Much Ado About Little

Kanwal Sibal

The outcome of President Zardari’s unplanned private visit has been largely what any objective observer would have anticipated. It could not have broken new ground as it was not preceded by any intensive preparatory diplomacy. The India-Pakistan relationship is neither on the edge of a precipice as it was after the Indian parliament was attacked in 2001, nor blocked as it became after the November 2008 terrorist mayhem in Mumbai.

India and Pakistan have resumed their composite dialogue. An established mechanism for discussing differences now exists, and the state of relations is being reviewed at the highest political level periodically.

Prime Minister has met the top Pakistani leaders several times abroad and in India. Zardari’s visit was therefore needed neither to deblock a stalled dialogue nor give a missing political impetus to toughly negotiated structured discussions already taking place.

In any case, he is hardly in a position to cut through all the vexed issues bedevilling bilateral ties as his own leadership in Pakistan is being contested by powerful lobbies. The visit could not therefore have been but low key in substance.

Progress in normalizing ties between the two countries has been slow because the issues are burdened by the weight of entrenched positions and deep-seated distrust. Pakistan’s complicity with terrorism is now more exposed than ever. Increasing religious radicalism in Pakistan casts a worrying shadow on India’s own internal management of its religious diversity. Almost four and half years have elapsed after the Mumbai terrorist carnage but the Pakistani authorities have side-tracked through legal obfuscations Indian demands to bring the Pakistani perpetrators to justice.

The Kashmir issue continues to distort Pakistan’s attitude towards peace with India as it is linked to the management of the civilian-military relationship within Pakistan as well as the jihadi groups that are now deeply embedded in Pakistani society. Pakistan has now added the emotive water issue to its differences with India in a way that is feeding anti-Indian paranoia in the country.

The Pakistani establishment has developed the mentality of countering India’s complaints with matching ones of their own. The Pakistani mindset has to change before its policies can change. Zardari may have good intentions and on some issues his position may be relatively more forward-looking, but that hardly warranted any excitement over the prospect of his pilgrimage visit to India delivering concrete results that have escaped the negotiators toiling for them within the framework of the “comprehensive” dialogue.

The political calculation behind the invitation extended by President Zardari and earlier by Prime Minister Gilani to Prime Minister Singh to visit Pakistan has to be analysed in this context. The Pakistani leaders know that our Prime Minister is keen to visit Pakistan and sees normalization of relations with Pakistan as the crowning glory of his political career. Vocal lobbies in India supporting such a visit facilitate Pakistan’s task in pushing for it. No persuasive reasons have been offered by this lobby to justify such a visit except vague and pious hopes that such a gesture would yield good results.

The Prime Minister is tempted but is hesitant to commit himself unless he is assured of substantial, solid results as otherwise he will be accused of political failure in dealing with Pakistan with his soft approach. He was right in telling Prime Minister Gilani that he would be glad to visit Pakistan if there was something solid to celebrate. He has conveyed to President Zardari his willingness to visit Pakistan on a mutually convenient date. This is by no means a time-bound commitment as the later Indian briefing talks of “appropriate time” and “substantive preparations”; it leaves the possibility of a visit open but a “convenient date” should depend on delivery by Pakistan on key issues of concern to India.

Pakistan is pressing for Prime Minister’s visit as the implication would be that it has delivered on the terror issue, including the trial of those responsible for Mumbai, to India’s large satisfaction, and that relations between the two countries have been effectively normalised.

The reality, however, is that after four and a half years there is no forward movement on Mumbai and Hafiz Saeed cannot be curbed because he is politically too powerful, and after the announcement of a US bounty on his head has become a hero in Pakistan as some Pakistani commentators say. On Siachen Pakistan is not willing to formally authenticate the Actual Ground Position Line as that would endorse Indian “aggression” and close any room to undo it if circumstances permit. Pakistan will not cease poisoning domestic public opinion against India on the water issue. If after the Prime Minister’s visit all these issues remain on the table as before, with what conviction would we agitate them thereafter? A premature visit by the Prime Minster is a diplomatic trap. Yes, if the inconceivable happens and Pakistan delivers on some key issues, let the Prime Minister go and justifiably celebrate that solid achievement.

At the one-on-one meeting the Prime Minister asked for the umpteenth time that Pakistan prevent terror attacks against india, try the perpetrators of the Mumbai attack and curb Hafiz Saeed, eliciting a non-committal response from Zardari who, in turn, mentioned Kashmir, Sir Creek and Siachen. All this is well worn ground, which might explain the subdued and matter of fact statements by the two leaders after their meeting, with Prime Minister speaking laconically of finding practical and pragmatic solutions to outstanding issues. Even the breakthrough on trade was not played up. There was a clear attempt by both not to hype up the results of the visit.

All said and done, President Zardari’s visit was much ado about little.

Author is Member Advisory Board in Vivekananda International Foundation and Former Foreign Secretary

Little Expected, Little Gained from Zardari Visit

Kanwal Sibal

It was a private visit, but it was unavoidably given an official colour as the Indian prime minister could not have ignored the Pakistani president's presence on Indian soil without creating a misunderstanding.

Observers would have conjectured that India considered the embattled Mr Zardari a spent force incapable of delivering on vital issues whatever his desire for improved relations with India.

The government would have been criticised for missing the opportunity to show India's backing for an elected civilian president at odds with the armed forces who, combined with the judiciary, wanted his ouster.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is, in any case, very keen to make a breakthrough with Pakistan and would have sought this unexpected opportunity to engage with Mr Zardari who was, therefore, invited to Delhi en route to Ajmer for a lunch and a private conversation.

Nothing much was expected from this meeting except a review of various issues and a general exchange of views on further steps needed to make progress.

This is so because India and Pakistan are already engaged in a structured bilateral dialogue covering the whole gamut of bilateral issues whose format and the agenda were agreed after tough negotiations.

One round of this dialogue has already been completed and the second has begun. During this period, the Indian prime minister has met Pakistan's leaders in India and in foreign capitals.

Unhappy History

What India expects from Pakistan is known to the latter; the answers Pakistan gives to India's demands are also known.

If progress in resolving outstanding issues is slow, it is because the issues are overlaid by unhappy history and deep mistrust.

Translating general expressions of friendship and goodwill into practical decisions is very difficult.

India wants satisfaction on the terrorism issue; Pakistan wants "justice" on the Kashmir issue and sees terrorism as a way to force India to yield ground.

This thinking has not been totally discarded even though Pakistan itself has become a prey to the very monster of terrorism it created.

The increasing radicalisation of Pakistan and the impunity with which Hafiz Saeed, the founder of Pakistan-based militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba, operates accounts for this.

Now Pakistan has raised the water issue in highly charged terms even though the only agreement that has worked between India and Pakistan is the Indus Waters Treaty.

In these circumstances, to have expected President Zardari's visit to have provided a breakthrough would have been unrealistic.

President Zardari at the Sufi shrine in Ajmer The visit did not live up to the media hype, says Kanwal Sibal

At about 40 minutes, the one-on-one meeting of the leaders was shorter than expected.

In this amount of time all outstanding bilateral as well as regional issues could not have been discussed in any detail.

Prime Minister Singh appears to have spoken, not for the first time to his Pakistani interlocutors, about the need to bring the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to justice, prevent terror attacks against India from Pakistani soil and curb the activities of Hafiz Saeed.

Mr Zardari seems to have given a non-committal response.

Predictably, the president spoke of Kashmir, Siachen and Sir Creek - three areas where the two countries dispute control.

It was important for both leaders to assure their publics that "core" issues had been flagged. That both agreed to a step-by-step approach to resolve them only indicates the limited potential of this high-level conversation in Delhi to break new ground.

This step-by-step resolution of issues has lasted a few decades already and could well last a long time more now that there are question marks about Pakistan's future stability, the growing Islamisation of sections of its society and the uncertain consequences for itself and the region of its expected over-reach in Afghanistan after the US withdrawal.

Mr Singh expressed his appreciation of the steps taken by Pakistan on the trade front.

More could have been said about this positive development in bilateral ties in the statements by the two leaders and the later briefing on their talks by the Indian side.

Subdued Terms

Why this was not done is not clear. Perhaps Mr Zardari was reluctant because he does not want to be personally associated too much with this initiative which he undoubtedly favours, leaving its positive profiling to his government.

Somewhat surprisingly, the two leaders spoke after their meeting to the press in uncharacteristically subdued terms, with the Indian prime minister speaking laconically of finding practical and pragmatic solutions to the outstanding issues and the Pakistani president being even more bland.

Much has been made in the Indian media about the invitation to Mr Singh to visit Pakistan.

Pakistan is pressing for his visit as that would imply that it has delivered on the terror issue, including the trial of those responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attack, and that relations between the two countries have been effectively normalised.

Mr Singh wants to go but he wants concrete results that would vindicate his policy of engaging Pakistan despite its recalcitrance on the issue of terrorism, an approach that has many critics in the country.

A premature visit by the prime minister could be highly counter-productive for him personally and for the country. Hence his caution.

In response to Mr Zardari's reiteration of an invitation to visit Pakistan "soon", Mr Singh has indicated his readiness to go on a "mutually convenient date", nuanced to an "appropriate time" in the briefing later by the Indian ministry of external affairs with the added caveat of "mutually acceptable dates" and "substantive preparations" beforehand.

All in all, the visit did not live up to the media hype, but it served its purpose of maintaining high-level engagement with Pakistan in the hope that incremental progress could be made in resolving the difficult issues that bedevil the bilateral relationship.

Author is Member Advisory Board in Vivekananda International Foundation and Former Foreign Secretary

Setting up a Central University: Vision, Issues and Debates

Anirban Ganguly

Though the setting up of a Central University is the prerogative of the Union Ministry of Human Resources Development (MHRD) it shall be in the right spirit of adherence to the Constitution and to our federal structure if it is done in consultation with the state in which the university is proposed to be set up by trying to appreciate the special needs and perceptions of the state administration, the elected representatives, leading academics and intellectuals. A unilateral imposition without taking into consideration the actual ground reality or expectation is bound to generate an atmosphere of distrust and bickering and invariably dilute the larger vision and goal of the effort.While it is a more fundamental debate as to why a large number of central universities have to be created without adequate resources, space and manpower and more importantly without a distinct goal for excellence, it would perhaps be in the best interest of the entire project if the selection of a location for the Central University of Bihar (CUB) is best left to the people of the state to deliberate and decide upon. The Bihar Legislature has already adopted unanimous resolutions asking the Centre to establish the CUB at Motihari in East Champaran district and there is a debate going on within Bihar itself on the proposed location of the new university with a group pitching in for Gaya, which was the initial proposal of the MHRD and another voting for Motihari which has been the favourite spot for the Chief Minister, Nitish Kumar. By appearing to be intransigent on its choice of Gaya, the MHRD is only further widening the divide and generating adverse reaction at a time when it can well do without such a furor. In fact our national tendency of parachuting a central institution of higher learning by disregarding the ethos of the people and the ground realities has nearly always prevented such institutions from evolving into centres of academic excellence. It is true that regional aspirations are growing and it is legitimate that the young in the states and in the districts aspire for national institutions that can bring them en par with the youth in the metros but it does not seem to serve the purpose if such initiatives are divorced from the actual needs and possibilities of the region. Therefore passing an act that declares the setting up of 14 central universities all over the country is one thing, but to formulate a unique vision and aim for each one of them needs a different approach altogether.

Historically; the setting up of institutions of higher learning had been a vibrant part of the Indian civilisational experience. The ancient Indian universities of Takshaśilā, Nālandā, Valabhī and Vikramaśilā were some of the leading knowledge-lighthouses of the ancient world and were unique in their growth and in their approach to knowledge and in their method of imparting it. The ancient Indians were adept at creating these institutions which grew in an organic manner over a period of time. The process of this growth seems to have been so steady and so rooted to the ethos and demands of the age that the institutions thrived for centuries providing intellectual direction to the evolution of civilisations and more importantly also served to facilitate – in those days of intimidating distances – interactions between world civilisations. They lived dynamically and grew and only saw decadence and destruction at the hands of invading hordes. It has been rightly pointed out that the centres of higher learning in ancient India ‘were unique in their organisation and scholarship during those distant times when elsewhere in the world very few had thought of organised education at the university level.’ Most of these universities were international as well as inter-provincial in nature and maintained a high standard with well laid down and meticulously conceived stipulations and criteria for admission. In Nālandā, it is well known that, ‘streams of pilgrim-students wended their way in search of knowledge’ from Tibet, Korea and China and in India from the central regions, from distant provinces such as the North-West, ‘Kāñchipura in the South, Purusapura (modern Peshawar) in the North and Samatata in the East.’ The university of Takshaśilā is said to have had such a vibrant and erudite faculty that they ‘could attract hundreds of students from distant parts of the sub-continent, in-spite of the long and dangerous journey which they had to undergo.’ It was then believed that the ‘knowledge of these teachers put together represented everything that was worth knowing in those days’ and the institution developed a great reputation in the field of medicine. History says that ‘the royal physician Jivaka who had cured the king Bimbisara of Magadha and also the great Buddha himself of some painful diseases, had studied medicine’ at Takshaśilā. This hoary tradition of developing seats of higher learning was eventually broken; a long interregnum followed and came to an end when British administrators decided to form universities on the British model in the Indian presidencies. The civilisational memory of past indigenous institutions of higher learning was lost or at best became opaque and the British pattern of the university was upheld as the one to be emulated and replicated countrywide. Such a perception was briefly challenged in the first decade of the last century by a dynamic nationalist group of Indian scholars and opinion-leaders who advocated the need of creating national education institutions modelled on the spirit of past Indian educational institutions. The movement, though short-lived, did generate much debate and saw efforts made at building some such representative institutions. Satish Chandra Mukherjee (1865-1948), Aurobindo Ghose (Sri Aurobindo) (1872-1950), Benoy Kumar Sarkar (1887-1949), Lokmanya Tilak (1856-1920) were some of the pioneers of this movement. The much deeper issue, however, is that post-independence, a wide debate on the need to develop a system of national education, or to evolve models of higher education institutions in tune with the Indian civilisational spirit never took off. Even those models of education developed by some of our leading national figures – the Basic Education, or the Nai Talim model, or the Visva-Bharati model – were not sufficiently explored or experimented with in the early years after independence when it was possible to chart out a wholly new and refreshing direction for Indian education. The various dimensions of education and perceptions of knowledge-imparting within the classical Indian paradigm were not considered and a serious and wide-ranging effort of re-discovering some unique facets of the Indian educational past was never undertaken in right earnest allowing – with some modifications – the continuation, replication and perpetuation of the British presidency model of universities. And in our present zeal for creating such institutions we seem to have ignored again our civilisational memory of this past experience and appear to have omitted deriving inspiration from the collective spirit that inspired such landmark creations of the ancient world.

Without entering into the politics of the current debate on setting up the CUB one can very well point out that the reasons for setting it up in Gaya, as proffered by the Union HRD minister does not appear to be very original, innovative or justified. One of the reasons cited is that Gaya has better infrastructure, is well connected and is a ‘historical and cultural centre of international importance’ while Motihari is 200 km from the state capital Patna, and does not have proper support infrastructure and has hardly more than half a dozen good hotels.’ Connectivity, support infrastructure, quality of life in the surrounding and faculty quality does not seem to have been taken into serious consideration when deciding to reconstruct the Nalanda ‘International’ University in the same state. The area then was designated and the university was allowed to take shape and it was thought that infrastructure and the surrounding area would grow with the growth of the university. Why is this precedence being overlooked by the MHRD in the current debate is difficult to explain. The backwardness of an area cannot in real earnest be the major deciding factor for setting up an institution of higher learning. By depriving the area of such an institution one shall simply relegate it to the realm of perpetual underdevelopment and isolation. Universities in ancient India never functioned in isolation; they were an organic part of the surrounding and did initiate great efforts to develop these areas through a number of public service initiatives. The surrounding localities, villages and towns were never allowed to stagnate while the university achieved academic excellence and fame. Similarly, today central universities that come up in remote locations in the states could try and develop such a vision of community growth and development, such an approach is in tune with the past Indian educational experience. A number of leading Indian educationists had given thought to this aspect of the functioning of a university. In fact, there were some formidable educationists who had undertaken such an approach in the early years and had called for its serious consideration. In his paper on ‘The Quest of Academic Values in the University’ veteran philosopher of history, scholar of culture and civilisation and former Vice Chancellor of the Lucknow University Professor Radhakamal Mukherjee (1889-1968) who had himself actively participated in the national education movement brought notice to this vital aspect. It would be worthwhile, for the sake of broadening the discussion, to cite Mukherjee’s views in some detail. Recalling the initiatives he had taken on trying to integrate the university with the surrounding community, Mukherjee wrote:

During my term of Vice-Chancellorship I set up the University Council of Social Work for a wide minded programme of adult education, Community Centre, Children’s play movement, sramdan for the common people. Constructive social work undertaken by the student community in the slums and villages can not only harness its best energies and aspirations in constructive channels but also abridge the present cleavage between the classes and the masses that thwarts social progress in so many directions. A full-fledged Department of Extramural and Welfare under the Dean of Students’ Welfare is a necessary adjunct of a modern University that must recognise its obligation to the region, the neighbourhood and the common people around it…

There has been no concerted effort at developing such a broader goal of social responsibility. Just because Motihari does not have more than half a dozen good hotels does not mean that no new development initiative can come up there! A central university could very well be the starting point of greater development in the area. A central university in Motihari can work wonders for the development and growth of the whole of northern Bihar and may even go a long way in arresting the rising tide of naxalism in the entire belt. If remoteness is indeed a criteria what explains the setting up of an IIT in then remote Kharagpur in 1950. The historic Hijli detention camp which detained some of our most valiant young freedom fighters was converted into housing the IIT which rose to become one of the premier institutions of technical education in the country. In fact, like Hijli Motihari and East Champaran too are intrinsically linked to our freedom struggle and to the memory of Gandhi launching his Satyagraha. In this context one can also recall that when the Pondicherry Central University was set up in 1985 in the outskirts of Pondicherry no major infrastructure support, except for the town itself, existed in the area with the nearest airport, Chennai, a good 150 km away. Today after two odd decades of the University’s functioning the area has grown significantly and has seen major infrastructure development. A number of central universities founded in the states – in Tamil Nadu, Odisha for example – are located in remote areas. Their failure, for the moment, to attract the requisite number of faculties for effective functioning – the Central University of Odisha at Koraput has been able to fill ten out the sanctioned strength of 48 faculty members, and the Central University of Tamil Nadu located at Thiruvarur has been able to recruit six of a sanctioned strength of 24 – reflects on the MHRD’s attitude towards these newly spawned institutions and not on their location or other local factors. Adequate publicity, attractive incentives and guarantees for research and education growth or even special recruitment drives with special provisions bypassing some of the more tedious bureaucratic procedures could have attracted a greater number of academics – especially the young – to these institutions. The MHRD seems to have failed to effectively undertake such a drive. The Central University of Karnataka, for example, located at Kadaganchi, 30 km from Gulbarga and 250 km from Hyderabad the nearest airport, has succeeded in attracting a good number of faculty members demonstrating that academic scope and teaching opportunities evolved by those laying the foundation of the new institution can and actually does determine the responses to these far-flung institutions. In a country like ours, with massive disparities at all levels especially at the educational, it is only with such initiatives of setting up universities at remote locations that one can really hope to bring about greater educational parity. Therefore remoteness of location cannot, in all fairness, be the principal criteria for rejecting the proposal.

The MHRD appointed Site Selection Committee comprising experts have also stated that Motihari falls in the seismic zone and a 1000 acres fertile land would go non-productive if the CUB comes up in the area. Shedding the blinkers, one could think of turning these factors into some of the most unique features of the proposed university – make it a new age model earth-quake resistance edifice with a special focus on agricultural and high-yield paddy research. In any case the people of the area are for the initiative and do not appear to be resisting any move at developing the university. It is a skewed view of things which says that seismically active zones be relegated to the national periphery when it comes to implementing development schemes. Under that logic, large tracts of northern India, including some of the leading corporate hubs, which fall within a high seismic zone, should perhaps be abandoned. What is urgently required is the revamping of our national understanding and vision of a university with the entire nomenclature and our understanding of it requiring massive revision and rethinking. Moreover, from an international outreach point of view, a university in Motihari, which is close to the border with Nepal, - with Birgunj, the gateway to Nepal being roughly 55 km away – can very well be developed with an international outlook and invite students from the neighbouring country, grow into a pre-eminent knowledge hub in the area and work towards developing that segment of the border region important for both the countries. Famed author of the Animal Farm, George Orwell (1903-1950), linked by birth to Motihari, has in any case already given the place an international profile! Gaya should have had long back a global education institution in keeping with its international spirit and its spiritual message, that such an institution has not been thought of in the past six decades reflects our attitude towards the preservation of our spiritual-cultural heritage and the dissemination of their perennial message.

Instead of making it an opportunity for jointly working out a grand educational vision between the centre and the state the effort at developing the CUB is fast degenerating into an avoidable blame game and a false show of strength. An effort at evolving a consensus by setting up a joint committee comprising of experts from the state and the centre and with the centre being sensitive to the needs and demands of the state can at least start making things move. In fact a high-level national committee can be formed with leading educationists, intellectuals and education administrators to examine in great detail the entire exercise and vision of setting up central universities in the country. Such periodic scrutiny shall avoid ad-hocism in this very vital sector of our national life and perhaps aid in developing a broad educational vision for higher learning in India in consonance with our civilisational legacy of education and learning.

Meanwhile the CUB must come up and come up with a grand vision and programme fulfilling the aspirations of the people of that region!

Sources

• Apte D.G., Universities in Ancient India, Baroda: Maharaja Sayaji Rao University, [date not stated]

• Mazumder Nogendra Nath, A History of Education in Ancient India, Calcutta: Macmillan & Co., 1916.

• Mukherjee Radhakamal, India: the Dawn of a New Era, New Delhi: Radha Publications, 1997.

• Sankalia H.D., The University of Nalanda, Madras: B.G.Paul & Co., 1934.

• Abdul Qadir, ‘CUB issue: CM’s stand puts Sibal in a bind’, The Times of India, April 2, 2012.

• Abdul Qadir, ‘CM remains firm on Central University of Bihar location’, The Times of India, 31 March, 2012.

• Santosh Singh, ‘This Round to Sibal, but Nitish not done yet’, The Indian Express, 30 March, 2012.

• ‘Agitation for CUB gathers momentum as PM supports Gaya, not Motihari’,

The Bihar Times, 19 March, 2012.

• ‘Nitish Kumar Urges Kapil Sibal to shed bias against

Motihari’, The Times of India, March 12, 2012.

• Basanta Kumar Mohanty, ‘Varsity in Limbo over Strife’, The Telegraph, Calcutta, 3 March, 2012.

• ‘Himanshi Dhawan, ‘Centre-state site tussle to deprive Bihar of central University’, The Times of India, 3 March, 2012.

• ‘Bihar Houses adopt resolution on Central University’, The Economic Times, March 1, 2012.

News Reports/Analysis

Author is Research Associate in Vivekananda International Foundation

President Zardari’s India Visit: A Precursor To PM’S PAK Visit

Satish Chandra

President Zardari’s upcoming visit to India on April 8^th shares some commonalities with Zia’s visit in February 1987 and Gilani’s visit in March 2011. In all three cases the visits were arranged at short notice and their ostensible purpose--- a pilgrimage to Ajmer in the case of Zardari and to watch a cricket match in the case of the other two----was different from the real objective notably to touch base with the Indian Prime Minister. Furthermore, as happened during the visits of the earlier two Pakistani dignitaries the Indian PM will host a lunch for Zardari, and like in those visits little by way of concrete agreements is likely to emerge.

While it was only with much reluctance that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi agreed to receive Zia, Dr Manmohan Singh went out of his way to host the Gilani visit and now the Zardari visit and may, in fact, even have engineered them. This difference in approach is reflective of the qualitative differences between Rajiv Gandhi--- the realist, steadfast in not making any concessions to an unreliable Pakistan which could compromise the national interest---and Dr Manmohan Singh---the woolly headed idealist ready to make any sacrifice to woo Pakistan quite unmindful of its inimical mindset vis a vis India.

Though it is unlikely that any agreements will be signed during the Zardari visit one may expect that discussions would focus on a variety of India-Pakistan issues. One would expect that terrorism would be at the top of the agenda particularly in the context of the bounty of $10 million recently announced by the US on Hafiz Saeed. Other important issues likely to be discussed are Kashmir, on which the revived back channel must have provided inputs, Siachen, Sir Creek, visa liberalization, trade, water etc as well as the strategy to be adopted for follow on talks.

The importance of Zardari’s visit to India lies not in whether or not anything tangible emerges therefrom, in terms of resolving differences, but in building up an atmosphere of warmth quite divorced from reality which would facilitate Dr Manmohan Singh’s visit to Pakistan in the coming few months. It may be recalled that an invitation for the same was extended by Hina Rabbani Khar during her official visit to India in July 2011. This was reiterated by Gilani during the SAARC Summit in the Maldives in November 2011 and in his meeting with Dr Manmohan Singh in Seoul in March 2012. President Zardari will no doubt repeat it in New Delhi and perhaps even reach some understandings on the areas on which it may be feasible to sign agreements when Dr Manmohan Singh visits Pakistan so as to be able to project the same as a grand success.

It is regrettable that Government has been complicit in helping create the illusion of increasing warmth in India-Pakistan relations by its acts of omission and commission. Firstly by failing to impose any penalties on Pakistan for its involvement in the Mumbai attacks of November 26^th 2008 as well as subsequent terrorist attacks like those in 2011 in Mumbai and Delhi it has virtually brushed this issue under the carpet. No wonder, therefore, that those involved in the Mumbai attacks have not been punished and Pakistan continues to export to terror to India with impunity. India’s tolerance for Pakistan’s recalcitrance on this count has enabled the two countries to maintain the façade of a business as usual relationship. Secondly, contrary to commitments made by Government including by PM himself in Parliament in July 2009 that Pakistan had “to act and act effectively on terrorism” for any comprehensive dialogue with it the same has been undertaken without the latter having brought to book the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks or having shut down the infrastructure terror. Thirdly, India last year went so far as to withdraw its opposition to a EU concessional trade package for Pakistan even though this action has hurt our own textile exports. It has been argued that Pakistan reciprocated our generosity by moving some way towards an MFN regime for India. It needs to be noted, however, that this Pakistani move, which has been hailed with so much fanfare by our leaders, is no favour to us as we had accorded MFN treatment to Pakistan way back in the mid 90’s. Moreover, by not according MFN treatment to India, Pakistan was only depriving itself of access to competitively priced Indian goods and having to pay much more for similar imports from elsewhere. In brief, by more or less taking terrorism out of the equation, by resuming the composite dialogue process, by frequent meetings at the head of state and head of government level albeit on the sidelines of other regional and international meetings, and by hailing Pakistan’s belated moves towards according India MFN treatment as suggestive of a change of heart towards India, a wholly erroneous impression is being sought to be created that we are on the cusp of an improved India-Pakistan relationship which is at complete variance with the fact that Pakistan has given India no satisfaction on terrorism and through 2011 pumped in as much as Rs16 billions of fake Indian currency into the country in support of terrorism.

In this backdrop, one needs to be concerned about the nature of agreements that Dr Manmohan Singh is likely to arrive at when he goes to Pakistan given our proclivity to readily make concessions and Pakistan’s aversion to make the slightest compromise. While a settlement on Kashmir is not on the cards as any Indian leader would be most unwise to commit himself in this matter without a prior consensus within the Indian political firmament, agreement on issues of lesser import like visas, Sir Creek and Siachen are a possibility. On the latter two it is hoped that in our anxiety to reach out to Pakistan there is no deviation from our existing negotiating positions as they are minimalist in nature. On Sir Creek one should maintain the stance so far taken by us that the boundary should be in the mid channel of the Creek as per international practice and not succumb to a settlement on the basis of Pakistan’s claim that the boundary should be on the Eastern side of the Creek. Should we do so not only would there be an obvious loss of some territory in the Creek area but also serious negative implications in determining our maritime boundary and exclusive economic zone. Similarly, on Siachen, we need to hold firm to our position that any demilitarization of the area would be contingent on a formal recognition in the text of the agreement, and not in any side-letter or annex, of the existing disposition of the forces of the two sides and the positions that they would be redeployed to, accompanied by a map and a clear assertion that no forward movement in the area would be undertaken by the forces of the two sides. Pakistan’s reluctance to plot the positions of the forces of the two sides in the main agreement places in doubt its bona fides.

Author is Distinguished Fellow in Vivekananda International Foundation

Asif Zardari’s Visit: India Should Avoid The Old Mistakes

Sushant Sareen

Quite clearly, between two countries which share an adversarial relationship, there is nothing that can ever be called a ‘personal’ visit by one head of state to the other country. And between India and Pakistan, this is quite simply impossible because in this era of 24x7 TV, a media circus will inevitably surround such a visit giving it saturation coverage and analysing every turn of the head, every wink, nudge, shrug, nod and what have you. At the political level, such a ‘personal’ or even a ‘non-official’ visit (for instance a cricket match) serves as a convenient excuse for the leaderships of the two countries to touch base and use the occasion to confabulate with each other. Thus it is that the moment it became known that Pakistan's President Asif Zardari wanted to go on a pilgrimage to Ajmer, the Indian leadership not only extended all due protocol to him but also graciously invited the Pakistani president to stop over in New Delhi en route to Ajmer for a meeting followed by a lunch with the Indian Prime Minister.

The official line in both Islamabad and New Delhi is that Mr Zardari’s visit is purely personal and the Indian PM is hosting a lunch for him only to extend courtesy to a visiting head of state. There is really nothing on the ground to suggest that the officials are burning the midnight oil to prepare for some kind of intense dialogue. And yet, hardly anyone in the two countries is taking the official line on face value. Notwithstanding denials by officials who are going blue in the face trying to dispel any notion that the meeting between the Pakistani President and Indian PM has been elaborately choreographed, most analysts are convinced that the pilgrimage is actually a smokescreen for holding direct high level talks between Mr Zardari and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

Asides the fact that political leaders of India and Pakistan are notorious for entering into a dialogue without adequate preparations – Agra 2001 is a prime example – the speculation that the meeting between Zardari and Manmohan Singh will give some sort of a push to the dialogue process between the two countries is also fuelled by the recent breakthrough in trade relations with Pakistan moving to a negative list of trade items pending the grant of MFN status to India. This was a long standing demand of India and is being seen (quite wrongly, it must be said) as a concession made by Pakistan. What is more, ever since the obnoxious Shah Mehmood Qureshi was removed as foreign minister and was replaced by Hina Rabbani Khar, Pakistan has been making all the right noises towards India, sending signals that it is genuinely interested in normalising relations with its eastern neighbour. Although the Indian permanent establishment is rather sceptical about genuineness of Pakistan's professed intentions for good relations, at the political level the Indian leadership appears to be falling over itself in trying to reach out to Pakistan and clasp the extended hand. Not surprisingly then, observers are waiting to see what, if anything, comes out of the meeting between Zardari and Manmohan Singh. And it is precisely this expectation, rather anticipation, that India needs to guard against.

To some extent, there is recognition in India that Zardari probably doesn't have the political capital to effect any major breakthrough with India and therefore it would be unrealistic to expect him to deliver on anything substantial on issues of critical importance to India. Many in India would also argue that any assurances that Zardari gives to India on the issue of terrorism cannot be taken seriously because he just doesn't have the power to fulfil these assurances. After all, the terror machine in Pakistan is controlled by the military establishment of that country and given the frailty of the political system, and his own precarious position, it is unlikely that Zardari can or will take on the powerful Pakistan army in order to live up to any commitment he makes to India. As a result, no one should be surprised if the issue of terrorism is raised in only a very pro forma manner by the Indian side.

Paradoxically, it is this palpable weakness of successive Pakistani leaders that serves as a trump card for them in their dealings with India. Chances are that Zardari will play up on both his sincere desire for good relations with India as well as his weak position within his own country to try and extract some major concession from his Indian interlocutors, without of course conceding anything in return. In other words, what Zardari will do is that when pressed on the issue of terrorism, he will explain his difficulties and constraints in addressing this issue immediately. He will in all likelihood play the ‘Mullah-Military card’. His pitch will be: “help me by giving me something that I can take back with me to my country and marginalise the military-mullah alliance on the back foot; without such a grand gesture from India the mullahs and the military will destabilise my government, depose me and take over power and then India will have to contend with a radical or at least a very hard line government in Pakistan, dominated, if not run, by the military-mullah alliance”. He will wave the trade deal as a sign of his commitment and in turn seek concessions on what some ignorant analysts, commentators and other sundry peaceniks call ‘low hanging fruit’, namely Sir Creek and Siachen, on which there is a false propaganda that a deal is all set to be inked if only the Indian leadership summons the political courage and displays the political will to do so. This is exactly the tactic used by successive Pakistani leaders with their Indian counterparts and this has always been successful in extracting concessions from India – Ayub Khan used this after the 1965 war, Bhutto after 1971, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif when they were at the helm of affairs.

Having fallen for the same beguiling Pakistani logic time and time again, India now needs to put a stop to this Pakistani version of ‘Apres moi le deluge’ and no better occasion to do this than Zardari’s forthcoming visit. While India should wish Zardari well – he is probably the most visionary leader Pakistan has got in a long, long time and his policies, domestic and external, hold the potential for making Pakistan a ‘normal’ state – his survival is neither India’s responsibility nor is it India’s primary interest vis-a-vis Pakistan, and most certainly not if this has to be achieved at the cost of surrendering India’s vital security interests or compromising on India’s sovereignty.

The big problem however is the obsessive quest of the current Indian dispensation to settle all the problems with Pakistan even if it means sacrificing India’s interests in the process. No one should therefore be surprised if India once again makes the same old mistake of trying to rescue a Pakistani leader by making concessions and ending up with the worst of both worlds – not only giving the Pakistanis what they wanted at India’s cost, but also failing to save the person for saving whom these concessions were made in the first place.

Author is Senior Fellow in Vivekananda International Foundation