Afghanistan: Political Compromise, Security Challenge and Economic Constraint

Lt General R K Sawhney, Distinguished Fellow, VIF

Sushant Sareen, Senior Fellow, VIF

After a keenly contested Presidential election, the result of which came under a serious cloud when Dr Ashraf Ghani Ahmedzai surprised the odds-on favourite Dr Abdullah Abdullah by crossing the half-way mark, it looked as though the all-important political transition in Afghanistan was unravelling, and with it the future of that country. But Afghan pragmatism, some hectic shuttle diplomacy by the Americans and, most of all, the sagacity of the two leading contenders, ensured a far-reaching political compromise that paved the way for a smooth political transition from one elected government to another, a first in Afghan history. Within a day of the new dispensation assuming office, the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the US and NATO was signed, thereby allowing foreign forces to stay on in Afghanistan and provide the much needed security support to the Afghan forces for at least another two years, and maybe even beyond that until 2024. The US, its allies and other countries, including India, have also reiterated their commitment to providing critical financial and military support to the new Afghan government.

Political Reforms

Despite all the positive developments of the last couple of weeks, the situation in Afghanistan remains fragile. The Ashraf-Abdullah combine literally has its work cut out for it, not just to make sure that the political system continues on the rails but also deliver a modicum of governance to the people. Both these leaders will need to put the bitterness generated by the election behind them in order to be able to work together. An even more important, if also difficult, task before them will be to get their followers and supporters to get over their rivalries, turf wars and distrust of each other in the interest of Afghanistan. Although both Dr Ghani and Dr Abdullah have shown enormous statesmanship to agree on a power-sharing deal, unless this spirit of accommodation and adjustment can filter down to their supporters, the entire political arrangement could collapse. In other words, while the two main protagonists understand that they cannot keep sniping at each other because this will tantamount to playing in the hands of the enemy (read Taliban and their main backers, Pakistan), their followers might not be as evolved and savvy as them.

Some amount of political tussle is inevitable, even desirable, to forge a democratic political culture in a country where democracy is still in its infancy. As long as this political tug-of-war doesn’t degenerate into armed conflict between contending players and doesn’t affect the Afghan state’s ability to protect itself, it shouldn’t be a problem. At the same time, even though a power sharing deal has been put in place, it needs to be formalised. Necessary reforms will need to be made in the constitution over the next couple of years to make the post of Chief Executive Officer into a de jure Prime Minister. Alongside, other administrative and political reforms will need to be made in order to devolve power to the provinces and end the over-centralisation that is currently the norm. Most of all, solid electoral reforms will have to be put in place so that the sort of controversy that erupted in the last election is avoided. Quite frankly, the last election didn’t really inspire much confidence in the election process and Afghanistan simply cannot afford to go through another controversial election –both the 2009 and 2014 elections were tainted – if democracy has to have any chance of survival.Even with the best of intentions, fixing the political and administrative system will take some doing. But if anyone is up to this task, it is the cerebral President Ashraf Ghani and the astute CEO, Dr Abdullah.

The Economic Bind

Politics is however just one leg of the tripod on which the future of Afghanistan rests. The other two are security and economy, which are going to be a lot more difficult to fix than the political system. To be sure, the economy and security situation are inextricably linked to each other. With security, there can be no economy; conversely, if the economy doesn’t pick up or tanks, security will become impossible to manage. Ultimately, Afghanistan will have to stand on its own and cannot depend on an endless and limitless flow of funds from foreign donors. For the foreseeable future, of course Afghanistan will continue to depend on other countries to meet its expenses. As things stand, the Afghan state is unviable and in no position to meet its expenses from its own resources. To make matters worse, the uncertain security situation has resulted in massive capital flight. There is no worthwhile domestic or foreign investment in the country. Massive investment projects are stalled because the investors are in a wait and watch mode. Add to this the end of the expat economy – steady drying up of the money that was flowing into the local economy because of the presence of thousands of foreign diplomats, soldiers, aid workers and what have you – and things don’t look very bright.

Even the Americans have come to realise that they have built an economically unsustainable and unviable state. The big challenge for President Ashraf Ghani will be to rebuild a sustainable and affordable Afghan state. Once again, he is perhaps the best man for the job at hand because of his experience and knowledge of dealing with the economy. Needless to say, the international community will need to financially support and sustain Afghanistan through the process of economic transition. But this process cannot be endless, and even Dr Ghani knows this. What is more, the donors will have to be convinced that their money is being put to the best use and not enriching the top dogs in the government. While some donors like India could fund vital infrastructure and development projects like roads, dams, power networks etc., these will help only to the extent that it will help give a push to the Afghan economy. This assistance won’t solve the problem of how the Afghan state will meet its expenses, for which it needs hard cash.

The Afghan state will have to rejig its revenue model to levy taxes, easier said than done in a country where this concept is alien. As things stand, most of the revenue of the Afghan government comes from customs duties. Other revenue streams will have to be introduced for the Afghan state to stand on its own. Equally onerous will be the task of reducing the role and influence of the narco-economy in the national economy. Some officials have claimed that Afghanistan is on the verge of becoming a narco-state. This needs to be reversed because not only does this have serious implications for the ability of the state to tackle the insurgency (which is being fuelled by the narco-trade) but also it has the potential of undermining the state itself and reducing it into a non-entity by using its money and fire-power.

There are two potential areas which can generate substantial (but perhaps not sufficient) resources: mining natural resources and transit routes. According to some studies, Afghanistan is sitting on a mountain of precious metals worth over $ 1 Trillion. The harnessing of these two potential sources of revenue will depend in large measure on the security situation. There is also a possibility that if indeed the estimates of natural resources are correct, then Afghanistan could just as easily become a target of hostile powers wanting to control these resources. Even otherwise, unless the Afghan state is able to get its act together, these natural resources could turn into a ‘resource curse’ for Afghanistan, depriving it of any chance of emerging as a stable and secure country.

One thing should however be clear: if the funds stop flowing in from donor countries, the Afghan state could easily collapse like a house of cards. One of the abiding lessons of history in this part of the world is that when a state becomes incapable of paying its soldiers and its staff, it collapses. But here’s the thing: if the current dispensation folds up because it cannot pay its bills, the guys – both local and foreign (once again read Pakistan) wanting to pull it down have even less of a chance in being able to manage the Afghan economy. In fact, for precisely this reason, it would actually make a lot more sense for the Pakistanis and the Taliban to let the international community and the current Afghan dispensation do the heavy lifting on the economy and make it sustainable. But if such good sense had prevailed, Afghanistan wouldn’t ever be in the dire straits that it has been in over the last four decades.

The Security Challenge

In a somewhat perverse sense, the Afghans should be thankful to the savage Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria, for convincing the world of the peril of abandoning Afghanistan in haste either because of the treasure being expended in this country or because of the fatigue of war. The alarming rise of the IS and the barbaric brutalism (quite similar to that of the Taliban) that it has come to represent has played a big role in convincing the US and its allies that a hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan could see a Taliban comeback. As far as the Afghans are concerned, the signing of the BSA is very welcome because it is seen as an emphatic statement by the US-led international community of its commitment to Afghanistan.

The presence of the foreign forces is however something of a double-edged sword. One way of looking at this issue is that it will continue to serve as a red rag for the Taliban who will then make this an excuse to continue with their destructive and diabolical actions inside Afghanistan. Conversely, it can just as well be argued that even if every single foreign solider was to leave Afghanistan tomorrow, the Taliban will still continue with their destructive and diabolical actions. But a more serious argument against the foreign forces is that as long as they remain in Afghanistan, it will keep the Americans and their allies hostage to Pakistan. With the Iranian route closed to the allies, and the Northern Distribution Network in trouble after the problems with Russia, Pakistan remains the only ground route available to supply the troops in Afghanistan. This gives Pakistan a leverage that it will continue to use against the efforts to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. This means that the very conditions that ensured the failure of the international forces to pacify and stabilise Afghanistan will continue to operate as long as these forces remain present in Afghanistan. It can therefore be argued that it might be better to pull out all foreign forces and then provide assistance to Afghanistan in a way that it is able to combat the covert and overt offensive from Pakistan. What is more, free of the Pakistani stranglehold, the Americans and their allies will be in a better position to turn the screws on the Pakistanis, which in turn might help the Afghans more than the mere presence of foreign troops in their country.

At another level, however,the presence of foreign troops instils confidence in the Afghan regime, which now has the power of the international community at its back. The support that the foreign forces will provide the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) in terms of training, capacity building, intelligence support etc. will be extremely useful in combating the Taliban. Equally important is the fact that it will serve as a big obstacle in the path of the Pakistanis who will not be able to interfere and intervene as openly in Afghan affairs on the side of the Taliban as they might have done if the foreign forces were no longer present in Afghanistan. Of course, this doesn’t mean that the Pakistanis will not play the double-game they have been playing ever since 9/11 and the US intervention in Afghanistan. But the Pakistanis will also not be able to play the sort of role they played in the late 1990’s when their officers and soldiers directed and participated in the Taliban offensive. Quite asides the fact that the Pakistan of 2014 is just not the Pakistan of 1994 (when the Taliban first erupted on the scene), even the Afghanistan of 2014 is not the Afghanistan of that time when it was internationally isolated and even ignored. Back in the 1990s, it was easy for rest of the world to turn its back on Afghanistan because as far as the US was concerned there was no international Jihadist movement but only “a few over-excited Islamists”. 9/11 was a rude awakening for the Americans and rest of the West about the threat that these “over-excited Islamists” pose to global peace and security. Unless the US and other Western countries want another 9/11 type attack on their soil, they can no longer afford to ignore, much less abandon, countries like Afghanistan which are in the vanguard in the fight against radical Islam and international jihad.

Just as the international situation and awareness about what Afghanistan is facing is no longer what it was in the 1990s, the Afghanistan of today is also very different from the Afghanistan of 1990s. Since 2001, Afghanistan has undergone a huge transformation, the credit for which is due to the US and its allies who, despite all the mistakes they have made in the security and economic domain, have done a remarkable job in resurrecting Afghanistan after rescuing it from the medieval and barbaric Taliban and their overlords in Pakistan. What also goes in favour of Afghanistan is the fact that unlike Iraq which was divided first in the minds of its people, the Afghans continue to cherish their Afghan identity. Despite ethnic and other differences, Afghans don’t want to see their country Balkanised. In other words, while many Iraqis would be happy to carve out their own independent states, hardly any significant Afghan group wants out of Afghanistan. This sense of Afghan nationalism is an asset that needs to be nurtured and made into a force in the fight against Pakistan-sponsored Taliban.

But fighting the Taliban will require more than just the positives outlined above. The ANSF remains a work-in-progress. It is turning out into a fine fighting force, but will take some more time before it is able to reach a level of preparedness that equips it handle the full spectrum of threats that Afghanistan faces. Unfortunately, until now, the Americans and their allies have built up the Afghan army as a sort of armed constabulary or a para-military force. As long as the foreign forces were present in big numbers, it could be argued that the Afghans didn’t need anything more than an armed constabulary as an army. But with the withdrawal of bulk of foreign forces looming large and with the ANA taking over security function and even conducting operations on its own, that old argument no longer holds any value. If anything, keep the ANA under-equipped is turning to be counter-productive because it is undermining its ability to tackle the threats that a foreign-sponsored insurgency poses.

What this means is that like any other regular armed force, the ANA must have air power at its command. This doesn’t mean equipping it with fourth generation fighters and AWACS. But at the very least, a couple of dozen second generation fighters which can provide ground support to troops are necessary. Alongside, helicopters for troop infusion, medical evacuation and also providing close air support will act as huge force multipliers for the ANA. At the ground level, the ANA has to be equipped with artillery (both light and heavy) which is suitable for mountain warfare. Armour is another area where the ANA is found desperately lacking. All this equipment and a service network needs to be created if the ANA is to be able to perform on the ground. Along with firepower and equipment, there are two other areas in which the West needs to build ANA capacity. The first is logistics. This will become extremely critical if the ANA is to be equipped to meeting the full spectrum of threats, including conventional attacks from Pakistan side. The other area is intelligence. While the Afghan intelligence organisation, National Security Directorate, has been quite effective and efficient, there remain serious gaps in its capabilities to provide the sort of intelligence that will assist military operations. This is a critical area in which the Americans can build Afghan capacities to take on the enemy.

Conclusion

It is easy, even tempting, to indulge in doomsday scenarios about Afghanistan. But much of the pessimism that is afflicting analysts is somewhat unwarranted. If anything, the way the Afghan politicians have managed to paper over their differences and bury the bitterness caused by the controversy over the elections, coupled with the grit and determination that the ANA has displayed in fighting the Taliban actually creates a sense of cautious optimism about Afghanistan’s future. This is not to say everything is well in Afghanistan. Far from it, Afghanistan continues to confront monumental problems that will require a lot of doing to overcome. But there is a reasonable chance that the Afghans might be able to tackle many of these problems, of course with the economic assistance and military aid from their friends and allies.

Regardless of the amount of money and military assistance that is given to Afghanistan, many of the problems will remain; only they will not be able to overwhelm the country. It is no ones’ case that Afghanistan will transform into a paradise overnight. By all accounts, it will remain volatile and disturbed, perhaps more in the eastern and southern periphery. But abandoning Afghanistan is also no solution. If anything, doing such a thing will only create another Islamic State like entity in the region, which is not in anyone’s interest, except perhaps for countries like Pakistan. Therefore, it is imperative that the Afghans be assisted to fight not just their own war but also the war of rest of the civilised world. The choice before the international community is a simple one: they can either fight this war in Washington or in Wardak, they can fight this war in London or in Logar, they can fight this war in Helmand or in Hyderabad, they can fight this war in Berlin or in Bamiyan and they can fight this war in Paris or in Pul-i-Chakri.

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Published Date: 9^th October 2104, Image source: http://www.tolonews.com

India in the Asia-Pacific under New Management

Prabhat P Shukla, 

Distinguished Fellow, VIF

It has been a busy September for India’s external relations. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has travelled to Japan, and has welcomed the Australian Prime Minister and the Chinese President in India. He has also travelled to the US, on a very high-profile visit, which seems to set it apart from all other visits from India, at least since the end of the Cold War.

To focus on the eastern direction for the moment, there have been several noteworthy departures from the past. The kind of language used in the Joint Statement issued after the talks to describe Japan is unprecedented, for a start. Modi declared that Japan was at the heart of his Look East policy. The two Prime Ministers added that the two countries had “congruent global interests, critical maritime inter-connection and growing international responsibilities”, which, along with their democratic traditions, drew them close together.

Describing defence cooperation as an important part of their strategic partnership, the leaders also identified the US 2 amphibian aircraft as a project to be worked through at an early date. All of this was intended to strengthen peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific Region and to ensure maritime security, freedom of navigation and overflights, and to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes. Further, the two countries agreed to reach out to other countries “in the region and beyond” in order to address the challenges and strengthen security.

Further, on the security aspects, there was a blunt reference in the Joint Statement to the worsening security situation among some countries, and the need for all countries to ensure the “elimination of terrorist safe havens and infrastructure.” The Statement also retained the reference – made earlier as well – to the North Korean nuclear and missile programme aimed at developing nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

Despite the obvious warmth both at the institutional and personal level, there were some areas where agreement was not possible. The first of these was the civil nuclear cooperation basket. It is reported that Japan wanted clear commitments on nuclear testing and reprocessing. It is obviously a question of finding the right formulation to allow such cooperation to go forward, since the Indian position on both is clear enough. In fact, the last Joint Statement, issued when Abe visited in January 2014, as Guest of Honour on Republic Day, carried a reference to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. There was no such reference this time, which would suggest that the unilateral moratorium on testing has been accepted by Japan as the basis for further progress. There is also the issue of the Indian Nuclear Liability Law, which places responsibility on the supplier of nuclear equipment for any accidents, as against holding the operator responsible. This remains an issue with all partner-countries, though we seem to have found a way forward with the Russians. This will need to be addressed in the case of Japan as well.

One of the important issues that has been in focus for some time was the infrastructure investment that Japan was to make in India. It came through well enough, with a promise of approximately US$ 35 billion over the next five years. And in order to ensure that there are no glitches in the implementation of this sector, Modi has announced the formation of a separate body under the PMO, to consist of both Indian and Japanese officials, to work on implementing agreements in this sector.

One sector that has not got the attention it deserves in the public discourse here, though it has been under discussion for some time now, is that of LNG: there is a very welcome formulation this time – not for the first time – that the two countries will work on joint procurement, upstream development, and promoting more flexible markets for the product. It is a fact that the Asian prices for LNG are among the highest in the world, because they are linked to oil prices. This needs to be addressed, and India and Japan are among the largest importers in the world, so they can make their views count.

All things considered, this was a very successful visit, even if some of the important issues remained unresolved. To the nuclear basket, we should add the problems in the functioning of the CEPA: it has not delivered the results we expected; in fact the trade turnover has come down since it was signed. Indian medicines and agricultural products continue to face access problems. The speculation is that these are related to the ongoing negotiations on the Trans Pacific Partnership, to which Japan attaches priority.

Notwithstanding the difficulties, Modi’s visit to Japan must be rated a major success, and one can confidently expect further substantive progress in the relations, as the logic of the security cooperation makes itself felt.

This has obviously not gone unnoticed in Beijing. They have repeatedly hinted through press articles, and – less frequently – in official comment, that India should not, and would not, fall prey to the blandishments of the Japanese or the Americans. Premier Li Keqiang, during his visit in 2013, stated bluntly that India should not look to a distant relative in preference to a near neighbour. Chinese fears were obviously fed by Modi’s talk of an 18th century expansionist mindset which led some countries to occupy others’ land or enter into their waters. Though he did not name China, the Global Times concluded that Modi did “embrace some nationalist sentiment against China” and took umbrage at this remark. It pointed out that India’s GDP was one-fifth of China’s, and that Japan was in no position to provide any substantive assistance. For good measure, it added that India’s improving relations with China also provided ground for better ties between India and Pakistan – the implication being that all this could be jeopardised by India’s cosying up to the likes of Japan and the US.

Ironic, then, that Xi was compelled by the situation inside Pakistan to drop his visit to that country during his trip to the region. In fact, it would be useful to understand the setting behind the visit of Xi to India. Since the new leadership took over in spring 2013, they have paid much attention to India – Li came calling in May, making great play of the fact that this was his first visit to any foreign country. Our then Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh paid a return visit in October 2013. The Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi came as Special Envoy of President Xi within two weeks of the swearing-in of the new Government in Delhi. And finally, President Xi himself came visiting in September.

At least in part, this is a reflection of the isolation in which China finds itself as a result of its aggressive approaches towards its neighbours in the western Pacific. It is also a realisation that antagonising India could well push it into the still-embryonic consensus emerging in the Asia-Pacific region – reflected in the US pivot to Asia - that collective engagement will be necessary if the rise of China is to be channelled in peaceful directions and to maintain stability in the region. Not only is China facing diplomatic difficulties, it is also facing economic and social troubles. The economy is showing reasonable headline statistics, but this is based on very shaky foundations, notably, so far as the finances and the real estate sector are concerned. Despite repeated assurances that the market will play an increasing role in the management of the economy, and that domestic consumption will lead future growth, nothing of the kind is happening, and there have been repeated financial stimuli to keep the rates of growth within target. As for social troubles, there are the current demonstrations in Hong Kong, and the running challenge to Chinese legitimacy and authority in Xinjiang and Tibet.

For these reasons, the Chinese have been reaching out to India. The gestures of the new leaders have been stronger than before: as noted, Premier Li Keqiang made great play of the fact that India was the first country he was visiting after taking over the job. Wang Yi, the Foreign Minister, was the first of the visitors from any of the P5 countries to visit India after the new Government took office in Delhi. This was the background to the visit of Xi himself.

Reconstructing the messaging that goes on around such visits is important. There is the non-verbal element, which the Chinese have been doing for decades now. It began when Vajpayee was in Beijing as Foreign Minister, in 1979. The Chinese invaded Vietnam while he was in China, forcing him to cut short the visit. In like fashion, the Chinese greeted President Venkataraman with a nuclear test. This was the first ever visit by an Indian President, and India was then a non-nuclear weapon state. And, of course, memories are still fresh of the intrusion and the pitching of tents in Depsang just prior to Premier Li’s visit in May 2013.

In line with this pattern, the visit of President Xi was preceded by large-scale intrusions and confrontation in the Chumar area of southern Ladakh. But this time, the Indian non-verbal messaging took a different form: the Tibetans were allowed to demonstrate openly, and at the venues where Xi was to be present, notably at Hyderabad House and the Taj Palace. And these were covered by all the TV channels. The past practice had been to disallow any demonstrations near where the Chinese dignitary was to be present, coupled with keeping the news outlets away from the demonstrations. In addition, the Indian Army also moved over a thousand troops to the area of confrontation.

There were also noteworthy aspects to the verbal messaging. At the press briefing after the talks on 18 September, there was an unusual formulation used by PM Modi. And he used it not once, but twice, in his prepared statement to the media. Right at the start, he said that neighbours, including China, were his priority, and

Therefore, a climate of mutual trust and confidence; respect for each other's sensitivities and concerns; and, peace and stability in our relations and along our borders are essential for us to realize the enormous potential in our relations.

A little later in the statement, he added that

...peace and tranquility in the border region constitutes an essential foundation for mutual trust and confidence and for realizing the full potential of our relationship.

What is unusual is that the posture we have adopted since the resumed engagement in 1988 has been that we should not allow the territorial issue to get in the way of normal relations in other areas. The form of words used by PM Modi seems to suggest that the overall relations were hitting against the border problem, and it needed to be addressed. He suggested that the way forward was for the two countries to clarify the Line of Actual Control [LAC] and to work to settle the border itself.

Since 2003, the Chinese have put aside the LAC clarification, even though the 1996 Agreement on CBMs in the Border Areas along the LAC requires both countries to do precisely this. But Xi did not answer this point in his reply, implying instead that border incidents would continue. And, of course, on the border, they have always stressed that this is an issue left over from history, and will require patience to resolve. This is where Xi used a slightly different formulation, which deserves to be quoted in extenso:

The China-India boundary question is an issue left over from history. Over many years, the two sides have made steady and positive progress in their boundary negotiations, through friendly consultations. The China-India border areas have maintained peace and tranquility. Yet, since the border has yet to be demarcated, sometimes there might be certain incidents. But the two sides are fully capable of acting promptly to effectively manage the situation through various levels of border-related mechanisms, so that such incidents do not have a large impact on the bilateral relationship.

China has the determination to work with India through friendly consultations to settle the boundary question at an early date. We also have the sincerity to work with India to maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas before we are able to finally settle the boundary question. [Emphasis added]

This is unusual in that there is no reference to the need for patience or the need to find a fair and balanced solution, which is the staple formula; instead, he says that China is determined to settle the issue at an early date. There was more to come, which suggests that Xi’s choice of words did not play well with everyone back in Beijing. Although Xinhua, and the People’s Daily, in their reports on the press conference, retained this formulation, the Global Times, in its version, dropped the reference to the phrase “at an early date”. Throughout the day [18 September] there were varying versions of the news reports that played out in the different news outlets, including one that even attributed this turn of phrase to Modi!

Finally, there was closure on this issue only after Xi returned home, and Foreign Minister Wang Yi gave the Party line to Xinhua, which retained the formulation “at an early date”. This was then dutifully carried in full, without change, by all the papers, including the more nationalist-minded Global Times.

This suggests two things. The first is that there are differences in the leadership over some of the critical issues, and these are serious enough to play out in the media. To those who would doubt this, we actually have evidence from another area – Hong Kong. And it again involves the Global Times. It was this paper that carried a report to the effect that the PLA was ready to keep the situation in Hong Kong under control, a report that was removed soon after it appeared.

It also suggests that Xi is not quite as sovereign within China as most believe. Why this is important for India is that most analysts believe – as did the present writer – that the PLA intrusions are stage-managed to coincide with high-level visits. And yet, this one time might just be the exception, and not choreographed: it is also reported that Xi assured Modi that he had nothing to do with, indeed had no knowledge of, the intrusions.

Would India figure so importantly as to be a subject of discord? There is, of necessity, a value judgement involved here. But we can take one more fact into account which may shed some more light. This is the removal of the former Ambassador, Wei Wei, to India just weeks before the visit was due. He was replaced by an official enjoying the rank of Vice Minister, Le Yucheng, who had been serving in Kazakhstan, where his own tenure was cut short. He presented his credentials just days before the visit. The former Ambassador’s new assignment is not known. It may be worth emphasising that Wei was appointed to the India job in January 2013, well after Xi had taken over as Party chief, and was to take over as President at the next meeting of the National People’s Congress.

Lending some further support to this hypothesis is the fact that after his return to Beijing, Xi addressed the PLA Chiefs of Staff, where he delivered some cautionary remarks to the assembled officers. This news got a lot of play in India for the remark that the Army should be prepared to win a local [regional] war in the age of information technology. In point of fact, this formulation is not new, and has been in use for a decade or more. This does not mean it is not serious, or that we in India can ignore this. No, we need to be fully prepared for any escalation that the Chinese might undertake in the border areas. But this is not a sign that military action against India is imminent.

However, there were new elements in the speech and these related to the need for absolutely loyalty to and firm faith in the Party, and to the need to ensure “a smooth chain of command and make sure all decisions from the central leadership are fully implemented”. For good measure, Xi added that, “Military commanders should have a better understanding of international and domestic security situations”. Clearly, he is warning the PLA senior echelons that the international and domestic situation is not as favourable to China as many in that country are wont to believe and should, therefore, trust the judgement of the Party leadership.

These are glimpses into the workings of the new leadership and its internal balance, and some of the thoughts expressed by Xi will need to be checked against delivery, particularly regarding a border settlement. But it is important to be aware of the different strands within China. Twice – at least twice – before, we have missed the import of such changes and hints at a settlement, once under Zhou Enlai and then under Deng Xiaoping; it would be a pity if we were to miss another chance.

This idea, that there was a new push behind the border settlement is reinforced by a comparison of the formulations used in the joint documents this time, and the previous one, when PM Manmohan Singh visited China in October 2013. In that document, there was a bland reference to encouraging the Special Representatives to explore the framework of a settlement. This time, the wording offers more of a commitment, not to exploring for a framework [which already exists, since 2005], but to an early settlement as a strategic objective. Therefore, the opening that has seemingly been offered needs to be vigorously pursued. Vigorously pursued but with a clear understanding that there are daunting problems along the way, even with the best of goodwill, which is by no means assured.

For the rest, some of the other noteworthy aspects of the visit are worth mentioning in brief. The decision to begin discussions on civil nuclear cooperation is an important and positive development. This is so not because there is great commercial scope in this area, but that China has so far refused to have any dialogue with us on nuclear issues because that might lead to at least an implicit recognition of our weapons programme. Even though they did reluctantly agree to the NSG waiver, and this implies recognition of our possessing nuclear weapons, this is a welcome additional step. It may even, over time, persuade China to stop blocking Indian membership of the NSG itself.

One of the other things that Xi mentioned was that China was willing to accept an expansion in the membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation [SCO], and to include India, which it had been resisting doing so far. While saying this, he added that he expected India to help build its [China’s] relations with SAARC. In the Maldives and Sri Lanka, Xi was more forthright on this latter aspect, saying that he expected them to help “upgrade” [“enhance” in the case of Sri Lanka] its relations with SAARC. What the idea is behind this formulation is not clear – Chinese scholars deny that China seeks full membership of SAARC.

Another proposal that was more in evidence in the other two SAARC countries that he visited, than in India, was the Maritime Silk Road. Perhaps this was in deference to the well-known Indian doubts about the idea, even though it is one that Xi claims personal ownership of. But he did get satisfaction, even if not in full measure, on the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar [BCIM] corridor.

There was an unforced error in the drafting of the Joint Statement though. This was the reference to the “Tibet autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China” in the context of the opening of an alternate route for pilgrims going to Kailash-Mansarovar. Such a reference has been absent in our joint documents for some years now, from 2010. Even last year, when the issue of the pilgrimage to K-M was reflected in the joint document, the formulation used was that the “Indian side conveyed appreciation to the Chinese side”.

In between, there was the visit of the Australian Prime Minister, Tony Abbott. Australia will be hosting the G 20 Summit in Brisbane in November, and this was a useful pre-Summit meeting for the two Prime Ministers to get acquainted. For obvious reasons, the visit was low-key in comparison to the other two visits, but it yielded a formal agreement, reflected in the Joint Statement, on supplies of Uranium to India. Australia has some 35% of the global reserves of the element, and was initially reluctant to supply to India, because of NPT-related issues. However, these have now been set aside, and hopefully, trade in Uranium can begin. Another important area of agreement relates to the sale of LNG from Australia. India’s needs are growing, and the pipeline projects around our periphery – TAPI and IPI – are going nowhere in a hurry; nor should we be particularly keen to allow Pakistan to sit astride our energy lifelines. In such a situation, LNG is the best and most flexible option, with Australia being one of the viable alternatives for us, in addition to the Persian Gulf suppliers.

A quick round-up of the regional and global issues that touch India suggests quite clearly that, of the three, it is Japan that is most in harmony with Indian views and interests. This is most obvious in the case of the UN Security Council reform, where both countries are claimants to permanent seats, and are working together; China is the most reluctant to offer support on this.

On terrorism, similarly, it is Japan that is willing to call for the dismantling of safe havens and infrastructure, while Australia and China are reluctant to make such a reference out of deference to Pakistani sentiments.

On civil nuclear cooperation, all three are reluctant partners, but Australia has shown the greatest willingness to meet Indian interests, and is also in a position to take specific steps to actualise this cooperation. Japan and China are both taking some hesitant steps, and it remains to be seen what the outcome of the talks with these two countries will be.

Probably the sharpest differentiation happens over the Asia-Pacific Region. India and Japan have no hesitation in calling for stability, freedom of navigation and overflight, and the importance of international law in governing dispute settlement. China obviously is equally against any such formulations, and Australia, out of deference to China, also refrains from too clear a formulation on this issue. It prefers, instead, to talk about the dynamics of the region being underpinned by a “cooperative mechanism”.

Afghanistan, an issue that we shall hear more of going forward, is another issue where India and Japan share similar views. We both agree that Afghanistan should develop as an independent country, free from external interference. For obvious reasons, China will have nothing to do with such a postulate. For less obvious reasons, Australia too is reluctant to sign up to such a demand, even though it had soldiers in the country, and suffered as a result of such interference.

Different strokes for different folks...

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Published Date: 9^th October 2014, Image source: http://news.oneindia.in

The J&K Flood Disaster : Overcoming Effects on The Security Paradigm

Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain

In 2005, one of the major considerations for the inauguration of the Karvan-e-Aman, the Srinagar- Muzaffarabad Bus Service, was the projection of a contrast which was expected to be perceived by the POK travellers between the standard of development on the Pakistan occupied side and that on the Indian side of Kashmir. That contrast has always existed. Yet, in one devastating night on 6/7 Sep 2014 the fury of the Jhelum has virtually equated the two sides of the LoC, laying bare vast stretches of human habitation, destroying livelihoods, habitat, much ancient architecture, and J&K’s famed products; papier-mâché, saffron, carpets, pashmina; just about everything one associates with the Valley’s great culture and tradition. Rightfully almost all the media coverage has concentrated so far on the human tragedy, involving displacement, health and sanitation, relief work, brave heart stories of courageous people, the deep and committed involvement of the Armed Forces, the youth’s energetic heroism and the negatives, involving governmental paralysis. Enough has been written on that, and a sensitive media has rightly ensured that no attempt was made to analyze the security paradigm of J&K and how that has undergone a change, post the flood.

But with 14 terrorists gunned down in Kashmir in September 2014, a reviving and brooding discontent in the flooded streets, much antipathy generated by the deliberate efforts of the separatists, and a vast vacuum created for recruitment of discontented people towards the gun, J&K has the potential of once again turning into a tinder box. This needs some analysis. It is not as if everything is going to happen overnight, but turbulent situations always have their seeds sown by uncontrollable events. The earlier these are recognized, the better it is for the security environment.

The prevailing complexities of a situation emerging from 25 years of terrorism and proxy war have been further complicated by the displacement of people and the trauma brought by the flood. Just prior to the disaster, alarm bells had already been sounded about the reemergence of militant activities, particularly in South Kashmir. In the current situation and its aftermath, the unpredictability factor increases exponentially thus adding trauma manifold. It is perhaps wishful thinking that the excellent rescue efforts by the Army will translate into openly displayed and fulltime goodwill; instead, it may remain a grudging goodwill unless a conscious effort is made to get into the groove of outreach as follow up. In fact, to assess the psyche of the distraught population of Srinagar is currently almost impossible.

Kashmir’s media, which influences opinion very largely, was itself paralyzed and has begun to emerge only now, tentatively. The media is not sure how to tackle the ambiguous situation; whether to play to the Separatist galleries, fringe elements, fence sitters, or the establishment. To be completely above all this is almost impossible, and survival instincts dictate a different course each day. To top it there is an uncertain political environment, a lame duck state government, and insufficient energy to retrieve Kashmir and some areas of Jammu from the disaster they have witnessed.

Traumatized people are considered the last ones to have any scope of change in mindsets; if anything, the failure of early return of livelihood and inability to get back their normal lives is going to keep the population even more vulnerable to negativity. The youth’s displayed dynamism is likely to give it greater self-assurance which while being positive on one hand can also be extremely negative if exploited by anti-national elements.

Is this therefore the time to look at national interests afresh and commence a new narrative? The disaster has witnessed a tremendous outflow of positive energy from the rest of India; aid is flowing in, and social media has seen greater focus on aid rather than the usual discussions on ideological and political differences. While people may be traumatized on the one hand, a large segment of the populace of Srinagar has recognized the efforts of the Army and other agencies (notwithstanding the media’s unintended neglect of the youth) in the rescue efforts. Traumatized people also speak the truth and do not turn their backs on their saviors. The Army has little role inside Srinagar city but it can energize other security forces and build on this relationship which is even more important than its relationship with the rural people. Symbolic acts of goodness must continue through the difficult winter months, including holding medical camps in conjunction with the local medical authorities, conducting small scale recreational events in the suburban areas, ensuring disciplined traffic movement of its convoys, and being available for various winter emergencies.

It is the time to unleash positive political activity, even as the people display their open dislike for political leaders for their collective failure. This is essential in an environment where political activity and outreach has been limited to non-existent. It does not necessarily mean that elections must be held on schedule, but the intervening period must not be occupied by anyone other than mainstream political parties of every hue. The critical psychological space cannot be handed over to separatists and their ilk.

All the above contributes to the security environment because J&K can ill afford bandhs, hartals or stone throwing any more. Whether separatist leaders will risk attempting to do this is unclear, but governance must now concentrate on ensuring that no triggers are provided, and this can be best done by being amply sensitive to the needs of winter for all segments of the population in all three divisions of J&K. The upper reaches of the Jammu division are as vulnerable as the Valley. Power, energy and food requirements must be thought through now; medical equipment and medicines must be stocked in plenty. The Army could be requested to enhance its medical resources this winter so that its assistance can be sought without hesitation. NGOs and volunteer organizations, if coordinated properly and with sensitivity, will be only too happy to have rotational presence through winter. Pediatric care in particular will be much in demand.

While winter tourism would be affected because of the absence of hotel rooms and lesser number of house boats in Srinagar, tour operators need to coordinate with the Department of Tourism to ensure that higher and unaffected areas of Pahalgam and Gulmarg continue to be patronized, as this will have a cascading effect on the economy of Srinagar, and the state will not be erased from the tourist map. The common perception will prevail that the Valley is out of bounds due to floods. Perhaps, this could be an opportunity to be exploited to permit more bed and breakfast facilities in the relatively affluent areas of Srinagar which have not been as badly affected by the Jhelum. For the next summer, we may once again revisit the dream mission of promoting rural tourism through facilities constructed in the villages of the upper ‘karewas’ near the Pir Panjal and the Kangan/Narayan Nag circuit.

Military security is being given the last priority here because the Army has amply demonstrated that it can multi-task itself with ease. Anyone who doubted its capabilities can see how it has simultaneously executed rescue in Srinagar and countered infiltration at the upper reaches of Kupwara, even as half its Headquarters was submerged in Badami Bagh. The Army’s multiple capabilities make it the only agency which can ensure not only full understanding of the challenges but also provide the lead in executing the revival through the difficult period of the first winter after the disaster. The critics of the Army’s presence and its outreach to civilian areas in the countryside will now have to take a back seat. In South Kashmir, which has been ravaged almost as much as Srinagar, and in the upper reaches of the Jammu division, the lead agency for reconstruction must be the Army, and there is nothing political about this; the humanitarian message must go starkly to the people of J&K.

There are enough detractors and exploiters of J&K’s disaster, chief being the ‘Nexus across the LoC and the Separatists’. They too may be sensing the opportunity which appears to be presenting itself. The threat is greater than may be realized now, and it is only coordinated and pro-active actions by India’s strategic thinkers, and execution by various agencies which could actually convert the Nexus’ opportunity into our gain. In all this, the people of J&K can emerge once again as the center of gravity just like they always have.

The underlying message in this piece is clear; there is a clear opportunity which has come the Nation’s way; we have the most dynamic political leadership in India in years; Pakistan has never been in the state of paralysis that it currently is; the separatists have also taken a psychological beating. We just need to set aside all other agenda and look at national interest afresh. Mainstreaming J&K more meaningfully may never happen as easily as it can now.

(The writer is a former General Officer Commanding of the Srinagar based 15 Corps and the author of the Hearts Doctrine; he is a Visiting Fellow of the Vivekananda International Foundation besides being active on the India-Pakistan Track 2 circuit)

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Published Date: 6^thOctober 2014, Image source: http://www.bbc.com

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

Security Architecture in the Persian Gulf: GCC, Gulf Union or Something Else?

Col Rajeev Agarwal

The West Asian region has been in turmoil for over three years now. What started off as a local incident in Tunisia in December 2010 engulfed the entire region of North Africa and West Asia in what has been popularly termed as ‘Arab Spring’. Three years down the line, some of the countries are still trying to grapple with the changed political dynamics (Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen) while others have prevented it from taking an ugly turn (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait). Then, there is the case of Syria where the uprisings turned violent and have led to a state of civil war. In addition, there is the most recent case of Iraq which has imploded under the pressure exerted by the Islamic State of Iraq and Al Shams (ISIS). The recent conflict in Gaza too has re-opened the old wounds between Palestine and Israel. The Arabian Peninsula was however, by and large left unaffected by the Arab Spring. Yes, there were clashes in Bahrain; Saudi Arabia had to offer concessions to its population and there were some protests in Kuwait and Oman, but none of these events were on the same scale as what transpired in the rest of the region. The Gulf monarchies survived and still look resilient.

What is, however, affecting the Arabian Peninsula and particularly the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is the dynamic change taking place in the regional balance of power. It is no longer the case of Saudi Arabia versus Iran in the Gulf region or the popular discourse of Arabs versus Israelis. This is largely due to the emergence of new power dynamics in the region. The re-emergence of Egypt post Mubarak, increasing isolation of Israel and emergence of Turkey as another powerful actor are some of the indicators in this regard. Coupled with this is the progressive shift in US policy and towards the Asia Pacific as a part of its “rebalancing”.¹

The Gulf region in fact embodies and reflects the concerns of the larger West Asian region. The countries north and south of the Persian Gulf form the core in almost all aspects. They contains majority of the crude oil and natural gas resources, employ the largest number of expat workers in the region, are home to the most holy sites for the Muslims (both Shia and Sunni), harbour a bitter regional rivalry often drawn along sectarian lines between Saudi Arabia and Iran and have a major role to play in all other issues effecting the larger region at large. The Arab-Israeli dispute, Egypt-Israel peace treaty, US role in the region, question of Muslim and/or Arab unity and in recent decades the threat of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism through groups like Al Qaeda etc all have links through the Gulf region.

The Gulf region and its well-being is therefore crucial towards ensuring peace in the region and to coordinate and implement it, there is a requirement of a potent and effective regional organisation. Perhaps concerned by the developing situation, the GCC decided to strengthen the regional security framework possibly in the shape of a‘Gulf Union’. This idea was discussed at the GCC Summit in Bahrain in December 2012,² but has yet to take any shape. During the Manama Dialogue in December 2013 too, Saudi Arabia brought up the issue of Gulf Union, but has failed to find resonance among all partners. Oman was quick to rubbish the idea with its Foreign Minister Yusuf bin Alawi stating, “We are against a union,” at the Manama Dialogue further adding, “We will not prevent a union, but if it happens we will not be part of it”³. Saudi Arabia seems however convinced that Gulf Union is the need of the hour. “People in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) want a closely-knit union and such a union has now become inevitable,”⁴ was how Prince Turki Al Faisal of Saudi Arabia, the Chairman of the Board of the King Faisal Centre for Research and Islamic Studies described the stance of Saudi Arabia at the conclusion of Manama Dialogue. Going by inputs, it is likely that even in its expansion, the GCC is likely to initially restrict such a framework only to member countries. The expansion of GCC into a broader framework or a new framework would be more a question of seeking the right framework to address regional security problems than merely economic cooperation or anything else. If that be the case, it raises critical questions regarding the viability of such a union such as:

• Can the Gulf region ignore the rapidly evolving dynamics in the region, especially with regards to Syria and Iraq while evolving a new security architecture?
• Can there be any effective regional security framework in the Gulf region without the participation of Iran and Iraq?
• Can a security framework in the Arabian Peninsula take shape without taking Yemen and its security concerns into consideration?
• How would the architecture overcome the Gulf countries’ decades of over-reliance on foreign (read, US) military presence in the region for their security?

Clearly, the GCC security framework would be ineffective without answering most of these questions.

Evolving Dynamics of Regional Security in the Gulf Region

Commencing with Tunisia in December 2010, the popular people’s revolts have threatened to not only alter the political dynamics in the region but also the security balance in the region. The evolving political order in the region is likely to witness considerable shifts within individual countries as well as at the regional level. Economic issues and peoples’ aspirations are likely to be major factors in redefining the regional landscape. These changes would have long term implications for both regional and international actors.

Amongst the regional powers, Iran has attempted to emerge as a major benefactor. It has drawn parallels with its 1979 revolution and has called for Islamic awakening in the region. Saudi Arabia has managed to survive the Arab Spring both internally and within the region. It resorted to immediate economic appeasements to the population at home coupled with the brutal crackdown on protests to quell the revolution before it could threaten the regime. However, without long term systemic changes in system of governance, it knows that it is living on borrowed time.

Another factor to watch out for is the rise of Egypt post Mubarak. It has always been one of most powerful military powers in the region. Its revival could have major repercussions on regional power balance. With former Chief of the Armed Forces, Fatah Al Sisi now elected as the President, Egypt would be a nation to watch out for.

Just before the onslaught by the ISIS on Iraq and the threat of its implosion, Iraq too was slowly consolidating itself. Despite frequent terrorists’ attacks on Shia population, Iraq was rebuilding its military power. Oil production too was on the rise and is becoming competitive in the region. If and when the ISIS threat is brought under control, Iraq could emerge once again as a major player in the region by the end of this decade.

Yemen on the other hand, despite the ouster of President Saleh, continues to be in turmoil. Saudi Arabia has often accused Iran of instigating and supporting the Al Houthi rebels in the North against Saudi Arabia. Despite the constitution of National Dialogue Congress in March 2013, there is hardly any progress towards reconciliation and peace. The spillover of Al Qaeda influence from across Yemen too threatens its security interests. Also, Yemen is the only country in the Arabian Peninsula which is not a member of GCC.

The crisis in Syria has threatened to alter the entire equilibrium in the region. Its civil war initially polarized the country as well as the region into pro and anti-Assad camps. The use of chemical weapons in Damascus on 21 August 2013 further complicated the situation bringing Syria to the brink of US led military strikes and a larger regional military flare up. The subsequent Framework Agreement sponsored by Russia and the UN resolutions however ensured that Syria declare its chemical weapons stockpile, agree to its destruction and sign the international Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC). The Syrian civil war is however far from over. With no resolution in sight and the ISIS threatening to over-run eastern parts of Syria and virtually obliterate the boundaries between Iraq and Syria, there seems no immediate solution to the Syrian crisis in the near future.

The overpowering presence of Saudi Arabia in the GCC, its predominance in the only security structure in the region; the Peninsular Shield Force, the underlying suspicion of smaller states in the GCC on the hegemonic designs of Saudi Arabia in the Gulf region are some of the other concerns to be considered by the GCC and the region. Increased membership and presence of some more powerful players in the group would help counter balance Saudi Arabia.

The Iran, Iraq Factor

Among all the questions regarding Gulf Security Architecture, the most crucial is the question of regional participation. Can the GCC afford to ignore the two most significant countries of the Gulf region, namely, Iran and Iraq and still evolve a viable security framework? The clear answer is ‘No’. Iran is geographically and militarily too large to be ignored. Also, most of the security concerns of GCC members would be taken care of if Iran is either reined in or dovetailed in a collective security apparatus (even if entails having a framework with a common minimum programme). However, the contrary may not hold true as any security framework without Iran will render it unviable in terms of regional security.

As regards Iraq, whether in conjunction with Iran or independently, it is again too big and mighty to be ignored. Given the above, it is imperative that Iran and Iraq form part of a Gulf security framework. The ongoing dialogue on Iran nuclear issue which is the biggest security concern for the GCC countries could offer hope. The interim deal reached between P5+1 in November 2013 and any future resolution of Iran nuclear issue would help dispel doubts in the minds of members of GCC and could pave way for greater Iran-GCC engagement.

Foreign Military Presence in the Gulf Region and the Current Uncertainty

Historically, the six states which now comprise the GCC have relied on an external security guarantor both to safeguard the regimes and to protect against external military threats. The US has been the predominant, especially after the United Kingdom military vacated the Gulf region in 1970s. Commencing with its pledge made in the 1980 Carter Doctrine to use military force if necessary to defend its national interests in the Gulf, the US has continued to guarantee the security of Gulf regimes and uphold their sovereignty through the periods of the Cold War to the present Global War on Terror. In the three decades since 1980, all of the six GCC states have expanded and deepened their military ties with the US, through bilateral defence cooperation agreements. These bilateral defence deals have however inhibited individual growth and has resulted in each GCC state having very small standing armies. Military bases and bilateral security guarantees have prevented and complicated the emergence of any effective regional security architecture at the GCC level wherein the GCC countries could have found solutions to their historical disputes within themselves. The stationing of foreign troops in the region has also given cause and justification to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, spread of influence of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates as well as radicalization of disenchanted elements in the region. Trans-national terrorism and the spread of ideational alternatives to national identities has emerged as a significant challenge to Gulf regimes, who fear the spread of sectarian tensions from Iraq or the "blowback" from any attack on Iran to the Shiite communities in the Gulf. The Iranian nuclear issue is another issue which has created fears and apprehensions in the Gulf region although the present talks between P5+1 could lead to some long term resolution of this very critical regional issue.

Although it has prevented intra-regional wars in the Gulf region and helped regimes survive, US presence has, in the long run been detrimental to the larger security interests of the region. With its predominant military presence West and South of Arabian Gulf, it has polarized the region into pro and anti Iran camps. The war on Iraq has virtually handed over the depleted nation into Iran’s influence, thus extending the proverbial ‘Shiite crescent’ across the North of Arabian Gulf up to the Mediterranean Sea. Also, as mentioned earlier, it has been one of the significant factors in the rise and spread of terrorism in the region.

In the past three years, especially after the onset of ‘Arab Spring”, there is a widespread apprehension in the Gulf region and the larger West Asian region that the US may be losing interest in the region and may not be as actively involved as it was in the past decades intervening and solving conflicts in the region. The clear reluctance shown by the US in getting directly involved in the military campaign in Libya, its refusal to militarily intervene in Syria despite the widespread civil war and thousands of human lives lost as well as its drawing down on wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are a clear indication of its loosing appetite for any more involvement in the military conflicts in the region. Also, its renewed focus in the Asia-pacific through its ‘rebalancing’ policy towards the region could wean away some of the existing military and diplomatic vigor in the West Asian region. In addition, reports on US discovery and production of shale gas resulting in reduced reliance on the region’s oil as also the feeling that with the current economic downturn, the US will be forced to look more inwards are issues of grave concern to the region and are setting serious doubts in the minds of policy makers in the West Asian region on future US intentions.

Echoing these concerns, Abdulaziz Sager, Chairman of the Gulf Research Center said in a column in Arab News, “The US-GCC relationship appears to be at crossroads. Despite a long history of relations and a clear common and mutual interest in the stability and security of the Gulf region, the GCC states and the United States look as if they are growing apart on an almost daily basis…the prevailing mood appears to be that the terms are beginning to change to such a degree that the GCC states have no choice but to act on their own and without consideration of US interests and concerns. This is bound to have consequences, real and unintended, for both sides, and the question should be asked whether such increased separation will not come back to haunt the region as a whole.”⁵

Even Leon Panetta, former Secretary of Defense of the US while speaking at the Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies Research said, "It is our hope that the GCC can play an important role in the future providing security for this region. Across the board, Washington is urging allies to build local capacity. That's what we're doing for the UAE and that's what we're doing with other countries. Yes, we give them the help they need, we give them assistance, but the fact is that they have to help provide for their security.⁶"

Countries in the region are already planning for the worst case scenarios wherein they would be deprived of external security guarantees. While the idea of expansion of GCC into a Gulf Union could be one indicator, the increase in import of weapons and equipment in the region too is a pointer to this effect. In December 2011, the US signed a massive $30 billion sale of 84 F-15 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia⁷. In April 2013, the US announced another big defence deal worth $ 10 billion through arms sale to Saudi Arabia, Israel and United Arab Emirates which includes sale of 26 F-16s to the United Arab Emirates and advanced missiles to both Gulf states capable of being launched in friendly territory and penetrating with great accuracy far behind an opponent’s borders. In the case of Israel, it is likely to procure new missiles designed to attack and incapacitate an adversary’s air-defence radars, advanced radars for its own Air force, refueling tanker planes and — in the first sale to any foreign military — the V-22 Osprey troop transport aircraft⁸.

A Possible Security Framework for the Gulf Region

GCC was formed primarily as a defensive mechanism against post revolution Iran. With Iran looking for better integration in the region and looking to emerge from the decade’s long shadow of sanctions, there is a need for a relook. In a speech at the Manama Dialogue 2006, Bahrain’s foreign minister, Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, stated: “In the Gulf, no sustainable long-term regional security arrangement can be envisioned without Iraq and Iran acting as two of its pillars.”⁹ The ongoing civil war in Syria, the implosion of Iraq under the ISIS, the Gaza conflict, ongoing transition in Egypt and the struggle in Yemen clearly demonstrate that these conflicts cannot be resolved locally as also that the GCC cannot remain immune from such conflicts. There is thus a requirement to rework the regional dynamics in a comprehensive manner while devising a new regional structure.

Before finalising any security framework, GCC would have to deliberate and take a realistic view of the evolving regional dynamics. Also, the GCC needs to pause and take lessons from history. The League of Nations formed after World War I was rendered ineffective as the US did not join it initially and the USSR was barred from joining it due to the threat of communism. The result was a toothless organisation which could not prevent military conflicts nor settle disputes. Even the UN Security Council with only five permanent members selected in 1945 is out of sync with the developments in the world in past 65 years and is not representative of the security dynamics of the world.

GCC, the only regional organisation representing the Gulf region, too is grossly inadequate and underrepresented to address regional security issues. Firstly, it is restrictive in membership and does not include important nations North and West of the Persian Gulf like Iran and Iraq. Even within the Arabian Peninsula, it does not include Yemen. Secondly, it lacks a strong and regionally representative military force. The only military arm; Peninsular Shield Force consists primarily of troops from Saudi Arabia and therefore cannot be termed credible or effective. Thirdly, it does not have any forum to share views or vote of key external players in the region like the US, China or Russia.

Any future architecture will need a core organisation. GCC could be the core to commence this. It could be expanded to GCC+2 (Iran and Iraq) initially and thereafter expanded to include Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Yemen. Each member could have a veto power in matters of regional security which would preclude any one from taking any offensive action against another. There will be occasions when a member may feel threatened by another, but a veto and the threat of a collective punitive action by other members could deter the threat. Obviously, Israel would be a difficult issue. However, if there is some forward movement on Palestine and Israel could rethink its approach in the region akin to its reconciliatory policies in 1990s, there could be scope for a larger regional architecture. Obviously, any extra regional player having stakes and influence in the region will need to be incorporated in the structure, maybe as dialogue partners, but that could follow later.

This is not to say that by just making such a framework, all the problems which are intra GCC or within the Gulf Region would get solved. The differences and conflict of opinions and ideologies in the region are too deep rooted to be overcome soon. It would however be difficult to imagine expanding the GCC into an all-encompassing framework right away. Any start would be however welcome and if correctly articulated, could eliminate at least the threat of conflict within the region. Also, over time, some of the minor irritants could get solved through mutual dialogue. The inclusion of states like Iran, Iraq and even Egypt and Turkey would also act as counter balancing force to Saudi Arabia in the region. Another important spin off from a larger more encompassing security framework could be the effect on terrorism in the region. If the members of the new architecture align closely, the space occupied by terrorist forces like Al Qaeda could reduce. The vacuum created due the fall of dictators in the region which they have currently filled would then become vulnerable to state and larger regional control, thus edging them out of the region. Among all other new member states proposed, the inclusion and acceptability of Iran would be the key and could dictate the future course of such an organization. It is however interesting to note that presently, there is no formal platform of dialogue between GCC and Iran. How do they expect to resolve issues when they don’t even talk?

Further, the framework would have to see beyond its immediate geographical boundaries to include major stake holders in the region for which they could take a leaf out of ASEAN model where, in addition to the core members, various forums have been added to ASEAN to incorporate economic and security interests driven by extra regional powers. This could result in Turkey, US, Russia, India and even China being included as dialogue partners or as independent observers. It would help in improving the atmosphere and confidence in the region. Over time, the Gulf Security Council could hold joint military exercises, have military observers from each country and later even consider a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) to replace the present Peninsular Shield Force¹⁰, which is grossly under equipped and is seen more as a manifestation of Saudi Arabia’s regional designs than anything else.

Conclusion

The bottom line is clear. The present system of Gulf Security is grossly inadequate to meet regional security challenges. A Security Framework based on merely GCC members too would be inadequate, as pointed out earlier. Also, with changing dynamics in the region as also likely change in the priorities of the US, it is possible that in coming decades, the Arabian Gulf does not get the same attention that it gets now from the US. Already there are signs of downsizing the military presence in the Gulf region due to budgetary cuts, ending the wars in the region (Afghanistan, Iraq) and the current policies of the US of not getting itself actively involved in any regional conflict (Syria, Libya).

The GCC thus has to start looking beyond US for their individual and collective security. It is therefore time for the GCC as well as other major stake holders like Iran, Iraq and Egypt to rise above the usual rhetoric and forge a regional Partnership. There will be teething problems, the framework might eventually fail, but all that can only be seen once they take the bold step to come together. If the two Germany could unite, if the US and Russia could talk now and during the Cold War, there is no reason why the Muslim countries in the Gulf region cannot garner courage and come together for their own collective security.

Endnotes

1. US Secretary of State speech at Asia-Pacific Summit in November 2011, available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/11/176999.htm.
2. Saudi Arabia calls for ‘strong and solid’ Gulf union, Al Arabiya news, available at http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/12/24/256782.html
3. Oman opposes Gulf union, Arab News, 08 December 2013, http://www.arabnews.com/news/488956, accessed on 23 December 2013.
4. Gulf union is inevitable: Saudi Prince Turki Al Faisal, Gulf News, 08 December 2013, http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/gulf-union-is-inevitable-saudi-prince..., accessed on 23 December 2013.
5. “Whither GCC-US relations?” Arab News, March 29, 2013, at http://www.arabnews.com/news/446395, accessed on July 14, 2013.
6. US looks to allies to secure Arabian Gulf, The National, April 24, 2013, at http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/us-looks-to-allies-to-secure-ara..., accessed on July 14, 2013.
7. U.S., Saudi Arabia strike $30 billion arms deal, Washington Post, 29 December 2011, Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/us-saudi-..., accessed on 06 August 2013.
8. U.S. Arms Deal With Israel and 2 Arab Nations Is Near, New York Times, 18 April 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/19/world/middleeast/us-selling-arms-to-is..., accessed on 06 August 2013
9. Sam Sasan Shoamanesh, A New Security Order for the Middle East, 04 October 2012, http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2012/10/04/a-new-security-order-for-the-middl...
10. Shaheen Kareem, Defensive shield for the Gulf since 1982, The National, available at http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/defensive-shield-for-the-gulf-si...

(The author is Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses)

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Published Date: 1^st October 2014, Image source: http://news.kuwaittimes.net

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)