Showing posts with label international security. Show all posts
Showing posts with label international security. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 30, 2012

A Good Product To Sell


Kanwal Sibal
Member Advisory Board, VIF

The relationship between democracy and international security is frequently debated in international circles. It is also said that more prosperity at the international level is conducive for global security. How true are these propositions, in fact?

There is no accepted definition of democracy. The world’s most liberal countries call themselves democracies and so do the world’s most authoritarian regimes. Who then lays down authoritatively universally applicable norms of democracy?

Any country’s political system, in reality, cannot be divorced from its history, tradition and culture. That is why even Western democracies are not identical. Many non-Western countries believe their systems respond better to the needs of their societies. The issue is how to balance community interests and individualism. Who will decide on a definitive answer to this old debate?

There is a crusading spirit behind the Western advocacy of democracy. Its yardsticks for democracy are prescriptive. Whereas in the West democratic systems took long decades to evolve, non-Western countries are expected to move quickly towards the Western version of democracy. In their case, the process is sought to be accelerated through external political interference and pressure, and in some cases by military means.

The selective application by the West of the weapon of democracy by targeting political adversaries and sparing allies and friends makes the international debate on democracy and international security even more controversial.

The West’s hubris about its democratic vocation is such that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, history had ended for some with the definitive triumph of democracy. This has not happened. Early Russian experience of democracy has, on the contrary, been unsatisfactory. The coloured revolutions in former Soviet space held up great democratic promise, but that promise too has faded.
The “Arab Spring” hardly describes accurately the phenomenon of change that has affected this area. The ouster of dictators by the street was too quickly labelled as a grassroots democracy movement. The sceptics saw the Islamists stepping into the political breach created by social media activists. In Tunisia, the government with Islamist tendencies has come to power. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists have won a majority in parliament. The public in these countries has preferred to express its political aspirations not through secular parties but Islamic ones with no ideological roots in democracy, In Libya, the uprising against the dictator was tribal in nature with strong Islamic affiliations and not a movement for democracy. In Syria, too, the opposition to the Assad regime has less to do with democracy than a sectarian effort to create a situation that would invite foreign intervention on the Libyan pattern.

To some extent, the Egyptian example, whatever the complexion it has taken now, encourages the exercise of street power to overthrow entrenched dictators or regimes divorced from the aspirations of the people. Some nervousness about the fallout of the Arab Spring has been felt by the Chinese government. In Russia, too, street demonstrations against the fairness of the last parliamentary elections and later against Putin’s decision to stand again for election seemed to have been partially inspired by the Arab example. But the force of this example has been lost because its end result has been regressive in many ways. The limits of the so-called Arab Spring to threaten authoritarian regimes across the world are starkly exposed by the fact that it is the leading authoritarian Gulf states that are today the strongest backers of this phenomenon.

As regards international security, we use the term constantly as if its meaning is clear. It is not. No global security architecture exists as yet; nor does any mechanism to provide equal security to all nations. Some countries possess nuclear weapons or highly advanced conventional forces. The vast majority possesses neither. Whereas the regional powers have a smaller circle of security interests, the big powers see their security interests extending far beyond their immediate neighbourhood They conflate their national security interests with international security.

In this situation, who is responsible for international security? The United Nations Security Council? For the developing countries, the UNSC is not sufficiently representative as it no longer reflects the shifts in global power since 1945. Is it Nato with its out-of-area operations? Is it the defence alliances that exist in West Asia and the Asia Pacific? Did military action taken against Iraq or Libya, and potentially contemplated against Syria and Iran, have “international security” as a shared international objective? Was the intervention in Afghanistan to oust the Taliban for assuring such security? And if so, is the self-imposed deadline for withdrawal by 2014 by cutting a deal with the Taliban for “international security”?

Some would argue that the tendency to intervene in the internal affairs of countries, to not respect the sovereignty of States, to use human rights and democracy issues for allegedly geo-political reasons, to promote controversial doctrines such as the right to protect do not necessarily enhance international security, rather they create tensions and a sense of insecurity in many parts of the world. Power is even now so unequally distributed within the international system that the dominant West has the freedom to conceptualize and apply these new approaches to others.

The view that democracies do not fight with each other carries the implication that if democracy spreads across the globe the world will become peaceful. No doubt the trans-Atlantic space occupied by mature Western democracies is peaceful. But if the world’s foremost democracies do not fight each other they are quite prone to fight others. The Korean and Vietnam wars, the Falklands war, the Nato action against Yugoslavia, the wars against Iraq, the Nato action against Libya, the Afghanistan war — all involve Western democracies. Iran is being threatened with military action by them and Syria is in their cross-hairs, irrespective of the terrible human costs that follow all such interventions. The argument that such wars prevent dictators from committing even greater atrocities on their own populations may be defensible up to a point, but the geo-political calculations behind such regime change policies are evident. It would be naïve to believe that powerful countries are moved only by altruistic reasons.

The prosperity argument also does not bear scrutiny. The Cold War was not motivated by prosperity issues on either side. China’s claims to the South China sea, its aggressive posture on Taiwan, and its differences with India and Japan have nothing to do with difference in prosperity levels. Neither do India-Pakistan differences. Iran’s nuclear challenge does not stem from economic deprivation. The solution to Russia-West issues or Russia’s relations with its immediate neighbours do not lie in increased prosperity in these countries.

The West has a good product to sell in terms of its mature version of democracy. The problem is with its aggressive political salesmanship, to the point of relentlessly vaunting the qualities of its product and even thrusting it forcibly on others. The way India sees it, the case for democracy is strong and self-evident, but it has not been won as it is overlaid with geo-political calculations and aggressive political structuring at the international level without regard to human costs.

Wednesday, May 23, 2012

Daft of Hillary to Push Us on Iran



Kanwal Sibal
Member Advisory Board, VIF
India-US relations have neither burgeoned as much as the enthusiasts may have wanted nor withered as much as the skeptics may have anticipated. The relationship is neither in an impasse nor is it set to surge ahead dramatically.

The welcome improvement in India-US ties does not automatically mean a convergence of interests on thorny issues.

On Iran, for example, our differences are real. The US is pressuring India to scuttle its relationship with Iran, which India is resisting.

The inconsistency of the US position on Iran and Pakistan in relation to India is glaring. This weakens the US case on Iran in India’s eyes.

The US wants India to disengage itself from Iran which is not India’s adversary but engage Pakistan which is one.

It wants, moreover, to retain the freedom to disregard India’s concerns while maintaining a level of relationship with Pakistan that it feels its national interest requires. At the same time, it wants to constrain India’s choices vis a vis Iran irrespective of the requirements of India’s national interest.

India has interests in Iran that go beyond the US-Iran relationship, just as the US has interests in Pakistan that go beyond the India-Pakistan relationship.

What is different in the two cases is that while India is doing nothing to boost Iran’s capacity to directly threaten US security, US policies bolster Pakistan’s capacity to directly threaten our security.

The US wants India to recognize the frightening danger of Iran’s nuclear conduct and its involvement in international terrorism and therefore join it to squeeze Iran politically and financially. We are being asked to sacrifice our national interest for the sake of the larger interest of the international community as seen by the US and its allies.

For India, Pakistan’s nuclear conduct with China’s support and its long standing use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy is far more of a problem. Yet, while recognizing the reality of Pakistan’s doings, the US and its allies do not seek to squeeze Pakistan politically and financially.

The US threatens to use military means to prevent Iran from going nuclear, but it continues to give military assistance to Pakistan even when, according to its own assessments, Pakistan is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal and is blocking negotiations on the Fissile Missile Cut-off Treaty at Geneva in order to amass more fissile material as a riposte to the India-US nuclear deal.

It is in this background that Hillary Clinton’s heavy handed diplomacy on the Iranian question during her India visit earlier this month should be considered.

She thought she would convince our public that Iran should be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons as its leadership intended to use them to wipe Israel off the map. Why Iran should commit national suicide by such recklessness was not explained.
She made far too much of Iran’s involvement in the terrorist attack in New Delhi against an Israeli embassy member to persuade us of Iran’s unspeakable terrorist affiliations when the US has been long equivocal about the terrorist attacks India has suffered at Pakistan’s hands for over two decades leading to the carnage at Mumbai.

India cannot see Iran as a bigger terrorist threat to international security than Pakistan.
Her open pressure on India to reduce oil supplies from Iran was not wise either. The US is not unaware of India’s energy compulsions and other valid reasons why it should maintain a viable relationship with Iran.

If placating Congressional opinion is a factor driving the US to put pressure on countries like India, the Indian government has also to take cognizance of parliamentary opinion which is against succumbing to US pressure on Iran.

Hillary Clinton was also ill-advised to publicly commend India for already reducing its oil purchases from Iran. This suggested that India was meeting the US demand, despite its protestations otherwise. Knowing the political sensitivity of the issue, why give ammunition to the opposition to attack the government?

This deliberate raising of the salience of the Iran issue to India-US ties and making it a test case of sorts for the strategic relationship is low-yield diplomacy in the long run as pressure breeds wariness.

Why Hillary Clinton felt the need to visit India just before the scheduled strategic dialogue between her and Foreign Minister Krishna next month in Washington is not clear.

It is one thing if the intention was to make some positive announcement on India-US relations on Indian soil to capture maximum attention. But if it was to mobilize support on Iran, FDI in retail or canvas for US nuclear suppliers, then the timing and the purpose can be questioned.

On Iran, the Prime Minister rightly reminded her that with the global economy in crisis, oil prices rising and India needing an additional 10 million tons, we could not afford to reduce oil supplies from Iran.

Foreign Minister Krishna acknowledged in his joint press conference with Clinton that Indian imports from Iran had in fact declined for commercial and technical reasons. The Petroleum Ministry has since declared officially that oil imports from Iran would be 15.5 MTs in 2012-13 as against 18.5 MTs in 2010-11 and 17.44 MTs in 2011-12.

Has India acted under US pressure or has it been forced to reduce imports because of payment and shipping insurance problems, as well as the reluctance of private sector companies and banks to risk losing access to the US financial sector because of the draconian US sanctions on Iran?

In either case, India’s legitimate strategic needs have had to yield to US’s dubious strategic calculus. This underlines the present limits of the strategic partnership between the two countries.