Lip Service is Still Being Paid to Defence Indigenisation

Brig (retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, 

Visiting Fellow, VIF

The Defence Minister, Mr A K Antony, has repeatedly exhorted the armed forces to procure their weapons and equipment from indigenous sources in recent months. It is a well-established fact that no nation aspiring to great power status can expect to achieve it without being substantively self-reliant in defence production. However, it is not the armed forces that are the stumbling block. Unless the government drastically reorients its policies, the import content of defence acquisitions will continue to remain over 80 per cent.

India’s procurement of weapons platforms and other equipment as part of its plans for defence modernisation, must simultaneously lead to a transformative change in the country’s defence technology base and manufacturing prowess. Or else, defence procurement will remain mired in disadvantageous buyer-seller, patron-client relationships like that with the erstwhile Soviet Union and now Russia. While we manufactured Russian fighter aircraft and tanks under license, the Russians never actually transferred technology to India. Whatever India procures now must be procured with the transfer of technology being built into the contract even if it means having to pay a higher price. The aim should be to make India a design, development, manufacturing and export hub for defence equipment in two decades.

Though it seeks to encourage public-private partnerships, the government continues to retain its monopoly on defence production and R&D. The latest Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) was amended in April 2013 to reflect the current thinking on ‘buying Indian’. However, in effect it still favours the defence PSUs over the private sector. MNCs are allowed to bring in only up to 26 per cent FDI as against 74 per cent for non-defence sector joint ventures. Though the procurement of weapons and equipment worth more than Rs 300 crore from MNCs has been linked with 30-50 per cent offsets, it is doubtful whether the economy is ready to absorb such high levels of offsets.

The DRDO is in the process of implementing the report of the P Rama Rao committee that had asked it to identify 8 to 10 critical areas that best fit its existing human resource pool, technological threshold and established capacity to take up new projects. Since its inception in 1958, the DRDO has achieved some spectacular successes, but also has many failures to its name. However, to its credit, it worked under extremely restrictive technology denial regimes and with a rather low indigenous technology base.

The DRDO must now concentrate its efforts on developing critical cutting edge technologies that no strategic partner is likely to be willing to share; for example, ballistic missile defence (BMD) technology. Other future weapons platforms should be jointly developed, produced and marketed with India’s strategic partners in conjunction with the private sector. The development of technologies that are not critical should be outsourced completely to the private sector. Also, the armed forces should be given funding support to undertake research geared towards the improvement of in-service equipment with a view to enhancing operational performance and increasing service life. Gradually, the universities and the IITs should be involved in undertaking defence R&D. This five-pronged approach will help to raise India’s technological threshold over the next two decades by an order of magnitude.

The defence production process must provide a level playing field between defence PSUs and private Indian companies forming joint ventures with MNCs where necessary. The amount of FDI that MNCs can bring in must be raised to 49 per cent immediately and to 74 per cent in due course to make it attractive for MNCs. However, no MNC that is unable to provide transfer of technology – either due to the home country’s restrictive laws or due to proprietary considerations – should be considered for future defence acquisitions.

India cannot leap-frog to a higher defence technology trajectory virtually overnight. Transforming a low technology base to a higher plane will need time, patience and large-scale capital investment. It will also need strong support across the political spectrum. In the interim period, there will be a further dip in defence preparedness. This short-term weakness in capacity building will need to be carefully weighed against long-term gains that will be strategic in nature.

The immediate requirement is to think big in keeping with the country’s growing economic clout and to plan for the future with a level of confidence that policy planners have not dared to exhibit before. In 10 to 15 years India must begin to acquire most of its defence equipment needs from Indian companies—with or without a joint venture with an MNC. Only then will the era of self-reliance in defence acquisition truly dawn on the country. It will be a difficult quest, but not one that a great nation cannot realise.

A Response Deficient both in Strategy and Tactics

Dr. M.N. Buch

Visiting Fellow, VIF

Naxalites, Maoists, Left Wing extremists call them what you will, (for convenience I shall call them Naxalite) have virtually taken over about 160 districts of India. That covers more than a quarter of the whole country.

All of these are located in the heart of India ---Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Eastern Bihar, parts of West Bengal, South Eastern Maharashtra, South Western M.P, Orissa and North Western Andhra Pradesh. In Andhra Pradesh in the Telangana Region the administration and the police, by forceful action, have been able to regain control and the Naxalites are on the run from there. In Chhattisgarh, Orissa and South Eastern Mahrashtra, however, the Naxalites reign supreme.

As is well known the extreme Left Wing armed movement originated in Naxalbari of Darjeeling District of West Bengal as a revolutionary attempt to overthrow the legally constituted government. Violence was the creed of this movement and murder of innocent people, including government servants and policemen, was the weapon used to try and overawe the administrative structure of the State. Siddharth Shankar Ray, as Chief Minister of West Bengal initiated the campaign against Naxalism, but it was the Left Front Government led by Jyoti Basu which effectively uprooted Naxalism from the place of origin. Even though there are areas in West Bengal which have Left Wing extremism even today, for example the Lalgarh area, by and large in West Bengal the situation is manageable.

In the Telangana area of old Hyderabad State there was strong Left Wing armed resistance to zamindari in the Nizam’s dominion, but after the Police Action when Hyderabad State was taken over, the newly appointed Commissioner of that region, V. Nanjappa, very effectively curbed militancy. The cause of that militancy was the iniquitous exploitation of the zamindari regime of the Nizam’s government, just as in West Bengal it was the Cornwallis Permanent Settlement and the misdeeds of the zamidars which gave rise to peasant unrest. One reason why Naxalism was controlled in West Bengal was that the Jyoti Basu Government introduced genuine land reforms which created a climate of hope in rural Bengal and weaned away people from Left Wing extremism. The second reason, of course, is that the parties of the Left Front voluntarily accepted our democratic system and electoral politics drove away the Naxalites. Fortunately in Andhra Pradesh right from the time when N.T. Rama Rao became Chief Minister the administration took a firm decision to counter Naxalism and this took the following form:-

1. The police force was reorganised, strengthened, properly trained and equipped and a strike force called the Greyhounds was constituted. More police stations were opened and every police station was strengthened so that it became impregnable to Naxalite attacks. These police stations were then used as centres from which anti Naxalaite operations could be launched.

1. The Intelligence set up was strengthened and gradually information about Naxalite activities began to reach the police, which launched immediate strikes if the information was reliable and could be acted upon. This resulted in a number of successful encounters in which the police had the upper hand.

1. The police adopted a proactive policy of area domination and there was penetration of security forces into erstwhile Naxalite strongholds.

1. Simultaneously the district administration was also strengthened and made proactive. Police measures were paralleled by a thrust for development and this began to eat into the Naxalite base. Today the position is that government has recaptured most of the Naxalite affected area of Telangana and the Naxalites have been driven out to find shelter in Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra and Orissa. There are lessons to be learnt from the successful operations of the Andhra Pradesh Government.

1. In all hostage-taking incidents we should refuse to negotiate and make it clear that if need be we are prepared to lose the hostage. However, the retaliatory strikes will be swift, deadly, if necessary brutal and they will be effective.

1. The Andhra Pradesh tactics of converting all police stations into strongholds and then using them for mounting anti Naxalite operations must be adopted and immediately implemented.

1. The police force of the Naxalite hit States must be strengthened, equipped, armed, trained and led by officers who inspire confidence so that the State Police becomes the main strike force. It is only when KPS Gill re-energised and re-organised the Punjab Police that with the help of central police forces and the army he was able to restore order in the Punjab. In the Naxalite hit districts of Chhattisgarh our evaluation study found that even today the people of Bastar are not inimical to the Chhattisgarh Police and if that force is strengthened it can take on the Naxalites.

1. Surveillance from the air is not enough. A sufficiency of transport helicopters to quickly move forces to where they are needed and armed helicopters which can be used to strafe Naxalites who have laid an ambush or are moving around in large numbers is the need of the hour and there should be no hesitation in this behalf.

1. The armoury of the police must include heavy weapons so that a police party which is ambushed can retaliate with high explosives fired from mortars, rocket launchers, etc. Armoured fighting vehicles of the BMP type should also be provided to the police. The objective is that every ambush must be successfully countered and heavy casualties inflicted on the attackers.

1. There should be aggressive patrolling, the objective of which is to bring the Naxalite dalams to encounter. With proper planning it should be possible to knock out a whole dalam in a single encounter. If heavy causalities are suffered by the Naxalites police morale will rise and the Naxalites will find it difficult to gain recruits as their morale plummets.

1. At present the situation is so serious that in target areas we need Corps and Division level exercises in jungle warfare. On paper these would be training exercises, but the objective would be to flush out the Naxalites and drive them into the arms of security forces, mainly police and central armed police forces which could then liquidate them. It is very doubtful that the Naxalites would attack the army, but if they are stupid enough to do so they would be given short shrift. As an area is cleared normal district administration must be restored very quickly and area normalised.

1. There is a theory, to which obviously Chidambaram and Montek Singh Ahluwalia subscribe, that development will end the Naxalite problem. Development is possible only in an environment of peace and security and as things stand today the Naxalites do not permit development. Therefore, restoration of peace is the number one priority of the government. Initially the steps taken would be harsh and even brutal and the liberal brigade would raise a howl. Let them. Ignore them if possible, suppress them if necessary, but do not lose sight of the objective of bringing India back to normal rule in which a democratic administration is re-established. Once that happens bring everyone back on board so that development programmes and programmes of assimilation to which the tribals can relate can be launched and tribal grievances removed.

What are the Naxalites? What is their objective? How do they operate? Who supports them? What is government’s reaction to Naxalite activities? How seriously does government view the Naxalite problem? The first fact to be remembered is that in the so-called Red Corridor, or Liberated Areas as they are called, the writ of government does not run. The situation here is much worse than it ever was in Nagaland or Mizoram at the height of insurgency. In the North East government decided very early that it would prove to the insurgents that they cannot defeat the Indian State by force of arms. A large number of units of the armed police were inducted into the insurgent hit areas, but overall operational command was given to the army, which took control of anti-insurgency operations. There was never a time when the police or the army withdrew from Nagaland and Mizoram or left space which the insurgents could take over. These areas have always been treated as frontier areas even by the British and the civil administration only had a presence there through political agents or deputy commissioners reporting directly to the Governor of Assam. The policing was provided by the Assam Rifles and, therefore, when insurgency endangered the integrity of India the army took over this policing and administrative role. At the same time a regular administrative structure was slowly created, first in the Union Territories carved out of Assam by way of Nagaland and Mizoram, with appointment of district officers and superintendents of police, setting up of police stations and creation of development blocks. As the insurgents learnt the hard way that they cannot defeat the Indian Army many of them began to come into the mainstream and over time it was possible to democratise the administration and to convert the Union Territories into States of the Union. Today Mizoram is peaceful and insurgency in Nagaland is confined only to some pockets and is very much under control. This is not the picture in the Naxalite dominated districts of India.

The National Centre for Human Settlements and Environment (NCHSE) did an evaluation of five Naxalite dominated districts of Chhattisgarh on behalf of the Planning Commission to see how various development projects are progressing. The findings of the NCHSE team were that the normal district administration is only a façade and operates at the mercy of the Naxalites. The Naxalites do not allow school buildings to be constructed because they suspect they can be used by security forces and, therefore, school buildings are blown up. Education, therefore, has suffered in these areas. No development project can be undertaken unless the Naxalites want it. In one case of Dantewada District, the details of which are available but are not being revealed for security reasons, a contractor from Nagpur was permitted to undertake the construction of a road, for which he had to pay the local dalam or armed group of Naxalites a sum of rupees twenty lakhs. He paid this, but another dalam then demanded a similar amount, which he could not pay. He was shot dead. His widow, obviously a woman of great courage, came down from Nagpur and upbraided the Naxalites for breach of promise. One dalam apologized, but she still remains a widow because her husband’s life could not be restored. The road, incidentally, was not built.

In the Naxalite area government’s primary health care system hardly functions. The revenue courts do not function, land records are where they were prior to the Naxalite movement, civil litigation stands informally transferred to so-called Naxalite courts, where there is no real justice, the forest department exists at the mercy of the Naxalites and criminal justice itself has become a function of kangaroo courts. The only system which functions is the excellent Public Distribution System (PDS) of Chhattisgarh but there, too, the Naxalites insist that lorries carrying PDS goods will be handled by them and they will do the actual distribution because that gains them credit.

The Naxalites operate at two levels. One is the normal organisation of villagers through which contact is maintained with the administration. The other is armed dalams where large groups of insurgents armed with modern weapons freely roam the area. The villagers are terrified and dare not inform the security forces about Naxalite movement. The security forces, too, send out patrols and pressurise the villagers, but ultimately the police can only beat up people whereas the Naxalites kill them. Whether it is a beating at the hands of security forces or death at the hands of Naxalites, the poor tribals of the Naxalite infested zone are today the most miserable people on earth. That is what the Naxalites have done to them.

Who are these Naxalites? How do I know about them? I would restrict my comments to the Bastar Division of Chhattisgarh only. From the time when it was a part of Madhya Pradesh, Bastar was the largest district in India and was a part of Raipur Division. One area called Abuj Marh was the only Inner Line area located within the heartland of India in that entry into the Marh was by permission of the D.C. of Bastar, there was no revenue survey or settlement, there was jhoom cultivation, there was neither a revenue or police presence and it is only the Tribal Welfare Department which ran schools and had a presence in the Marh. The region was tiger infested and in one village man-eaters ate the entire population of thirty-eight people, including the village school teacher. The Forest Department eventually launched a campaign to eliminate the man-eaters and two of them were shot dead. The whole of Bastar was beautiful, unspoiled and totally peaceful. The Maria, Muria, Dandami Maria, Hill Maria, etc., are all Gond tribes which inhabit Bastar. Bastar was originally a princely state in which the much smaller princely state of Kanker was merged. Outside intervention came through two major projects, the Dandakaranya Project centred at Pakhanjore for rehabilitation of East Bengal refugees and the Bailadilla Project for mining iron ore. Bastar is a mineral rich region in which there is some of the purest iron ore in the world called blue dust, zinc, tin, precious stones like corundum, coal - name it you will find it in Bastar. It also has beautiful forests with the teak zone located on dike merging with schist and gneiss of the sal zone, moving towards semi moist deciduous forests of Bailadilla and South Bastar. There is poverty, but no starvation because nature is bountiful in the district. Unfortunately exploitation by outsiders in the Dandakaranya Project and the Bailadilla iron ore mines did lead to displacement, inequality, loss of livelihood, deforestation and pollution of rivers. This is a major cause of discontent in Bastar.

As for my credentials, I had been Director, Tribal and Harijan Welfare of Madhya Pradesh and have very extensively toured Bastar, then the most important tribal district in India. Thereafter as Secretary of the Environmental Group of Departments, which included forests, I had a great deal to do with Bastar. One signal contribution I made was to abandon tropical pine plantation in Bastar. Under the sponsorship of the World Bank the Government of India and the Government of Madhya Pradesh, in Machkot - Tiria on 400 acres cut down the beautiful mixed forests and introduced monoculture of Pinus Carribia for development of pulp wood plantation to feed the paper factories of Sweden. The idea was to grow this species in 40, 000 acres, thus virtually destroying the beautiful forests of Machkot Tiria. Despite immense pressure from the Government of India to take up the project because it would give that government foreign exchange I stoutly resisted it and contributed to saving the indigenous forests of Bastar. Today the tropical pine is in decline and indigenous species have made a come back.

In the end of 1983 when I was still in service Arjun Singh, the then Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh, asked me to tour South Bastar where the beginnings of Naxalism were being felt. I toured extensively and what I found was that Andhraite Naxalites under some pressure in that State had penetrated into Bastar. Despite the poverty of the region, despite displacement by Dandakaranya and Bailadilla, there was no home grown militancy. Bastar was a ryotwari district and land ownership of the tribals was protected by the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code. I told Arjun Singh that we could accelerate the pace of development, but through projects which tribals could assimilate. We could post officers and staff of known efficiency and integrity and we could take police action. However, nowhere did I find even one worker of any political party, including the Congress, BJP and the Left who mingled with the people and educated them on the dangers of Naxalism and militancy. I told him that this task could not be performed by civil servants. It is this political vacuum which has been invaded and taken over by the Naxalites. Even here, when Digvijay Singh was Chief Minister, a very fine IPS officer called A.N. Pathak, as IG anti Naxalite operations, camped in the deep jungles of South Bastar and virtually drove out the Naxalites. However, under pressure from the so-called liberal activists the Digvijay Government stopped these operations and ordered Pathak to withdraw from Bastar with a major part of his force. The police lost the initiative, the Naxalite flooded in and that was the beginning of the present sorry state in Chhattisgarh.

My third link with Bastar is that Kamal Nath, as Union Minister for Forests and Environment, appointed me Chairman of a committee to look into the environmental impact of the proposed Indravati Project in Bastar. This was largely a hydel project, with some irrigation. I shot down the project in flames because it would have caused immense environmental damage both to the river and to the forests through which it flowed. My report was accepted in toto and the project shelved. I have given this background because today the picture is very different and Bastar is the least safe place in India. Neither in Kashmir nor in the North East have the security forces ever given up their role of dominating the area. In Bastar the exact reverse is true and it is the Naxalites who dominate.

This brings me to the questions I asked about the Naxalites. The so-called activists, B.D. Sharma, Binayak Sen, Arundhati Roy, Swami Agnivesh, Dr. Hargopal and large numbers of JNU brand liberals all look on the Naxalites as people leading a revolution against the heartless, capitalist, anti people and anti tribal State. To them Naxalite terror is a war of liberation. If it is a war then surely the Geneva Convention should apply. Just a few days ago Naxalites entered a village in Gadhchiroli District of Maharashtra and decapitated two villagers and abducted ten others. In Jharkhand a police inspector was abducted and beheaded. In Bastar in a single ambush seventy-seven jawans of CRP were killed. The Naxalites target the elected representatives, as witnessed by abduction of a Member of the Orissa Legislature. They have destroyed the panchayat raj institutions and when Alex Paul Menon, Collector of Sukma was addressing a panchayat sammelan the Naxalites brutally murdered two of his security officers and abducted him. The Naxalites have destroyed education by blowing up schools, they have disrupted the health care system, they do not allow development works to be undertaken so that the problems of poverty cannot be tackled, they blackmail people and at the point of a gun extort money from them, so much so that even the poorest villagers who go to market have to pay their tithe to the Naxalites. A bus operator can run his bus only on routes permitted by the Naxalites and the timings scheduled by them. The murder of policemen is considered an act of merit, including by their pseudo intellectual supporters. Abduction is now a major weapon for forcing government to surrender to all their demands. This government seems to be doing so quite willingly. This is a total negation of government and it is high time that government went on the offensive and recaptured the Naxalite dominated areas in order to establish democratic civilian government there. Unfortunately neither Chidambaram nor the Home Ministry have realised the seriousness of the problem, which is why our responses to Naxalite terror are ad hoc, sporadic and based on expediency. We need to sweep the Naxalite hit areas clean of terrorists. For this purpose we need to do the following:-

One thing does pain me. Our intelligence agencies, central and state, seem to be quite good at the surveillance of political rivals of government. When it comes to intelligence about the movement of large bodies of armed people who in broad day light could abduct a District Collector, there seems to be a total intelligence silence. Nehchal Singh Sandhu is a first class intelligence officer, who is Director of the Intelligence Bureau. His operational record is outstanding. My prayer to him would be that he organises our intelligence services in such a way that whereas their overseeing of terrorism imported from Pakistan or encouraged to grow in India by that country remains strong, an equally strong intelligence network is built up about Left Wing extremism. At the present moment at an operational level that networks seems to be weak. The Pakistan- China orientation of the Intelligence Bureau would have to include a highly effective division whose sole concern is Left Wing extremism. Nehchal would do a great service to the nation if under his leadership the Intelligence Bureau becomes that organ of the State which the Naxalites fear the most

Civil Military Relations - Need for a Right Traction

Dr. M.N. Buch
Visiting Fellow, VIF

“ Tweedeldum and Tweedledee

Agree to have a battle!

For Tweedledum said Tweedledee

Had spoiled his nice new rattle.

Just then flew down a monstrous crow,

As black as a tar-barrel!

Which frightened both the heroes so,

They quite forgot their quarrel.”

[Alice “Through The Looking Glass”. Lewis Carroll]

The Indian Armed Forces especially the Army, are the one institution where people repose their trust in a country in which almost every institution is viewed with extreme skepticism by the citizens. Where there is disorder and anarchy the Armed Forces are islands of discipline, where there is corruption on a horrendous scale the Armed Forces are models of rectitude, where there is panic the Armed Forces ensure calm, where there is disorder the Armed Forces represent order and where there is injustice the Armed Forces stand for justice. When all others turn tail the Armed Forces stand firm and united. That is the picture that the average Indian has of the Indian soldier. But most important of all, when all around us our neighbours sink into a morass of military dictatorship or military supported totalitarianism, India shines as a democracy in which the Armed Forces are proud to be a part of the whole but also accept that they are under civilian control, they are the Army of the people of India and they exist for India and not vice versa. That is the strength of our democracy.

Under Article 83(2) of the Constitution the supreme command of the defence forces of the Union is vested in the President and the exercise of supreme command is regulated by law. The Supreme Commander cannot use the Armed Forces for his own political ends, but in obeying the Supreme Commander the Armed Forces will function according to law. For example, under the Army Act, 1950 and the Rules framed thereunder every single officer, including a junior commissioned officer or a warrant officer, holds his commission from the President of India. Under section 19 it is the Central Government which has the power to terminate the services, by dismissal or removal, of any person subject to this Act, right from Sepoy to the Chief of Army Staff. Subject to the provisions of the Act command of the Army vests in the Chief of the Army Staff and he enjoys all the powers provided in the Act. In the matter of discipline, command, deployment, conduct of operations, waging of war itself, the Armed Forces are fully empowered and the Chief of each of the Armed Forces acts as the military advisor to government in all matters pertaining to his Force. In the matter of policy civil authority is supreme but in the matter of command and control the power vests exclusively in the Chief concerned. This was amply illustrated in the Bangladesh War when the decision to undertake the war lay with the Council of Ministers but the timing and conduct of operations were determined by Army Headquarters and the Chief of the Army Staff. This is the correct relationship of the civil and the military in a democracy. When this equation is disturbed disaster inevitably follows the worst example of which was the Sino-Indian border war of 1962. Signs of the sorry state of the Army were clearly there to see in the December 1961 Operation Vijay which ended Portuguese rule in Goa. As Secretary to the Chief Civil Administrator I was witness to the utter shambles in the Armed Forces, with the three Services at daggers drawn with each other and the Army miserably unprepared for any operation against a serious enemy. An arrogant Krishna Menon as the Defence Minister, a weak General Thapar as C.O.A.S. and an indecisive Jawaharlal Nehru as Prime Minister were together a prime recipe for disaster and in 1962 it befell us.

We did learn some lessons from 1962 war and gradually the Armed Forces were rebuilt. However, the politics of selecting the Service Chief continued to be quite murky and the overlooking of Lt. Gen. S.K. Sinha left scars which did not heal for quite some time. Of course Gen. Sinha, as befits an honourable man, immediately resigned from service and he did not make the life of the new Chief miserable by making an issue of the appointment. The episode of the removal of the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat, for his contempt of civil authority did leave a bad taste in the mouth, but it was necessary in order to ensure civil supremacy in a democracy. However, it is in our national interest that such a thing never recurs. Moving from history to the present day, we have a situation in which we have a Chief of Army Staff, Gen. V.K. Singh, who has given a new definition to the Army Chief voicing his thoughts. When Gen. Rodriguez was the Chief of Army Staff he made certain remarks about the need for the Army to be involved in the framing of civil policy, though the context in which he made these remarks was the growing involvement of the Army in the maintenance of law and order. He felt, and quite rightly too, that the civil power must put governance right in order to build up the capability of the police to deal with law and order, crime, militancy and even insurgency which fell short of threatening the integrity of the country. It is because the police had been politicised and made ineffective that the Army had to be deployed in situations in which in the past the State Armed Police and the Central Police Forces were adequate to restore order. Prolonged deployment of the Army was cutting into the training programme of the Army to prepare it for war and excessive exposure to civil affairs was affecting the morale of the Army. Unfortunately the remarks of the Chief were read out of the context and he was severely reprimanded. Now the Chiefs withdrew into a shell, which is also not a good thing so far as healthy civil-military relationship is concerned.

Gen. V.K. Singh came in as a crusader against corruption in the Army. Two things happened. One was a series of courts martial against many senior officers and the second was a feeling in Army Headquarters that defence procurement initiated under earlier Chiefs was suspect. Purchase of vital equipment such as 155mm artillery guns, 155mm light artillery guns, new tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles, purchase of ammunition and even infantry weapons was put on hold. Part of the reason was infighting in Army Headquarters, part of it was an extremely weak government which was scared of its own shadow post Bofors, part of it was a system in which the press and the politicians smelt corruption where there was none and arms brokers who, if they found that their items were not being approved, spread insidious rumours about wrongdoing in purchases. The entire procurement process virtually came to a halt. As Gen. Vij once remarked, “It takes years from the point of deciding a weapon system to its actual delivery and delay in the process become so prolonged that the system becomes obsolete before it is acquired”. This is the bind in which our Armed Forces now find themselves and politicians, journalists, timid bureaucrats and senior military officers are all equally responsible for this situation. The next war against Pakistan and China will be fought by the Indian Army with slingshots and quarter-staves.

One thing is clear. In a country as strapped for resources as we are one needs much greater integration between the Armed Forces, the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence and the National Security Council and the National Security Advisor, various intelligent agencies and the Forces’ Headquarters and Ministry of Defence in order to ensure optimum use of resources. Despite the opposition of one of the Armed Forces we must appoint a Chief of Defence Staff who will ensure a balance between the Forces in the matter of their respective roles, their organisation and their equipment. The National Security Advisor would provide government with the threat perceptions, immediate, in the near future and in the foreseeable future and together with the Defence Secretary and the Chief of Defence Staff the respective roles of the three Armed Forces would have to be worked out. Ultimately all weapon acquisition should be routed through the CODS. The role of the Defence Secretary as the Principal Advisor to the civil government would remain unchanged, but the entire professional advice and the technical requirements of the Armed Forces as projected by each of the Service Chiefs would be integrated by the CODS.

The matter of acquisition, increasingly through local production, but from abroad where necessary should be streamlines. Each Service Chief, through CODS, should determine what systems are necessary and then identify where the systems are best available. No doubt prices would fluctuate, but when we are talking about high end technology, the price difference is likely to be within a range in which the top and the bottom will not be too far removed. Price, therefore, cannot be the determining factor. It is the quality of weaponry that really counts. Once the Services are able to convince government about their requirements the budget should be immediately approved and placed at the disposal of the Service Headquarters concerned. The Service Chief should then constitute a Procurement Board, which should have a member representing Finance also. Government must prepare a procurement manual which lays down all the parameters for arriving at a conclusion and the Procurement Board must strictly follow the guidelines. The process should be open and subject to scrutiny, with the Chief of Defence Staff providing superintendence. However, the decision of the Procurement Board must be final and the Board itself should have the authority to issue purchase orders. The case need not go back to government. The representative of Finance should have the power of veto, which must be exercised very sparingly. If we cannot trust the three Service Chiefs and the Chief of Defence Staff to take honest decisions then these officers should not be in office. Once a decision is taken, unless there is really good cause to believe, based on hard evidence, that the process is tainted, there should be no intervention in procurement and government must defend the decision in public, before the media and in Parliament. If this happens, if delay is eliminated, if frivolous and mischievous complaints are not entertained, our Armed Forces will get the weapons that they need, corruption will be reduced or eliminated and the country will feel secure. This lesson must be learnt from the present crisis.

This article begins with a citation from ‘ Through the Looking Glass’. The Army Chief writes to the Prime Minister that the Indian Army is so badly equipped and so short of ammunition that it cannot fight a war. Normally it would be for Pakistan’s ISI to find out this sorry state, but why should it bother when the Army Chief himself revealed the situation? Then this wretched letter leaks and becomes public property. The one person who risks losing his job is the Director General, Inter-Service Intelligence of Pakistan, who will have no espionage role left when the Army Chief of India is providing all the information. Instead of looking at the seriousness of what is being revealed both the Defence Minister and the Army Chief are busy lamenting the fact that the letter did not remain confidential. The contents of the letter are now secondary. Both Tweedeldum and Tweedledee are fighting over who leaked the letter and the Prime Minister is observing a Buddha like silence. He should have peremptorily dismissed, and I mean dismissed, both the Defence Minister and the Chief of Army Staff for playing stupid games while India burns.

I hope Gen. V.K. Singh’s successor has the good sense to rebuild the confidence of senior officers in their Chief, of the junior officers in their seniors, of the jawans in their officers and in the Army in which they serve and the confidence of the nation itself in the health of the Army. Government on its part must introspect on the changes it must bring about so that the events of the last two years never recur. Let us create the post of Chief of Defence Staff. Let us create a very strong Personnel Board in the Armed Forces which, in each Service, keeps the full record of every rank in the Forces from jawan to General, which record must be immutable. Let us have a Promotion Board which ensures that the entire process of promotion, especially to the senior most ranks, is totally open and transparent and that even those who are left out are convinced that the decision is fair and just. Let us remove the whimsicality of the Chief as the sole criterion for promotion. If government does these things, if it streamlines the process of procurement, it will have done a great service to the nation because our Armed Forces would then become our true shield and buckler against all enemies.