Killing of Pak Taliban leader in US Drone Strike: Implications for AfPak

Monish Gulati

Introduction

Just days after Barack Obama announced fresh stipulations on the use of drones, a US drone strike on May 29 killed the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) deputy chief Waliur Rehman. The TTP confirmed his death the next day, declared that they were withdrawing from peace talks with the incoming Nawaz Sharif-led Pakistani government and would extract "revenge in the strongest way". On 31 May, an assault by approximately 100 militants on a security post in Mamuzai, Orakzai agency in FATA, left three Pakistani soldiers and 20 militants dead. It is believed that the attack was in response to the death of Waliur Rehman.

The US drone strike on 29 May was the first inside Pakistan since 17 April this year and the first since Pakistanis voted overwhelmingly on 11 May for political parties, which amongst other issues, strongly opposed the US use of drones in Pakistan in their manifestoes. The Pakistani government condemned the drone strike, saying that it violated Pakistani sovereignty. Analysts are divided as to how and how much this drone strike would complicate the early days of Nawaz Sharif, who had just begun to make overtures for peace with the TTP.

The Strike

The drone strike reportedly occurred in the village of Chashma, some three kilometers from Miran Shah, the district headquarters of Pakistan's North Waziristan agency, an area dominated by the Haqqani Network. The US drone fired four missiles at a mud-built guesthouse in the Chashma area, in the early hours of May 29, killing all those inside. Apart from Waliur Rehman and his deputy Fakhar-ul-Islam, there were two Uzbek militants amongst the seven people killed.¹ The attack was quite similar to the one on Mullah Nazir, taking out the top rung of the leadership of the faction.

Waliur Rehman

Waliur Rehman Mehsud was a member of Malkhel tribe, a sub-clan of the Mehsuds inhabiting the Sarokai Manzai area of South Waziristan. He joined the Haqqani network² and, according to US State Department,was its chief military strategist³. Rehman was also reported to be a former member of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazlur (JUI-F). When the TTP was founded in 2008, he joined the group and became the spokesperson of its chief, Baitullah Mehsud. After the death of Baitullah Mehsud in a US drone strike in 2009, Hakimullah Mehsud was anointed Baitullah’s successor, while Waliur Rehman was assigned the group’s command in South Waziristan. It is believed that this caused a rift between Hakimullah and Waliur Rehman, which persisted till the end.

Rehman, while serving as principal deputy to Hakimullah, also managed the TTP's finances⁴. In 2009, when the security forces launched an operation in South Waziristan, causing most TTP militants to move out of the region – but Waliur Rehman preferred to remain in the Wana sub-division, where the Mullah Nazir group was in control. Rehman and his fighters shifted to North Waziristan after the suicide attack on Mullah Nazir on November 29, 2012. Besides orchestrating multiple terror attacks inside Pakistan and in neighboring Afghanistan, including the suicide attack at Combat Outpost Chapman that killed seven CIA personnel, Rehman was also linked to the failed Times Square car bombing in New York City.

Rehman was also a key TTP negotiator in the 'peace talks' with the Pakistan government and was considered amenable to the views of the military establishment which was pushing for ceasefire in return for holding back any possible direct military action. He was against attacking Pakistan and its security forces and was keen on a negotiated ceasefire settlement which suited both the Haqqanis and the Afghan Taliban as it allowed the TTP the option of participating in the spring offensive in Afghanistan this year. A report published by The News indicated that U.S. officials warned Pakistan government and military leaders against entering into peace negotiations with the TTP. Washington felt that the peace negotiations were motivated by Mullah Omar to secure TTP support for the spring offensive in Afghanistan.

Assessment

It is felt that Rehman’s death could, one, weaken and fractionalize the TTP; two, put the peace talks in limbo and cause the TTP to focus on Pakistan; three, with peace talks not forthcoming, the increased TTP attacks would cause the Pakistani army to launch an offensive in areas dominated by the TTP.

Rehman's death could prove to be a serious setback for TTP as he was not only the group's principal military strategist and primary fund raiser but also a key interlocutor between the group and the Pakistan government. With his death, Mehsud will now be able to extend greater control over the TTP and the new Pakistani government would find TTP less amenable to peace. The TTP instead may launch fresh attacks across Pakistan to avenge Rehman's killing, which would create new pressures on the Pakistani government. With Hakimullah refusing to give up targeting Pakistan, the army would be forced to, once again, take a call on launching a military offensive against TTP in North Waziristan.

The killing is also expected to trigger one or multiple splintering in the group, weakening its capabilities. It was, therefore, not surprising that the US State Department soon announced that Rehman was targeted on a tip-off provided by a member of the Hakimullah Mehsud-led group and the US will award the informer with $5 million. ⁵ In 2010, the US had declared Rehman a "specially designated global terrorist" and offered a $5m reward for information leading to his arrest. Meanwhile, six Taliban commanders allied with Rehman unilaterally declared Khan Said (Syed) as Rehman's successor; a move analysts view as an indication of dissent.

The strike may also have an impact on Pakistan's relations with the US as the PML-N has said it plans to renegotiate all agreements with the U.S., including secret ones signed by previous governments. The anti-drone chorus is likely to grow as the incoming Pakistani government campaigned on promises to negotiate with the TTP and oppose U.S. drone strikes.

While there is no denying the US desire to see Rehman dead, the question remains on the timing of the strike; coincidence or a strategic move? Two days after Waliur Rehman was killed, James Dobbins, U.S. special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, visited the Pakistani Army chief General Kayani, as well as Foreign Secretary Syed Jalil Abbas Jailani. According to the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Dobbins discussed Pakistan’s recent elections and the U.S.'s 2014 troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. ⁶

Two issues figure prominently on the US agenda for AfPak; conclusion of a successful security transition in Afghanistan and the ongoing drawdown, which will pick up pace in 2014. From the point of view of the security transition US will want, one, TTP to stay out of Afghanistan; two, if TTP chooses to continue attacks in Pakistan, all the better, it will cause the military to respond. With Pakistan employing its air force to support the army ground action, military intervention in FATA and Waziristan could significantly impact the capability of the TTP. Three, there should be no peace deal. US does not want some cozy bargain to be struck where the Pakistan based militants ease off inside Pakistan while Pakistan turns a blind eye to their activities in Afghanistan.

Regarding the drawdown of ISAF/NATO equipment through Pakistan, US would like both Torkham and Chaman to be operational and route right down till Karachi/Port Qasim secure. The initial movement through Chaman last month was attacked despite the route being secured by the Frontier Corps. The recent rise in Taliban activity in Karachi too does not bode well. Pakistani military action in North Waziristan and Khyber agency would help in quelling militant activities and facilitate drawdown.

Conclusion

In Lahore, James Dobbins also met Nawaz Sharif, who, according to reports, indicated that Pakistani support for the U.S.'s exit strategy in Afghanistan could hinge upon American cooperation on drone strikes within Pakistani territory.⁷ Events in the days ahead would reveal whether killing of Waliur Rehman was a US masterstroke or just blessed relief for Pakistan even if it was brought about by the much hated drone.

(The author is a Defence Analyst based in Delhi)

Endnotes

1. ‘Big blow: TTP loses deputy chief in drone hit’, The Express Tribune, May 30, 2013.
   http://tribune.com.pk/story/556387/big-blow-ttp-loses-deputy-chief-in-dr...
2. ‘Waliur Rehman: From madrassa teacher to Taliban commander’, The Express Tribune, May 30, 2013.http://tribune.com.pk/story/556397/profile-from-madrassa-teacher-to-tali...
3. ‘Wali Ur Rehman’, U.S. Department of State Rewards for Justice flier.http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/146936.pdf
4. Mansur Khan Mehsud. ’The New Face of the Pakistani Taliban?’, ForeignPolicy, April 30, 2010.http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/30/the_new_new_face_of_the_...
5. ‘Wali killed on a tip-off by Hakimullah supporter’, The Express Tribune, June 2, 2013.
   http://tribune.com.pk/story/557769/wali-killed-on-a-tip-off-by-hakimulla...
6. Muhammad Saleh Zaafir. ‘US AfPak envoy on a fact-finding mission’, The News, May 31, 2013.http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-23203-US-AfPak-envoy-on-a-fact-...
7. Kamran Yousaf. ‘New envoy: Drones impede Pakistan’s role in Afghan peace, says Nawaz’, The Express Tribune, May 31, 2013. http://tribune.com.pk/story/556905/new-envoy-drones-impede-pakistans-rol...

National Counter Terrorism Centre

Dr M N Buch 

(Visiting Fellow, VIF)

When we were caught unawares by the Pakistani intrusion into Kargil a high powered committee was set up under Shri K.S. Subramaniam, who had been Defence Secretary of India, to suggest measures whereby we could avoid intelligence failures, provide for a quick response to a Kargil like situation and take such counter insurgency measures as would make India secure. Like all reports of this nature the Subramaniam Committee report also was never meaningfully implemented. We even failed to set up a coordinating agency within the armed forces under a Chief of Defence Staff, not so much because the civil service component of the Defence Ministry opposed this but because there was inter-service rivalry between the armed forces and no Chief was prepared to accept a higher authority for the purpose of coordination. Since Kargil, just as it was before Kargil, India has continued to be a target of terrorism, largely sponsored by our neighbour, Pakistan, but also terrorism which has been born within the country. I am including insurgency and militancy which use violence as a major weapon within the definition of terrorism and, therefore, Naxalite violence or the type of violence one sees in Jammu & Kashmir would also come within the overall ambit of terrorism.

In the United States of America on 11th September 2001 aircraft were used by terrorists as living bombs and crashed into the World Trade Centre Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington D.C. Several thousand lives were lost and even more injured in these horrible examples of extreme terrorism in which aircraft were used as suicide bombs. Now it is a fact that the United States of America is a federation in which all residuary powers vest in the States, which means that what is not specifically reserved for the Federal Government is available to the State Governments. In India the reverse is true because under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, apart from the Union List which gives the exclusive powers of Parliament and the State List, which gives the exclusive power of the State Legislatures, there is the Concurrent List in which both law making bodies have the power to legislate, with the rider that a law of Parliament overrides a State law on the same subject. Residuary powers are vested in the Centre and there are circumstances under which the Centre can give directions to the States, can legislate on behalf of the States under certain circumstances even on matters in the State List and can go to the extent of dismissing a State Government and assuming direct federal control under Article 356 of the Constitution. In other words, India is a very centripetal federation, heavily weighted in favour of the Centre. Despite this, after 11th September 2001 incident the United States government decided to take really effective measures to prevent a similar attack in future. Agencies like FBI and CIA were strengthened and their powers enhanced and a national counter insurgency centre was set up which had the authority to intercept mails, telephones and various electronic means of information and communications technology and to take effective action to arrest and neutralise would be terrorists.

None of the State Government raised any objection to the new arrangement, despite the fact that the counter terrorism organisation was armed with police powers which lay within the domain of the State and local governments. No one distrusted the new arrangement or considered it politicised and the States had full confidence that the agency would use its authority against terrorists and would not harass ordinary citizens or destablise State Governments. What is more, the police at all levels, city, county, State and federal, all work in tandem. Their single objective is the maintenance of law and order and ensuring the safety and security of citizens and they do not eye each other with suspicion. The culture there is that in performing its police functions the Force is allowed to work according to law and the kind of political and other interference which takes place in India is virtually unknown. In Madhya Pradesh recently the Home Minister insisted on the suspension or at least the transfer of an Inspector of the Traffic Police because he dared to pull up a twenty-year old boy for not wearing a helmet when riding a two wheeler. The boy was the son of a party worker. Moving out the Inspector in this manner naturally demoralizes the entire Force and to expect it thereafter to maintain order and counter terrorism would be virtually impossible of achievement. Defying a traffic policeman in Britain or United States is totally unthinkable. This example is being given because if in the minor matter of a traffic violation the Home Minister intervenes and prevents the police from performing its function how can anyone trust the police to be able to deal with a major threat of terrorism.

The Government of India has been trying to create agencies within the government structure which could collect and collate intelligence, pass on actionable information to the field authorities and then ensure that the terrorist organisations are hit hard enough to hurt. If we go back to the beginning of the twentieth century, especially at about the time of the Partition of Bengal by Lord Curzon, a terrorist organisation called the Anusheelan Party came into being. Its organisation was cellular and, therefore, very secretive. The bomb and the bullet were their favourite weapons. The British used some young Bengali officers of the Bengal Police to penetrate this organisation, collect information on different cells, which were largely unconnected and when the intelligence input became adequate they suddenly struck and virtually destroyed the Anusheelan Party. This was one of the most successful counter terrorism campaigns ever conducted in India. The Bengal Police was totally trusted by the British, just as the Punjab Police was trusted in dealing with the Ghadar Movement. In the Punjab it is only after Julio Rebeiro and K.P.S. Gill revitalised the Punjab Police and it came to the forefront in dealing with Khalistani terrorism that the situation began to normalise. The day the J&K Police becomes operationally capable of taking on militancy in the State we shall control this phenomenon. The Special Operations Group of the J&K Police has already begun to show signs of promise. In the Naxalite areas the model force would be the Andhra Pradesh Police which has targeted the top leaders and eliminated them and has the situation firmly in control in the Telangana area. This is the capability of our police, provided it is given good leadership and this is the Force which must be co-opted into countering nationwide terrorism. We have to ensure that NCTC does not become a surrogate of the State Police. Its role has to be of a mentor, a provider of credible information and, where necessary, a strike force that will complement the State Police.

As originally envisaged NCTC was to operate within the framework of the Intelligence Bureau. Under Entry 9 of List 1 of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution Parliament has the power to legislate both on the Intelligence Bureau and on the Central Bureau of Investigation (IB) and (CBI). Unfortunately even today there is no law governing both these organisations and such police powers that CBI has are enjoyed as the Delhi Special Police Establishment created by the DSPE Act. Naturally the States were extremely wary of a wing of IB, not accountable to Parliament because it is a purely executive branch of government, with NCTC being empowered to enjoy police powers in the matter of striking at terrorists, taking armed action and arresting people, apart from intercepting telephone calls, and means of electronic communication in the realm of information technology and information communication technology that non-Congress States opposed the move because they were convinced that the new organisation would be used to spy on political opponents and to arrest and harass political leaders opposed to the ruling party. Many Congress Chief Ministers also have reservations. Therefore, NCTC could not be constituted, intelligence is both scattered and random and there is no fully legally empowered coordinating agency which can not only obtain and analyse intelligence but also strike against terrorists without any delay. IB is not and does not have a strike force, NIA looks at cases at the stage when an incident has occurred and has to be investigated ex post facto. Who will make preemptive strikes? The States have raised the bogey of a conspiracy by the Centre to curtail State autonomy and intervene in matters within List 2 of the Seventh Schedule. Incidents like Hyderabad, therefore, continue to happen. The mutual distrust of Central agencies and State Police Forces continues. This environment is not conducive to cooperative effort or coordinated action.

Coordination apart, it must also be realised that the State Police has to function under strong political constraint. Many terrorist groups have local political connections and if the police tries to deal with them impartially, then these terrorists can use their political strength to negate police action, thus enhancing terrorism. The importance of a federal agency is that it is not under local influence and, therefore, can afford to be more objective and impartial. A local goonda or terrorist may have a limited sphere of influence within which he feels safe, but if national level agencies come into action then that local influence disappears and the law will take its course. My submission is that a central organisation does not weaken the State Police but instead helps in creating an environment in which the State Police can act. This is a matter worth consideration.

There is the fear that the State Police will be superseded by NCTC , which will then arrest opposition Chief Ministers, thus creating a political path along which the ruling party at the Centre can walk to power in that State. Apparently, these fears are grossly exaggerated because NCTC will not replace the State Police, it will have to hand over the accused persons to the local police station after they have been caught and the entire legal procedure will have to be followed by the investigating agency. Apart from the new agency being under political watch it will also be subject to the scrutiny of courts. After the Keshwanand Bharti case no one in India can possibly weaken the courts or remove executive agencies from the scrutiny of the court. If NCTC acts arbitrarily, under political influence or unprofessionally then the courts will intervene and restore the balance. At the same time if NCTC becomes not only an instrument for sourcing of information but also a coordinator of action against terrorists and conspirators of terror we can certainly become more secure.

The United States is fortunate that it has a friendly neighbour, Canada, on the northern border and an equally friendly neighbour, Mexico, on the southern border. The eastern and western borders of the country face two huge oceans which are very much under the control of the United States’ Navy and Coast Guard. Infiltration of terrorists from abroad, therefore, is very difficult. Home grown terrorism based on religion, caste, or region is almost unknown. India has a porous northern, western and eastern land frontier, facing as we do Pakistan and, close by, Afghanistan and China, a not always friendly Bangladesh and Myanmar which, till very recently till our relations with the country improved, was not averse to sheltering militants from our north eastern States. Our sea frontiers are liable to infiltration from Pakistan, from the Arab littoral and from various insurgent groups or pirates which might crop up from time to time towards our east. Terrorism is exported to India and, therefore, is difficult to control. Besides this we have our own internal problems of terrorism, militancy, separatism and violence emanating from religion, caste and region. To the extent the Naxalites use violence as a major weapon, Naxalism is a form of terrorism. A communal riot takes place, it further divides communities and this encourages the growth of terrorism. Every time we allow people to bring the law into contempt because no one obeys the law we encourage terrorism. Apart from NCTC, therefore, it is absolutely essential that we put an end to sectarian and regional strife, control separatist movements which are home grown and ensure that communal riots do not take place. In all this a central authority for the control of terrorism becomes of vital importance and it is about time our political parties started to think nationally and eschewed narrow parochial interests. It is in this context that a legally constituted Intelligence Bureau, properly empowered and made accountable, is vital. Its mandate already includes counter espionage, which would cover insurgency, militancy and terrorism. Once the IB is made accountable by law, NCTC should be located within it. One can then assume that the States will accept NCTC as a friend and hostility to it will cease.