myanmar armed forces in professional and technical courses; the vacancies in such courses for the Myanmar defence forces are being regularly enhanced. Maintenance of some Russian origin equipment is also being provided by the Indian defence forces. Building of defence infrastructure in the border areas has been another proposition which may fructify soon. This would facilitate quick movement and deployment of Myanmar forces to tackle insurgents and maintain law and order in border areas.

Even though the sector commanders on both sides are in touch with each other on a regular basis, India wants to intensify engagement so that insurgent groups are choked of arms supplies and cadre in the north-eastern states.

While for long Myanmar army has been pleading a lack of capacity in tackling the varied insurgent groups along the border, there is a view that Myanmar lacks the political will to act against some of these groups especially the Nagas’ insurgent outfits.

During his visit to Myanmar Mr. Antony met both the President of Myanmar and their Defence Minister. He conveyed the importance placed by India on enhancement of bilateral ties in all fields, including defence. He noted that the recent exchanges of visits between both countries at political and other levels had imparted a new momentum to the bilateral relationship.

Both the Defence Ministers deliberated on the following points:-

(a) Improvement of mechanisms for coordinating patrolling by the army along the land borders to prevent infiltration of insurgents

(b) Similar arrangements for patrolling maritime boundaries to curb activities of insurgent groups

(c) Ensuring that neither side allows the insurgents to use their territory for activities detrimental to each others’ security.

(d) Additional vacancies for training of Myanmar army personnel in Indian training academies

(e) Repair and training cover for Myanmar defence forces equipment of Russian origin

The visit also came at a time when China has expressed ‘grave concerns and dissatisfaction’ regarding some of the Myanmar army’s shells landing on their side of the border during the ongoing Kachin conflict. At the time of Indian Defence Minister to Naypidaw, a Chinese high level military delegation led by Lt-Gen Qi Jianguo, the deputy chief of general staff in the PLA met with Burma’s President Thein Sein in Yangon for strategic security consultations between the armed forces of China and Burma. However, the Indian and Chinese dignitaries’ visits seem to be unrelated.

Despite the recent opening up to the U.S. and the West due to its nascent democratic and economic reforms China’s strategic influence in Myanmar is considerable. India’s engagement with Myanmar and the western interest in Myanmar would contribute to moderating China’s influence. However, China due to its proximity and nature of relationship with the dispensation in Myanmar is unlikely to give free run to others. The multimodal linkages from Yunnan to Indian Ocean are critical to its energy security and economic growth.

It is quite evident that Tatmadaw would continue to remain the most important element for quite some time to come due to the nature of power distribution in Myanmar despite the baby steps towards democracy. Strengthening of defence relationship with Myanmar should proceed in congruence with political and economic engagement. Strategic imperatives can be underscored by the fact that India can ill afford to have another Pakistan on our East.

Obama's visit to Myanmar: Implications for India

Vinod Anand (Senior Fellow, VIF)

President Barack Obama’s visit to Myanmar last month was recognition of measures taken by the current regime towards opening up of Myanmar. The visit has largely been viewed as a part of the Asia Pacific ‘pivot’ announced by the US President in November, 2011. Further, the US was also aware of significant inroads being made by the European countries particularly Germany, UK and France in Myanmar and therefore, did not want to be left behind especially in the era of economic downturn

The visit took place despite the fact there was a lack of consensus in Washington on the Myanmar policy with resistance from human rights groups as well as from nuclear non proliferation lobby given the revelations of North Korea supplying some missile related material to Myanmar.

Political Gains

From the political perspective the visit has had a significant impact. Firstly, this has reinforced the commitment of President Thein Sein and the reformers who are flagging the benefits that have been received post opening up of polity and economy. The government was quick to release another set of political activists prior to the visit; such tools may be used again for greater concessions from the US and the West.

Secondly, the separate meetings that President Obama had with President Thein Sein, Aung Suu Kyi as well as the parliament speaker U Swe Mann is indicative of the broad based approach that the US is following to support the reforms.

A major advantage gained in Myanmar was for civil rights groups, political activists and human rights agencies given that the space for information and activism has considerably opened up by the Obama visit.

From Indian perspective, there is a hope that the course of reforms would be progressive even though they may occur at a relatively gradual pace. There is a general belief that the core of resistance from the military is likely to continue and they need to be pushed by the international community in the right direction. India has continued with a broad based and balanced relationship with political leadership as was evident from the highly successful visit of Aung Suu Kyi to the country in November. The military in Myanmar was also engaged through the visit of the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee Air Chief Marshal Norman Browne to Myanmar in November.

Moderating the Chinese Influence

Myanmar’s recent political and economic reforms seem to have been driven by Naypyidaw’s desire to reduce its overdependence on China.

With the U.S. and the Western nations engaging Myanmar, the strong influence of China in Myanmar is likely to be impacted. Due to China’s imposing presence and its exploitation of Myanmar’s resources against the popular will there has been considerable public opposition to the Chinese projects. Last year, construction of Myitstone dam was suspended by the President, Thein Sein. The opposition against the project brought together conservationists, environmentalists, Kachin activists and the political opposition. Popular opinion has been building up against some of the other Chinese sponsored projects in Myanmar. Recently, there have been protests against a copper mining project in Monywa, Sagaing Division, jointly undertaken by China and a military sponsored local company. An enquiry commission headed by Suu Kyi has been appointed to investigate the issue.

China’s larger interests are likely to be certainly affected, but to what degree and extent is not clear so far. Firstly, China may lose its sole beneficiary and benefactor role but only to become the most preferred one. The subsequent developments would also be dictated by what stand the next governing duo in China, Xi-Le take to ensure primacy in Myanmar.

Meanwhile, Myanmar’s leadership has been attempting to balance its emerging relationship with the U.S. and China. President Thein Sein visited a trade fair in China in September and Soe Win, the Deputy Commander of the Burmese army headed a military delegation to Beijing for strengthening military and cultural ties before the Obama visit.

Secondly, the links between Yunnan province of China and Myanmar are well established and are thus likely to be sustained.

Thirdly, the U.S. has not lifted sanctions on trade of jade and related items, a crucial component of trade with China; thus trade relations with Yunnan/China are not likely to be impacted.

Fourthly, entry of major global energy players in Myanmar may be a setback for Chinese companies as increased competition would prevent greater off-takes for Beijing.

In addition, the US offer to the Myanmar army to participate in the Cobra Gold Joint exercises in Thailand in 2013 is also being seen with much wariness in Beijing. These exercises have now expanded from a bilateral U.S.-Thai format to a multilateral one with many American allies such as South Korea participating in the same.

On the whole however Beijing is likely to remain wary of the US attempting to make an imprint in its backyard and in other parts of South East Asia. Additionally, increased engagement with the U.S. and the west could also be useful to Myanmar to extract more developmental and economic aid as well as trade and economic concessions from China. Beijing would have to tread cautiously to keep Myanmar under its sphere of influence by adjusting its policies to suit the new circumstances.

Security Concerns

From the security point of view, Indian concerns are mainly related to firstly the influence of PLA through military largesse to the Tatmadaw (Myanmar armed forces) and sanctuaries offered to the North East militant groups in Myanmar and the ongoing conflict in Kachin areas. The U.S. President was non prescriptive during his visit on the ethnic issues and only highlighted challenges faced by the country. India needs to further strengthen its own equation with Myanmar government in order to curtail anti India activities by some of the Myanmar based rebel groups.

In the military field, India is ramping up cooperation with high level visits by the Defence Minister Mr A K Antony in January, 2013 and the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of the Air Staff, ACM Norman Browne who visited Myanmar last month. Myanmar army is looking for hardware and there is some scope for India to provide items such as transport aircraft, helicopters and so on as well as expand training and capacity building.

Balancing of Chinese influence off the Myanmar seaboard with the entry of the U.S. is also likely and could be seen to be beneficial from the perspective of maritime interests of the country. However, this will continue to be a contested zone in the long term as China is unlikely to give a free run to others in the area which it sees as critical to its energy security.

Opening of the Myanmar economy presents a good opportunity for India to strengthen its trade and economic relations besides increasing venues for Indian investments in resource rich Myanmar. Hopefully, Myanmar’s engagement with the west would lead to some progressive reforms in governance supported by the US and Western institutions including the non government sector, aid agencies and business. Entry of international agencies such as World Bank, IMF, ADB and others is likely to lead to expansion of the economy particularly in terms of effective regulations for investment and conduct of business. Moreover, unlocking of Myanmar’s resources particularly oil and gas could be seen as beneficial to India given its dependence on West Asia so far. These factors indicate that support to transformation by Mr. Obama during the visit may provide an indirect impetus to Indian plans of economic engagement in Myanmar particularly to boost bilateral trade planned to increase from the paltry US$ 1070.88 million in 2010-11 to over USD 5 billion by 2015.

Impact on India's Look East Policy

Myanmar being the land route to South East Asia is the lynchpin of India’s Look East Policy (LEP). In addition, the Chennai-Dawei sea corridor is seen to be another growth highway for the LEP. With the opening of Myanmar economy the LEP is likely to get a boost. This apart the overall development of infrastructure including the railway and road network, ports and transportation is seen to be beneficial for the LEP and the prospects are likely to be enhanced. In this it is India’s own inefficiencies in project implementation that is of concern for New Delhi and how it will be able to get its act together remains to be seen?

There is a need to explore the scope for joint India China infrastructure projects in Myanmar to include oil and gas, transportation both road and rail and construction of dams. Indian and Chinese companies are presently engaged in the Shwe gas and pipeline projects which may provide a model for the future. GAIL and ONGC Videsh Ltd. own a 30% share in the A1 fields and intend to acquire a share in the A 2 fields which could be jointly exploited along with other majors such as Daewoo Corporation.

India also has a large number of projects in the pipeline in Myanmar many of which are languishing due to lack of impetus and tardy implementation. These include upgradation and resurfacing of Tamu-Kalewa-Kalemyo road; construction and upgradation of the Rhi-Tiddim Road; Kaladan Multimodal Transport Project and high speed data link in 32 Myanmar cities. ONGC Videsh Ltd. (OVL), GAIL and ESSAR are also working in the energy sector in Myanmar. M/s RITES is developing the rail transportation system and is supplying railway coaches and locos. Tamanthi and Shwezaye Hydro-Electric Power projects are also in the pipeline.

How much progress can be achieved in this direction will depend on the trust that each country, India and China can repose on each other and a favourable equation that can be worked out by the enterprises in what Chinese term as, “win-win,” agreements.

India- West joint projects also have major prospects in the fields indicated above. Some initiative will have to be taken by the Indian industry as well as such bodies as the CII which has a programme of cooperation Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI). Indo-US/EU Business Councils and similar organizations may act as a catalyst for this purpose. A joint initiative will pay rich dividends in this direction.

Further, with Myanmar slated to chair the ASEAN Summit of 2014 it would also make efforts to move positively on the path of democracy and further political and economic reforms.

Finally, the domestic reform in Myanmar and its reconciliation with the U.S. and the West is expected to open up many economic and strategic opportunities for Myanmar. India is well positioned to cement its growing economic and strategic engagement with Myanmar both on bilateral and multilateral basis. Myanmar’s steps in balancing its relationship with China need to be supported. For India, Myanmar will remain a strategic land bridge for engagement of South East Asian nations. Improving regional connectivity and integration of regional economies would serve the interests of both Myanmar and India well.