The ghosts of war continue to haunt Sri Lanka in one form or the other. Now it has come as US-sponsored resolution at the 19th
session of the United Nations Human Rights Council. The resolution is
also backed by France and Norway that once acted as ‘facilitators’ in
the peace process between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE.
Moved on 06 March 2012, the resolution placed three requests for Sri
Lanka:
- To “implement the constructive recommendations made in the report of the Lessons Learnt Reconciliation Commission” (LLRC) and to “initiate credible and independent actions to ensure justice, equity, accountability and reconciliation for all Sri Lankans.”
- To “present a comprehensive action plan as expeditiously as possible detailing the steps the Government has taken and will take to implement the LLRC recommendations and also to address alleged violations of international law.”
- To “accept, advice and technical assistance from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and relevant special procedures mandate holders on implementing the above-mentioned steps, and requests the Office of the High Commissioner to present a report on the provision of such assistance to the Human Rights Council at its 22nd session”
There are two aspects to the entire debate: one is fixing
accountability for excesses committed by the Sri Lankan forces during
‘Eelam War IV’; and the other is the way forward in the form of post-war
reconciliation in the island.
Colombo is uncomfortable with both. The Sri Lankan government argues
that the problems should be dealt with internally and any solution has
to be “home grown”. It cites steps taken so far in this regard. On
accountability the Army has appointed a Court of Inquiry as an initial
fact-finding mission. For reconciliation the President-appointed LLRC
has already submitted its report late last year and the government is in
the process of implementing its recommendations. To Colombo, any UN
action “would only lead to derailing the ongoing reconciliation process
that has been put in place by the government.” Some in the regime go to
the extent of arguing that “If we submit to this resolution, Tiger
terrorists will raise their head again.”
But the underlying point made by the sponsors of the resolution is
that the objective behind the move at UNHRC is not to condemn Sri Lanka
but to “sow the seeds of lasting peace.” It is pointed out that the
“real reconciliation must be based on accountability, not impunity.” The
Court of Inquiry appointed by the Army is considered “too late and too
little”. Since it is not independent, its findings may not be impartial.
The LLRC contained both positive and negative aspects. On positives, it
talked about the need for demilitarisation, investigation of
disappearances, apart from acknowledging existence of ethnic grievances;
surprisingly, it supported devolution of powers to minorities, although
did not spell them out. At the same time, it did not fix accountability
for human rights abuses during Eelam War IV. For the collateral damage,
the report reasoned it out as a result of LTTE action and military
reaction. Most importantly, the LLRC did not give any action plan on the
way forward either on reconciliation or devolution. It is only after
the introduction of resolution in Geneva on 27 February that talks of
roadmap have commenced. Sri Lanka seems to be bit more sensitive to
external pressures than to the internal ones.
Given these factors, India’s role is important. In a similar
situation in May 2009, India, along with China, Pakistan, and Russia,
bailed Sri Lanka out from a Western-sponsored resolution at UNHRC. But
what should India do now? Should it support the resolution as demanded
by all parliamentarians from Tamil Nadu, or should it oppose the
resolution keeping in mind the interest of bilateral ties with Sri
Lanka? India’s dilemma is evident when the External Affairs Minister SM
Krishna said, “Certainly we will take into account the overall
relationship between India and Sri Lanka and the sentiments that are
prevalent in our country.” However, in a letter to the present and
ex-chief ministers of Tamil Nadu, from where pressure on the Center is
increasing to act on the issue, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh sounded
less dilemmatic: “We are engaged with all parties in an effort to
achieve an outcome that is forward-looking and that ensures that rather
than deepening confrontation and mistrust between the concerned parties,
a way forward is found on issues related to accountability and
reconciliation,"
This is the key. Neither ‘for’ nor ‘against’ the resolution is an
ideal way out for the problem. New Delhi has to think out of the box at
this juncture. Two options can be explored. One is to act as a
‘mediator’ between the sponsors and the state concerned – Sri Lanka – to
rework on the Resolution and make it as a consensus document. For this,
two aspects of the resolution – accountability and reconciliation –
have to be dissected. The accountability component can be taken-off from
the resolution completely and can be addressed separately. Colombo
should be persuaded to clear the air on excesses committed by its
forces. It could be through a non-partial investigation involving
combination of local and international experts. Sri Lankans have to be
involved in the exercise to gain acceptability in the country; outsiders
have to be included for credibility at the international level.
On reconciliation, Colombo should be made to realise that military
defeat of the LTTE was not the end in itself; only a political
settlement that addresses grievances of minority communities can lead to
lasting peace in the island. Unfortunately, this seems to be not on the
priority list of Rajapaksa regime. In a recent interview, President
Mahinda Rajapaksa outlined his thoughts on political settlement
succinctly when he said, “We are keen on a sustainable political
settlement. But it must have wide acceptance, especially in the context
of the post-conflict situation.” When this pronouncement is taken
seriously, writing on the wall is clear. At the maximum, what is on
cards is some arrangement revolving around the existing 13th amendment. Through 13th
Amendment, the island was divided into various provinces and granted
some powers under Provincial List. However, the Provincial Councils
always lacked sufficient powers – especially land, police and finance –
to run their affairs in an efficient manner. In addition, Colombo wields
immense powers of overruling any of Provincial decisions. Instead of
strengthening the Provinces, the present government is planning to
dilute the present arrangement further. Unless there is genuine power
sharing, the Provincial Council arrangement will be mere eyewash. The
best option is to go beyond 13th amendment framework as always insisted by India.
While this will take time to work out, Colombo should meanwhile
seriously implement recommendations of the LLRC. There is nothing wrong
in presenting an action plan on this to the UNHRC. In that case, the US
should be persuaded to take this action plan as the final resolution and
passed as a consensual document. The West also should understand
Colombo’s constraints and compulsions.
In case Sri Lanka refuses to make international commitment on
reconciliation; in case Washington insists on going ahead with the
present resolution without any amendments, the second best option for
India is to abstain from voting. It would convey a clear-cut message to
Colombo: “Our friendship is very important, but that thrives on making
commitments and, most importantly, seriously implementing them.” And, to
the West, the signal would be “your resolutions will remain mere paper
tigers as long as they are away from the reality.”
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