Brig (Retd) Vinod Anand,
Senior Fellow, VIF
The events in Afghanistan seem to be turning a full circle.
‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ that commenced in the aftermath of
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks is drawing to a close and plans are
afoot to hand over Afghanistan to the very forces that were the root
cause of the problems in Afghanistan. The American strategy has been
shifting and its objectives have been diluted over a period of time.
Disruption and dismantling of the Taliban networks is no more their
objective. While their current strategy definition aims to build capable
and transparent Afghan security and governing institutions and move to a
supporting role and then transfer full responsibility to the Afghans by
the end of 2014, it cannot be said that they have been successful in
their endeavours so far.
The neighbours of Afghanistan and Pakistan would be the worst
sufferers of the adverse fallout from a Talibanised Afghanistan. Laying
down of timeline for withdrawal without attaining the necessary
benchmarks for ensuring a self-sustaining Afghanistan in terms of
governance, security and economic parameters has created its own
dynamics which does not bode well for the future of Afghanistan.
If the politics of Afghanistan holds, then the security scenario is
expected to improve with concomitant positive impact on economy.
However, the most dangerous trend which is apparent from a series of
attempts by the American leaders is to outsource reconciliation with the
Taliban to the Pakistani establishment. Afghanistan’s High Peace
Council’s ‘Peace Process Roadmap to 2015’document points towards
Pakistan becoming the main arbiter of Afghanistan’s destiny at the cost
of Afghans and the regional stakeholders. In any case the Afghan
reconciliation process remains stymied because of the competing
interests of all the entities involved in the process. Further, the
Afghan war is not popular domestically and there is no upside to the
European and American economies for the time being.
The current situation in Afghanistan can be best described as
‘complex and uncertain’. Afghanistan is a country amid transition and
2014 is the year when many of the components of the transition are
supposed to reach fruition. However, many elements of these Afghan
transitions themselves remain inextricably entwined influencing each
other in different and complex ways. For example, it may not be
possible to usher in economic development in Afghanistan till some
modicum of political stability and security has been achieved.
Afghanistan of today is much different from that of 2001; years of
infusion of western aid coupled with many million Afghan children going
to school and many other accomplishments and the gains of the last
decade or so of western engagement would be lost if the Taliban were
allowed to return to power. Despite the fact that Taliban continues to
carry out targeted operations there is still a semblance of relative
stability and prosperity due to presence of western troops.
However, there are many uncertainties about the future political,
security and economic environment which is impacted by combination of
factors by varying degrees generating several likely future scenarios.
These factors include: a level of overall Western assistance,
implications of inevitable foreign aid cuts, sustainability of the
Afghan National Security Force (ANSF), the number of American/western
troops to be left behind, the outcome of the 2014 elections, the
prospect of a political settlement, future of the insurgency, Pakistan
as a factor and the competing objectives of the regional players.
Political Factors Impacting Security
Afghanistan’s engagement with the West and conduct of elections and
ushering in of democracy have planted the seeds of modernity in the
Afghan civil society even though the elections conducted so far may not
have adhered strictly to the norms of western democracies. The
influence of civil society activists and independents in the National
Assembly has been growing due to many factors including access to media.
Yet, they have been struggling against the traditional factional
leaders to have a say in the policy. It is also seen that even in
security organs Pashtuns, Tajiks and others, of all factional
affiliations, have worked together relatively well.
Therefore, free and fair conduct of forthcoming Presidential
elections in April 2014 is being seen as an important factor in
providing stability to post-2014 Afghanistan. Political trends indicate
a degree of dissonance between President Karzai and the US,
differences on how the reconciliation process should proceed, the role
of Pakistan and an American perception that Karzai intends to hold on to
power or at least would install his own candidate as President
through possibly a stage managed elections (using the election
machinery) in 2014.
Further, while the US and Afghanistan have concluded a Strategic
Partnership Agreement in 2012, Karzai has so far been reluctant to
conclude a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) that could involve giving
long term basing rights to the US forces and immunity to troops from
prosecution. Afghanistan has clarified that these negotiations are
premised on the understanding that the United States does not seek
permanent military bases in Afghanistan, or a presence that was
perceived as a threat to Afghanistan's neighbours. However, Karzai has
been accused of using the BSA negotiations as a tool to sort out
internal political wrangles. Even after the Loya Jirga meeting held in
end November had approved the signing of the BSA, Karzai wants the same
to be approved by new Assembly after the elections in April 2014.
Trends in ongoing reconciliation efforts seem to indicate that all
the parties to the negotiations have different approaches to the
negotiations. While Afghan regime wants the talks to be Afghan-owned,
Afghan-led and Afghan controlled process as endorsed in many of the
international conferences on Afghanistan, Pakistan wants to be the main
driver of eventual reconciliation between the Afghans. Apparently, the
US and many other western nations who were making reconciliation efforts
and talking directly to the Taliban representatives seem to have
outsourced their efforts to Pakistan. Pakistan’s duplicity and deceit in
the West’s war on terror has now been rewarded by making Pakistan as
the main arbitrator of Afghan destiny.
Prospects of success of reconciliation efforts do not look good
because of a number of factors including the stance of Pakistan. The
Taliban have not been militarily defeated and not very keen to come to
the negotiating table. Karzai’s efforts at reconciliation with the
Taliban have floundered so far including his visit to Doha in first week
of April for the same purpose. However, some efforts for reconciliation
are still on behind the scenes and there may be some forward movement
after the elections in Afghanistan in April 2014.
Finally, there has to be a political solution and not a military one
though a strong military action should have been able to bring the
insurgents to the negotiating table. A negotiated outcome has the
potential to usher in peace and stability in Afghanistan. However, a
forced reconciliation is unlikely to lead to sustainable peace. Further,
reconciliation should not become a code word for surrender or handing
over power to the Taliban. A Taliban dominated government is not
acceptable to most of the Afghans and even to its neighbours except
Pakistan. Non-Pashtuns and anti-Taliban forces also need to be co-opted
in the peace efforts.
Trends in Security
There has been a clear increase in the number of attacks launched by
the Taliban in 2013, year on year as compared to 2012. Thus, there has
been a general increase in insurgent activity including increased number
of insider attacks on the Afghan local police. On the other hand, it
can also be said that Afghan national security Forces after having taken
over the lead role in operations have fared well. They have withstood
the Taliban offensive even though their rate of causalities has been far
more than the coalition forces.
Taliban had launched their annual spring offensive, ‘Operation Khalid
bin Walid’ in March this year. According to a Taliban spokesman , the
offensive was to “consist of special military tactics quantity and
quality wise while successful insider attacks, to eliminate foreign
invaders, will be carried out by infiltrating Mujahideen inside enemy
bases in a systematic and coordinated manner." The DOD report of July
2013 states that there had been some “regression” (loss of security) in
several provinces, including Wardak, Faryab, Farah, and Herat1.
Evidently, the Taliban’s focus was on weaker forces like ANP, local
police to undermine their organizational cohesion, and morale. The aim
was to seize initiative. According to Gen. Salim Ehsas, Chief of
the Afghan Police forces, the militants have carried out 6000 attacks
all across the country. 1,273 Afghan public order police service members
and 779 Afghan local police (ALP) officers along with 856 civilians
lost their lives. According to Gen. Dunford Afghan casualties are among
my top concerns,” and stated that ANSF was suffering in some cases 100
to 120 causalities per week2.
ANSF conducted around 300 independent military operations and over
1,500 joint military operations with coalition security forces in the
current campaigning season3. Though the overall causality
numbers in case of ANSF are not being released as some sort of a
security measure yet it has been reported that the causality rates among
Afghan security forces have increased by 80 percent compared to 2012.
This is further compounded by the fact that the attrition rates of ANSF
have also increased to 35 percent4. Though such rates appear
to be alarming yet the ANSF has somehow been able to maintain sufficient
strength in their units. However, large numbers of casualties and
inadequate facilities for their evacuation adversely affect morale and
have negative impact on recruitment and attrition.
As part of their overall strategy, the Taliban has targeted key
officials of the Afghan government and vulnerable military and civilian
installations. Though, of late number of such attacks has declined. The
key objective of the Taliban is to continue to expand their areas of
influence and operations with a view to acquire a predominant position
if and when negotiations take place.
It has been estimated that Taliban’s strength is between 25,000 to
30,000 fighters with various degrees of commitment to the cause. The
Haqqani network operating in the North-East Afghanistan with launch pads
in North Waziristan Tribal agency of Pakistan has a strength of about
3000 personnel while Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s group is estimated to have
1000 fighters.
One of the major tactics employed by the Taliban is the use of IEDs;
US military commanders have been increasingly concerned by the number of
deaths caused by the use of IEDs. Year 2010 saw a considerable jump
over the number of fatalities over 2009 due to IEDs. Year 2011 saw some
decline yet the number of total fatalities (492) and the portion (252)
of fatalities due to IEDs was quite large. Years 2012 and 2013 have
seen a decline in IED fatalities.
Another tactic used by the Taliban has been to increase the use of
infiltrators into the ANSF and cause maximum causalities to both ANSF
and coalition troops. This is further supplemented by Taliban’s
leadership’s instructions that civilian casualties should be avoided.
Evidently, the Taliban is attempting to shape the perceptions of the
common populace and win them over through improved relations with local
leaders and elders and use local Imams and teachers to indoctrinate
students in Taliban ideology and outlook.6 Added to this is
another developing trend though as yet not very pronounced wherein ANSF
have been concluding local ceasefires and making many other such
arrangements with the insurgents. The ISAF for the time being thinks
that such pacts may prove to be beneficial to impart some flexibility
and stability in post-2014 situation. However, adverse effects of such
arrangements should not be underestimated as the past experience
dictates that such understandings have been used by the Taliban to
expand and consolidate their influence and presence7.
Further, according to the Pentagon estimates, there is a large core
of the Taliban which remains loyal to the Taliban insurgency headed by
Mullah Omar headquartered at Quetta.
Uncertainty over Quantum of US/ISAF Forces
There have been many statements made by the US leadership that the US
and coalition troops are going to stay in Afghanistan though no
quantity has been agreed upon as yet. Gen. James Mattis, Commander of US
Central Command before retiring in March, stated that a total of 20,000
troops (13,600 of US and balance by other NATO partners) would stay
post-2014; while Lt. Gen. Dunford, Commander of US/ISAF forces in
Afghanistan had not indicated any numbers when questioned by Senate
Armed Services Committee. AT a NATO meeting in February 2013, the size
of force remaining behind in post-2014 was mentioned as 8,000 to 12,000
US forces and about 5,000 from other partners of the coalition. The
residual force is to consist of ‘trainers and mentors’ with unspecified
number of counter-terrorism forces. But the size of residual forces
still remains a question mark with some analysts even assessing that the
Americans might renege on their long term commitment and pull out lock
stock and barrel if the situation worsens in the coming years; if not in
2014, it might fully withdraw by say 2016. The objective of such a
residual force is ‘to ensure sustainable stability until Afghans can
provide for their own security’.
Quantum of western troops staying back after the end of their combat
mission in December 2014 has become contingent on the conclusion a BSA
which would determine the status and role of U.S. forces. The main
demand of the US is that the US forces should remain outside the
jurisdiction of the Afghan law and be subject to the US military courts.
The US is keen that ANSF handle their own security needs and is ready
to leave behind some troops in advisory and training capacity but for
protection of the US troops, BSA is necessary. There is also a mention
of a ‘Zero Option’ i.e. no troops stay behind if BSA is not concluded
but then this may be only a tactic to force the Afghans to sign the BSA.
Eventually, the BSA may be signed in some form or the other as the
interests of both sides are aligned. On the other hand, a demand for
similar agreement by the US forces in Iraq failed to materialize and the
American troops had to withdraw.
The above problems would be further compounded by an under resourced, under equipped and not fully trained security forces.
ANSF Development
The planned strength of 352,000 (195,000 ANA and 157,000 ANP) has
not been achieved due to various contextual factors. There are plans to
reduce the strength to 228,500 by 2018 so that Afghanistan is able to
sustain its forces (financially more viable) However, according to a US
GAO report released in October 2013 the ANSF may be short by over
15,000 personnel and the efficiency or training levels have been lowered
in assessment procedures. A claimed improvement in the effectiveness
of Afghan security forces has been partly due to the lowering of
standards by U.S.-led forces.
As mentioned earlier, the annual attrition rate for the Afghan Army
is now 35 percent, according to U.S. military commanders, provoking an
enormous churn in the ranks.
The Pentagon’s inspector general reported (March 2013) that the
extensive U.S.-led coalition effort to develop the Afghan National
Army’s command-and-control capabilities, which are crucial in executing
counterinsurgency operations on its own, “had produced a marginally
sufficient” system. The ANA “did not yet have the ability to plan and
conduct sustained operations without U.S. and Coalition support,” the
DOD IG report said.
According to a Regional Command Annual Assessment Report (RASR) of
September 2013, only 20 ANA out of 65 and 8 ANP units out of 21surveyed
(which were assessed during the month of September 2013) have been
assessed as fully capable. Further, according to the UN
Secretary-General, there remains a notable shortage of logistical, air
support, medical evacuation, and counter improvised explosive device
(IED) capabilities within the ANSF. Despite a clear recognition from a
number of senior US/NATO officers of the need for more balance between
combat and specialized combat arms like armoured corps, artillery,
engineers etc., tangible action to address this issue has not been
taken.
Recruitment and retention policies as well as the quality attracting
the suitable, committed and educated individuals both in the ranks as
well as officers would continue to pose difficulties. Given the low
levels of education facilities in Afghanistan, it is not surprising to
find that approximately 70% of ANA is functionally illiterate. To mould
them into an effective army would be a challenging task. There is also
an essential imperative of having an ethnically diverse army. A rough
estimate indicates that while the presence of Pashtuns at all levels
corresponds to their general proportion of the population, Tajiks
continue to dominate the officer and NCO ranks. In contrast, Hazaras,
Uzbek and other minorities are significantly under represented. These
discrepancies promote factionalism and create negative dynamics.
Further, there is still a debate on whether US air assets in post
2014 Afghanistan would not only support ISAF but also ANSF. The
deficiency of air support to ANSF would definitely affect their
operational performance. There are reports the United States will
transfer to the ANSF some mortars, long-range artillery, and unarmed
remotely piloted vehicles8. On the other hand, there are also
indications that the US and western forces are more keen to make ANA as
a counter insurgency force rather than a regular standing army which
can defend its borders from any type of external threats. Regular army
has implications for increased financial burden which they may be
unwilling to bear. Further, they also appear to be mindful of
Pakistan’s sensitivities about a strong ANA.
The size of ANSF, especially ANA, is required to be determined based
on internal as well as external threats to the country. One of the means
to achieve the economic scale for the security forces would be to
ensure that such threats, which essentially come from Pakistan based and
supported insurgents, is reduced by regional and global initiatives.
In any case, there is an immediate need to create/strengthen as well
as institutionalize a cohesive security structure which should evolve
policies regarding important questions such as ultimate force size,
equipment as well as infrastructure expenditure. At the moment, such
vital decisions are being taken mostly on ad hoc basis.
The Afghan security forces are going to continue to depend upon
international assistance for foreseeable future; funding requirements of
ANSF have been agreed to in Chicago Summit last year but the key
question is whether the fund promised (US and partners 3.6 billion
dollars per year plus 500 million to be provided by Afghanistan) would
be made available. These funds, if provided, may not be sufficient for
development and sustainment of the ANSF. The funds are also for a four
year period till 2017. Long term commitment of funds is absent and it is
tied up with many conditions to be met by the Kabul government.
Pakistan as a Source of Insecurity
The double role of Pakistan in Afghanistan has been well recognized
by the western nations and even some experts and authors of Pakistani
origin have verified to this effect. Many recent writings point out that
Pakistani’ establishment’s policy of treating Afghanistan as ‘strategic
depth’ may be undergoing a change because of the existential threat
from its own terrorist and extremist groups. While the newly installed
government in Pakistan has made some positive noises its credentials and
its capability to deliver remain suspect. In fact, the new Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif has made statements to please every stakeholder.
He has been attempting to juggle too many balls hoping that none falls.
However, there is no tangible evidence to support the fact that Pakistan
is ready to become part of the solution in Afghanistan. Though,
officially Pakistan supports an Afghan-led and Afghan controlled
negotiation process, it has exhibited its prowess in disrupting the
reconciliation process by releasing/arresting Taliban leaders who do not
toe its line. Pakistan’s need to be the driver of reconciliation
process is driven by its obsession of bringing a government in Kabul
which is not friendly to India in any manner whatsoever. Having provided
havens and resources to the Taliban in its territory, Pakistan
envisages a Taliban dominated/influenced government in Afghanistan that
follows its strategic discourse. There is also widespread belief amongst
the Pakistani leadership that once the western forces withdraw, the
ANSF would not be able to sustain itself and would collapse in the face
of onslaught by the Taliban with some help from Pakistan as was done
during mid-1990s. This is a possibility if ‘Zero Option’ is exercised by
the U.S. and the donor commitment to funds for Afghanistan wanes and is
finally withdrawn. An apt analogy is that of Najibullah government
whose armed forces continued to provide security from 1989 to 1992 when
the Russian aid was finally withdrawn. That resulted in the collapse of
the armed forces and the government.
There is a climate of fundamental distrust between the governments in
Kabul and Pakistan. The ANA is also not keen to accept in a meaningful
way the offer by Pakistan to train its armed forces. Somehow Pakistani
establishment feels that President Karzai is better disposed towards
India and encourages expansion of Indian influence in Afghanistan.
Pakistan, on the other hand, continues to support Quetta Shura led by
Mullah Omar, Haqqani group and Hekmatyar factions of Taliban which have
been carrying out attacks inside Afghanistan for many years.
In any case, other than Pakistan there is no other neighbour of
Afghanistan who favours installation of a Taliban government in
Afghanistan. No country in the region wants Afghanistan to become a
haven for terrorists who would embark on a regional and global jihad
after having tasted victory against the erstwhile super power USSR and
now the reigning super power US.
Implications for India
India’s efforts in Afghanistan are shaped by its commitment to build a
peaceful, stable and prosperous Afghanistan that is bereft of extremist
and radical ideologies. Its principal objective is to build indigenous
Afghan capacity and institutions which cover almost all sectors. India’s
reconstruction and developmental programmes have been devised in a
manner that supports the priorities of the Afghan government and its
people. Besides the aid of over 2 billion US dollars, Indian companies
are also in the process of investing 10 to 11 billion US dollars in the
Hagijak iron ore mines and the connected ancillaries. India is investing
in mineral, agricultural and other sectors to help build a sustainable
economy. As part of the Istanbul process, India has also been
instrumental in encouraging other countries to invest in Afghanistan.
Promoting Afghanistan as a regional hub for trade and commerce would not
only help Afghanistan in integrating its economy with the region but it
would also enable Kabul to earn adequate transit revenues to sustain
its government’s budget including that of the ANSF over the long term.
India had signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement with Afghanistan
in 2011 which catered for providing Kabul with both military and
non-military aid. India has been training ANSF personnel in its
academies and military institutions. While Karzai has been pressing
India to provide military equipment like artillery guns and tanks, India
has been keen to provide only non-lethal equipment. India’s reticence
in supplying such weapon system is possibly shaped by the likelihood of
the same falling into the Taliban or even Pakistani hands. India has
also been telling the US and other western countries to leave such
equipment that enables the ANSF to perform their tasks efficiently
before they withdraw. However, there is growing opinion amongst some
strategic thinkers that India can afford to give some regiments of 105mm
artillery guns which are being phased out. Similarly, some older
versions of tanks can also been given though there might be some issues
about their origin. Afghanistan has also requested for transport
aircraft like AN-12 and some MI-17 helicopters which is within the
capability of India to provide. Problems of some of the equipment and
weapon systems being of Russian origin can be resolved after
consultations with Moscow. Such equipment would go a long way to help
ANA improve its defensive capabilities.
Further, India has also agreed to provide trainers for the Afghan
National Army academy that has been established by the UK and is
modeled on Sandhurst. India is also likely to deploy technicians to run
an old military hardware maintenance facility in Afghanistan. As part of
its overall effort in strengthening the capacities of ANSF, a few light
helicopters like Cheetah for reconnaissance purposes would also be
delivered.
The thaw between the U.S. and Iran has opened up new opportunities
for improving connectivity between India and Afghanistan and onwards to
Central Asia and beyond. Development of Chabahar port in Iran and the
connecting infrastructure to Afghan border can be expedited and mineral
resources/finished products can be evacuated in variety of ways.
Development of Afghanistan and consequential benefits to Afghan populace
and government would help in stabilising Afghanistan and improving its
security environment.
Conclusion
The unfolding scenarios in Afghanistan are largely dependent upon the
US strategies, Pakistan’s stance, and the manner of reconciliation and
integration of radical elements. Though other regional powers have
significant stake in the outcome of what is happening in Afghanistan,
they have not been much involved in the ongoing process. The US and its
coalition partners’ strategies have been shifting and their resolve to
invest and endure has weakened due to many contextual factors. They are
now only working for a face saving withdrawal. Further, if the politics
in Afghanistan holds, that is a successful holding of Afghan elections
in April 2014, then the security environment is also expected to improve
and consequently the economic transition would be more likely to
succeed in the long term.
While the US and its allies have invested considerably in ANSF, they
are as yet reluctant to make it a regular standing force suitably
equipped with necessary wherewithal so that it could discharge its
duties with a high degree of satisfaction. The ANSF needs to be provided
with a balanced composition of arms and services in order to meet both
internal and external threats likely to be posed to survival of
Afghanistan. American and other western forces need to leave adequate
military equipment and weapon systems behind instead of hauling them all
over back to the US or somewhere else. As it is, lot of blood and
treasure has been spent over the last twelve years or so and leaving the
equipment back may not be of much consequence monetarily. So far as
signing the BSA is concerned, it is expected that it would be signed
sooner or later as its draft has been approved by the Afghan Loya Jirga.
India needs to have a de novo look at its policies in Afghanistan; if
its strategic interests in Afghanistan are bolstered by providing
lethal military equipment to ANSF then it must take a call. India’s core
strategic interest continues to be that ‘Afghanistan should never be allowed to become a haven of terrorists who would embark on regional and global jihad’.
Endnotes
- Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan; Post Taliban Governance, Security and Policy’, Congressional Research Service Report No. RL30588, October 23, 2013, p.23
- DOD, News Transcript, “Department of Defense Press Briefing with Gen. Dunford from the Pentagon Briefing Room,” June 18, 2013
- “Taliban Attacks Kill 3000 Afghanis in Seven Months: Interior Ministry”, Press TV, October 29, 2013 available at http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/10/29/331970/taliban-killed-thousands-...
- “Afghan Combat Deaths Nearly Double in 2013 Fighting Season, while US Causalities Drop”, RT News, November 09, 2013 available at http://rt.com/news/afghan-combat-deaths-double-2013-462/
- See http://icasualties.org/oef/
- DOD Report “Progress Toward Stability and Security in Afghanistan”, July, 2013, pp 20 available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Section_1230_Report_July_2013.pdf
- Ibid. pp.20-21
- Jim Michaels, “ White House Scaling Back Military Support for Afghan Forces”, The USA Today, June 04, 2013 available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/06/03/afghanistan-pentagon...
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