Indo-Israel Relations and Iran’s Nuclear Question

Kanwal Sibal, 

Dean, Centre for International Relations and Diplomacy, VIF

In the last 20 years or so there has been a remarkable growth in India-Israel relationship, which is all to the good. Criticism that India wants to work on this relationship more behind the scenes rather than giving it full visibility, is not unjustified. This should change. More openness would consolidate the image of independence of our foreign policy.

The problem is that we have long convinced ourselves that there would be a price to pay not only with regard to friendly Islamic countries, but also our own Muslim population. We have created this mental block for ourselves, which our policy makers will take time to overcome.

The point is raised about our voting against Israel in the United Nations. Frankly, too much should not be made of this issue. Actually, such voting has not mattered much in affecting realities on the ground, and probably does so even less today. Behind the charade of voting in the UN in particular way, we should look at the developing reality of the India-Israel relationship. The two should be separated.

When India votes in the United Nations in a particular way, it is because of the difficulty in dramatically changing past positions taken over several decades. Any radical change can generate an unnecessary controversy, especially as some of the core issues underlying the Israel-Palestinian issue have not moved towards any durable solution. We have also to weigh our relations with the Islamic world- whatever the differences between them and their hypocrisies- the lobby that is comprised of 1½ billion Muslims. Some kind of a balance has to be found, just as Israel is cautious about taking positions on India-Pakistan issues. This is a small price to pay in terms of having a cover domestically and internationally to develop our bilateral relations with Israel, strengthening them and giving them more visibility.

The other issue is Iran going nuclear. We have to look at the so-called domino effect of Iran going nuclear more carefully. I believe there cannot be any such domino effect unless, primarily, the West opens the doors to nuclear technology to the Muslim countries or China does. If there is fear that Saudi Arabia or other countries would go nuclear, then the way to avoid this is to exercise very stringent controls on any transfer of nuclear technology, including civil nuclear technology, to these countries. As of now, I don’t think that any Muslim country, barring Iran that has now got a nuclear reactor from Russia, has a nuclear reactor. There is one being built in UAE by the Koreans, but other than this not a single Islamic country has it. Some of them have experimental reactors, but most are non-functional. These countries, therefore, do not have a base to go nuclear, and if such a base is created, it will be by western companies, besides China and, potentially, Pakistan. Therefore, why not focus on the sources of proliferation.

The United States and the West had a robust policy on non-proliferation, which for years and years we suffered from, and even now the doors are not fully open for us, as, for example, the issues of re-processing and enrichment technology with the Americans. There is a bar to that even in our 123 Agreement with the United States carries restrictions in this regard. The Russians, however, have not put any such conditions in our bilateral agreement with them, and the French are saying everything is open in terms of cooperation. But these are grey areas. What I mean is that even with a country like India, the international community is not ready to open the doors of nuclear technologies. So, there is absolutely no case for them to open the doors of nuclear technologies to potentially problematic countries.

In any case, if Iran goes nuclear and other countries in the region follow, from our point of view there are two points to note: one is that it reduces Pakistan’s calling card as the only Islamic country with a nuclear bomb; if four or five other Islamic countries have them, it devalues their exceptional status. I am saying this half in zest and half seriously too. Second, Pakistan is being given so much space in the area of proliferation that is baffling. This is being given not only by the United States of America, but indirectly even by Israel, as Israel is concentrating only on the threat that Iran’s nuclear capability can pose to it. I don’t see, for example, the very powerful Jewish lobby in the United States putting pressure on the US Government to do something about Pakistan’s nuclear capability. Pakistan could be a source of proliferation of nuclear technology to the Arab world should Iran go nuclear. China announced very recently the agreement to set up of a new 1000 MW power plant in Pakistan, and there is not a squeak from the rest of the world.

From Indian perspective, 99 percent of our security has already been compromised by the ease with which Pakistan was allowed to go nuclear by the West, with its unwillingness to focus on the China-Pakistan nuclear connection. If Iran goes nuclear that might add maybe one percent to our concern, but not much more.

If we have a different perspective, it is not to say that we contest the reality of Israeli concern, given its history, which requires it take the existential threat to its security far more seriously than others. The unacceptable statements that the Iranian leadership makes about the existence of Israel do not make sense and add to concerns all round. It is difficult to understand why Iran makes such statements because, as it is, Iran is beleaguered internationally from the diplomatic point of view and it makes things worse for itself by unnecessarily provoking not only US opinion, but international opinion in general. Why Iran should stand out as the sole country to talk about the eventual destruction of Israel is not easily comprehensible.

Additionally, Iran’s own future, its identity, its vocation, its civilizational profile do not depend on Israel, the nature of its relationship with Israel or the creation or the destruction of Israel as a state. Why does Iran give so much importance to this issue? It would seem that Iran considers this is part of Iran’s confrontation with the United States of America; in itself it is a side issue. The Iranians claim that they have never talked about the destruction of Israel as such- they speak of one state in Palestine, which implies, of course, the effacement of Israel as a separate entity. Iran’s position is also part of its effort to retain its leadership of the Islamic world.

Should one take the Iran threat to destroy Israel seriously? Unlike Pakistan, which is a 65 year old state, Iran is a three to four thousand year old country and civilization. They are not going to risk the destruction of their own civilization in return, which has such a glorious past, simply because of the Israel-Palestinian issue.

As regards India’s concerns about oil price stability being a factor in our concerns about the Iranian nuclear issue, the position is not clear. Some people are wondering why in view of persistent global recession oil prices are so high. The dynamics of oil prices are quite complex. The Iranians had thought that all these military threat against it would inflate oil prices and they will have a bonanza. In fact, one arrow in their quiver has been found to be useless because oil prices haven’t shot up to the levels that people thought that they would in view of the uncertainties surrounding Iran. The game is complex, and reasons why oil prices rise and fall need better understanding. I wouldn’t take the question of oil price stability that seriously in terms of the Iranian nuclear question and its impact on the Arab world.

Tense But Together

Kanwal Sibal
Member Advisory Board, VIF

To assess the outcome of the fourth BRICS summit at New Delhi on March 29, a look is required at the genesis of this grouping, its value for its members and the extent to which it can influence international decision-making.

The origin of BRICS lies in the RIC (Russia-India-China) group set up formally at Russia’s initiative in 2002 to promote multipolarity at a peak moment of American unilateralism and to give Russia a platform to exercise its great power role diminished by the Soviet Union’s collapse and Western geo-political pressures on its periphery.

Around 2006, Russia concluded that RIC had internal limitations because of India-China differences, and that the BRIC concept, with Brazil’s inclusion, would better subsume them, besides strengthening even more the political as well as the economic base of multipolarity. The inclusion of Brazil, the largest South American country and the fourth emerging economy identified by Goldman Sachs in 2001, gave a certain coherence to the group. It also facilitated Russia’s political re-entry into South America from where it had retreated after the Soviet collapse.

China, with its diplomatic and economic offensive in Africa and especially its expanded engagement with South Africa, put its imprint on the BRIC group by successfully pushing for the latter’s inclusion in December 2010. This has given greater geographical representation to the group and strengthened further its multipolar, non-Western character.

Russia’s interest in RIC/BRIC/ BRICS has been more political than economic. It lacks, in any case, the capacity to carve out an economic and commercial sphere of influence in these emerging economies. On the financial side, though, it has since 2006 spoken against the dollar as the principal international reserve currency as it gives the United States of America excessive influence in global affairs, besides inflicting on others the consequences of its consumer profligacy and financial mismanagement.

India’s approach has been practical. Initially, it too was perturbed by US unilateralist tendencies and felt pressure on nuclear and Pakistan related matters, and consequently supported Russian advocacy of multipolarity. The RIC format also enhanced India’s international stature in general and vis a vis China in particular. Its membership of a non-Western group with the potential to bring about a better global balance was consistent with its independent approach to international affairs. However, with its improved relationship with the US, especially after the nuclear deal transformed it strategically, India is sensitive to any undue anti-US/ Western thrust of the group.

India was not initially enthusiastic about RIC’s extension to BRIC politically as it lacked then its present profile. India had no issue with BRIC existing separately as an economic group to focus on World Trade Organisation matters and headed by commerce or trade ministers, rather than by foreign ministers as Russia wanted and succeeded in eventually bringing about. India had reservations about South Africa’s inclusion in order to preserve IBSA’s salience as a South-South grouping. While India benefits from RIC/BRIC politics that reduces Western domination, it has sought to de-emphasize the perceived anti-Western political logic of these groups by putting the accent on their economic agenda.

China was tentative towards RIC to begin with, but after the first meeting became more confident about its participation. It might not have wanted, initially, to play second fiddle to Russia or play into Russian hands against the US, or it might have been uncomfortable with India gaining an enhanced stature. The Chinese were even unresponsive to Indian moves to boost the economic content of RIC. But with its own outreach to India later and its economic penetration of South America and Africa that followed, it now participates actively within the group.

Now that China is the foremost economic power within BRICS, and is headed towards surpassing the US in economic size, its preponderance in the economic and financial agenda of the group will keep increasing. The internal equations within BRICS will inevitably move in China’s favour, principally at Russia’s expense, in great power terms. Even though both countries need each other strategically to counter US hegemony, and China’s economic stakes in the US being incomparably greater than those of Russia, it will be interesting to watch the eventual internal balance in the group on how far to challenge the West.

Western reaction to BRICS has moved from some strategic concern to a touch of indifference to renewed attention. The RIC seemed an embryonic strategic challenge to the West, but as its impact proved limited and as it was assumed that the relations of each member with the US surpassed in importance intra-BRIC relations, it ceased evoking much interest even with Brazil’s addition and the emergence of the overlapping BRIC group.

Today, with financial turmoil and economic difficulties sapping the self-confidence of Western countries, healthy growth rates in China and India aiding global economic recovery, and Brazil at last beginning to realize its potential, BRICS cannot be ignored. Western sceptics point, though, to intra-BRIC differences, especially between India and China, and the undercurrents of strategic discomfort between Russia and China, as an obstacle to any broad range genuine partnership between these countries.

Yet, what the BRICS countries collectively represent is impressive. They account for 43 per cent of the world’s population, more than 26 per cent of the global gross domestic product and the world’s land area, and hold four trillion dollars in combined foreign reserves. China and India are expected to become the first and the third largest economies by 2050, with Brazil and Russia in the fifth and sixth positions.

More concerted deliberations by them will influence the way in which the international community addresses the present imbalance in international political and economic governance. With every summit the BRICS agenda is becoming more substantive.

At the New Delhi summit the five countries called for greater representation of emerging and developing countries in global governance and expressed concern about the economic and financial policies of developed countries spilling over negatively into the emerging market economies. They lectured on the need to adopt responsible macroeconomic and financial policies, the need to avoid creating excessive global liquidity and the need to undertake structural reforms of their own. They criticized the slow pace of International Monetary Fund quota reforms and welcomed, without agreeing on any one in particular, the candidatures from the developing world for the World Bank presidency. They discussed the creation of a new development bank for infrastructure projects in BRICS and other developing economies, a project on which a joint working group will report to the next summit. An agreement on extending credits in local currency under the BRICS Interbank Cooperation mechanism has been reached.

All these are initial steps to obtain greater say in managing the global financial system and diluting the supremacy of the dollar, even as it is clear that progress on this will be slow and the biggest beneficiary will be China.

On political issues, the BRICS position on Iran challenges Western policy by clearly opposing military action against Iran, but the cautious formulation on Syria does not ignore Western and Arab concerns while rejecting regime change. Regrettably, Chinese reticence explains the absence of support from this group for India’s and Brazil’s candidature for permanent United Nations security council membership. This reflects the as yet unsettled political equations within the group that will detract from its global impact.