Strategic Stalemate: State of the Internal Security Environment in the North-east

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal, 

Visiting Fellow, VIF

Paresh Baruah’s United Liberation Front of Assam-Independent and S S Khaplang’s National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K) have joined hands with seven other militant organisations active in India’s north-east to form the United National Liberation Front of West South-east Asia. According to news reports, the meeting took place in the Sagaing region of Myanmar where Chinese intelligence personnel are known to be active.

Several of India’s north-eastern states have been in a state of turmoil for many decades. The primary cause of strife is an unstable internal security environment that has been compounded by political and economic neglect. While the militant movements in the north-eastern states are mostly home grown, some of these have developed links with Pakistan’s ISI and international terrorist organisations like the LeT and HuJI.

Due to porous borders, the militants found it worthwhile to seek shelter in India’s neighbouring countries like Bangladesh and Bhutan. After the governments of the two countries joined hands with India to fight these extremists, they have been operating from bases in Myanmar with support from China.

Various Indian insurgent groups have found it convenient to operate out of bases in the weakly controlled areas in Myanmar, but the government of Myanmar does not encourage or support them. In April-May 1995, Operation Golden Bird was launched as a joint operation. Approximately 40 insurgents were killed and a huge cache of arms was recovered. Since then the two armies have been cooperating with each other for mutual benefit. In November 2001, the Myanmar army had raided several bases of Manipuri rebels and had rounded up almost 200 rebels and recovered 1,500 guns.

The intensity of instability varies from state to state. In Nagaland, peace had prevailed till recently due to the cease-fire that had held for 14 years. However, it was only a tenuous peace and various Naga and Manipuri factions remained engaged in a fierce internecine struggle for power in both these states. Political negotiations with the Naga leaders for a final settlement were proceeding extremely slowly. In early-April 2015, the NSCN (K) unilaterally abrogated the cease-fire.

In Tripura, violent incidents tend to break out at regular intervals and invariably lead to demands for the deployment of the Army and other security forces. In Mizoram, which has seen many years of relative calm, subterranean tensions have been simmering for some time and may again rise to the surface if these are not addressed satisfactorily.

In Assam, the situation has improved a great deal over the last five to six years. The ULFA leadership that was safely ensconced in Bangladesh could have been targeted only in conjunction with the government of Bangladesh. The government of Sheikh Hasina and the Bangladesh security forces extended the cooperation that was necessary for the launch of joint operations to apprehend the ULFA terrorists active against India.

The government of Bangladesh dismantled the infrastructure of the terrorists, including commercial organisations like hotels that ULFA was running quite openly, and stopped the flow of arms and ammunition across the border. In case such cooperation had not been forthcoming, India would have been forced to explore other options including covert operations to address the remaining roots of terrorism.

The counter-insurgency campaign against the remnants of the Paresh Baruah-led separatist ULFA cadres has made substantial headway and most of them have now taken shelter in Myanmar. The Bodo (NDFB) extremists have lost several senior cadres in recent encounters with the army and this extremist organisation too appears to have reached a discernible level of strategic fatigue. The NDFB may soon opt for negotiations with the government so as to buy time for resuscitation.

The traditional narrative in the north-east has been that illegal migration from Bangladesh into lower Assam has altered the demographic profile of the affected districts and added a sectarian dimension to the internal security challenge. Though the Muslim population of the state has grown from about 16 to 18 per cent in the 1950s and 1960s to above 30 per cent now, the insurgency in Assam has never been driven by religious fundamentalism.

The government claims that it has instituted various measures like border fencing, reduction of distance between one border outpost and another, increase in the strength of the riverine police and the provision of floodlights to detect and prevent infiltration. However, the measures had remained ineffective till the government of Bangladesh stepped in pro-actively to deny sanctuary to Indian militants.

The vibrant culture of the beautiful Brahmaputra basin, which gave birth to an ancient civilisation and was once a flourishing centre of trade has been torn asunder by militancy and terrorism that are now several decades old. Sporadic acts of violence, a gun culture, extortion and kidnappings now mark daily life, even though the security forces have succeeded in maintaining a semblance of normalcy.

Unless a political solution is found to solve the underlying socio-economic problems and to ameliorate the “hearts and minds” challenge of alienation from the national mainstream, full blown-militancy could again bounce back without warning in Assam.

The funds earmarked by the Central Government for development must trickle down to the people in a transparent and accountable manner. Central funds worth thousands of crores of rupees must not disappear without a trace as has happened in the past.

Over a period of more than half a century, the Indian army has successfully conducted a difficult counter-insurgency campaign in the north-eastern states, despite adverse terrain and weather conditions, logistics difficulties and political flip-flops. Military operations against the terrorists who are still active must continue unfettered.

However, the mistakes made in the early 1990s must not be repeated. When the situation had deteriorated, Operation Bajrang was launched but was soon called off as it became inconvenient for the newly elected government to have the army deployed in the state; six months later Operation Rhino was launched and was again inexplicably slowed downwhen limited success had been achieved.

The proclivity of successive state governments to scale down army operations for political reasons as soon as the situation improves visibly is always a major setback for the conduct of sustained counter-insurgency operations. The security forces need time to become effective and establish a counter-insurgency grid, including humint networks to gain actionable intelligence. ‘On-off’ deployment policies hamper operations and reduce the ability of the security forces to deliver effective results.

Policymakers and those who are responsible for governance must introspect and try to understand why the Indian state has repeatedly failed to successfully counter the long-festering militancy in Assam and other north-eastern states and address the root causes, which are mainly socio-political and socio-economic in nature.

The nation cannot sustain a high growth rate over a long period if a major region is not part of the success story and, in fact, acts as a drag on it. High opportunity costs are imposed on the national economy due to unrealised revenues and taxes and the cost of maintaining internal security. India’s quest to ‘act east’ and enhance its trade with ASEAN countries through the land route will also remain a non-starter unless durable peace returns to the north-eastern region.

Finally, the re-emergence of Chinese support for militant movements inimical to India’s interests after almost 30 years of non-interference is an ominous development. In case the Chinese succeed in getting the nine extremist organisation that they have helped bring together to coordinate operations and intelligence, it will pose a fresh challenge for India’s counter-insurgency campaign.

---

Published Date: 1^st May 2015, Image Source: http://m.ucanindia.in

The Evolving Indo-Myanmar Defence Relationship: an Analytical Perspective

Brig (retd) Vinod Anand 

(Senior Fellow, VIF)

It was only in early 1990’s that India realized that it was fast loosing strategic ground to China due to its lack of engagement with Myanmar. Not only security and stability in the border regions was crucial to India from internal security point of view but also constructive engagement with Myanmar and connectivity through it was very important for India to realize its ‘Look East Policy’ unveiled in early 1990s.

The military to military relations between the India and Myanmar gained traction with the goodwill visit of the then Chief of Army Staff, General B.C.Joshi to Myanmar (May 1994). Supply of some military hardware followed. Momentum to the defence relationship was further imparted when in January 2000 when a military delegation led by the then Indian Army Chief, Gen. VP Malik visited Myanmar and met Myanmar’s senior military elite to forge a military to military relationship which over the years has proved very fruitful. Since 2000, after the return visit of Gen. Maung Aye to India, bilateral annual border meetings between the two armies have been taking place regularly. India has also supplied a range of military hardware since then.

The Indian Prime Minster during his visit to Myanmar in April 2012 had also stressed on the need for maritime security cooperation and observed that both India and Myanmar need to “expand our security cooperation that is vital not only to maintain peace along our land borders but also to protect maritime trade which we hope will open up through the sea route between Kolkata and Sittwe.” In February, 2012 Myanmar Navy had taken part in joint naval exercises conducted by India with the participation of 14 nations’ navies (Milan series of naval exercises).

The recent visit of Mr. Antony to Myanmar (20-21 January, 2013) was a continuation of trend that has marked the growing defence cooperation between the two countries. After a degree of democratic reforms that were ushered in 2010, many military dignitaries from both sides have exchanged visits to enhance military to military cooperation and address mutual border security threats and challenges. In fact, in last two years or so the three Indian services chiefs have visited Myanmar to forge a closer defence relationship with Myanmar. This time the Defence Minster was accompanied by Army Commander of Kolkatta based Eastern Command and Vice Chief of Indian Navy which highlighted the fact that India was keen to further address its concerns regarding land and maritime security concerns in coordination with Myanmar armed forces.

It is important for India to build up capacities of the Myanmar’s armed forces especially in relation to developing its prowess in fighting the insurgents. Since the year 2000 there have been off and on coordinated operations along the borders to flush out the insurgents. The insurgents take advantage of the difficult terrain along the borders and lack of adequate controls along the borders to carry out attacks and then cross over to Myanmar.

The Defence Minister’s visit last month also came in the background of clashes between the Kachin insurgents and the Myanmar armed forces; Kachins remain the only group with which the Myanmar government has not been able to conclude a lasting ceasefire. Kachin Independent Organisation has been known to have cross-border linkages with Indian insurgents groups like ULFA in the shape of having provided shelter and advance military training to ULFA cadres. It was reported that there was a base of Indian insurgents in Kachin areas across the border. Last November, a high level 12-member team from Myanmar led by their Naga administration zone chairman U R Sanchyu and Pangsau sub-township representative had held a meeting with the Indian delegation at Jairampur in Arunachal Pradesh's Changlang district for discussions on cross-border crime, insurgent activities and other connected issues.

Further, NSCN is another active insurgent group which has trans- border affiliations with Myanmarese Nagas of Sagaing division opposite Indian states of Manipur and Nagaland. There were also reports early last year that a variety of North Eastern insurgents groups have joined together to coordinate their anti-India activities. ULFA, NSCN-K and PLA of Manipur seemed to have played key role in bringing these groups on a common platform. Sharing of information on operations and sources of weapons, facilitating training and providing mutual support and shelter along the Indo-Myanmar borders were some of the other objectives to be achieved by the so called “United Front’ composed of 14 anti-India insurgent groups.

In addition, the signing of a ceasefire agreement with Myanmarese Nagas of Sangaing division by the Myanmar government in May 2012 holds the prospects of the Indian Naga insurgent groups and their affiliates finding shelter and succor in their training bases. India was not informed about such an agreement and thus there was a certain degree of disappointment among the Indian security forces. With the Myanmar armed forces engaged in putting down the Kachin insurgency, it is quite possible that they were not willing to open another front that would have compounded their problems.

India has been providing training facilities to Myanmar armed forces in professional and technical courses; the vacancies in such courses for the Myanmar defence forces are being regularly enhanced. Maintenance of some Russian origin equipment is also being provided by the Indian defence forces. Building of defence infrastructure in the border areas has been another proposition which may fructify soon. This would facilitate quick movement and deployment of Myanmar forces to tackle insurgents and maintain law and order in border areas.

Even though the sector commanders on both sides are in touch with each other on a regular basis, India wants to intensify engagement so that insurgent groups are choked of arms supplies and cadre in the north-eastern states.

While for long Myanmar army has been pleading a lack of capacity in tackling the varied insurgent groups along the border, there is a view that Myanmar lacks the political will to act against some of these groups especially the Nagas’ insurgent outfits.

During his visit to Myanmar Mr. Antony met both the President of Myanmar and their Defence Minister. He conveyed the importance placed by India on enhancement of bilateral ties in all fields, including defence. He noted that the recent exchanges of visits between both countries at political and other levels had imparted a new momentum to the bilateral relationship.

Both the Defence Ministers deliberated on the following points:-

(a) Improvement of mechanisms for coordinating patrolling by the army along the land borders to prevent infiltration of insurgents

(b) Similar arrangements for patrolling maritime boundaries to curb activities of insurgent groups

(c) Ensuring that neither side allows the insurgents to use their territory for activities detrimental to each others’ security.

(d) Additional vacancies for training of Myanmar army personnel in Indian training academies

(e) Repair and training cover for Myanmar defence forces equipment of Russian origin

The visit also came at a time when China has expressed ‘grave concerns and dissatisfaction’ regarding some of the Myanmar army’s shells landing on their side of the border during the ongoing Kachin conflict. At the time of Indian Defence Minister to Naypidaw, a Chinese high level military delegation led by Lt-Gen Qi Jianguo, the deputy chief of general staff in the PLA met with Burma’s President Thein Sein in Yangon for strategic security consultations between the armed forces of China and Burma. However, the Indian and Chinese dignitaries’ visits seem to be unrelated.

Despite the recent opening up to the U.S. and the West due to its nascent democratic and economic reforms China’s strategic influence in Myanmar is considerable. India’s engagement with Myanmar and the western interest in Myanmar would contribute to moderating China’s influence. However, China due to its proximity and nature of relationship with the dispensation in Myanmar is unlikely to give free run to others. The multimodal linkages from Yunnan to Indian Ocean are critical to its energy security and economic growth.

It is quite evident that Tatmadaw would continue to remain the most important element for quite some time to come due to the nature of power distribution in Myanmar despite the baby steps towards democracy. Strengthening of defence relationship with Myanmar should proceed in congruence with political and economic engagement. Strategic imperatives can be underscored by the fact that India can ill afford to have another Pakistan on our East.

China’s Involvement in India’s Internal Security Threats

Dr. N. Manoharan
Senior Fellow, VIF

Unlike Pakistan, the involvement of China in meddling with India’s internal security is not a simple story of ‘sub-conventional warfare. It is more nuanced and complex. Under Mao Zedong, China supported revolutionary insurgencies throughout the world. The spirit of Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai pervaded between India and China and the former was tagged as “neutrals” in the initial years. Yet, what made China to take interest in “national self-determination struggles” in various parts of India? Partly it was due to Beijing’s perception that its southern neighbour had been turning into an “anti-China base”. Nor did the Chinese take lightly Indian sympathy to Tibetan refugees, who were fleeing the state repression. China also suspected Indian covert hands in Khampas rebellion in Tibet. But, the actual support by China to rebel movements of India gradually commenced after the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict when bilateral relations between the two countries hit rock bottom. For Beijing, patronage to insurgent groups in the northeast India looked ideal not only because of geographical proximity, but also due to the region’s isolation from the Indian mainland, and the existence of external support network created and sustained by the then East Pakistan.

From 1966, China started training several batches of rebels from the northeast. Incidentally, the ‘Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution’, popularly known as the ‘Cultural Revolution’ commenced in the same year in China. The first to reach out to the Chinese help were the Nagas. China was considered as the “only hope for revolutionaries”. Taking cue from Nagas, other groups in the region, especially Mizos and Manipuris, got hooked to China. Pakistan had already been in the job of supporting insurgent groups of the northeast since the mid-1950s. The infrastructure and methodology was there to imbibe. And it became easy for China to take on. The China-returned guerillas not only fought better, but were also not amenable to come to negotiating tables even when the time was ripe for resolving conflicts. However, when it came to China’s involvement in Naxalism, it was more of inspirational than any sort of direct material support. Charu Mazumdar, one of the pioneering leaders of the Naxalite movement, famously remarked: “China’s Chairman is our Chairman and China’s path is our path”. Naxals saw Maoism as the right template for making a revolution in India.

After 1978, Deng Xiaoping put Chinese economic, security and foreign policies on a new footing. His policy of “reform and opening” subordinated the revolutionary and anti-imperialist elements of China's foreign policy to the overriding imperative of economic development. The Cultural Revolution was severely condemned for having obstructed and delayed China’s economic and technological progress, and for the divisions it brought about in both its ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ worlds. China’s support to Northeast insurgency dwindled in the late 1970s, if not dried out completely. At around the same time, it should be noted that there was gradual normalisation of Sino-Indian relations. During this period, the northeast militant groups got an alternative support base in Bangladesh, Bhutan and Myanmar.

The revival of Chinese involvement in India’s internal security threats commenced roughly in mid-1998 when Sino-Indian relations witnessed strains in the wake of nuclear tests by India. And Beijing had been looking at the developments in the strategic landscape, especially India-US relations with utmost concern and suspicion. More than the Indo-US Nuclear Deal, China was far more concerned about the increasing defence cooperation between India and the United States. China’s role in India’s internal security threats during this phase has been wide-ranging: clandestine support to militant groups, not objecting to Indian insurgent leaders taking asylum in its territory, turning blind eye to Chinese arms flows into India and cyber warfare.

The rebels of the northeast, apart from their nuisance value to the Indian security forces deployed in the region, are also amenable to motivation by the Chinese to target key Tibetan leaders in exile based in India and to gather vital intelligence information about Indian force deployments along India-China borders. In the present period, Chinese intelligence agencies have taken over the role of Mao’s CPC. Apart from reviving contacts with old militant groups like NSCN and PLA, China’s linkage has now extended to touch new groups like United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF). On linkage with Indian Maoists, there is no evidence to suggest China’s direct support.

But, China did not wish to do anything overtly. Since indirect involvement is hard to prove a retaliatory response is more remote. Also, such involvement draws less international stigma. Most importantly, it provided China ‘plausible deniability’. On cyber warfare, the methodology is simple: use a network of cultivated and loosely controlled “patriotic” and mercenary hackers that allows the state to deny responsibility something similar to the method used in the case of small arms.

From time-to-time, India has taken up the issue with Beijing both diplomatically as well as through the aegis of counter-terror cooperation. However, China has categorically denied giving any help to insurgent groups, particularly the ULFA, UNLF, NSCN (I-M) and PLA. But, what surprises is the low level of confidence at which the issue is raised and discussed with the Chinese. India’s official position on the entire gamut of China’s involvement has been soft. One agrees that opinions and assessment on the state of China’s involvement should be expressed after careful judgment based on the long-term interests of building a stable relationship between the two countries. But, there is nothing wrong in having a structured mechanism to discuss this issue specifically. Simultaneously, all routes of Chinese interactions with Indian militant groups should be blocked. This requires enhancement of India’s border security apart from cooperation of India’s other neighbours like Myanmar, Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan. Except Bhutan, none of India’s neighbours are serious or consistent in cooperating with India to tackle insurgents in the region.