Terror Attacks in Bodh Gaya: Prevention is Better than Cure Printer-friendly version

Dr. N Manoharan, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

When serial blasts rocked Mahabodhi temple at Bodh Gaya on 07 July 2013, it was for the first time that a Buddhist holy spot was targeted in India. Ten of the 13 bombs planted at the temple were indeed of low intensity, but their psychological impact was huge. Though no group or individual has claimed responsibility so far, fingers are being pointed at four different directions as possible perpetrators.

Was there a political motive? Congress General Secretary Digvijaya Singh tried to connect the timing of the blasts with Gujarat Chief Minister and BJP leader Narendra Modi’s advice to the party workers to teach Bihar Chief Minister Nitish Kumar “a lesson”. What Digvijay Singh was trying to suggest was that the BJP would be interested in projecting Bihar’s law and order situation in a poor light, especially after JDU-BJP split in the state. The speculation has no value other than to gain cheap publicity.

There were also conjectures on the possible involvement of Tamil extremist groups to express their resentment against Sinhala Buddhists for the latter’s treatment towards their ethnic brethren in Sri Lanka. Two Buddhist monks were attacked in Tamil Nadu in March this year; and, in January 2011, the Mahabodhi Society Temple in Chennai was attacked. But, the Tamil groups involved in those attacks clearly lack the capability of carrying out terror attacks, that too using bombs. They have no wherewithal to strike a target more than 2000 kilometers away.

Were Maoists behind the attacks? Gaya is indeed a hotbed of the Maoists, but when it comes to a possible motive, it is difficult to establish their involvement. Mahabodhi temple was neither a state symbol nor a camp for security/police forces. Maoists would not bother otherwise. There were doubts whether they did the attack on behalf of any jihadist organisation. There are opportunistic linkages between Maoists and jihadist terror groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). However, such linkages have so far not been so deep as to extend to the outsourcing of terror attacks.

The final possibility is the involvement of the Indian Mujahideen (IM). There have been alerts from the Intelligence Bureau over Mahabodi Temple as one of the prime targets of terror groups like the Indian Mujahideen. The Delhi Police had also sounded out Bodhgaya Temple as one of the targets based on interrogation of IM militants in its custody. The National Investigation Agency (NIA) that has been investigating the case has established IM hands in the blasts. What does the IM have against a Buddhist target? Two broad motives can be established.

The primary aim was to avenge “atrocities” against Muslims in Myanmar by the Buddhist majority. For quite some time, Pakistan-based terror groups like the LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Bangladesh-based Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI) and Jamaat-e-Mujahideen of Bangladesh (JMB) have been trying to establish a firm foothold in Mayanmar, especially in the Muslim-inhabited Arakan area. They have links with local radical groups like Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), Jammat-ul-Arakan, Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami Arakan and Difa-e-Musalman Arakan. These Myanmarese groups have training camps in neighbouring Bangladesh. Bodh Gaya is one of the popular pilgrimage destinations for the Burmese Buddhists.

The second motivation was obviously anti-India. The Indian Mujahideen is part of ISI’s grand strategy of destabilisation by taking subversion and terrorism to the heartland of India using violent non-state actors. Thus, IM’s hand is evident in most of the terror attacks in India’s hinterland since the mid-2000s.

The serial blasts clearly established a serious security lapse at various levels. It is not clear why the IB alerts were not taken seriously. It is also beyond comprehension why such a high-profile target was not guarded properly. The outer ring was manned by the state police, but with scant presence. Ironically, the security inside the temple premises was entrusted to private security personnel. The fact that 13 bombs were placed at diverse places to go off serially in a span of half-an-hour shows the level of incompetence of the security net around the Mahabodhi temple. This lacuna should be addressed on a priority basis.

An old adage “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” applies to internal security management. Two important preventive measures, among others, are suggested:

1. There should be adequate ‘target-hardening’ around the temple. It includes a professional security cover that should be in a position to deter prospective attackers. Given the importance of the place (a UNESCO heritage site and one of the holiest Buddhist shrines in the world), the idea of deploying a central security force at the outer ring should be explored. The other measures that require attention under ‘target-hardening’ include functional metal detectors, proper frisking, situational awareness, effective surveillance cameras, and check points at all approach roads. The objective is to make the environment as unfriendly and as difficult as possible for the terrorists to commit any subversive act.
2. Also, the key to success in fighting terrorism effectively lies in obtaining accurate and reliable intelligence about impending attacks and neutralisation of terrorist modules well in advance. Intelligence gathering in India, especially preventive aspects of intelligence, needs substantial improvement. Terrorist attacks occur either due to absence of precise/actionable intelligence or, more often, lack of follow-up action even when such intelligence is available. Specific intelligence should reach the concerned agency in real time. Cohesion amongst intelligence agencies and sharing of intelligence in a far more integrated manner is an operational necessity. What is required is ‘intelligence convergence’ more than ‘intelligence coordination’, of both men and material

The Ishrat Jahan Case Chargesheet: More Questions than Answers

Dr M N Buch, 

Dean, Centre for Governance and Political Studies, VIF

On 4^th July 2013, newspapers had headlined reports to the effect that the Delhi Special Police Establishment (hereinafter referred to as CBI for the sake of convenience) has put up a challan against eight police officers of Gujarat on a charge of murdering one Ishrat Jahan and three of her companions near Ahmedabad in 2004. The newspapers also reported that CBI is trying to prosecute the present Special Director of the Intelligence Bureau for being party to the murders. It is alleged that Ishrat Jahan and her companions were abducted by the Gujarat Police, kept in illegal custody for two days, sedated, put in a car on the highway near Ahmedabad and were then shot dead after planting a weapon in the car. According to CBI, the Gujarat Police made out a false case of an armed encounter in which the deceased were shot by the police.

According to CBI, this entire story was false. What is more, IB officers facilitated this by giving a false intelligence report that Ishrat Jahan had terrorist links with Pakistan and that she and her companions had come to Gujarat to assassinate the Chief Minister. According to the CBI, this makes the IB Special Director very much a part of the conspiracy to kill Ishrat Jahan.

Ishrat Jahan was not a normal resident of Gujarat because she and her family were residents of Maharashtra. There is no record of any contact or enmity between Ishrat Jahan and the accused police officers. Even the CBI version that Ishrat Jahan and others were abducted by the Gujarat Police recognises that the deceased were travelling to Gujarat and were intercepted within the boundaries of that State. It is not alleged that the Gujarat Police went to Maharashtra and abducted Ishrat Jahan and others, bringing them forcibly to Gujarat. The one undisputed fact which emerges is that the deceased persons travelled from Bombay to Gujarat on their own volition. They were not forcibly removed or otherwise enticed to come to Gujarat.

Abduction has a specific legal connotation under the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Section 362 of the IPC defines abduction in the following words, “Whoever by force compels, or by any deceitful means induces, any person to go from any place is said to abduct that person”. Kidnapping or abducting a person in order to murder him or her comes within the ambit of section 364 of IPC and renders the accused, on conviction, to imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment up to a period of ten years. If the murder occurs, then section 302 IPC would also apply. Under section 365 of IPC, if kidnapping or abduction is done to secretly and wrongfully confine a person, then on conviction, the accused will be liable to imprisonment of up to seven years rigorous imprisonment. In the present case, if abduction did take place, it was obviously for the purpose of murdering the abducted person and this would come within the definition of section 364 of IPC.

Was Ishrat Jahan then abducted for this purpose? According to CBI, that was the sole purpose. Let us assume that Ishrat Jahan and her companions were in fact abducted. Under Anglo Saxon Jurisprudence, the principles of which we follow in India, an accused person is deemed to be innocent till proved guilty. Under section 102 of the Indian Evidence Act, the burden of proof lies on the person who makes an averment and whose case would fail if no evidence were to be produced either by the contender or the defendant. The accused in a criminal case does not have to prove his innocence. It is for the prosecution to establish by evidence beyond the shadow of a doubt that the accused has committed the offence as charged. That being the case, regardless of the challan, the eight indicted Gujarat police officers would also be entitled to a presumption of innocence unless proved guilty. Therefore, it becomes all the more important to subject the Ishrat Jahan case to some very serious questions.

Behind every crime, especially murder, there has to be some motive. The Chambers 21st Century dictionary defines motive in following words, “A reason for, or underlying cause of, action of a certain kind”. In other words, the Gujarat Police must have had some motive in allegedly abducting, illegally confining and then murdering Ishrat Jahan and her companions. Could it be that the Gujarat Police deliberately wanted to kill an innocent Muslim woman? Is there a shortage of such women in Gujarat that the police had to entice a woman living in Maharashtra to come to Gujarat so that they could abduct her, confine and then murder her? Does the Gujarat Police consist of psychopaths whose hunger for murder demands victims periodically? We are not living in ancient Greece where vestal virgins had to be sacrificed from time to time to satisfy the Gods, nor are we living in a Mayan or Aztec era when ritual human sacrifices were normal. What, then, could be the motive of the Gujarat Police to murder an innocent person with whom it did not have normal contact?

The police normally acts under the following circumstances:-

1. On registration of a First Information Report of the committing of a cognisable offence, on which the police commences investigation.
2. In a law and order situation, when faced with an unlawful assembly the police uses necessary force to disperse the mob and restore order.
3. When faced with a situation in which armed people, whether dacoits, militants, terrorists, robbers, or a violent mob armed with guns and other weapons, clash with the police it may to resort to fire arms in order to control the situation. Here the use of force can include causing death.
4. In a situation where there is armed insurrection, for example the Naxalite affected districts, where the police uses force to break an ambush, apprehend or liquidate armed hostile elements or deal with any similar situation which simulates war.
5. In exercise of the right of private defence or on the orders of a superior officer, an Executive Magistrate or a court of law, provided the order is lawful.
6. On receipt of intelligence reports about antinational, antisocial or criminal activities which affect law and order generally, national security and the territorial integrity of India. In fact, the police is the executive agency which acts on such intelligence inputs.

In the case of Ishrat Jahan, of all the reasons why the police can and must act, it appears to be the last one, that is, intelligence reports which indicate that a person or persons are planning some action which can cause harm to the national interests at large. The case made out by CBI is that false information was generated by the present Special Director, Intelligence Bureau, which was passed on to the Gujarat Police and on the basis of which and with the help of IB operatives, the Gujarat Police planned the murder of Ishrat Jahan and her companions.

What particular motive would the Intelligence Bureau have to feed false information to the Gujarat Police? What mens rea did the Gujarat police officers have, what malice overtook their minds that they should specifically target a young nineteen-year old girl from Maharashtra? One normally does not find policemen targeting people at random for murder. In fact, even terrorists do not indulge in such kind of senseless murder because even where a terrorist attack kills innocent people, the intention is to create an environment of fear, uncertainty and terror which paralyses society and causes the government to fall. Did the murder of Ishrat Jahan create such an environment of terror? Who was to be terrorised? The State of Gujarat had been very peaceful immediately after the post Godhra riots in 2002 and the Muslim community as such was maintaining a low profile. So how would the murder of a nineteen-year old girl have any relevance in a situation where things were already peaceful?

Some inkling of the then current thinking can be glimpsed in the election campaign in Gujarat then in which the Congress accused Narendra Modi of being a merchant of death, or a ‘maut ka saudagar’. Narendra Modi replied that he was indeed a ‘maut ka saudagar’, but only for terrorists like Sohrabuddin. In other words, the Gujarat Police was acutely aware that the post Godhra riots could lead to repercussions because of terrorist action. Therefore, terrorist outfits had to be hit very hard. Please note that the operative words are “terrorist outfits” and not the Muslim community at large. This is about the time when the Gujarat Government had evicted the Vishwa Hindu Parishad from government premises then occupied by this member of the Sangh Parivar.

By a process of reductio ad absurdum, one could safely conclude that if the Gujarat Police acted against Ishrat Jahan, it had to be on account of intelligence reports indicating that this young woman either had terrorist links or was part of larger conspiracy to initiate terrorist activity. Because preemptive strikes are often made in order to abort a terrorist strike, Gujarat Police also probably decided on a preemptive strike.

In the instant case, the Intelligence Bureau has quoted the Pakistan origin American terrorist, David Headley, as stating that Ishrat Jahan had terrorist links in Pakistan with Lashkar-e-Taiba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. The National Investigation Agency, which is a close cousin of CBI, has discounted this statement of Headley, saying that it is based on hearsay, that is, Headley’s conversation with terrorist leaders in Pakistan. Headley was not a member of the American or Pakistani police investigating a case in which evidence was being collected first hand against Ishrat Jahan.

It is legitimate to take into account what a third party might have to say about the suspect, even if such conversation cannot be used as evidence in a court of law. Ultimately much of the information collected by intelligence agencies comes from third party sources, which means that a great deal of it is based on hearsay and would not be admissible in a court of law. Should an intelligence agency ignore all such information? If it does so, the executive arm of government would remain without any knowledge, inkling or suspicion of any activity which could harm India and this would be only encourage our enemy to strike anywhere at will.

Let us take an example from the United States of America. Recently, the police arrested two people who had planned to use some form of remote controlled X-ray weapon to kill President Barack Obama. It is rumour, hearsay, information fed by informants which ultimately led FBI to the accused. If FBI had waited to collect primary evidence, it could not have saved the President from an assassination attempt. An intelligence agency, therefore, must cast its net wide in gathering information and it must pass on all information which calls for action to the police. Of course, the police is expected to act with due caution and within the general framework of law, but act it must.

Chapter IV of the Indian Penal Code gives the General Exceptions whereby an act which would otherwise be criminal is not a crime. For example, section 79 of IPC says, “Act done by a person justified, or by mistake or fact believing himself justified by law – Nothing is an offence which is done by any person who is justified by law, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of mistake of law in good faith, believes himself to be justified by law in doing it”.

Section 100 IPC states the circumstances under which the right of private defence of the body extends to the voluntary causing of death of an assailant. This is not to state that in the Ishrat Jahan case, police may claim the right of private defence if indeed the deceased persons were deliberately murdered, but certainly when an intelligence report creates a reasonable apprehension that a person or persons may indulge in an act of terrorism or violence which can cause bodily harm to a targeted person, then if the police acts in good faith and even causes death, the right of private defence can be claimed and will apply.

Under section 102, the right of private defence commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit the offence and though the offence may not have been committed such right continues as long as such apprehension of danger to the body continues. In other words, if the police were to act in the right of private defence, then this right commenced on the day that the Intelligence Bureau report reached it and would continue till such time as such apprehension ended one way or the other.

From reports which have been published, it would appear that CBI, while denying that Ishrat Jahan was member of a terrorist organisation, does accept that two of her companions had some links with terrorist outfits in Jammu & Kashmir. The IB’s reports, including those based on David Headley’s statements, are brushed aside by CBI; terrorist links of two of Ishrat Jahan’s companions are accepted. From where did CBI acquire this information or knowledge? Be that as it may, why was Ishrat Jahan travelling with three other people, two of them known to have terrorist links?

According to Ishrat Jahan’s family, she was an innocent young girl from a pious Muslim family. Her companions on the ill fated journey were not the kind of people with whom a pious family would allow their young daughter to undertake a journey alone. The reason for these four people being together, therefore, needs to be investigated in depth because it does not stand to reason that a young lady should undertake a long journey with people with whom she is not related, is not intimate or otherwise connected through business or any other similar cause. Unless all the questions raised in this paper are seriously and satisfactorily answered, one would find it difficult to believe that this is a case of murder simpliciter by the police in which the CBI is acting completely objectively.

CBI has put up a challan and would naturally now claim that the matter is sub judice. Perhaps it is, but even those cases in which a challan is put up continue to be governed by the provisions of Chapter XII Cr.P.C. Under section 173, on completion of investigation the officer incharge of a police station is required to forward a report, referred to normally as a challan, to a Magistrate having jurisdiction, together with the accused in person if in custody or with a notice to appear before the court if he is on bail. This report may be submitted through a superior police officer designated under section 158 Cr.P.C. and such officer may direct the officer incharge of the police station to make further investigation.

Similarly, under section 173 (8), even after the challan is submitted, the police can investigate for the purpose of obtaining more evidence, oral or documentary. Therefore, raising of questions regarding the investigation itself at any stage is not prejudicial to a trial and it is on this account that this paper raises certain questions which, if the investigating agency so desires, can take into account for further investigation under section 173(8) IPC. In fact, when the Magistrate having jurisdiction take cognisance of an offence under section 190 Cr.P.C. he himself can raise these issues and direct the investigating agency to further investigate the matter. This issue is being raised because at any stage up to the commencement of the trial, the raising of questions relating to the investigation would not be debarred by the fact that the challan has been presented.

Let us assume that without any of these questions being addressed, the court frames charges. That still opens the much wider question of whether or not the manner in which the Ishrat Jahan case has been dealt with casts a shadow on the future functioning of Intelligence Bureau, R&AW, the Special Branch of State Police forces and other specialised intelligence agencies. Should they or should they not forward intelligence report to the concerned government or agency? Unless the report prima facie appears to be baseless, can the executive agencies ignore them? Who will be accountable if acts of terrorism occur because the executive agencies hesitate to take action?

This is not to justify any illegal acts of the police and if in the case in question, the police has acted outside this law, it must pay the price. But let us not be left with a lingering suspicion that the objective in this case is not justice but rather the targeting of a particular individual or a political party in Gujarat to prevent it from coming to centre stage in the next general elections. One cannot help but believe that in the railway bribery case, CBI has, under political pressure, acted swiftly to protect former Union Railway Minister Pawan Bansal, whereas in the Ishrat Jahan case it has rushed to indictment of another kind, once again on account of political pressure.

National Counter Terrorism Centre

Dr M N Buch 

(Visiting Fellow, VIF)

When we were caught unawares by the Pakistani intrusion into Kargil a high powered committee was set up under Shri K.S. Subramaniam, who had been Defence Secretary of India, to suggest measures whereby we could avoid intelligence failures, provide for a quick response to a Kargil like situation and take such counter insurgency measures as would make India secure. Like all reports of this nature the Subramaniam Committee report also was never meaningfully implemented. We even failed to set up a coordinating agency within the armed forces under a Chief of Defence Staff, not so much because the civil service component of the Defence Ministry opposed this but because there was inter-service rivalry between the armed forces and no Chief was prepared to accept a higher authority for the purpose of coordination. Since Kargil, just as it was before Kargil, India has continued to be a target of terrorism, largely sponsored by our neighbour, Pakistan, but also terrorism which has been born within the country. I am including insurgency and militancy which use violence as a major weapon within the definition of terrorism and, therefore, Naxalite violence or the type of violence one sees in Jammu & Kashmir would also come within the overall ambit of terrorism.

In the United States of America on 11th September 2001 aircraft were used by terrorists as living bombs and crashed into the World Trade Centre Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington D.C. Several thousand lives were lost and even more injured in these horrible examples of extreme terrorism in which aircraft were used as suicide bombs. Now it is a fact that the United States of America is a federation in which all residuary powers vest in the States, which means that what is not specifically reserved for the Federal Government is available to the State Governments. In India the reverse is true because under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, apart from the Union List which gives the exclusive powers of Parliament and the State List, which gives the exclusive power of the State Legislatures, there is the Concurrent List in which both law making bodies have the power to legislate, with the rider that a law of Parliament overrides a State law on the same subject. Residuary powers are vested in the Centre and there are circumstances under which the Centre can give directions to the States, can legislate on behalf of the States under certain circumstances even on matters in the State List and can go to the extent of dismissing a State Government and assuming direct federal control under Article 356 of the Constitution. In other words, India is a very centripetal federation, heavily weighted in favour of the Centre. Despite this, after 11th September 2001 incident the United States government decided to take really effective measures to prevent a similar attack in future. Agencies like FBI and CIA were strengthened and their powers enhanced and a national counter insurgency centre was set up which had the authority to intercept mails, telephones and various electronic means of information and communications technology and to take effective action to arrest and neutralise would be terrorists.

None of the State Government raised any objection to the new arrangement, despite the fact that the counter terrorism organisation was armed with police powers which lay within the domain of the State and local governments. No one distrusted the new arrangement or considered it politicised and the States had full confidence that the agency would use its authority against terrorists and would not harass ordinary citizens or destablise State Governments. What is more, the police at all levels, city, county, State and federal, all work in tandem. Their single objective is the maintenance of law and order and ensuring the safety and security of citizens and they do not eye each other with suspicion. The culture there is that in performing its police functions the Force is allowed to work according to law and the kind of political and other interference which takes place in India is virtually unknown. In Madhya Pradesh recently the Home Minister insisted on the suspension or at least the transfer of an Inspector of the Traffic Police because he dared to pull up a twenty-year old boy for not wearing a helmet when riding a two wheeler. The boy was the son of a party worker. Moving out the Inspector in this manner naturally demoralizes the entire Force and to expect it thereafter to maintain order and counter terrorism would be virtually impossible of achievement. Defying a traffic policeman in Britain or United States is totally unthinkable. This example is being given because if in the minor matter of a traffic violation the Home Minister intervenes and prevents the police from performing its function how can anyone trust the police to be able to deal with a major threat of terrorism.

The Government of India has been trying to create agencies within the government structure which could collect and collate intelligence, pass on actionable information to the field authorities and then ensure that the terrorist organisations are hit hard enough to hurt. If we go back to the beginning of the twentieth century, especially at about the time of the Partition of Bengal by Lord Curzon, a terrorist organisation called the Anusheelan Party came into being. Its organisation was cellular and, therefore, very secretive. The bomb and the bullet were their favourite weapons. The British used some young Bengali officers of the Bengal Police to penetrate this organisation, collect information on different cells, which were largely unconnected and when the intelligence input became adequate they suddenly struck and virtually destroyed the Anusheelan Party. This was one of the most successful counter terrorism campaigns ever conducted in India. The Bengal Police was totally trusted by the British, just as the Punjab Police was trusted in dealing with the Ghadar Movement. In the Punjab it is only after Julio Rebeiro and K.P.S. Gill revitalised the Punjab Police and it came to the forefront in dealing with Khalistani terrorism that the situation began to normalise. The day the J&K Police becomes operationally capable of taking on militancy in the State we shall control this phenomenon. The Special Operations Group of the J&K Police has already begun to show signs of promise. In the Naxalite areas the model force would be the Andhra Pradesh Police which has targeted the top leaders and eliminated them and has the situation firmly in control in the Telangana area. This is the capability of our police, provided it is given good leadership and this is the Force which must be co-opted into countering nationwide terrorism. We have to ensure that NCTC does not become a surrogate of the State Police. Its role has to be of a mentor, a provider of credible information and, where necessary, a strike force that will complement the State Police.

As originally envisaged NCTC was to operate within the framework of the Intelligence Bureau. Under Entry 9 of List 1 of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution Parliament has the power to legislate both on the Intelligence Bureau and on the Central Bureau of Investigation (IB) and (CBI). Unfortunately even today there is no law governing both these organisations and such police powers that CBI has are enjoyed as the Delhi Special Police Establishment created by the DSPE Act. Naturally the States were extremely wary of a wing of IB, not accountable to Parliament because it is a purely executive branch of government, with NCTC being empowered to enjoy police powers in the matter of striking at terrorists, taking armed action and arresting people, apart from intercepting telephone calls, and means of electronic communication in the realm of information technology and information communication technology that non-Congress States opposed the move because they were convinced that the new organisation would be used to spy on political opponents and to arrest and harass political leaders opposed to the ruling party. Many Congress Chief Ministers also have reservations. Therefore, NCTC could not be constituted, intelligence is both scattered and random and there is no fully legally empowered coordinating agency which can not only obtain and analyse intelligence but also strike against terrorists without any delay. IB is not and does not have a strike force, NIA looks at cases at the stage when an incident has occurred and has to be investigated ex post facto. Who will make preemptive strikes? The States have raised the bogey of a conspiracy by the Centre to curtail State autonomy and intervene in matters within List 2 of the Seventh Schedule. Incidents like Hyderabad, therefore, continue to happen. The mutual distrust of Central agencies and State Police Forces continues. This environment is not conducive to cooperative effort or coordinated action.

Coordination apart, it must also be realised that the State Police has to function under strong political constraint. Many terrorist groups have local political connections and if the police tries to deal with them impartially, then these terrorists can use their political strength to negate police action, thus enhancing terrorism. The importance of a federal agency is that it is not under local influence and, therefore, can afford to be more objective and impartial. A local goonda or terrorist may have a limited sphere of influence within which he feels safe, but if national level agencies come into action then that local influence disappears and the law will take its course. My submission is that a central organisation does not weaken the State Police but instead helps in creating an environment in which the State Police can act. This is a matter worth consideration.

There is the fear that the State Police will be superseded by NCTC , which will then arrest opposition Chief Ministers, thus creating a political path along which the ruling party at the Centre can walk to power in that State. Apparently, these fears are grossly exaggerated because NCTC will not replace the State Police, it will have to hand over the accused persons to the local police station after they have been caught and the entire legal procedure will have to be followed by the investigating agency. Apart from the new agency being under political watch it will also be subject to the scrutiny of courts. After the Keshwanand Bharti case no one in India can possibly weaken the courts or remove executive agencies from the scrutiny of the court. If NCTC acts arbitrarily, under political influence or unprofessionally then the courts will intervene and restore the balance. At the same time if NCTC becomes not only an instrument for sourcing of information but also a coordinator of action against terrorists and conspirators of terror we can certainly become more secure.

The United States is fortunate that it has a friendly neighbour, Canada, on the northern border and an equally friendly neighbour, Mexico, on the southern border. The eastern and western borders of the country face two huge oceans which are very much under the control of the United States’ Navy and Coast Guard. Infiltration of terrorists from abroad, therefore, is very difficult. Home grown terrorism based on religion, caste, or region is almost unknown. India has a porous northern, western and eastern land frontier, facing as we do Pakistan and, close by, Afghanistan and China, a not always friendly Bangladesh and Myanmar which, till very recently till our relations with the country improved, was not averse to sheltering militants from our north eastern States. Our sea frontiers are liable to infiltration from Pakistan, from the Arab littoral and from various insurgent groups or pirates which might crop up from time to time towards our east. Terrorism is exported to India and, therefore, is difficult to control. Besides this we have our own internal problems of terrorism, militancy, separatism and violence emanating from religion, caste and region. To the extent the Naxalites use violence as a major weapon, Naxalism is a form of terrorism. A communal riot takes place, it further divides communities and this encourages the growth of terrorism. Every time we allow people to bring the law into contempt because no one obeys the law we encourage terrorism. Apart from NCTC, therefore, it is absolutely essential that we put an end to sectarian and regional strife, control separatist movements which are home grown and ensure that communal riots do not take place. In all this a central authority for the control of terrorism becomes of vital importance and it is about time our political parties started to think nationally and eschewed narrow parochial interests. It is in this context that a legally constituted Intelligence Bureau, properly empowered and made accountable, is vital. Its mandate already includes counter espionage, which would cover insurgency, militancy and terrorism. Once the IB is made accountable by law, NCTC should be located within it. One can then assume that the States will accept NCTC as a friend and hostility to it will cease.