Our major foreign policy challenges are enduring and no dramatic
change in our security environment is likely in 2014. Relations with
Pakistan could actually worsen. Nawaz Sharif is focusing on Kashmir,
knowing that it is a dead-end issue. His strong links with Punjab-based
jihadi groups, the continuing grip of the Pakistani military on policies
towards India, his adviser Sartaz Aziz’s new environmentalist twist
that India vacate Siachen to cease polluting Pakistan’s waters,
Pakistan’s prevarication on DGMO talks to end LOC firings, relegating
the MFN issue to the back-drawer, are all negative portents.
Afghan Problem
Developments in Afghanistan can potentially worsen our security
environment as the prospects of stability there are uncertain. US/UK
efforts to accommodate the Taliban with Pakistan’s cooperation
facilitates the latter’s re-entry into Afghanistan even though it is the
most de-stabilisation factor there. This will strain our strategic
partnership with Afghanistan, requiring us to re-write our plans for
investment there and we will not obtain access to Central Asian oil and
gas resources. Our security threat from extremist ideologies backed by
Pakistani hostility will increase.
Hobbled China Policy
China is becoming more self-assertive with its growing economic and
military power. Its conduct in the western Pacific signals that its
seemingly softer posture towards us currently can turn harder if it
suits its strategy. Its position on border differences remains
intrinsically hard and border negotiations from progressing on equitable
terms will be prevented. It seeks a stabilisation of the status quo
which gives it freedom to nibble away at our territory in sensitive
areas. Our military and infrastructure expansion plans are medium term
and will not materially change equations in 2014. Our China policies are
handicapped by excessive prudence, now influenced also by domestic
economic lobbies.
Rifts in India-Us Ties
Improved India-US ties was an external gain in recent years but the
difficulties in managing an unequal relationship and differences on key
multilateral issues have exposed the limitations of forging real
strategic ties. The prevailing view is that relations have already
reached a plateau. US corporates, once the strongest proponents of
stronger India-US ties, have become powerful critics of our trade,
investment and tax policies. Our nuclear liability law has become a sore
point, with the expanded defence relationship not satisfying those who
expect greater returns from India for the nuclear deal. India is
skeptical of the US re-balancing towards Asia and does not want to be
caught in the uncertain outcomes of US-China rivalry in the background
of huge mutual interdependence. These fault-lines will continue to test
the resilience of India-US ties in 2014. Added to this is the current
diplomatic wrangle over the deplorable treatment of a senior Indian
diplomat in New York, which is symptomatic of the moral fraud and
arrogance that permeates US handling of international affairs whose
victims can be friendly countries like India too. The tide of antipathy
towards the US in India’s diplomatic cadre is so strong currently that
its after-effects will be palpably felt in our dealings with the US in
2014.
Uncertainties
Our relations with Russia, too dependent on defence acquisitions
while being stagnant economically, remain lop-sided. India’s commitment a
strategic partnership with Russia remains strong but nourishing it is
becoming difficult because even on nuclear cooperation issues our
nuclear liability law is an obstacle. No new breakthroughs with Russia
are visible for 2014. The European Union is a vital partner
commercially, but the finalisation of the FTA with it in 2014 is
uncertain. With individual European countries like France, UK and
Germany, ties are stable and will remain so. The limited nuclear
breakthrough between the US and Iran could, if it got consolidated in
2014, remove a major obstacle in the way of a normal India-Iran
relationship, but the outlook is not certain.
Neighbourhood Issues
Our neighbourhood will remain problematic. Nepal is unable to settle
down politically, giving the Chinese room for manoeuvre at our cost. The
cracks in Bangladesh’s polity are becoming unbridgeable. Our inability
to boost Sheikh Hasina politically with the Teesta Accord and the Land
Boundary Agreement has been short-sighted. A pro-India political leader
of a major Muslim country combating Islamism within is an exceptional
phenomenon that we have failed to capitalise on, which we may rue if
things go wrong for us in 2014 in Bangladesh. Sri Lanka has artfully
pursued a policy of engaging us enough to blunt strong Indian reactions
to the strategic openings it is providing China. Delhi is caught between
domestic and external pulls on its Sri Lanka policy, to the detriment
of our national interest. We have lost ground in the Maldives. 2014 does
not offer hopes of improvement in our regional position.
If the opposition comes to power in 2014, the country’s mood may
change, but how much improved sentiment will bring better external
results is doubtful. Our adversaries are strong, our challenges are
complex and our friends cannot be depended on beyond a point. We have to
rely on ourselves, which is the logic of our strategic autonomy. For
self-reliance and more effective external projection, we need better,
more decisive governance, which our fractured polity does not guarantee
us in 2014.
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