India’s New Defence Procurement Procedure: Will it end scams and promote Indigenisation?

Radhakrishna Rao, 

Visiting Fellow, VIF

Scams and scandals surrounding some of the high ticket defence acquisition programmes have not only besmirched the fair image of India but also severely dented the defence preparedness of the country with serious consequence for its long term security.

Indeed, the very fact that the well laid down rules and regulations governing the import of defence hardware were flagrantly violated in the acquisition of 12 VVIP AW 101 helicopters from the Anglo-Italian enterprise Augusta Westland has come as a rude shock to the country. Defence Minister A K Antony recently informed the Lok Sabha (lower house of the Indian Parliament) that the Indian Air Force(IAF) flouted the norms while holding trials of AW 101 helicopter. Going specific, Antony pointed out that “the IAF is responsible for agreeing to hold the trials of VVIP helicopters abroad at locations specified by the vendors.” And flouting all the norms and guidelines involved in the field evaluation trials of imported defence hardware, the trials of Augusta Westland AW 101 chopper were carried out in United Kingdom(UK).

Similarly, the trials of its competitor, Sikorsky S-92 helicopter were conducted in USA.

And when the bribery scandal involving the allegation of the payment of Rs.3,600-million kickback to secure the Rs.36,000-million chopper deal surfaced, questions like how could a helicopter which was supposed to take off with load from an altitude of 45,00-metres with low air pressure was allowed to be tested in the UK ( which incidentally did not have the kind of elevation in the first place) came to the fore. . What is more, an island nation like UK does not offer climatic extremes as found in India—from the freezing cold Siachen base camp in Himalayan heights to the searing hot Jaisalmer located amidst the sprawling Thar desert in the plains of Rajasthan where the chopper is supposed to ferry the VVIP passengers. It stands to reason that a helicopter meant for use in India should be flight evaluated under varying environmental and climatic conditions of the country. Indeed going by the norms of defence acquisition, trials are to be held in the same place where the platform is to be put to use. How then this golden rule was bent and twisted, no one is sure as yet. It is high time that effective and bold steps are initiated to put an end to such a “shocking impropriety” in the defence deals involving foreign vendors.

One more question that remains unanswered is why it was decided to buy 12 helicopters instead of the originally envisaged eight? By all means, the action for buying 12 helicopters remains far from justified. For all the VVIPs in the country are unlikely to fly at about the same time in these helicopters. Clearly and apparently, the alleged involvement of one of the former IAF chiefs in this scandal could have demoralising effect on the defence forces of the country.

Perturbed over the bribery allegations in defence hardware import, India’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) has proposed radical changes in the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP). It is claimed that the DPP-2013 goes beyond the earlier DPPs in so far as eliminating the behind the scene “murky machinations” of brokers and middlemen is concerned. Perhaps the most significant among the changes suggested in DPP-2013 by the Defence Acquisition Council(DAC), the apex decision making body of the Ministry of Defence(MOD) headed by Antony, is providing the Indian defence industry the first right of refusal to take up a defence project. As such, the DPP-2013 would make it mandatory to explore indigenous options for military hardware and going in for imports only if the domestic players throw their hands up on the timely supplies of quality products. This, change, it is said, would help reduce import by boosting the indigenous production of defence hardware. However, the moot question is whether Indian defence industry has a capability level good enough for taking up some of the challenging defence projects. Perhaps with some hand holding by the Defence Ministry, Indian industry would be in a position to meet the high profile requirements of the Indian armed forces on time.

On another front, the DPP-2013 seeks to create a level playing field for Indian private companies which not long back used to be denied equal opportunity when compared with the state owned enterprises. For long, the Indian Defence Ministry had favoured the public sector enterprises much to the disadvantage of the Indian private players. Fortunately, this mind-set will no more dominate India’s defence production scenario. For instance, the maintenance, repair and overhaul of military equipment has been opened to private players, ending the monopoly enjoyed by the defence Public Sector Units and Ordnance Factory Board(OFB).”The only way forward for the country is the rapid indigenisation of defence production with both the public and private sectors playing pivotal roles in this endeavour. We will make all efforts to create genuine playing field for India’s manufacturing industry vis a vis the global players,” said Antony.

Indeed, at long last, the Defence Ministry has started looking at the Indian industrial capability in a holistic manner by suggesting private-public participation for high ticket defence contracts.

Further, the DPP-2013 also favours the growing participation of Indian industry in defence production either directly or through a joint venture with foreign partners. In the ultimate analysis, the objective of this new defence procurement procedure is to “infuse greater efficiency in the procurement process and strengthen the defence manufacturing base in the country”. As part of the plan to boost home grown defence production capability, the 41 units under India’s Ordnance Factory Board(OFB) are being upgraded and modernized with an investment of Rs.150,000-million.According to an evaluation by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute(SIPRI), OFB was the world’s 46th largest arms manufacturer in 2010.

Indeed, in the aftermath of Augusta Westland chopper acquisition scandal, Antony, known for his clean image and uncompromising personal integrity, has been repeatedly stressing the point that the imports will be the last option and indigenization of fighting equipment and defence systems is the only answer to do away with scandals involved in overseas defence purchase. According to SIPRI, in terms of the import of defence hardware, India has in the last decade overtaken China to emerge as the largest arms importing country. Rightly, Antony has strongly advocated that India should reverse the trend of 70% defence imports in favour of domestic sources and bring down imports to 30%. As it is, Antony had recently informed the Indian Parliament that “Between April 2012 and Feb.2013, the country’s provisional expenditure on defence import was Rs.251,260-million which is the highest in the last three decades.”

With a view to end impropriety and malpractices involved in the defence purchase, with immediate effect, all decisions that require bypassing the standard procedures will have to be approved by DAC. Further, it has been decided that specifications for any tender will have to be frozen at the “acceptance of necessity” (AON) level. These changes incorporated in DPP-2013 are expected to expedite the acquisition process and increase transparency in all their manifestations, says Antony.

Against this backdrop, the recent initiative by the state owned Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to develop an advanced military howitzer by involving Indian industries in both the private and public sectors augurs well for boosting the indigenous defence production base. As it is , DRDO has been actively pursuing the development of 155-mm,52 calibre Advance Towed Artillery Gun System(ATAGS) at its Pune based Armament Research and Development Establishment(ARDE).Enhanced fire power at longer ranges, higher accuracy and improved survivability are some of the conspicuous features of this new battlefield system.

Significantly, after the scandal surrounding the import of Bofors gun in 1980s created a big political storm in the country, no new artillery system was acquired with serious consequences for the combat readiness of the Indian army. However, the hope for the Indian army is that state owned OFB has decided to manufacture the Bofors guns indigenously at its Jabalpur facility. As it is, sometime back OFB was able to get hold of the blueprint of the Bofors guns it had acquired from the Swedish arms manufacture. There is no denying the fact that it is the fire power of Bofors guns that saved the day for the Indian army during the 1999 Kargil skirmish. ”It took 15 long years for the Indian Government to recover from the shock of Bofors scandal. The adverse fall out of the scam are the loss of credibility of the top leadership of the services among the troops and the public; ban on defaulting company that is likely to affect major projects, thereby delaying modernisation and further slowdown in decision making by bureaucrats which is the worst factor,” says Major General Mrinal Suman, an expert on Indian defence issues.

Of course, Antony is fully well aware that in this age of globalization, “zero import” is out of question. Stating that maximum fighting equipment should be acquired from indigenous sources, Antony noted that India will have to give a second look at its defence production base and procurement policy with a view “speed up indigenisation on time”. In Antony’s own words, “we have to further tighten our mechanism. Whenever allegations are made, we have to go to the root and find the truth and punish the guilty. We cannot waste a single penny of Indian taxpayers’ money for greedy players”.

With a view to help the domestic industry take up the challenge of meeting the requirements of Indian defence forces on time and with adherence to the highest quality standards, DAC has approved the release of a public version of its 15 years perspective document outlining the “Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap”(TPCR). As envisaged now, the TPCR will provide useful guidance to the Indian defence industry for boosting its infrastructure capability and enhancing its research and development base. Meanwhile, in a development that could help end the long monopoly of imported Tetra trucks—whose acquisition earned notoriety for impropriety from the word go—a consortium of Indian companies has emerged as the lowest bidder in the first in a series of Indian army tenders to procure specialized vehicles.

Defence Procurement: Would You Do Business With India?

Dr M N Buch 

(Visiting Fellow, VIF)

Ever since we became independent we seem to be lurching from one crisis to another in any matter which concerns a deal or a transaction in which we make purchases or where decisions are taken regarding business. One harks back to the scandal attributed to the purchase of jeeps when Krishna Menon was High Commissioner in London. The most celebrated scandal in this behalf was the purchase of 155 mm guns from Bofors, a Swedish arms manufacturer renowned internationally for the quality of the product produced by the company. The Bofors anti aircraft gun of 40 mm, the Bofors quick firing gun version mounted on small naval vessels were the mainstays of most of the Allied Forces and even today the Bofors anti aircraft guns are widely used. The 155 mm gun is of such a superb quality that it could virtually dominate the Kargil battlefields and was a major factor in our being able to dislodge the Pakistanis. However, the purchase agreement was befouled by allegations of bribes being given by the suppliers through an Italian agent, in which the name of Rajiv Gandhi was also mentioned by V.P. Singh. The amount of bribe was Rs. 64 crores. Rajiv Gandhi denied any wrongdoing, V.P. Singh never produced any evidence which could have clinched the matter, CBI utterly failed to unearth irrefutable evidence and Quattrochi, the Italian agent, could never be brought to book. What resulted was that we virtually black-listed Bofors and every effort to purchase more guns to strengthen the artillery has been aborted by allegations of corruption, leading to blacklisting of almost all the manufacturers of a gun of this calibre and quality. The tragedy is that Bofors, despite all the mud slung at them, completed its part of the transfer of technology by making available very detailed drawings of the gun. These lay gathering dust in the Defence Ministry, despite the fact that the Ordnance Factory Board kept telling government that it could manufacture the gun on the basis of these drawings. Manufacture could have started at least eight years ago and by now the indigenous gun could have been in service with the Army. One allegation of corruption, which never led to any viable action against the persons named as the culprits, has left the Indian Army in the unenviable position of not having added a single worthwhile gun in over twenty years.

The acquisition by purchase or indigenous manufacture of warships upto the destroyer class by the Navy has had a relatively better record than weapon acquisition by the Army or the Air Force, but in terms of under water capacity the Navy has not advanced at all, whether it be the French Scorpene submarine or the German HDW. The Navy has been able to make very little progress because we just do not take any decisions in order to avoid complaints. Despite this there are serious allegations of financial irregularities. By now we should have had at least fifty submarines, including at least four or five nuclear submarines, but all we have managed is one nuclear submarine on lease from Russia and one indigenously manufactured nuclear submarine whose sea trials have yet to be conducted. Our lone aircraft carrier is now obsolete and its replacement, INS Vikramaditya (formerly Admiral Gorshkov), has had a 250 percent increase in cost and will not be delivered till the end of 2013, five years behind schedule. The keel of the indigenous aircraft has been laid but it is unlikely to be in service till 2017. Meanwhile China has acquired and put into service one aircraft carrier bought from Ukraine and is in the process of manufacturing one more carrier. Without a strong submarine fleet equipped to fire nuclear tipped missiles we cannot really boast of having a sea-land-air based nuclear deterrent in place. Those who are responsible for decision making must realise that in an environment in which our two chief opponents, Pakistan and China, have nuclear weapons and some delivery systems to target Indian cities, our delaying of decisions of purchasing or manufacturing necessary defence equipment has left the nation precariously vulnerable.

The cause celebre is a relatively minor acquisition of twelve helicopters for carriage of VVIPs. The proposal has been mooted by the Air Force about fifteen years ago because the MI8 helicopters on VIP duty are now totally obsolete, difficult to keep airborne and really not in a position to safely carry dignitaries such as the President and the Prime Minister. It was initially mandated that the new VIP helicopters would have an operational ceiling of 18,000 feet and the specifications were drawn up accordingly. Only one helicopter, the Eurocopter 200, could attain this height and this narrowed down the purchase to a single vendor. The then National Security Adviser, Brajesh Mishra, pointed out the unacceptability of a single vendor. The SPG, which guards the Prime Minister, also objected to the cabin size and said that it would not be in a position to protect the VIP unless the cabin specifications were changed. Therefore, the NSA recommended that the matter be re-examined. The file was shunted back and forth for at least five more years. Ultimately the Air Force recommended new specifications, lowering the ceiling to 15,000 feet and also stating the size and the layout of the main cabin. Now four firms give their tenders. Had the specifications not been changed the order was not large enough for any firm to change the aircraft design and also restructure the production line as this would be uneconomical. Therefore, there was no alternative but to change the specifications. It is now alleged that bribes were paid to the cousins of the Chief of Air Staff and, therefore, there was the suspicion that the specifications were altered to suit one company only, Finmeccanica, which manufacturers the Agusta Westland helicopter. The amount of bribe is stated to be in excess of Rs. 360 crores.

The above allegation is based on the statement said to have been made by two officials of Finmeccanica who were arrested in Italy on a complaint alleging corruption in the Indian transaction. No one has said that the process whereby the Agusta Westland helicopter was finally selected was in any way wrong. It is not alleged that technically and financially the best bid was not that of Finmeccanica and Russian and American (Sikorski) bids were wrongly rejected. The adherence to prescribed norms of the Agusta Westland helicopter has not been questioned, nor has its performance. It has also not been alleged that had the bribe not been paid the helicopter would be cheaper to that extent. Had this been stated then it would have meant that we were being overcharged in order to pay a bribe.

What has been the Indian reaction? The media, print and electronic, have virtually gone berserk in sniffing out and unearthing wrongdoing in the instant case. Television anchors wave papers on the screen and state that these give proof positive of wrongdoing in the helicopter deal. From this these anchors deduce that other deals not connected with this particular purchase also are suspect, that bribes have been given and that either because the same agent figured in more than one case, or because the supplying company was the same, every defence deal is based on corruption. What is written in those papers is never shown, nor is it categorically stated that they constitute the totality of documentation, nor is their any real attempt to prove that the so-called papers, which form part of a larger whole, are being read in context. Selective display of documents or use of words can be very dangerous. One recalls the story of the Giant Panda who walked into a restaurant in New York finished his meal, took out a revolver, shot dead the restaurant owner and left without paying for the food. When arrested he said, “Have you not read what we Pandas do? A Panda eats, shoots, and leaves”. Delete the commas and this would read “A Panda eats shoots and leaves”. Our Indian scribes, unfortunately, believe in retaining the commas in the above sentence, which not only changes the meaning of the context but also leads to very dangerous conclusions. There is no need to be judgemental about an issue because some television anchor waves papers in the air, pontificates holily about the evidence of wrongdoing that he has and then tries to browbeat people into saying ‘mea culpa’. If there is wrongdoing let it be investigated and the accused brought to trial. That trial will be in a court of law, not in a court of journalism.

To return to the helicopter purchase case, the need for new helicopters is amply proven and requires no clarification or elaboration. Changing of specifications, which would be universal and not confined to benefiting a particular manufacturer, is not only permitted but is normal. If the tender procedure is transparent, if bids are duly received and are examined impartially, if the product is what we need, if the price is acceptable, then the deal is complete and must be given effect to. If there are allegations that despite precautions bribes have been given, let the complaint be investigated and if a prima facie case is made out, then the accused persons must be brought to trial. However, the acquisition should be completed because it does not make sense to foreclose on a deal which is beneficial to India.

The Indian Air Force has been trying desperately to find a multi-role combat aircraft. The process of specifying norms, performance parameters, etc., has been long drawn out and the Air Force has virtually tested every alternative almost to destruction. Optimising the performance index of the aircraft, its lift and delivery capacity in the matter of weapons, the transfer of technology and the possibility of future total indigenisation, the maintenance schedule and cost, as also the operational life of the aircraft, the Air Force found the Dassault Rafale aircraft to be best suited to our needs. The American F16 and F18, The Anglo German Eurofighter and the Russian MIG-35 did not come up to the mark and were rejected. The technical and financial bids were taken into consideration when making a final selection. Over a year has passed and we have still not signed the final agreement. Meanwhile our television channels have tried to find a connection between a person who sued the Dassault Corporation over some deal for Mirage 2000 aircraft dating back to about eight to ten year. That gentleman sued the Dassault Corporation because he said he had not been paid an amount which had been promised to him by way of commission. My information is that he lost the case. Now an effort is being made to try and show that he is involved in the Rafale deal also so that even this acquisition is aborted. Are only television channels honest in this country and every one else is rotten to the core?

The process by which we arrive at conclusions is bizarre. There is a perception which we can ignore only at peril that Indian officialdom is corrupt. Let me narrate an incident dating back to 1968, when I was Director, Tribal and Harijan Welfare in Madhya Pradesh. One day my minister summoned me to the Secretariat, about ten kilometers from my office. When I entered his room I found a gentleman sitting there. The minister said that he had some problem and could I sort it out? I took the gentleman to my office where I would attend his case. I had not brought my driver and was driving the official vehicle myself. When we reached the Hamidia Hospital gate the gentleman asked me to stop. I asked him why and he said that we should have a cup of tea and some snacks before proceeding further. I told him that I would give him a cup of tea in my office but I found him still a little uneasy. Suddenly it stuck me what the man must be thinking. I was a sahib because the minister had offered me a chair. At the same time I was driving my own car and there was no attendant with me. This meant that I could not be the bada sahib who naturally would have travelled in style with paraphernalia. Therefore, unless the applicant entertained me I would not give him a proper hearing. This is what people felt about the bureaucracy even in 1968, when actually the bureaucracy was by and large honest and efficient. Today the position is that every single person is convinced that government and its minions are corrupt, despite the fact that there is a substantial number of people who are honest. The tragedy is that this perception of dishonesty is what our media is exploiting to blow things out of proportion.

Let us take the helicopter purchase case. If the aircraft is good let us buy it, but if bribes have been given let us deduct that amount from the payment to be made to Finmeccanica and also impose an equivalent fine. The aircraft acquisition, however, should go on and government out of panic should not negate the entire effort by cancelling the order. Let us have a similar attitude towards all defence requirements, which must be finalised unless there is incontrovertible proof of corruption. Waving sheets of paper before a television audience does not constitute such proof.

General N.C. Vij, former Chief of Army Staff, once told me that the process of weapon acquisition is so tortuous in India that by the time the weapon is received its half life is over. The following time frame for weapon purchase is suggested:-

1. The Service Headquarters submits a proposal to government for acquisition of a certain weapon system, together with full justification, the cost estimate and tentative specification parameters. The process of preparing this proposal should not exceed one year.
2. Examination of the proposal by government and a decision on the acquisition in principle, with a provisional budgetary allocation. The period for this should not exceed six months.
3. Detailed specifications to be finalised by the Service Headquarters, acquisition of prototypes and the testing to destruction under different physical and weather conditions. This process should be completed within two years
4. Stage two technical and administrative estimates and proposals to be submitted by the Service Headquarters to government. The process of decision making in this behalf must be completed within six months.
5. Preparation of tender documents, issue of notice inviting tenders, receipt of tenders and the preparation of a comparative chart by the Service Headquarters, assisted by the Defence Ministry, together with short-listing of providers. This process should not take more six months.
6. Examination of the scrutinised bids and the comparative statement, the short-listed providers of the systems and a final decision on acceptance of the bid by government. This should not take more than six months.
7. Finalisation of whatever documentation is needed for the contract and issue of the work order. This should not exceed six months.

If the above scheduled is followed, then within six years from the proposal having been mooted the inflow of equipment concerned should begin and the whole process should be completed within seven to eight years from start to finish. If this happens our acquisition process would be within the given time frame, there would be no delays and because the process is continuous, the need or the possibility of giving bribes would be substantially reduced. Then people would be encouraged do business with India.

Let us take this whole issue very seriously because if the present trend continues we might as well disarm and disband the armed forces, deploy village kotwals or chowkidars armed with lathis to guard us and practise how to behave like slaves before the new conquerors who would inevitably make us captive. To obviate such an eventuality we need a government which is firm in its resolve and which refuses to be swayed merely because some complaints have been made, we need a machinery for quick investigation of complaints, but we also need a media which is responsible in its behaviour, exercises restraint where it is necessary in our national interest and which at least in defence matters puts the interests of the nation before its own hunger for attention.

How Should The Executive Government Function?

Dr. M.N. Buch

Visiting Fellow, VIF

The Constitution of India in Part V for the Union and Part VI for the States divides the functions of the State between separate, equal and interconnected wings, the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary. 

Article 53 of the Constitution and Article 154 of the Constitution vest the executive power of the Union and the States in the President and Governors respectively. As per Articles 76 and 163 the executive power is to be exercised on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. In effect, therefore, the Council of Ministers exercises executive power. Under Articles 73 and 162 the executive power of the Union extends to all matters with which Parliament has power to make laws and, for the States, to the extent of power of the Legislature to make laws. The executive power, therefore, is to be exercised at the judicious discretion of the President or Governor and it is only the Legislature which by law can circumscribe the executive power. Otherwise neither the Judiciary nor the Comptroller and Auditor General, nor the Legislature acting in a watchdog capacity can limit this executive power. To put it another way, that which the law does not either limit or prohibit is permissible in the exercise of executive power. As will be explained later, this is an extremely important point because many of the problems of governance in India have arisen out of an incomplete or wrong understanding of what executive power means and the manner in which such power can be exercised.

The conduct of business of the Government of India is governed by rules framed under Article 77 and in the case of the States by rules framed under Article 166. These rules divide the business of government between different ministries or departments and assign to each department its area of jurisdiction and competence. The rules also prescribe how a minister will deal with a case and how the Secretary and his officers will advise the minister or implement laws, policy or lawful orders of the minister. The rules also categorically state and it is the personal responsibility of the Secretary concerned to ensure compliance with the Business Rules. Where an individual department cannot take a decision or where more than one department is involved in decision making, the case may be referred to the Prime Minister or Chief Minister in coordination or it may be submitted to the Council of Ministers for orders. Within its own area of competence and subject to laws, rules or normal practices of the department, the department is competent to take an executive decision. If the decision is legal and not contrary to rules, it cannot normally be called into question, unless there is positive evidence of wrong doing. The fact that a particular decision may opt for a more costly option does not by itself make the decision bad in law or even executively ill-advised. 

Let us take the case of spectrum allocation. At the time when mobile telephony began to make its presence felt in India, this country had about the worst telecommunication system in the world. It is only the introduction of digital telecommunications which transformed the telephony picture. It is in this context that government decided to throw open the doors of the telecommunication industry in order to attract more participants. Present revenue was not the concern but rather the swift development of a sector which provided vital infrastructure for communications. The policy followed was that spectrum would be allotted on a first come first served basis. Because in implementation there were severe flaws, including major complaints about corruption, the case came under audit scrutiny and the Comptroller and Auditor General went public in stating that by not auctioning spectrum government incurred a loss of Rs. 1,72,000 crores. If auction had been done the exchequer should have benefitted to this extent. The word ‘if’’ is very dangerous here because if wishes were horses pigs would fly. Therefore, speculation on what might have been is quite unacceptable. The problem with the 2G spectrum case was that in implementation the then minister committed a number of unacceptable mistakes, including going ahead with allocation contrary to the stand taken by the Ministry of Finance. In fact the Secretary of the Ministry should have refused to issue any orders in this case until the Council of Ministers took a decision, but the Minister was in a hurry. When the bubble burst government panicked and heads were allowed to roll. This is a case where if the executive power had been correctly exercised there would be no scam, largely because it is still not clear whether there actually was a scam or not. What should the government have done? There should have been a clear-cut decision on policy about allocation of spectrum. This could be by auction, it could be by allowing every serious contender to participate in the development of telephony, it could even be a decision to allocate a spectrum on a nominal fee, but with annual fee being periodically adjusted according to expansion of the network. Eventually this would come to a huge amount and while giving India even greater mobile telephony facilities, it would have served the consumer by keeping call rates low but, because of the size of the market, giving government enormous revenues. Nothing of the sort happened and instead we had arbitrariness of the minister on the one side, dithering of government on the other side and government generally behaving like a naughty school boy caught with his hand in the jam jar. The quite uncalled for statement of CAG that a loss of Rs. 1,72,000 crores had been suffered only added fuel to the fire, despite the fact that the calculated loss is based on an argument somewhat on the following lines, “ If A had been done instead of B, then the revenue would have been XXX and because it was not done and because the revenue did not reach this figure, therefore, XXX is the loss”. This whole argument falls to the ground because it is based on pure speculation. Why has government been hesitant in stating this in clear terms? Why has government not taken the stand that it took a certain executive decision about spectrum allocation and that it stands by this decision and strongly refutes any suggestion or wrongdoing? 

There is another area which is of some concern and that is equipment of the armed forces adequately to fulfill their task of defending India against all comers. Defence deals right from the time of Krishna Menon as High Commissioner in London have been subjected to complaints, counter complaints and hesitation on the part of government to take a final decision. It was not always so because our defence agreements with the Soviet Union, for guns, armoured vehicles, fighter and transport aircraft, fighting ships and every conceivable piece of military equipment seem to have been completed without undue delay. Again, all these agreements were government to government, which made decision making relatively easy, but they were not necessarily without some consideration passing at individual levels. It is in our weapons deals with western bloc countries that we seem to have had trouble because here it is the private contractors or suppliers who provide the equipment. When the Bofors gun was purchased there was loud and persistent complaints about corruption in the deal, the echoes of which still reverberate. The gun is first rate and it has been the mainstay of our artillery arm. However, because the then Prime Minister stood accused of wrongdoing, every government now hesitates to take a decision about weapons purchase. Scorpene and HDW submarine deals with France and Germany seem to be on a roller-coaster ride and the purchase and production have been inordinately delayed. The purchase of T-90 tanks seems to be hanging fire. The Army has not acquired any artillery gun since the purchase of Bofors 155mm guns. The specialised ammunition needed by our Armoured Corps is not being acquired because the firm supplying is has been blacklisted. Even Rafale fighter purchase seems to be slowing down because someone has complained. The net result is that the armed forces just do not have the equipment they require to fight a war successfully on at least two fronts, Pakistan and China. What use is our claiming to prevent corruption if as a result thereof India is left defenceless? 

This issue is stressed because equipping the armed forces is an executive decision and lies entirely within the realm of the executive government. Here the process of decision making would involve the armed forces in that they would project their requirements and convince government of the need for a particular weapon system. This calls for a constant dialogue between the Service concerned and the Ministry of Defence, with a clear understanding on both sides that the matter has to be finalised within a given finite period. Once government is convinced of the requirement of that particular Service, the sanction for purchase must be given and the budget placed at the disposal of the Service Chief concerned. The entire process of testing of equipment before starting the process of purchase, floating tenders, evaluating tenders both technically and financially, arriving at the best option, making the final selection and placing an order should all be done on the advice of a committee set up by the Service Chief and including a representative of finance and one or more expert scientists who could give technical and scientific advice. The role of the executive government would be to stand by the decision taken and to defend it at all levels, including in Parliament. Unless there is proven misconduct, with the proof being of the highest order, government should not hesitate in approving the weapon acquisition concerned. That is how a government must behave. Provided that the process of acquisition is according to set procedures, rules, principles of prudence and is transparent one need not be afraid of any ex post facto criticism.

There are many areas in which the executive government is subjected to directions by the courts on how an executive decision should be taken or how and in what areas legislation must be enacted. One such area is police reforms. It is legitimate for the Supreme Court to direct that the police, which is the investigating arm of government in the matter of criminal law, should be insulated from every kind of pressure or influence when investigating a case so that the cause of justice is furthered by impartial investigation. For this purpose certainly the Supreme Court can direct government to take necessary executive measures or to provide legal safeguards whereby the police performs its functions without fear or favour. What the Supreme Court cannot direct is that the law governing the police must be worded in a particular way, the police organisation should be of a particular kind and that the personnel policy relating to the police must be as suggested by the Supreme Court. How to insulate the police from undue pressure, what personnel policy to follow to protect individual policemen who do their duty, without reducing the superintendence, direction and control role of the executive government are all issues on which it is the executive which will take its own decision and prepare the draft legislation for the consideration of the Legislature. It is the Legislature which will decide how the Bill in its final form as approved by the Legislature is enacted into law. In other words, micro-management of the police is beyond the jurisdiction of a court and fully within the domain of the executive. This does not mean that one wants a police force which is servile but one does want government to retain the authority to restrain the police if it exceeds its legal brief or begins to operate in a manner which is not in the public interest. The executive decision regarding this and the draft of the legislation to be placed before the Legislature fall within the executive domain.

One very sensitive area is corruption. Can the executive, which itself is corrupt, be trusted to ensure a corruption free society? Here the campaign against corruption is to be divided into three parts. The first relates to legislation and it is the job of the executive to suggest what laws are needed and for the Legislature to enact laws which would facilitate the fight against corruption. The second part relates to the role of the executive, which has to implement anti-corruption laws. The executive must set up an efficient agency which investigates cases of corruption without fear or favour and then takes suitable steps to prosecute offenders. Like the police this agency must be insulated from pressure, partly through legislative cover and partly through executive decisions to give autonomy to the agency. This is a very important executive function. The third part would be prosecution and trial in which the Judiciary will have to pronounce on guilt or innocence and to determine the quantum of punishment in cases where conviction takes place. It is for the executive to facilitate the Judiciary in arriving at just and fair decisions, which also means that the executive must not come in the way of trials, either by refusing or delaying sanction of prosecution or by asking the investigating agency to go slow in the presentation of its case before a court. However, there is a further role for the executive in curbing corruption, which is a review of all rules, regulations and procedures which bring about a citizen-government interface, with a view to reduce this interface to a minimum, simplifying procedures and drastically reducing or eliminating delays in decision making. This has to be linked with a firm decision to bring about one administrative reform. There should be clear-cut assignment of functions and duties to government officials at all levels, with interlocking accountability whereby the superior of the government official concerned is held fully accountable for the action or inaction of his subordinate. This would dramatically improve supervision of subordinates because the superior knows that a default of the subordinate will be visited on him also. Simplification of rules and procedures, avoidance of delay and inter-locking accountability would bring about a major improvement in the functioning of government and make the executive government function more efficiently.

At the highest level of the Prime Minister or a Chief Minister the executive government has to make its policy on any issue completely clear, specific and unambiguous. If it is a policy relating to land allotment, let it be made public. If it is a policy relating to purchases, let the policy be made public. If it is a policy relating to government’s approach to specific problems let the policy be made public. However, once a decision is taken the executive government must stand by it and not get swayed or deviated because someone does not like the policy or has complaints against its implementation.

The present position is that the executive government has abdicated its functions through sheer indecision. Thus if a person raises a claim against government the officer empowered to take a decision just pushes the file back and forth, forcing the claimant into expensive and long drawn out litigation. This does not necessarily stop corruption, but it does provide a shield to an officer because in our system indecision is not penalised. At the level of policy government avoids all hard decisions under the excuse of the compulsions of coalition. In areas of national security, economic development, education policy, even fighting corruption, if there is no consensus there is no decision, but only a dangerous drift. This is a negation of government. Into this vacuum other players step in -- Naxalites, terrorists, agitators to name just a few. Or the judiciary takes on an executive role. This is why through public interest litigation our High Courts and Supreme Court increasingly venture into areas where no court in other democracies would dare to tread. Or else the Legislature refuses to allow even such vital Bills as 13 Bills of the Human Resources Development Ministry to be introduced, much less enacted. Such a grid lock can only be broken by an assertive executive that functions as an executive should, firmly, decisively and with confidence. India needs such an executive – fast.