Dr. N. Manoharan
Senior Fellow, VIF
Violence in Bodo areas is not a simple story of communal conflict
between Bodos and non-Bodos, but is a complex issue with socio-cultural,
economic, political and security dimensions.Clashes have erupted from
time-to-time1 in the area, but the situation this time has
reached a state where the number of killings has crossed 90. There is a
displacement of about 400,000 people and its echo has been felt in other
parts of India in terms of reverse flow of Northeasterners, triggered
by rumours of reprisals. What factors were responsible for the present
situation? Who were the actors involved? What were the major points of
friction? What is the way ahead?
Land, language and livelihood have been the major elements of Bodos’
grievances that caused the community to agitate. Desire for political
power came later, although the aspiration was basically to realise their
core socio-economic demands. The Bodo movement in its long history “has
had several forms moving gradually towards the demand for a separate
state” and even a sovereign “Bodoland”. The entire movement can be
broadly divided into six phases: Colonial, 1947-67, 1967-87, 1987-1993,
1993-2003 and post-2003. In each phase, the Bodos gradually advanced
their socio-economic and political aspirations, but not without facing
proportionate challenges in the form of resistance from other competing
groups in the area, or lethargy of the state or even division within its
own community. From the mid-1980s armed component to the movement took
shape. Militant groups like Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) and National
Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) came to the fore. Since the 1993
signing of BAC Accord and later 2003 BTC Accord, there were concerted
efforts made by the Bodos to “prove right of the autochthonous over the
land” what they called “Bodoland”. They first turned to “illegal
Bangladeshi immigrants” and then to Adivasis. The resultant violence and
counter-violence led to large-scale killings and displacement.
To take a snapshot of present cycle of violence, the events leading
to July riots was triggered by a 24-hour bandh called by All Bodoland
Minority Students’ Union (ABMSU) on 29 May 2012 to protest against the
alleged removal of a signboard by cadres of the ex-Bodo Liberation
Tigers (BLT) from a piece of land in the Badlangmari area that had been
allocated for a mosque. The bandh turned violent injuring 13 persons.
The momentum of violence, however, started with the killing of two
members of All Bodoland Minority Students Union (ABMSU) allegedly by
Bodo gunmen at Anthihara in Kokrajhar on 06 July 2012 and on 19 July,
two more people were killed in Magurmari in Kokrajhar. In retaliation,
on 20 July, four former BLT cadres were killed. Violence intensified
since then and went out of proportion for the local police to be able to
control. It subsided only when the Army was called in.
The challenge to crafting a way ahead is can the grievances of Bodos –
safeguarding their culture and improving their economic conditions – be
met without a separate state of Bodoland and without compromising the
interests of other ethno-religious groups living in the so called Bodo
areas? The answer lies in looking at the issue in a comprehensive,
rather than segmented manner. The following six broad measures can be
considered:
Timely Action: Analyzing all previous incidents of violence in
the Bodo areas, it is clear that as and when the security apparatus
missed taking note of symptoms of unrest and failed to take
appropriate proactive action, the situation got out of control. The
state police and Intelligence should have woken up by March 2012 itself
when Bodos started commemorating 25 years of their “struggle”. Similar
symbolisms and assertions were bound to be displayed by non-Bodo groups,
especially Muslims and Adivasis. The manifestation of such assertions
by competing groups was always through violence. This should be
understood. Signs of imminent clashes were simmering since May, but were
not taken seriously by the government. Nipping the problem at the bud
would have averted indiscriminate violence and resulting killings and
displacement.
Political Settlement: There is no point in going for a fresh
accord. The failure of Bodo Autonomous Council (BAC) of 1993 and Bodo
Territorial Council (BTC) of 2003 clearly shows the problem was more
with the implementation and less with the provisions per se. It is
vital, therefore, to fix the present BTC accord without any ambiguities
and implement it in full. It was the ambiguities in the previous two
Accords that led to lot of misunderstandings, opportunistic
interpretations and confusions. Yet full and timely implementation would
have averted many issues. The future amendment and implementation of
the Accord is such that the provisions should satisfy both Bodos and
non-Bodos in unequivocal terms. It should be realised that any success
of the Accord lies also in cooperation between Bodos and non-Bodos.
Armed Groups: Armed groups representing Bodos and non-Bodos
have to be tackled through appropriate means, either through political
or military means or a mix of both. As long as they remain armed and
active, insecurity and the consequent trust deficit would linger on. It
would not suffice to prevail only on those groups that have not entered
into ceasefire, but on all groups that have access to weapons and are
motivated to kill.
Reconciliation: There is a significant gap between the present
ground reality in the Bodo areas and the romance of Bodoland. It is
important to bridge this gap. The political leadership should rise to
the occasion in convincing the respective communities to see the things
as they are and look ahead, instead of exploiting the situation to gain
electoral mileage. Appropriate confidence-building measures and
reconciliation among the concerned communities – Bodos, Mulsims, and
Adivasis – are crucial.
Illegal Migration: It is also important to find a lasting
solution to the issue of illegal immigration from Bangladesh. Despite
the enormity of the issue, the response in stemming the flow of migrants
from neighbouring Bangladesh has been grossly inadequate. The entire
stretch of 4,096-km India-Bangladesh border is heavily populated, making
monitoring extremely difficult. Fencing has to a large extent been
acting as an obstacle, but only 2,760.12 km have been fenced so far.2
The remaining stretch should be fenced at the earliest, complimented
with floodlights and hi-tech surveillance devices. Most importantly,
existing border has to be demarcated at the earliest to make them free
of ‘enclaves’ and ‘adverse positions’; much of the activities take place
in these undemarcated areas. Although the Border Security Force (BSF),
in charge of policing the border, has been doing its job creditably, the
force levels are not sufficient to monitor the long and difficult
border. Apart from raising new battalions, it is important not to divert
the BSF for duties other than border management. They also have to be
equipped legally to handle situations at borders that include not only
illegal migration, but also smuggling, drug-trafficking, counterfeit
currency, and militant movements. Apart from creating physical hurdles,
it is also important to discourage illegal migrants through suitable
deterrent legislation. Till recently, illegal migrants in Assam were
handled by Illegal Migration (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983,
that was held as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2005 as it was
“coming to the advantage of such illegal migrants as any proceedings
initiated against them almost entirely ends in their favour, enables
them to have a document having official sanctity to the effect that they
are not illegal migrants.”3 An exclusive refugee/migration
law is long pending. It is also vital to hasten the present plan of
issuing multi-purpose identity cards, at least to curb further illegal
migration. At some pockets, issue of temporary work permits can be
considered so that Bangladeshis can come, work and go back. At the macro
level, India should help in the overall economic development and
prosperity of Bangladesh so that its citizens need not to go elsewhere
for their livelihood.
Refugee Camps: Relief camps housing internally displaced requires
due attention. All three broad categories of communities – Bodos,
Muslims, Adivasis – are housed in various camps. Some of the camps have
been in existence since 1993, as inmates could not return to their homes
fearing violence. Because of overcrowding there is persistent lack of
food, water, accommodation, medical attention, and sanitation. These
concerns should be addressed urgently. Apart from making the living
conditions of the internally displaced in relief camps better, the
government should make sure that the displaced are rehabilitated at the
earliest. Else relief camps would turn into breeding grounds for new
militants.
