The Lessons Of State Elections, 2012

Dr. M.N. Buch

Visiting Fellow, VIF

The Election Commission has successfully conducted general elections to State Assemblies in Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Punjab, Goa and Manipur. The results were declared on 6^th March, 2012. The Commission is to be complimented on ensuring that even in insurgency hit Manipur the elections were held under tight security in which voters felt safe to cast their votes and there was an excellent turnout of voters. Even in Uttar Pradesh, where it was feared that the elections would be violent, the Election Commission very competently saw to it that peace was maintained and the elections were free and fair. It had been alleged that S.Y. Qureshi, the Chief Election Commissioner, would be biased towards the Congress, but he deserves unstinting praise for the completely bias free election conducted under his directions. The results of the elections are proof of his fairness and impariality because in three States out of five, including in Uttar Pradesh, which is the most populous State, the Congress did very badly indeed. We should be proud of this officer and the Commission headed by him.

There are lessons to be learnt from this election and the first and most important is that the 2012 elections are witness to the decline of the two major parties which can be considered national. The Congress has a presence in every State, has always been considered a middle of the road party and is the party which has been in power longest at the national level. In Bihar and Uttar Pradesh the party has been virtually wiped out, which does not speak highly of its prospects in the coming elections in 2014. Similarly BJP, which has an imposing presence in many States, has fared badly except in Goa. If the second national level party, BJP, is also not to be a serious contender in the 2014 elections, we are bound to have a situation in which there is a splintered parliament and no party would have the strength to lead a stable coalition in which junior partners in the coalition cannot call the tune. A weak coalition means that policies which are in the national interest, though not necessarily in the interest of a component party, cannot be framed or implemented and the government, therefore, would never rise above a lame duck position.

In the case of BJP the party faces a major dilemma. It has a cadre, largely of the RSS, which means that it has a grass-root presence. At the same time its secular credentials are in doubt and there is a popular perception that the party has a somewhat narrow Hindutva agenda, which makes it unacceptable to large sections of people, especially in Southern and Eastern India. If the party wants to come to power at the Centre it was to widen its base in order to increase its acceptability. In order to widen the base the party must abandon a narrow Hindutva programme, but here it runs the danger of losing the RSS cadre. The party, therefore, will have to build a cadre separate from RSS in order to retain a grass-root presence, while moving its own agenda towards a more secular, centrist stance. It remains to be seen whether the party has the courage to take these hard decisions.

When one reads the manifesto of BJP no clear picture emerges about the party’s vision of the India of the future, nor does it place before the people the party’s stand on overall development and sectoral development. In broad terms the party is not clear whether it wants a socialist economy, a mixed economy or an economy in which the private sector has the major role and the public sector is peripheral. There is no specific statement on infrastructure development and role of the State in this behalf, nor is there a clear statement about the education policy for the future and how the State will ensure that high quality education is available to every child in India. There is no policy about health care; the party does not state what the agriculturist can expect of it in the coming years, not the industrialist, the businessman or the worker. Margaret Thatcher, on becoming the Prime Minister of Britain, stated that she would dismantle socialism and then steadfastly in the next eleven years she went about achieving her objective. What course has BJP set itself? Only if BJP comes out with a picture of what people can expect from a BJP government in terms of development in its widest context, will people have a fair chance of deciding whether BJP has a programme which would be of benefit to India and, therefore, they can vote it to power.

The problem with the Congress is not one of acceptability but is the more existentialist question of whether there is such a thing as the Congress party. One senior Congress leader told me that anyone who thinks that there is a Congress party is a fool and that it is the private fiefdom of the Nehru-Gandhi family, to which all Congressmen owe their existence and to whom they have to swear loyalty. This became amply clear in the recent Uttar Pradesh elections. The Congress put all its eggs in the Gandhi family basket. Rahul Gandhi was the star performer who, under suitable tutelage, ran the election campaign in the field, with his sister putting in a star guest appearance and his ailing mother providing support from the sidelines.

What did Rahul Gandhi offer? A circus that might have had some relevance about forty years ago but which is totally obsolete in the India of today. Therefore, the star performer spent time in a Dalit household in which he kept a two-day stubble on his chin. He went on stage, made meaningless speeches, resorted to dramatics and publicly tore a manifesto of the Samajwadi Party which paper, however, was not the manifesto but just a miscellaneous bunch of papers of no consequence. He went to constituencies that had a sizable Muslim presence and there he sported a beard so that in looks he could appear to be Muslim. The Muslims were promised reservation in jobs, an enquiry into the Batala House encounter and many empty promises to protect the Muslims. The agenda was obviously communal because nothing positive was mentioned about Muslim education, emancipation of Muslim women, a development agenda based on job creation rather than just reservations, economic uplift and improvement of the Muslim social structure. What Rahul Gandhi offered would probably have worked four decades ago when the Muslims voted en masse. It did not work in 2012. Personal security, notwithstanding aberrations, including Bombay in 1993 and Gujarat in 2002, is now taken as a right by Muslims. The Muslims are aware of their backwardness, but they have done introspection and are prepared to accept that it is their low level of education which is a major factor in keeping them backward. The average Muslim wants access to education, vocational training for children which can make them employable, creation of job opportunities through economic development and equal opportunities in employment coupled with affirmative action. Reservation is the least of the Muslim priorities. On none of these issues did Rahul Gandhi or the Congress make any significant contribution, which has caused the Muslims to turn away from the Congress.

The communal card no longer holds validity in today’s India. Nitish Kumar realised this and his entire election campaign was based on a development agenda. That is why his BJP partners were able to get Muslim votes in Bihar. In Gujarat Narendra Modi never speaks of the Muslims and 2002 notwithstanding, the development momentum which has been unleashed in Gujarat has also improved economic opportunities for the Muslims, benefitted them in improving their economic status and, therefore, has brought about a better law and order environment in the State. Therefore, in local body elections a number of Muslim candidates preferred the BJP and were successful in the elections. This point is made not as an apology for Narendra Modi, but rather as a pointer to what the Muslim needs. No Indian Muslim wants separation from India nor would he like to migrate to Pakistan. Every Indian Muslim accepts India as his own country. This has buried the ghost of 1947 and political parties should not try to revive it. The Muslim wants education for his children, safety for himself, honour and dignity for his women folk and job opportunities and a business environment in which the Muslim can prosper. The party which gives him this, which is exactly what every other community wants, will win the next election. Rahul Gandhi’s 2012 agenda promises none of these and does not bode well for the party.

The Congress, like BJP, has not placed before the people any worthwhile agenda of governance which could enable the people to decide whether the Congress is the right party to be voted to power. At least Indira Gandhi gave such slogans as “gareebi hataao”. Sonia Gandhi’s Congress does not even give this sort of a slogan. How can a party which has no worthwhile economic agenda to offer, but is dependent almost entirely on caste and an effort to woo voters on account of religion call itself a national party and hope that the people of twenty-first century India will vote it to power?

The entire planning process set in motion by Jawaharlal Nehru with the first Five-Year Plan was as much an economic statement as a political one. The Plan, with its priorities, was and is a government document, but because it is approved by a government whose composition has to be political, it is also a statement of the ruling party’s ideology and programmes. That was perhaps true for the five initial Plans. Thereafter the planning process has become bureaucratic rather than reflective of the wider thinking of government and the means of converting this thinking into a concrete plan of action. Unless the Congress Party once again begins to take the people of India into confidence about where they want lead India to, the party can neither aspire for national power, nor deserve it.

The growth of regional parties is a repeat of what happened after the emergency and the defeat of Indira Gandhi in 1977. In the last two decades of the twentieth century one saw signs of reemergence of national parties, including the Left Front. 2012 has reversed this trend and the regional parties are becoming powerful. As I have already stated, this is not a promising sign.

The government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee and the two governments presided over by Dr. Manmohan Singh have had to face the same dilemma, generally speaking from the same opposition parties, which were or are in coalition with the party in power, that is, the most outrageous demands from coalition partners and the continuous threat of withdrawal of support, which would cause the government to collapse. In turn this has led to the dominant partners of the coalition continually striving to retain power and, for that purpose, to make totally unacceptable concessions to the alliance partners.

Let us take the current scenario. The scheme of the Constitution is federal, with strong centripetal forces. The Constitution gives the States certain independent powers and also prescribes the relationship between the state governments and the federal government. As per List 1 and 2 of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, the exclusive powers of the Union and the States are prescribed. If federalism demands that the Central Government should not dabble in state affairs, it also demands that the States should not intrude into areas where the Central Government has the constitutional authority. For example, foreign relations and international treaties are exclusively within the domain of the Centre as per Entries 10 and 14 of List 1 of the Seventh Schedule. Similarly, as per Item 221 List 1 of the Seventh Schedule Railways are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Centre. No State Government has the right to interfere in these matters or to force the Central Government to adopt a particular policy dictated by the State. The Prime Minister wanted to make certain concessions to Bangladesh, of which a treaty on the sharing of the waters of Teesta River was one of the components. It is legitimate for the Chief Minister of West Bengal to put forward the case of the State regarding the consequences of the Teesta water treaty, but it is neither legitimate for her to block the treaty or for the Prime Minister to surrender to the demands of a Chief Minister. A treaty with a neighbouring country which benefits both is more important than the rights of a riparian State in India. Unfortunately the equation within Parliament which has made Mamata Banerjee’s party a key factor in supporting government seems to have outweighed the considerations of an amicable relationship with Bangladesh. The Central Government should have consulted the West Bengal Government, but for the West Bengal Government to have blocked an international treaty which had larger ramification than those within West Bengal alone is itself a breach of the federal principle. This has been possible only because the electorate has given to India a hung parliament in which compromise has replaced principled policy as a means of government.

The latest fiasco over the railway budget explains the danger of the growth of regionalism at the cost of national parties. The railway budget is required to be drawn up by the Union Minister of Railways who, together with his cabinet colleague, is responsible to the House of the People under Article 75(3) of the Constitution. He is not responsible to the chief of the political party to which he belongs and which is a coalition partner. For Mamata to insist that the Railway Minister should resign or be dismissed because of the provisions of the railway budget, of which she did not approve, is a clear violation of federal principle because here it is the Prime Minister and Parliament to whom the Minister is accountable, not Mamata Banerjee. Similarly, for a coalition partner to demand that a particular portfolio should be in the exclusive domain of that party goes against every principle of democratic government. This all the more dangerous because one hears bazaar gossip that the price that the Samajwadi Pary is demanding for its support of the Central Government is that the Defence Ministry be given to Mulayam Singh Yadav. At a time when the Defence Ministry is engaged in the most delicate negotiations for acquisition of weapons and weapon system worth lakh of crores of rupees the Minister should not be changed, especially because Mr. A.K. Anthony has a reputation for total personal integrity. If to save its own skin the Congress party succumbs to these demands, then the party has no right to rule this country. That is one of the major lessons which have emerged from the state elections of 2012.

First and foremost the Prime Minister should have the courage to tell his coalition partners that not only they, but all parties and all State Governments would be consulted in matters of national interest but also that the ultimate decision would be that of Central Government and that would be binding. He must make it clear to the coalition partners that once a decision is taken by the cabinet it applies to everyone, even to those cabinet ministers who come from allied parties and not from the Congress Party. He must also make it clear that beyond a point the coalition partners will not be allowed to dictate terms and if this causes the government to fall fresh elections would be held. Whatever is in the national interest should be done, including a massive effort by the two major parties to ensure that in the next elections the importance of the regional parties is reduced and the major parties get a clear run to bring proper government to India. 

Balochistan on The Boil, Pakistan in Denial

Sushant Sareen

Senior Fellow, VIF

The insurgency mounted by Baloch freedom fighters has been variously described as ‘Pakistan’s Other War’, ‘The Silent War’, ‘The Dirty War’ etc. by the international media. One of the main reasons why this ‘war’ has until now not made the front pages of newspapers is the conspiracy of silence hatched, dictated and enforced by the ‘deep state’ which had muzzled Pakistan’s ‘independent’ media from any detailed reportage about the turmoil in Pakistan’s largest and poorest province – Balochistan. Let alone foreign journalists, even Pakistani media personnel are not allowed free access to most parts of Balochistan which have become virtual ‘no-go’ areas. Local journalists are intimidated – around half a dozen have been killed and many more have gone into exile – and forbidden from any bold reporting. Big media houses follow an undeclared policy of not covering the inconvenient reality of Balochistan in any great detail. But even the sketchy reports of incidents of violence and unrest – targeted killings, ambushes of security personnel, ‘missing persons’ and the discovery of their mutilated bodies, the daily humiliated visited on the ordinary Baloch who is insulted by being forced to shout slogans in favour of Pakistan, the fleeting references to the ban imposed by Baloch freedom fighters on raising the Pakistani flag or singing the Pakistani national anthem anywhere in the province etc. – are enough to inform about the great tumult that is building up in the province.

It took a maverick US Congressman, Dana Rohrabacher, to bring Balochistan on to the centre-stage of Pakistan's political discourse. The Congressional hearing organised by Rohrabacher, followed by the resolution moved by him in the US Congress calling for the right to self-determination in Balochistan shook and shocked the Pakistani establishment – military, media, politicians and judiciary, all together – out of their callous reverie about Balochistan. Suddenly, Balochistan became the flavour of the season and saturation coverage was given to the dismal state of affairs in the province. Parallels were drawn with the follies committed by the Pakistani state in the erstwhile East Pakistan, doomsday scenarios were floated, conspiracy theories were conjured up and verbal self-flagellation about the sins of omission and commission committed by the Pakistani state, particularly the security establishment (Army, FC, intelligence agencies and their jihadist proxies) became the order of the day for over two weeks.

Then, just as suddenly as Balochistan erupted on air waves and newsprint as a panic word, it disappeared. This was partly the result of the cracking of the whip by the ‘deep state’ and a muzzle order issued by the media regulator, and partly it was the result of a realisation that the heavens were still some distance away from falling down and all was still not lost in the province. Notwithstanding the degree of equanimity that has come into the public discourse on Balochistan, it is quite clear that Pakistan is at its wits end on how to address the sweeping anti-Pakistan and pro-independence sentiment in Balochistan. Other than resorting to Gestapo-like tactics to bludgeon the freedom seeking Baloch into submission, the Pakistani establishment is pretty clueless on what it can do to woo the Baloch and end their alienation and disaffection with Pakistan. Until now, Pakistan has been following a 3 C’s policy: (1)coercion (illegal confinement and targeted killings by death squads run by the Pakistani intelligence agencies and paramilitary forces like the Frontier Corps), (2)corruption (buying off support of the local politicians and every Pakistani party recruiting their own set of Quislings, collaborators and what Baloch freedom fighters call ‘Sarkari’ Baloch like the Lt. Gen. (retd) Abdul Qadir Baloch, Chief Minister Aslam Raisani, Sardar Sanaullah Zehri etc.), and (3) cajoling and cooption (grandiose gestures like the Aaghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan package of economic initiatives and political reforms, cosmetic gestures like making the port city Gwadar second capital, increasing recruitment of Baloch into army and paramilitary forces, some development work, and tons of propaganda) – to woo the Baloch or at least sow divisions in their ranks. But there is little by way of success that this policy has achieved.

Another tack adopted by the Pakistani establishment was to use the ‘embedded’ media to churn out a counter narrative which was a combination of an Ostrich-like approach to the problem and a deliberate attempt to play down the severity of the issue. According to this narrative, the problem in Balochistan was only of three out of around seventy odd Sardars – Bugti, Mengal and Marri – and was limited to around four to five districts, including Dera Bugti, Kohlu, Khuzdar and Turbat. But the incongruity of this narrative is borne out by the sheer mismatch between the scale of the insurgency and panic in Islamabad. After all, if the problem in Balochistan was so small, then why was so much newsprint and airtime expended on discussing the problem? Perhaps the answer to this lies in what Sardar Akhtar Mengal called a panic created by the fact that the ‘overlord’ (read US) had suddenly taken notice of the rampant and brazen violation of human rights in Balochistan by the ‘underling’ (read Pakistani establishment)! The Pakistani spin about the fringe nature of insurgency has also been blunted by the gauntlet thrown by the leaders of the Baloch freedom movement who have challenged Pakistan to test the popularity of the demand for independence by holding a referendum under international supervision to ascertain whether the Baloch wanted to stay in Pakistan or wanted their freedom.

A clumsy effort was also made to sow ethnic and linguistic divisions by pitting the Baloch against the Pashtuns and the Balochi speaking against the Brahvi speaking people, but it did not receive much traction because the protagonists of Baloch independence have made it very clear that they hold no claim over Pashtun lands – North Balochistan – and are not demanding independence for Balochistan province but for only the Baloch areas of the province along with Baloch areas of Punjab and Sindh. The Pakistani ‘deep state’ and its clients in the media and political establishment also tried to discredit the Baloch freedom movement by coming up with conspiracy theories and launching a propaganda campaign about how an international conspiracy masterminded by the perfidious Americans and fully supported by the Israelis and Indians was being hatched to dismember Pakistan.

Far from being fazed by this canard, leaders of the Baloch freedom movement openly welcomed any assistance that would come their way regardless of where it came from. One of the icons of the Baloch freedom movement, Brahmdagh Bugti, even said that they would accept the assistance from Satan himself to rid themselves of the yoke of Pakistan. Indeed, many of the Baloch activists are hoping that the propaganda about foreign assistance becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, something that cannot be ruled out if the Pakistani paranoia gets a life of its own and ultimately forces the international community to intervene to prevent the atrocities being committed against the Baloch. In a sense, the seriousness of the situation in Balochistan can be gauged by the fact that until now there has been practically no assistance given by any foreign power to the Baloch, something that the Pakistan military and intelligence establishment know very well. What is scaring them is how much the situation can actually deteriorate if some foreign power did start providing 'diplomatic, political and moral support'.

The attempt to push things under the carpet, deflect attention from the real issue, and downplay the unrest and alienation in Balochistan doesn’t mean that things are looking up for Pakistan and that they are not as bad as was being projected. In fact, the situation is probably a lot worse and could deteriorate further, both because the Baloch freedom fighters are already feeling enthused by their cause coming on to the radar screen of the international community and also because the Pakistani crackdown is likely to get a lot more brutal, albeit after a bit of a lull to let things cool down. In the meantime, the Pakistani political establishment has pretended to reach out to the disgruntled Baloch leaders by announcing a withdrawal of cases against them and declaring an intention to hold a sincere and serious dialogue with the Baloch leadership to address their grievances. But instead of placating the Baloch, the withdrawal of cases has been greeted with derision. As for a dialogue, the Baloch leaders have declared that they will be willing to talk to the Pakistani establishment only if the talks are centred on discussing Balochistan’s independence.

The Baloch leaders – both pro-independence and pro-federation – have also rejected the All Parties Conference proposed by Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani. While the Baloch have labelled the APC as a pointless exercise, even mainstream political parties in Pakistan, in particular the main opposition party PMLN, have dismissed the APC proposal. In fact, the PMLN has attached almost impossible to meet pre-conditions – arresting and trying the murderers of Nawab Akbar Bugti (read former military dictator Gen Pervez Musharraf), recovering and releasing all ‘missing persons’ (believed to have been picked up by the security agencies), and brining to justice all officials involved in extra-judicial killings. Actually, the PMLN is more interested in grinding its own political axe rather than seriously address the Balochistan issue. Given such an attitude and approach, it is no surprise that the APC is a stillborn proposal in which no one is interested, certainly not the ruling PPP which is chary of doing anything that ruffles the feathers of the military establishment.

Time however could be running out for the Pakistani state in Balochistan. Things have reached such a pass that pro-federation politicians who act as toadies of the government are finding it difficult to defend, much less justify, the actions of the Pakistani state. In any case, the traditional political elite has been steadily losing ground to a new crop of middle-class youth leaders who cutting across tribal lines are forging a potent national movement. None other than the doyen of Baloch nationalists, Sardar Attaullah Mengal, admitted this to PMLN chief Nawaz Sharif. According to Mengal, things were no longer in the control of the old leadership as a new generation of leaders were now calling the shots. The man who is believed to have become the icon of the Baloch freedom fighters is the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) chief, Dr Allah Nazar. Others like the Balochistan Republican Party (BRP) chief, Nawabzada Brahmdagh Bugti (grandson of the slain Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Bugti), Hyrbyair Marri (son of Nawab Khair Bux Marri), and Balochistan National Party (BNP) chief Sardar Akhtar Mengal (son of Sardar Attaullah Mengal) are also in the vanguard of the nationalist movement. But while Dr Allah Nazar is fighting against Pakistan from inside Balochistan, the other pro-independence leaders are in exile and hence their effectiveness is somewhat reduced.

At the political level, moves are afoot to bring all the pro-independence elements together and forge a united national movement. The first step in this direction has been taken with efforts underway agree on a ‘Freedom Charter’ which will serve as the vision statement of a future Balochistan state. But a lot will depend on how much support the international community gives to the Baloch. It is entirely possible that with tectonic changes taking place in the region, especially in relation to Afghanistan and Iran, the international community might discover that an independent Baloch state could well be the strategic answer to all their problems. But it is equally possible that a tired and defeated international community might recede into a shell to lick its wounds and leave the Baloch to their own devices. In case of the former, chances of an independent Balochistan which also acts as a bulwark against Islamic fanaticism and terrorism will be very bright. But in the latter case, with no help coming for the Baloch, chances are that the Baloch independence movement being smothered yet again.

An Insider’s Perspective

Kanwal Sibal
Member Advisory Board, VIF

Riaz Mohammed Khan’s book “Afghanistan and Pakistan” adds to the already numerous books available on the shelves on the linked Afghanistan-Pakistan situation. The Taliban-takeover of Afghanistan, the 9/11 terror attack that provoked US military intervention leading to Taliban’s ouster from power, US failure to consoildate its success because of the distraction of the Iraq war, the resurgence of the Taliban and Pakistan’s collusion in this, have all been analysed by diverse authors from different perspectives. So when a new book appears it has to offer more than a pastiche of facts, views and analyses that the reader is already familiar with.

The author, who was Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary from 2005 to 2008, offers an insider’s perspective on the subject. His book is not a work of scholarship based on “rigorous or extensive” research, as the author avows in the introduction. He offers, as he says, a “broad-brush treatment of events”, weaving “personal experiences, perspectives, and evaluation into the larger narrative”, derived from his various assignments in the Pakistani Foreign Office.

A former Pakistani diplomat who has officially handled Afghanistan related issues, analysed them on file and in internal discussions, and contributed in some measure to policy making, can be expected to adhere largely to the standard Pakistani view that we know. While this undercurrent in not absent from the book, the sobriety with which the author expounds his views and the penetrating reflections he makes on many aspects of Pakistani thinking and policies is striking.

The first part of the book covers the post-Soviet withdrawal phase of the Afghanistan conflict from 1989 to 1995, the advent of the Taliban from 1996 to 2001, the developments in Afghanistan post-9/11, with the interests and concerns of the external powers examined in a separate chapter. The second part deals with the Pakistan context of the Afghan situation, with focus on the grave challenge of religious militancy and extremism that the country faces. The intellectual crisis and weak governance in Pakistan is examined with great acuity in chapter 6 of the book. The book ends with the author’s “Conclusions” that pinpoint the mistakes made and opportunities missed by western powers in dealing with the developments in Afghanistan at critical moments. This section assesses the exit strategy, the prospects of stabilizing Aghanistan, the reconciliation and reconstruction agenda and the challenge of rebuilding of the Afghan National Army. The December 10 review of the US counter-insurgency strategy is examined, recommendations are made for an Afghnistan-Pakistan modus vivendi, the conundrum of US-Pakistan relations is looked at, with a glance at the expectations of Pakistan whose dearth of political and intellectual leadership is highlighted.

The author does not believe that Pakistan bears the major responsibility for the mess in Afghanistan, though he does expose the disruptive aspects of its policies and actions. The Pakistan Army and the ISI, he acknowledges, have supported the Afghan insurgents at the highest levels, and at the middle levels have admired their piety and intransigence. He rejects, however, the idea that the ISI created the Taliban, arguing that they were a phenomenon waiting to happen after 10 years of Soviet occupation and 5 years of internecine conflict, with President Zia’s islamization policies, the mushrooming of madrassahs and muslim charities from the Gulf under the influence of Wahhabi and Deobandi ideology acting as catalysts. He concedes that in the 1990s the Pakistanis did believe that the Taliban offered the best hope for stabilization as they drew strength from ethnic Pashtuns straddling the border, and that once settled in power they would become more moderate. Hence, Pakistan favoured engaging the Taliban before and after 9/11, but the international community isolated them in the 1990s because of their human rights record, treatment of women, the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania embassies and the Al Qaida connection, pushing the Taliban therefore towards greater dependence on foreign elements.

After 9/11 Pakistan’s earlier policy of supporting the Taliban was of course in shambles, with the Northern Alliance in Kabul and Al Qaida and Taliban elements moving into FATA. President Musharraf pressed the US not to allow a government in Kabul unfriendly to Pakistan and pleaded for the inclusion of some moderate Taliban elements in it, but the Bonn Agreement excluded the Taliban and all hardline Mujaheddin groups, which, for the author, was a mistake.

The author argues that Pakistan is not responsible for the post 9/11 resurgence of the Taliban. They had been routed but not destroyed. Later developments, according to the author, including America’s war on Iraq which strengthened the Al Qaida and deflected US attention away from Afghanistan, lack of economic support for Afghanistan after Bonn and the meagre results of the Tokyo Donors Conference that only helped to foster the opium economy, the ineffectiveness of aid programmes, poor governance, the absence of government at local levels, the neglect of agriculture as a result, the non-Pashtun character of the Afghan National Army, the perception that the Taliban were fighting for Pashtun rights, the overweening US and UN presence that hurt President Karzai’s image and no accretion to his authority after the 2004 Presidential election, all contributed to the steady resurgence of the Taliban.

Afghanistan holds Pakistan responsible for this development as the insurgents operate from Pakistani territory. Pakistan, however, believes it is a victim of the unsettled situation in Afghanistan. The author refutes the widely made charge that because Pakistan views the Taliban as a long term asset for recovering political influence in Kabul, it is reluctant to act against the group. Pakistan, in his view, can be blamed for half-hearted cooperation but not such calculation. He sees the conflict as fundamentally an Afghan issue. However, with US counter-insurgency efforts failing to produce wanted results, Pakistan has come under greater pressure, with the drone attacks exacerbating US-Pakistan tensions. Lack of trust now marks the military relations between the two countries, with a growing disconnect between the US and Pakistan perceptions and approaches at the operational level.

The author makes the familiar argument that Pakistan does not target the Afghan Taliban as they do not fight Pakistani troops or carry on acts of violence within the country, that Pakistan’s primary concern is the Pakistani Taliban and that apart from Pakistani empathy with the Taliban, Pakistan has limited capacity to interdict and control them. According to him, Pakistan has been soft on the Haqqanis and Mullah Nazir with a view to squeezing Baitullah Masud. However, even as suicide bombings in Pakistan are rising, the US asks Pakistan to do more. The author denies any double dealing by Pakistan; even pro-US elements in Pakistan, according to him, are disappointed that the US does not see the complexity of the problem facing Pakistan. The general feeling in Pakistan is that the war on terror is not that of Pakistan and that Pakistan is being used as hired help. The author tries to persuade but fails to convince.

Looking ahead at prospects of stability in Afghanistan, the author sees the US military presence in Afghanistan a problem as well as a solution. The Afghan population is tired of violence and conflict. If the US forces begin withdrawing and other improvements on the ground occur, the rationale for fighting would weaken. Hearts and minds cannot be won by intensification of military efforts. But then, until the Afghan National Security Forces(ANSF) are built, the militancy cannot be pacified.

The chapter on the role of external powers provides some useful insights into the thinking of China and Iran as shared with the Pakistanis. The author sees the rivalry between India, Iran and Pakistan as a source of problems. While recognizing that Pakistan and Afghanistan cannot be detached because of intense informal linkages between the two countries, he sees Pakistan’s posture of treating Aghanistan as its backyard as being deeply offensive to the Afghans. He is scornful of the concept of strategic depth that has animated the thinking of the Pakistani military towards Afghanistan and finds Pakistani pleas for a friendly government in Kabul politically unwarranted as Afghanistan has never posed a conventional military threat to Pakistan.

Backing the Taliban is no longer a viable option for Pakistan today, he says, as that would give the Pakistani Taliban more strength. The author realistically notes that the Taliban had earlier risen to power in Afghanistan because of unique developments, but today opposition to them is strong, Afghanistan is not the war torn country of the mid-1990s and the non-Pashtuns are not willing to accept Taliban rule. Pakistan can at best exert local influence in a fragmented Afghanistan.

It is difficult to believe that, as the author claims, Pakistan will not pursue factional politics in Afghanistan to balance Indian influence. General Musharraf, who no doubt reflects sentiments prevailing in the Pakistani military, still proclaims at all forums that India is in close alliance with the erstwhile Northern Alliance groups and that the Afghan intelligence cooperates with R&AW in Pakistani frontier areas and Balochistan. The author is even less persuasive when he argues that in Pakistan’s soft environment(!) contacts between the Afghan Taliban and retired military officials do exist but the latter are not acting in accordance with official policy. According to him, a stable Afghanistan would require a balance between different groups and not domination by any particular one.

India’s interest in Afghanistan is not presented by the author with the usual Pakistani distortions. He sees India maintaining good relations with the Northern Alliance and building goodwill among the Pashtuns. He believes, rightly, that some understanding between India and Pakistan could have a positive impact on Afghanistan, recalling that in 2006 India had approached Pakistan to help Afghanistan settle down but Pakistan took it as a bid to raise the transit issue and did not respond.

For Iran the Taliban are, the author recognizes, a challenge because of their salafist ideology The Iranians recall the killing of their personnel by Pakistani anti-shia elements amongst the Taliban. Iran has concern about US support for Iranian dissident groups. They haven’t made Pak-US military co-operation an issue in Pakistan-Iran bilateral relations. The author considers the Iranian policy pragmatic and circumspect.

The author is critical of Saudi Arabia’s role in financing madrassahs in Pakistan and Afghanistan with salafist ideology and making no effort to reverse this policy. The Russians cannot overlook the fact that the Taliban were the only government to recognize Chechenya. The author has detected no concern in Russia about US bases in Afghanistan. China has expressed no adverse reaction to US military intervention in Afghanistan either. However, beyond curbing terrorism and religious extremism, China would not want a consolidation of US presence in Afghanistan. China has shown no anxiety in bilateral discussions with Pakistan about Nato presence in Afghanistan or its use of Pakistani faciities. In the author’s view tension between US and Pakistan is a liability for China, but he does not explain why.

The chapter on Pakistan in the book is possibly the most revealing as the author is clinical in dissecting Pakistan’s shortcomings and failings. An Indian observer making similar assessment of the state of affairs in Pakistan would have been accused of a deep anti Pakistan bias. The author confirms all the negative Indian perceptions of Pakistan. For him, the challenge in Pakistan is a combination of religious motivation, madrassah education, Afghanistan and Kashmir related rhetoric and official patronage for religious militancy. The Pakistani sunni groups have participated in Taliban campaigns. The LeT has been involved in the Kashmir insurgency, but while the group has avoided violence in Pakistan it has fostered an environment of intolerance in Pakistan.

In the 90s sectarian violence was seen as a bane, but jihadi groups despite their sectarian affiliations were cossetted by the military, while the Nawaz Sharif government, whose supporters in the business community who believe in Islamization, saw jihadi groups with equanimity. Benazir Bhutto did not take on the religious constituency, Musharraf was cautious not to touch the army’s sensitivities on Kashmir and ruffle orthodoxy.

There is ambiguity in Pakistan towards the threat of religious extremism, he notes. A lot of ground has been ceded to conservative islamic thinking and to religious parties. Musharraf’s concept of enlightened moderation was simplistic. He failed to achieve madrassah and mosque reforms and the banning militant sectarian groups. The attempt to revise the blasphemy laws created some anxiety amongst the ranks, which points to the spread of extremist thinking in the lower echelons of the military.

Pakistan shows a strong trans-national impulse rooted in the Ummah, with jihadi groups showing no respect for national boundaries, including in Afghanistan says the author. The Tableeghi Jamat has created a dense religious emvironment. The influence of the jamaat e islami, religious vigilantism, politicisation of education has stifled culture. Zia ul Haque policy of islamisation and the Saudi inspired salafist thinking has taken root.

The author is candid about the backing the jihadi groups have received from the Pakistani military with a view to compelling india to negotiate on Kashmir. The Pakistani military has believed that the liberation struggle in Kashmir could be successfully supported. The ISI was deeply involved with Kashmir groups. Pakistan is in permanent confrontation with India. Mistrust of india, he says ominously, is part of Pakistan army’s institutional culture which can be softened but not changed.

The ideas of security, religiosity and patriotism suit the military. There is aggressive patriotism at retired mid level military and civilian official level. Jihad, piety and faith is the motto of army, The ranks of the armed forces are not immune to extremism. Hawkish views on security and foreign relations assosciated with ISI are quite common in the Foreign offfice and the civilan establishment because of many bouts of military rule in Pakistan.

The author confirms the many syndromes his country suffers from. Pakistan has a beseiged mentality, with conspiracy theories rampant. It externalizes blame, blaming India and the US for supporting the Taliban, even Mahsud, as well as suicide bombings. Pakistan resorts to denial with facility, saying the Kashmir struggle is indigenous, denying the presence of Mullah Omar or the Al Qaida in Pakistan. There is a streak of anti- modernity in popular thinking, an antipathy towards secularism, modernization and liberalism, a tendency to condone the Al Qaida and Taliban’s excesses as a consequence of the US presence in Afghanistan.

The author’s conclusions cover the past and the future. Many of his recommendations for the future are eminently sensible, even if his analysis of the past can be questioned in parts.

About VIF India

The Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF) is a New Delhi-based think tank set up with the collaborative efforts of India's leading security experts, diplomats, industrialists and philanthropists under the aegis of the Vivekananda Kendra. The VIF’s objective is to become a centre of excellence to kick start innovative ideas and thoughts that can lead to a stronger, secure and prosperous India playing its destined role in global affairs.

Vision and Mission

VIF is an independent, non-partisan institution that promotes quality research and in-depth studies and is a platform for dialogue and conflict resolution.

It strives to bring together the best minds in India to ideate on key national and international issues; promote initiatives that further the cause of peace and global harmony; monitor social, economic and political trends that have a bearing on India’s unity and integrity; analyse the causes for social and ethnic conflicts leading to extremism and offer policy alternatives; interact with civil society and offer institutional support for exchange of ideas and interaction among conflicting groups; critique public policy and the working of democratic institutions and constitutional bodies; and evolve benchmarks for good governance and efficiency in public institutions.

These are objectives that fall under a broad head called `nation-building’ and often come within the purview of universities and institutions of higher learning. Unfortunately, for reasons best known to those who manage them, these academic bodies have not been able to attend to these tasks. This neglect, it seems, is in some way responsible for the perceived failure of representative bodies and the prevailing inefficiency in the government sector. VIF believes that many of these institutions – which are central to our democratic existence – cannot be expected to work better, unless academia, think tanks and civil society engage with them and critique them on a regular basis. Given its deep and abiding commitment to the deepening of democracy and to the emergence of a strong and self-reliant India, VIF has embarked upon quality research and scholarship in a host of areas in the hope that such studies will improve governance, strengthen national security, integrate India’s foreign policy to the nation’s long-term objectives and bring about much-needed functional efficiency in parliament and other representative bodies and in public institutions.

The Foundation seeks to meet its objectives through six Centres of study, viz

• Centre for National Security and Strategic Studies
• Centre for International Relations and Diplomacy
• Centre for Neighbourhood Studies
• Centre for Governance and Political Studies
• Centre for Economic Studies
• Centre for Historical and Civilisational Studies

Centres of Study

The Centre for National Security and Strategic Studies is VIF’s hub for deliberating on India’s national security challenges, international terrorism, left-wing extremism, militancy in Jammu and Kashmir, insurgency in the North-eastern regions of India and the threats posed by the demographic invasion from Bangladesh.

The Centre for International Relations and Diplomacy is dedicated to the study of global strategic issues, emerging trends in international power equations, India’s foreign policy vis-à-vis its national objectives and its relations with neighbours and the Indian Diaspora.

The Centre for Neighbourhood Studies monitors developments in India’s periphery, focusing on seven neighbouring countries, namely Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

The Centre for Governance and Political Studies examines various issues of governance and development with particular reference to India. It will generate and promote ideas that encourage transparency and accountability in government and all public institutions. It encourages scholarships in constitutional and parliamentary studies and also considers policy initiatives to tackle the menace of corruption.

The Centre for Economic Studies monitors global economic trends and policies and its impact on developing economies with particular reference to India. It closely examines the constant interplay between politics and economics, the emerging trends on both sides of the global economic divide and offer suggestions for Indian policy makers.

The Centre for Historical and Civilisational Studies examines the criticality of civilisational aspects in nation-building and in fostering oneness in a plural, multi-ethnic and multi-lingual nation like India. It has undertaken studies on the economic situation that prevailed during different epochs in the Indian sub-continent to understand the factors that had placed India at the head of the table both intellectually and economically at one time and the events and circumstances that robbed it of its civilisational advantages and relegated it to an unenviable position in the comity of nations.

Activities

To achieve these objectives the Vivekananda International Foundation:

Organises events, conferences, lectures, seminars and discussions and invites scholars and subject specialists for exchange of ideas. It organizes exhibitions, cultural events, training workshops for students and other targeted groups and yoga classes to involve citizens across age groups and professions in the task of national regeneration.

Interacts with the diplomatic community in New Delhi to project India’s viewpoint and to understand the views and perceptions of other nations to further India’s political, strategic, economic and civilisational interests.

Engages policy makers on issues of topical interest and share VIF’s views and concerns with them. The Foundation prepares policy briefs for limited circulation among people in government, parliamentarians, members of the judiciary, those heading and working in constitutionally mandated institutions and the civil society.

Develop institutionalized contacts with academic bodies, research institutions, select Indian and foreign think-tanks, universities and organizations representing the Indian diaspora for cross fertilization of ideas, exchange of scholars and sharing of information and experience.

Develops institutionalised contacts with academic bodies, research institutions, select Indian and foreign think-tanks, universities and organisations representing the Indian Diaspora for cross fertilisation of ideas, exchange of scholars and sharing of information and experience

Has already launched its website and intends to publish books, monographs, policy briefs and special reports.

Our Building

VIF is housed in an elegant building on San Martin Marg in Chanakyapuri, New Delhi’s diplomatic enclave. It houses a state-of-the-art library, an auditorium, conference rooms and cabins for scholars.

3, San Martin Marg, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi 110021

Tel: 011-24121764,

Fax: 011-24106698,

E-mail: info[at]vifindia.org