China Reinforces its Maritime Claims in South China Sea

Brig Vinod Anand, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

While last year China created an avoidable controversy by sending its giant drilling rig HD-981 for drilling for oil within the EEZ of Vietnam to bolster its claims in South China Sea, of late Beijing has adopted innovative strategy of building islands of sand for supporting its maritime claims.

Recent reports indicate that China has been converting small atolls and reefs in the Spratly archipelago into islands where besides harbours even airfields are being constructed. For instance, Fiery Cross Reef which was under water sometime back has been developed into an artificial island with a runway and other facilities that have military implications. Not only PLA Navy and Air Force would be able to project power further afar the construction of islands by China is expected to strengthen its maritime claims in the South China Sea.

The runway that has been constructed on Fiery Cross Reef is around three kilometers in length which would enable the operations of jet fighters and military transport aircrafts. Apparently, the length of the runway is more than even some of the runways on the mainland where the length ranges from 2.7 kilometers to 4 kilometer. Another runway of 3,000 meters in length is under construction on Subu Reef that has been developed into an island also located in Spratly group of islands.

As is well known Vietnam, China, Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia have contesting claims on this group of more than 750 reefs, islets, atolls, cays and islands in the South China Sea. Some of these locations have military constructions and/or civilian posts for fishing purposes. However, China’s territorial maritime claims in South China Sea are by far the most blatant based on its so called ‘nine dash line’ which, in fact, makes the whole of South China Sea as somewhat of a Chinese lake. This line lacks any legal or historical basis and does not follow any internationally accepted norms.

Building islands and converting them to military posts is designed to alter the status quo. While such actions enhance the strategic influence of China in South China Sea it also enables China to expand its EEZ thereby enabling it to exploit the natural resources of the area be it oil, fisheries or the mineral wealth lying under the sea. Basing men and material in the artificial islands also allows it to reinforce its maritime and territorial claims more vigourously.

The ASEAN member countries and the international community in general remains concerned with China’s assertive policies in the South China Sea which are against the accepted international norms. ASEAN countries meeting at Malaysia on 26 April expressed serious concerns on China’s land reclamation in the sea and called for ‘self-restraint in the conduct of activities’. China’s activities in the SCS are violative of agreed Code of Conduct Of parties in South China Sea concluded in 2002 and UN Convention on Law of Sea. In the last ASEAN Summit held at Nay Pi Taw in Myanmar the ASEAN members had stressed on resolution of jurisdictional disputes through peaceful means. China’s approach has been to deal bilaterally with the countries involved in the dispute rather than through a multilateral mechanism. In fact, in 2012 ASEAN summit in Cambodia no joint statement could be issued because of China’s influence on the host country and its insistence on not making a reference to the same in the communiqué.

According to one estimate a total of about 5.3 trillion US dollar of international trade passes through South China Sea and 90 percent of the intercontinental trade is carried out through the Seas and 40 percent of the entire world trade passes through the SCS. Therefore, freedom of navigation through the Seas remains an important principle to be upheld by the international community.

At a G 7 meeting in Lubeck, Germany, convened this month to reflect on maritime domain security, the Foreign Ministers of the seven nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, US and the High Representative of the European Union) made a pointed reference to the situation East and South China Seas and expressed their concerns about ‘any unilateral actions, such as large scale reclamation which change the status quo and increase tensions’. They were against any attempts to assert claims through the use of intimidation, coercion or force. They also called for acceleration of work on a comprehensive Code of Conduct in the South China Sea and, in the interim, underlined their support for the 2002 ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of parties in the South China Sea.

ASEAN members like Vietnam and Philippines are the worst affected by China’s aggressive policies and they have been looking for outside support to balance China’s aggressiveness and safeguard their interests. Philippines has revived its defence pact with the US and is looking towards Washington for succor and help if Chinese push comes to a shove. Similarly, Vietnam has shored up its relationship with the US and has also become a member of the US sponsored Trans Pacific Partnership in order to adapt to changing dynamics in the region. However, many experts feel that Obama has been amiss in its efforts to ‘rebalance’ in Asia Pacific as it lacks commitment.

Yet, recently President Obama while speaking at the Caribbean Summit in Jamaica observed that “Where we get concerned with China is where it is not necessarily abiding by international norms and rules and is using its sheer size and muscle to force countries into subordinate positions”. Obama again expressed his concerns about China’s activities in South China Sea during Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to the US in end April. The U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Harry Harris Jr has also expressed his concerns about China’s creation of a “great wall of sand” in the South China Sea. U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter also recently expressed anxieties about the militarization of the South China Sea disputes.

India has been consistently supporting freedom of navigation and adherence to UNCLOS by all the parties to the dispute in the SCS. India’s own activities in the exploration of oil by ONGC Videsh Limited off the coast of the Vietnam but well within its EEZ have been impacted by China’s assertive approach. China has raised objections to India’s exploration activities. India’s External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj while addressing the 12th India-ASEAN meeting in Myanmar in August last year had supported freedom of navigation and access to resources in the South China Sea in accordance with principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Therefore, the ASEAN, India, Japan, Australia and the G7 nations need to work together in maintaining status quo in the South China Sea and influence China in resolving the dispute through peaceful means.

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Published Date: 5^th May 2015, Image Source: http://www.telegraph.co.uk

Round Table Discussion on “Implications of the likely Leadership Change(s) in the PRC and PLA Strategy on the South China Sea Issue”

A Taiwanese delegation visited Vivekananda International Foundation on 18 May 2012 to hold a Round Table Discussion on “Implications of the likely Leadership Change(s) in the PRC and PLA Strategy on the South China Sea Issue”. The delegation comprised of Dr. Cheng-kun Ma, Professor and Director of PLA Studies Division, National Defense University (NDU), ROC (Taiwan), Major James Peng, Instructor of National Defense University, Taiwan and Col. Hui-shin Chen, Director, Defence Division of Taipei Economic and Cultural Center (India).

At the outset, a comprehensive presentation was made by Dr. Cheng-kun Ma who started by explaining the dynamics of power structure and power transition in China, as well as the representation and influence of military personnel in the CPC Central Committee. During the course of power transition plenary sessions are held by the CPC Central Committee. The importance of the 7^th one was noted as it would be followed by the 18^th CPC Party National Assembly. 

He elaborated on the three important mobilisations that were initiated by the Communist Party during the 6^th Plenary Session (that was held last year). They are 1) Ideological/Loyalty Mobilisation during which the cadres are sent to the localities and the local party members are asked to show their loyalty and reach consensus with the Central Party leadership about the power transition arrangement (for the 18^th Party National Assembly) 2) Political Mobilisation in which the Prime Ministers produces a report for the National Assembly 3) Organisational Mobilisation through which they produce party representatives to participate in the national assembly, it includes people from a) Provincial level Party Organisation, b) Central Financial Institutions c) State owned Enterprises and d) PLA- Military.

He also touched on the issue of representation and influence of military personnel in the political sphere of China. It was stated that the Communist Party has absolute leadership over the military and it has no significant authority in the power transition and political decision making, as the army occupies a small percentage of seats in the Party National assembly (they occupy roughly 1/10^th of the seats in the 17^th National Assembly).

The presence of different factions namely Communist Youth League, Shanghai Gang and the Prince-lings and their leaders were brought out, as well as the delicate power balance arrangement between them was highlighted. It was also noted by Dr Ma that although the Central Committee makes political decisions about how many members would they have for the next party assembly however the different factions within it exert their influence in the decision making process depending on their power at that time. He also elaborated on the role and power of the nine members of the Standing Committee who form the core leadership in the political hierarchy of China.

He further spoke about the issue of the Crisis in the South China Sea highlighting the Scarborough Shoal Confrontation between China and the Philippines as well as bringing out the PLA strategy on the matter. He pointed out that China was insisting on absolute sovereignty over the shoal and were pushing for bilateral negotiations instead of multilateral dialogue. It was mentioned that while China persisted on a diplomatic solution to the confrontation it was preparing for an armed conflict. But Dr Ma noted that China does not intend to initiate a military confrontation and is just putting pressure on the other side in order to solve the issue before the Typhoon season (June- September) arrives and has to pull back from the region. Finally, he mentioned about the US warning to Philippines to refrain from doing anything provocative that could further lead to escalation of tensions between the two as China has made its intentions clear to the US over the crisis in the South China Sea.

Round Table Discussion on "Indo-U.S. Military Cooperation in the context of South Asian Security and the Way Ahead"

A Round Table discussion on “Indo-U.S. Military Cooperation in the context of South Asian Security and the Way Ahead” was held on 17 May 2012. The guest speaker, on the occasion was Dr. Amer Latif, currently visiting fellow with the Wadhwani Chair for U.S.-India Policy Studies at CSIS. Previously, he was director for South Asian affairs in the Office of South and Southeast Asian Affairs in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (OSDP).

Dr. Latif noted that the robust engagement with the Indian and U.S. militaries was only deepening, yet there is a need to take this out of the joint-exercises and operability context, to a larger strategic aim. The United States he averred was driven by the pivotal nature of engagement in the Indo-Pacific region arising from trade, energy and security compulsions. Further, U.S. withdrawal in the Afghanistan context is not a definite, rather there is going to be a decisive U.S. engagement, in West Asia too. The U.S. is reviving its old relations with Japan, Singapore, Australia, Philippines and others in the Indo-Pacific, even in the wake of assertive cross-regional engagement between the states.

The United States and India are natural partners and hold common views on the rise of China, aftermath of Afghanistan post -2014 and its stability equally is the issue of stability in Pakistan, concerns over nuclear weapons in Iran, maritime security and terrorism. The 2012 US Defence Strategic Guidance is significant to the extent of US support to India’s ability in upholding regional stability, even so not mentioning its long-time allies in the region like Japan, South Korea, and Australia etc.

Dr. Latif brought out some key challenges in moving forward in the Indian and U.S relationship from; (i) strategic challenge marked by a parallel set of interests - there is agreement on policy outcomes but disagreement on policy implementations, (ii) Political – a trust deficit by India on issues of technology transfer, drawdown from Afghanistan and U.S as a credible partner. Arms sales to both Pakistan and India seem incongruous in this sense. (iii) There is a significant bureaucratic challenge in attempting to communicate effectively. Some level of transparency and predictability can help produce informed decisions. (iv) The communications challenge in articulating to both the Indian and US constituencies the values of a deepening engagement.

Finally, he noted that there is a semblance of understanding domestic compulsions in shaping the future course of the bilateral engagement ranging from domestic political factors to economic crises and alternate foreign policy concerns.

The discussion was lively and focused on the future course of ties between India and the U.S. The Director, Vivekananda International Foundation, Ajit Doval brought the event to a close remarking that it would be expedient to conduct a joint study on prospective military-industry cooperation in India to include the possibility of joint projects with the US relating to defence production.