Showing posts with label Chabahar port. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Chabahar port. Show all posts

Thursday, April 16, 2015

The 2015 Iranian Nuclear Deal: Concerns and Expectations

Alvite Singh Ningthoujam, 
Research Associate, VIF

The much-awaited nuclear breakthrough has happened again when Iran and the P5+1 countries comprising of the United States (US), Russia, China, France, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) signed the “parameters” for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on 2 April 2015. As it was with the 2013 Geneva interim accord, this deal is considered as a “good deal” or a “historic understanding” by the US President Barack Obama. Simultaneously, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continues to consider the deal as a threat to Israel’s survival and to the region. A few of the Arab countries welcomed the deal but with “caution”. India, which is the second largest importer of Iranian crude oil, is watching the developments anxiously.

The Deal:

After a prolonged gridlock, Iran and P5+1 countries have finally agreed on some conditions, which would halt the former’s ambitions to acquire nuclear military capabilities. This particular deal has fructified only after Iran has consented to limit its nuclear capabilities in return for lifting of financial sanctions which were crippling its economy. That said easing of sanctions would come only if Iran remains committed to the framework agreed upon.

According to the parameters of the JCPOA, Iran agreed to scale down nearly two-thirds of its installed centrifuges. Out of 19,000 centrifuges installed, Iran would restrict to 6,104 under the deal, and only 5,060 would be enriching Uranium for 10 years. It should also be noted that these 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, or Iran’s first-generation centrifuges. On the enrichment, Iran would lower its stockpile of approximately 10,000 kilogram (kg) of low-enriched Uranium (LEU) to only 300 kg, or not to exceed enrichment beyond 3.67 percent. Another important parameter is the agreement of Iran to stop enriching Uranium at its Fordow facility for 15 years, and this facility would be converted into research centres for nuclear, physics and technology, etc. However, research and development related with Uranium enrichment in Fordow will no longer be conducted by Iran. The level of Uranium enrichment has always been a major point of contention between Iran and the Western countries involved in the negotiation process. Moreover, owing to the geographical location of the Fordow facility, which is deep beneath the ground and heavily fortified this particular parameter is a crucial one.

Another pivotal parameter is that Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges which are currently being installed at Natanz facility, and these would be monitored by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for ten years. Along with this, the Islamic Republic will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 models. Under the agreement, the IAEA will have constant monitoring on the nuclear activities undertaken by Iran. On reactors and reprocessing front, Iran and the P5+1 have agreed to redesign and rebuild the heavy water research reactor situated in Arak. This reactor, however, will assist in peaceful nuclear research and in the production of radioisotope but it will not produce any weapons grade plutonium. Further, all the spent fuel from this reactor will be shipped out of the country, and no additional heavy water reactors will be built for 15 years.

The above mentioned are a few of the parameters agreed by both the negotiating partners. That Iran entered into negotiations on issues such as reduction of stockpiles; reduction of levels of Uranium enrichment; constant monitoring of its nuclear facilities; is significant as its officials had vehemently opposed to any of these earlier. If Iran fulfils or abides by its commitments, it will receive the much-needed relief, that is, the lifting of US and European Union (EU) nuclear-related sanctions. This requires a thorough verification by the IAEA. These sanctions, however, will be restored if Tehran does not adhere to the 2-April parameters agreed in Lausanne. Nevertheless, those US sanctions on Iran on issues related to terrorism, abuses of human rights, and ballistic missiles will continue to remain in place.

The unveiling of the nuclear agreement framework ushered in a significant ray of hope for the Iranians, who have been surviving under a deteriorating economy for the last several years. It was certainly a big relief for the common Iranians; not only they took to the streets in different cities and they expressed their joy through social media tools such as Twitter, right after the announcement of the deal. The Iranian society, for all these years, has gradually learned to survive under tight economic sanctions, high-level inflation, and rising unemployment rate. As a result, rejoicing by the people from different quarters is justified. The efforts of the Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and his negotiating team were acknowledged by many in the country. Meanwhile, Iranian hardliners or conservatives criticised the deal as they considered it to be “a bargain for the West and a disaster for Iran.” It should also be recalled that Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, who came to power in 2013, was severely criticised for his efforts to normalise relations with the outside world, and the negotiation with the US-led Western countries on nuclear issues was particularly targeted. But the indirect backing from Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei helped reach the deal. The leader was believed to have lent his crucial support with a motive to end Iranian isolation in the international community, and to revive its economy.

Reactions from Israel and the GCC Countries

The harshest reactions, as expected, came from Iran’s arch-rival, Israel. Netanyahu, who considered the 2013 deal a “historic mistake”, reiterated his firm opposition to any sort of agreement between Iran and the West. Calling it a “bad deal” and a threat to Israel’s existence, he is now lobbying for support to “kill” this deal. Prior to the agreement, Netanytahu tweeted that, “Any deal must significantly roll back Iran’s nuclear capabilities and stop its terrorism and aggression.” Acknowledging Israel’s concerns, Obama called up Netanyahu and briefed the latter on the JCPOA, and he “emphasized that the United States remains steadfast in our commitment to the security of Israel.”But this did not budge the Israeli leader who still subscribes to the Iranian threat of “annihilating Israel”. Israel’s sense of insecurity has been heightened as the commander of the Basij militia of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards said that “erasing Israel off the map” is “non-negotiable”, just a couple of days before 2 April. Under such circumstances, the Jewish state would not take any agreement on Iranian nuclear programme lightly. The political spectrum in Israel, including Netanyahu’s opposition, raised their concerns about this agreement. As a result, Israel’s security cabinet unanimously opposed the deal. It was during this meeting the Israeli PM talked about “a clear and unambiguous recognition by Tehran of Israel's right to exist”, a demand which the US State Department and Obama bluntly rejected, considering it to be “fundamental misjudgement”.

The vehement opposition to the deal is described by Netanyahu: "This deal would legitimize Iran's nuclear program, bolster Iran's economy & increase Iran's aggression and terror. The alternative is standing firm and increasing the pressure on Iran until a better deal is achieved."

Obama’s repeated assurance of making Israel maintain a military advantage over Iran with its support is unlikely to alter the latter’s mood. As it is, the relationship between the two countries is undergoing a rough phase which got deepened with Netanyahu’s election campaign rhetoric. For the moment, it cannot be forecasted as to how the US would convince Israel about the ‘positive’ side of this deal, but from Israel’s side, it is very probable that it will lobby the US Congressmen and senators (mostly the Republicans) to pass legislation to thwart the comprehensive, or pressurise Washington D.C. to make “improvements” in the terms and conditions of the deal. Either of these two possibilities, however, seems to be a difficult task, if not impossible. Moreover, given the broad international support for this kind of agreement, it appears unlikely that Israel can prevent the final deal which will be signed on 30 June. And this will depend on how successfully Iran and the P5+1 nations will agree on the framework. This in itself is a humongous task before them.

With regard to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, ‘Cautious’ is the word that is best suited to describe their feelings. Although a few Arab countries welcomed the deal publicly, they seemed to have mixed feelings about the framework agreement. While the deal is expected to lead to more security and stability in the region as predicted by experts, many of the GCC countries have always viewed Iran as a rival that tried to expand its influence in war-torn Iraq, Yemen and Syria. A source indicated that the deal will ensure “more space to arm and finance proxies that Riyadh opposes in countries across the region”. As a result, Saudi Arabia, in particular, despite its public welcoming of the deal, remained extremely concerned about the wider implications of the framework. Riyadh viewed the Iranian nuclear programme with dismay, and it has already hinted at seeking its own atomic weapons, preferably from Pakistan, were Tehran to acquire nuclear weapons. There is a fear that a nuclear or an armament race in this region might be ignited as a result of the agreement, while renowned security expert Bruce Riedel said, “it [deal] will significantly reduce the risk of further proliferation in the Middle East.” Moreover, with its regional ambitions, this kingdom would view the American-Iranian rapprochement with fear as the deal, for them, will undermine their security and influence in the region. Similarly, the United Arab Emirates which has long-running dispute with Iran over three islands in the Persian Gulf has its own concerns even though its businessmen hope to benefit from the agreement as they could expand trade volumes with Iran. Likewise, Kuwait, Bahrain and Iraq continue to remain uneasy about the deal. The only country which has expressed warmest reception is Oman, which is believed to have contributed towards efforts leading to the breakthrough. In 2012, Oman brokered secret nuclear talks between Iran and the US.

Given the deep-rooted suspicion about Iran, many Arab leaders doubt the ability of the Iranians to stick to the agreements. An analyst on the region mentioned that, “Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the Gulf’s hawks, fear Iran’s international rehabilitation through the nuclear agreement will ease its political and economic isolation and embolden its designs in the Arab world”. These uncertainties reflect the cautious approach of the mentioned GCC countries towards the deal. It is yet to be seen how Obama’s upcoming conference with the GCC leaders at Camp David can actually assuage their concerns. The main agenda is to discuss “their security and the Iran diplomacy”. The US President, however, expressed that “The biggest threats that they face may not be coming from Iran invading. It’s going to be from dissatisfaction inside their own countries”. And, the general perception that this deal would bring calm or usher in a major shift in West Asia, which is engulfed by conflict, appears to be a tall claim, considering the entrenched sectarianism and political discord that exist between different sects in the region.

India’s Expectations:

India, too, “hailed the agreement” as a “significant step” towards a comprehensive settlement of the Iranian nuclear dispute. According to a Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) statement, “The announcement yesterday underlines the success of diplomacy and dialogue, which India has always supported and which we hope would lead to a comprehensive agreement by June 30”. If the deal is finalised without further obstacles, there are certain benefits which India can enjoy. These are mainly in areas pertaining to economic transactions and energy-trade, which at the moment, have remained hampered due to the sanctions. For instance, after the 2013 interim agreement, India imported from Iran 276,800 barrels per day (bpd) of oil and condensate in 2014, as compared to that of 195,600 bpd in 2013. But the unresolved payment imbroglio for the import of Iranian crude oil; inability to streamline trade between the two countries and various other issues have downgraded the bilateral ties visibly. As a result, the Lausanne-deal is being looked at with lots of expectations in India.

Since the last few years, India has been facing the adverse impact of the economic sanctions on Iran. Severity of the US pressure was such that it had to halt importing Iranian oil in March 2015, the first time in at least a decade. Moreover, New Delhi has been unable to pay Iran approximately US$8.8 billion for imports of oil. Due to this, the Indo-Iranian bilateral trade, which is currently estimated at US$15 billion, has been adversely affected. These issues are expected to be streamlined if the negotiating partners reach a final agreement two months later. As an immediate impact, it has been reported that Essar Oil and Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Ltd have planned to import oil from Iran sometime from this month (April). Despite this, it would be unrealistic to expect a quantum rise in Iranian oil imports as the earlier dues need to be cleared, that too, by having a proper payment mechanism in place.

An added optimism out of this deal is that it will provide an incentive for India and Iran to play a proactive role in the reconstruction process of Afghanistan. Therefore, the agreement happens at a crucial juncture when the US is aiming to complete the withdrawal of its troops by the end of 2016. The newly-elected Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government, in late 2014, approved India’s participation in the development of Chabahar port in Iran by sanctioning approximately US$85 million. This amount will be utilised for the construction of two berths that would include container terminal and a multi-purpose cargo terminal. The importance of this port lies in the fact that it would offer an alternative route to the landlocked Afghanistan and resource rich countries in Central Asia without actually depending on Pakistan.

Along with the above expectations, also comes a little bit of concern. Indians, who are heralding the nuclear deal, should also be mindful of the fact that there are high chances of Indian companies facing a stiff competition inside the Iranian markets, should the final agreement be reached. The European and American companies will make unrelenting efforts to tap the Iranian economy. It is now in the hands of the Indian policy planners to reap the benefits of this thawing Iran-West relation. Tellingly, these projections will be actualised only if the final deal is clinched; as a result, India needs to have clear visions about its course of actions with Iran, should there be any negative fallout on nuclear talks. It is quite evident that the opening of Iran to the West and removal of sanctions presents India with an opportunity to strengthen its relationship with Iran in many ways.

As the Lausanne breakthrough provides only a framework, a major task is still left for the negotiators to convert it into the final nuclear deal. This in itself is going to be an important challenge. The potential for sabotaging deal is ever present as the Republicans in the US Congress and Israeli leaderships are dead against the deal with Iran. As a result, there is no room for complacency. It remains to be seen whether Obama’s foreign policy skills and leadership acumen can achieve the goals of the deal.

Published Date: 16th April 2015, Image Source: http://www.financialexpress.com

Tuesday, April 2, 2013

Afghanistan Economy Post 2014: Prospects and Issues


Brig (retd) Vinod Anand 
(Senior Fellow, VIF)

Secure and stable conditions remain crucial prerequisites for development and growth of economy. Though there are some analysts who believe that development and growth can take place without necessarily ensuring security first. However, that could be a self-serving argument without any solid basis for its support. Afghanistan which remains in turmoil and where plans for withdrawal of NATO/ISAF and US forces have been announced has started experiencing the adverse impact of the drawdown in both security and economy related areas.

While several statistics are given out about decrease in number of violent attacks by the Taliban yet it is also well known that the area of operations of Taliban has been expanding to cover areas in the North and the West where Taliban activity had been absent hitherto before. Though it might also be true that the number of attacks by the Taliban has decreased yet it might be a ploy of the Taliban to lie low till the western forces withdraw and thereafter test the mettle of Afghan National Security Forces which, sadly, is unlikely to be up to the mark for quite some time to come.

Meanwhile, the capital amassed by the private Afghan entrepreneurial class and wealthy Afghans has been flying out of Kabul to places in the Middle-East. Further, with draw down of the western forces and drying up of civil aid the Afghan economy is expected to suffer in a great measure. The World Bank has estimated that Afghanistan will face a projected financing gap of 25 percent of GDP by 2021-22. This in turn could impact security situation and development adversely.

There is another view that draw down of the western forces may not impact the Afghan economy much as most of the international funds do not stay in Afghanistan and find a way out in the shape as expatriated profits, salaries and imports. According to the latest Asian Development Bank Outlook, the planned foreign troop pullout by 2014 may lower growth by at least 2-3 percentage points which is being considered as not much of a decline in growth. There is also a belief that while the short-term impact of decline in aid could be disruptive there would be benefits in the long term. The World Bank has also presented a similar picture.

The international/ world wide experience is that political stability has been one of the key factors or rather a crucial factor for a successful transition. In this regard the examples of Cambodia, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa and Vietnam have been cited where the countries transitioned from conflict to stability and development. However, what needs to be remembered is that political, security and economic environment prevailing in every conflict-ridden country are usually unique and therefore unique solutions need to be found. Afghanistan in recent years has seen rapid economic growth which could be due to exogenous factors; what is yet to be seen is whether Afghanistan can create an economy which is self-sustaining. For its economy to become self-sustaining it would require international help for many years to come.

Along with stability, security remains another crucial factor for foreign investment and development. Unless there is a degree of security there will be little incentive for investment especially from private sector. On the other hand lack of development is also one of the major causes for insurgency and conflict. Thus it may be difficult to decide on priority between security and development. But with the planned exit (and that too at somewhat faster pace than announced earlier) there are anxieties and apprehensions that security situation is likely to worsen rather than improve and this would have negative impact on the investment climate. Can ANSF ensure security considering their yet to be developed capacities? The answer would most probably be in the negative.

It is also well-accepted that Afghanistan has large deposits of mineral and hydrocarbon resources exploitation of which could generate enough revenue for Afghanistan to move towards becoming self-sustainable. The gestation period for most of these projects, however is going to be long- thus full benefits would accrue only in the long run. To evacuate the finished products or ore from such resources would require building of the infrastructure in terms of roads, railway lines and pipelines which would also be adversely impacted by the geo-political interests of the stakeholders.

While China has planned to develop Aynak copper mines it is yet to start digging or commence this project in a meaningful way. Security remains the paramount concern. So far as its exploitation of hydro carbon reserves is concerned China National Petroleum Corporation has started production of oil in a small way in Amu Darya basin in Northern Afghanistan; the production is expected to rise to 25,000 to 40,000 barrels a day by end of the year. However, there appear to be some local rivalries and interests of the local warlords etc. which do not appear have to be taken into account. If everything turns out as planned the Chinese would also be setting up a refinery which would further add to government’s revenues and possibly create more job opportunities for the local populace.

Similarly, if and when India’s Hajigak iron ore mine project is realised it is expected to create 200 million US dollars per year revenue for the government. Hajigak's contract details include building of rail road, steel industry, power plant and others infra structure. There are plans to build railway line with linkages to Chabahar port; the other alternative could be trucking the products out which would slow down the rate of exploitation resulting into reduced volumes and lower economic activity and revenues- all this would depend on a number of factors including the expected returns from the project. Easier alternative would have been by transportation of products overland through Pakistan but obtuse policies of Pakistan prevent it from granting direct access to India.

India had also hosted an investors’ conference in June 2012 that focussed on inviting companies and businessmen to invest in Afghanistan. The conference was attended by private investors from 40 countries. The conference was timely as it was held between the Chicago and Tokyo conferences (May and July 2012)- one was about security funding i.e. for ANSF and the other for development aid (16 billion US $ over 4 years).

Five senior ministers handling mining, commerce and finance were in attendance. And they went out of their way to assure potential investors. As Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady, Afghanistan’s commerce minister said: “When you take into account the high level of risk, the return on investing in Afghanistan is much greater than most other parts of the world … Your investment will not only benefit you and your employees but also create conditions that will promote peace and stability in Afghanistan and the wider region.”

But investors who got a fair idea of opportunities for investment in Afghanistan seem to have adopted wait and watch stance. They appear to be waiting for the outcome of Presidential elections set for April 2014 and the impact of troops’ withdrawal on security and stability. No substantial commitments seem to have been made though the Afghan reps made good presentations about the incentives offered in terms of tax breaks, 100 percent ownership, easy repatriation of profits etc.

And of course, there is the question of Afghanistan’s geo-strategic location as a hub of multi-modal corridors in all directions. If the benefits of such a location are to be realised then regional cooperation is imperative. Presently, many of the regional players have their own versions of Silk Road strategies. America, China, Russia, Pakistan and even India have their own visions of such a strategy. While many initiatives for regional cooperation in building infrastructure through Afghanistan have been announced there is very little that has been accomplished on ground.

According to one Indian estimate if even 20 percent of the South and South East Asian trade were to pass through Afghanistan to Central Asia and beyond to Europe it would generate sufficient revenues for Afghanistan to become self-sustainable in the long run.

Further, traditional sectors that would aid economy are agricultural, health and education sectors- the agricultural and human resource potential are underdeveloped. They all need careful attention by the government and donors for accelerating growth, skill development and generating more jobs.

Thus, for the Afghan economy to stand on its own feet at least one to two decades would be required when all such projects could possibly be realised. Meanwhile, there is a serious risk of Afghan economy witnessing a down turn and therefore, the foreign aid and assistance would continue to be needed if the gains made so far are not to be lost.

Providing Security for the Projects

Foreign investment, especially by the private sector remains inhibited due to security concerns. Karzai has admitted that security situation was still fragile and attacks by Taliban are likely to continue post-2014.

So what are the alternatives or options available for providing security?

(a) It is business of the government to provide security for business enterprises in their territory- so ANSF would need to take on the task. Alternatively, a para military force could be created from demobilised ANA soldiers especially for this task. In any case over next few years the strength of ANSF is planned to be reduced from peak strength of 352,000(195,000 ANA, 157,000 ANP) to 228,500 by 2017; a large number of soldiers also leave after finishing their terms of engagement. (Planning for a $4.1 billion ANSF budget during 2017-2024, the United States expects to contribute about $2.3 billion yearly, and $500 million per year would be provided by the Afghan government, with that figure to rise steadily until 2024, at which time Afghans would have the capacity to provide funding themselves.)

(b) The second model is provision of security personnel by the country investing in Afghanistan which again is fraught with risks and additional costs in terms possible lives lost and money. This was tried out by India during construction of Zeranj-Delaram road in Nimroz province where the construction costs rose many fold and there were loss of lives in terms of security personnel and workers killed.

(c) Third possible alternative could be to provide international guarantees to the foreign investors to mitigate the risks of investing.