Carnage of Christians and Other Minorities in Pakistan

Sushant Sareen, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

On 22^nd September, 2013, two suicide bombers targeted a church in Peshawar, killing over 80 people and injuring nearly 150. Entire families were wiped out. Many Christian households, who in any case barely eke out an existence in a country and society where they are treated as Untermensch (sub-humans, because they are not Muslims) lost their sole bread earner. Teachers, students, newly-weds, about to be married, pregnant women, children (around 20) were blown to bits by the jihadists fighting for the glory of Islam. Of course, this is neither the first time such a carnage of minorities has happened in the ‘Land of the Pure’, nor will it be the last time such a massacre has happened because if truth be told, an open season has been declared on minorities in Pakistan. Muslim minority sects, Shias in particular and within the Shia community, the Hazaras, have routinely come in the cross hairs of jihadist mass murderers. Other non-Muslim communities too have been targeted – Hindu girls are a favourite target, Ahmediyas subjected to the worst kinds of hate crimes, and Christians not only made victims to the infamous and obnoxious blasphemy laws but also pogroms in which entire neighbourhoods are burnt by rampaging mobs. 

Every time an outrage such as the bombing of the All Saints’ Church in Peshawar takes place, there is the standard response in Pakistan: the government wrings its hands helplessly and issues a pro forma condemnation but does absolutely nothing tangible to prevent such an incident from being repeated; most politicians also issue similar pro forma condemnation not because they genuinely feel outraged, but because that is the politically correct thing to do; other politicians – to name just the most notorious of this lot, the Taliban defender and supporter Imran Khan, the flag-bearer of Islamist terror Munawar Hasan of Jamaat Islami and the Maulana who wants to run the Taliban but is currently running scared of them, Maulana Fazlur Rehman of JUI-F – condemn the incident but then make the whole thing sound insincere and disingenuous by adding qualifications which are really short hand for not pointing the finger at the real perpetrators but deflecting the blame to an un-named ‘third force’ or insinuating a ‘foreign hand’ (which though not always specified is often an allusion to the US, Indian and Israeli intelligence agencies).

The ugly reality is however quite different from the spin that the self-serving and scared politicians, analysts and strategists give to gruesome acts of terrorism. A son of Maulana Maudoodi, founder of the Jamaat Islami, the party that serves as the ‘Mother of political Islamism’ and is arguably not only one of the political faces of the Al Qaeda but also partners Imran Khan’s party in running the provincial government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, hit the nail on the head when he said that the bombing of the Peshawar church was a natural outcome of creating a state in the name of religion. But even this is a partial explanation of the blood lust that drives the jihadists. Pakistan's real problem isn’t so much that terrorists are running amok, but that Islamist terrorists are operating with impunity and, to an extent, with the sanction of state. In other words, more than terrorism, the problem is societal extremism and a communalised national mindset.

Much as Pakistanis like to explain away extremism in society as something that was fostered on the country by the Islamisation policies unleashed by the former military dictator, Gen Zia ul Haq, the fact is that this mindset has been present since before independence. If anything, it was this mindset that gave birth to Pakistan, and if there is no course correction, then this very mindset will probably become the reason for the death of the state of Pakistan. Terrorism and radicalism are only the manifestations or symptoms of the deep seated extremist mindset which has been consciously and deliberately fuelled by the State through an education system in which children are taught to hate other communities, rendering most of them incapable of living in peace with not only non-Muslims but also Muslims who adhere to a different sect or school of theology.

A recent example of this climate of intolerance was when a news anchor (infamous for being part of the caretaker setup put in place in 2007 by the then dictator and self-proclaimed ‘enlightened moderate’, Gen Pervez Musharraf) who started a campaign against an elite Lahore school because it was teaching comparative religions to students in order to inculcate tolerance and understanding of other faiths, and the alacrity and zeal with which the Punjab government headed by Shahbaz Sharif came down on the school administration and registered cases against them. In such an environment, bombing of religious places of ‘others’ – Christian churches, Hindu temples, Shia Imambargahs and Ahmediya masjids – is par for the course.

Yet another example is that of the Blasphemy law. The problem with the blasphemy law isn’t so much that it is a bad law (which it is) but the extremism in society. Many places have bad laws or laws that are anachronistic. For instance, Britain has both an adultery law and even a blasphemy law but it is hardly ever applied because society has moved on. In Pakistan, however, merely accusing a person of blasphemy is enough to practically pronounce the death sentence on the person because if the people don’t kill you even before any court finds you guilty, the judge will be so terrified of acquitting you that he will pronounce the guilty verdict without applying his mind or evaluating the evidence, and if by chance he does acquit you, then waiting to kill you outside the court will be all sorts of people.

There is little doubt that a lot of the terrorism that is affecting Pakistan now is really a blowback of the Pakistani State’s policy of using jihadist terror groups as instruments of state policy. But here again, it was not this policy per se that's the problem. Other countries have also used such cynical and disastrous policies and lived to regret it and then being forced to change course and jettison such policies. But unlike other countries, Pakistan doesn’t have the benefit of the political and social space for pulling back from the disastrous course it took some seven decades ago when it first tried to use jihad to achieve foreign policy and national security objectives. If anything, it appears extremely unlikely that the Pakistani State (as it is currently constituted) will survive the wages of this jihadist policy. The reason is that this policy fits in well and feeds on the national narrative of extremism. It is both a concomitant and a corollary of the conscious spread and tolerance of extremist thought in Pakistani society. It is now part of the culture that the state inculcated in the people.

It is precisely because of this culture of intolerance that neo-jihadists like Imran Khan and old school communalists like members of the ruling PML-Nawaz invariably resort to denial, deflection and obfuscation even in the face of horrific incidents of terrorism. So terrified are these so-called leaders of the Pakistani people that they do not even mention the name of the terrorist group which carries out such attacks, even though the terrorist group openly takes responsibility for the attack. With almost the entire country suffering from a sort of national and civilizational Stockholm Syndrome, how can Pakistan even think of fighting, forget about defeating, the Taliban?

While there are still a lot of right thinking and sensible people in Pakistan, many of whom display great courage and intrepidness to openly criticise, condemn and even challenge the Taliban and other Islamist terror groups and their overground supporters, the sad fact is that these brave people don't count for anything in today’s Pakistan. The main reason for this is that they depend on the state to fight on their side but the state is run by people who are either on the side of the terrorists or are using terrorists for their grandiose, if also delusional, strategic objectives or are just too scared of facing, much less fighting, the terrorists. A prime example is Shahbaz Sharif who publicly pleaded to the Taliban to spare the Punjab from their attacks since the PML-N and the Taliban were fighting for the same cause!

Today, the PML-N is in power not only in Punjab but also in Islamabad, and given the recent resolution passed by the All Parties Conference for opening a dialogue with the Taliban, the ‘fighting for the same cause’ has now been taken to the next level, in which the Taliban have been made ‘stakeholders’ in the system. In such a situation, the massacre of minorities is a small price to pay, especially when the PML-N storm-troopers in Punjab have also participated in pogroms against Christians. Therefore, chances are that in the coming weeks, months and years, there will be many more such incidents, all of which will be followed by the usual meaningless statements of condemnation and bizarre conspiracy theories.  

Be to Pakistan as its Posture Warrants

Kanwal Sibal 

(Member, VIF Advisory Board) 

Our international relations experts are divided on how to deal with Pakistan, with a section always advocating moderation in reaction to Pakistani provocations and others favouring more robust responses to Pakistani belligerence.This lack of consensus makes our Pakistan policy look vacillating and irresolute. 

It is easy to wear the mantle of moderation as the accompanying vocabulary of peace, engagement, dialogue and restraint sounds mature and wise. Those wanting firmer treatment of Pakistan slip into talk of retaliation, force, reprisal, imposing costs, which sounds aggressive and war-like. Public opinion on the whole is more indulgent towards “doves” even when their judgments are skewed than towards “hawks” even when their views are sounder. Dovish views are less unsettling than hawkish ones in a country that still lacks self-confidence and is more comfortable with caution than with risk-taking even when provoked. 

Dialogue

The complexity of our problems with Pakistan would justify a degree of prudence in our reactions. What is less justified is our posture of helplessness. We say meekly that we have no choice but to have a dialogue with Pakistan. Some on our side actually advocate “an uninterrupted and unterruptible” dialogue. Such thinking is pernicious for our interests but serves those of Pakistan, which is why its foreign minister has made this catchy phraseology her own. She has thrown it in our face while berating us for creating tensions over the recent beheading incident. She is hoisting us with our own petard! 

We were against negotiations with Pakistan with the gun of terrorism pointed at our head. We therefore linked resumption of dialogue with Pakistan’s commitment to end terrorism. Politically cornered when Pakistan failed to honour its commitment, instead of interrupting the dialogue we gave ourselves a way out by agreeing that both countries were victims of terrorism, which implied that terrorist incidents in India were the handiwork of non-state actors with no official connivance. Later, we formally delinked dialogue and terrorism and continued our parleys with Pakistan despite a spate of terrorist attacks, until the enormity of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks made such a position politically untenable. After a short interregnum we again resumed the dialogue because our decision-makers have convinced themselves that a “no-dialogue option” in not available to us. 

Between not having a dialogue and a composite dialogue covering all contentious issues, there is considerable space for talking to each other, but we have straight-jacketed ourselves into a structured dialogue that in fact reduces the centrality of terrorism and allows Pakistan to put in all elements of its political agenda where it wants territorial and other concessions from us, whether it is Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek or the Tulbul project. In fact this composite dialogue exposes us to Pakistani demands that we cannot satisfy, with the result that even Pakistani peaceniks express their disappointment at India’s rigidity, especially on Siachen. 

What this superficial formula of “an uniterrupted and uninterruptable dialogue” means is that even if another Mumbai-like attack takes place, India’s hands must remain tied and the dialogue must continue, ruling out any retaliatory action. 

Restraint

The perspective of such a draconian restraint on India provides no incentive to Pakistan to take any step to weed out terrorists targetting India, as any future attack would neither mean an end to bilateral engagement nor retaliation. Pakistan will thus retain the freedom to keep India under pressure with the threat of terrorism- as China does by not settling the border issue- and compel India to temporize, “buy” off Pakistani hostility with friendly gestures, including not taking advantage of its increasing internal difficulties and international isolation. What can suit Pakistani strategy better?

Some diehard apologists of Pakistan in India claim that there is a change in the Pakistani mindset towards India and none in India’s mindset towards Pakistan? Pakistan has supposedly moved away from communal hostility towards India to national hostility? Why the latter should re-assure us more is not clear. By the same logic, a nationalist but more politically open China would be better for its neighbours than the exisiting authoritarian version. Facts would suggest that Pakistan is becoming more “communal” or sectarian in character by becoming more intolerant towards the Shias and other minorities, that religiosity in society is increasing and extremism is on the rise. 

Provocations

It can hardly be that the internal mayhem being caused by the spread of extremist ideologies in Pakistan implies a more tolerant religious attitude towards India. Our policies towards Pakistan in the last 8 years both under the NDA and UPA governments show, on the contrary, how far our attitudes towards Pakistan have changed

In any case, if the Pakistani mindset towards India has changed, in what positive way has it expressed itself? On Kashmir, Pakistan has reverted to UN resolutions as a solution, on Siachen it feels wronged and on Sir Creek it rejects international principles. It will not permit Tulbul and will obstruct any power project in J&K, it is creating a new water issue despite the generous Indus Waters Treaty, it is expanding its nuclear arsenal by distorting the intent and purpose of the India-US nuclear deal and it is treating our terrorism concerns with contempt. If it has moved away from its irrational position of not trading with India and giving us MFN treatment, we do not need to feel grateful. Pakistan will benefit from this as well as the visa agreement more than we will, though any progress in these areas should be welcomed by us.

We should treat Pakistan as a friend when it is friendly and as a foe when it is inimical. We should be doves or hawks as the situation demands.

India’s Pendulum Policy on Pakistan

Sushant Sareen 

(Senior Fellow, VIF) 

More than anything else, experience should inform Indian policy-makers and the legion of analysts and commentators on Indo-Pak relations about the peril of using words like ‘irreversible’ and ‘uninterruptible’ to describe the extremely accident-prone peace (more likely, engagement) process between the two South Asian neighbours and adversaries. Even when superficially everything seems to be going well between the two countries, the state of bilateral relations remains quite fragile. A relatively minor incident has the potential to get blown out of proportion and unleash an emotional storm that results in a regression of any forward movement or progress that might have preceded it.

There was of course nothing ordinary about the recent events along the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir. Had it been only a ceasefire violation by Pakistan, it would have been treated as something of a routine nature. Even the death of an Indian soldier as a result of cross-LoC firing would also have probably not been hyped up by the Indian media. The Indian Army would have taken such an incident in its stride, with the proviso that it would return the favour to the Pakistanis in due course. But a raid across the LoC by Pakistan Army regulars, and worse, the medieval barbarism of mutilating corpses of Indian soldiers and beheading one of them, crossed all the red lines. 

Not surprisingly, once such an outrageous and unacceptable action became public knowledge, the incident acquired a life of its own, with the media, politicians, talking-heads and columnists all contributing to the rage in the country, and eventually forcing a very reluctant government of India to toughen its stand against Pakistan. Across the Radcliffe Line, however, the incident didn’t find the same salience. To an extent, the underplaying of the incident by the Pakistani media and their political class is an indication of how much the focus in Pakistan has shifted away from Kashmir. 

A decade or so ago, the Pakistani press would have gone hysterical. But now there are so many other things happening – around the time of the LoC violation, there was a huge bomb blast in Quetta killing over 100 Shias, in Islamabad a cleric who had parachuted in from Canada was on the verge of conducting a Long March to force a complete political overhaul, the provincial government in Balochistan was being dismissed, around 20 soldiers were blown up in North Waziristan, the Pakistani Taliban were proposing a ceasefire, political confabulations and manoeuvres in preparation for the forthcoming general elections were in full swing etc. etc. – that Kashmir, and by extension India, have perforce been put on the backburner. 

This, of course, doesn’t mean that Pakistan has forgotten all about Kashmir; only it is no longer a priority like it was until some time ago. The Pakistani strategy for now seems to be to keep probing India’s defences along the LoC, occasionally try and push in terrorists and infiltrators by giving them covering fire and generally not let things settle down in J&K. It is also important for Pakistan to keep reminding India to not think that Pakistan is a pushover because it is so embroiled in very serious internal crisis. While an increase in tension along the LoC suits Pakistan because this gives it the opportunity to try and once again convince the international community that the road to Kabul runs through Kashmir, it is unlikely if Pakistan would like to provoke an outbreak of hostilities along the LoC and risk a complete breakdown of the ceasefire agreement. 

For its part, India too would like to avoid a resumption of the shooting match and artillery duels across the LoC, partly to avoid unnecessary and undesirable international attention to the Kashmir issue and partly because relative calm along the LoC is helping in normalising the situation in Jammu and Kashmir. Chances, therefore, are that things will settle down on India’s western front after the latest flare-up. The DGMO’s of the two countries seem to have indicated as much. India will make a show of toughness to satisfy public opinion – for instance, the PM’s statement and the Army Chief’s presser – and for a few weeks keep the engagement process with Pakistan on the hold. But it will be back to business as usual after things cool down, that is until the next flare-up when the entire cycle will repeat itself. 

There is a slim possibility that something good might emerge from this incident. The increasing violations of the ceasefire by Pakistan over the last couple of years, which until now have been more or less brushed under the carpet, might receive greater focus in the talks that have been proposed between the two governments. Pakistan would certainly try to push through its proposals for conventional CBM’s along the LoC, which India has so far rejected. At the same time India will get the opportunity to lay down new procedures to ensure that there is peace and tranquillity along the LoC.

On the more substantive issue of the state of relations between the two countries and the principles on which India needs to formulate its Pakistan policy, there are lessons to be learnt from the latest spat between India and Pakistan. The one major take-away of this incident is the fickleness of diplomacy conducted in full public glare and also of diplomacy that seeks to benefit on the backs of greater interaction between the peoples of the two countries. In other words, depending too much on the so-called people-to-people relations to push forward the engagement process with Pakistan is a strategy fraught with consequences which are not in the control of the two States and their establishments. 

The people of the Indian subcontinent are very emotional, something that can be of great advantage when things are all sweet and honey in giving a fillip to the engagement process; but when things go bad, these same emotions can swing things in the other direction by generating pressures that governments find too onerous to bear. When public opinion turns hostile on a foreign policy issue like Pakistan, it is quite natural for any government to get swayed by the emotional outpouring of an outraged public. The point is that when people and their emotions get involved in determining the pace and direction of a foreign policy issue, it results in what can be called a Pendulum Policy in which relations with another country swing from one extreme to another. This is exactly what was on display after the LoC incident.

Just a couple of days before the LoC violation, Pakistanis were being feted in India. The TV networks and newspapers were going overboard in covering the cricket series between the two countries. Trade and travel were the new buzzwords. There was excited anticipation of the new visa regime, including the visa on arrival facility. Businessmen were going to and fro striking deals, holding exhibitions and what have you. Pakistani artistes were being invited for live performances and participating in TV music, game and reality shows. Then suddenly the pendulum swung the other way. Hockey players were sent back. Singers and actors were no longer welcome. The Indian bureaucracy suddenly discovered a lacuna in the visa on arrival facility and put it on hold. The trade along LoC came to a standstill. Visitors to either country started making a bee-line for going back home. Some politicians started baying for blood and demanded breaking off relations and waging war. In short, from the hyperbole of Aman ki Aasha, the two countries swung to the other extreme of Aman ki Ashes! 

This is hardly the way to conduct diplomacy, even less so by a country with ambitions to play a role on the global stage. Surely, for two nuclear weapons states to behave in such an emotional manner is rather strange and unseemly. A large part of the blame for such pendulum swings rests on the government. What some analysts defend as the policy of strategic restraint is perhaps more appropriately described as a policy of strategic fuzziness and strategic irresoluteness, aptly summed up in a recent article by the former RAW chief, Vikram Sood, who asks “why are we talking to them [Pakistan], with whom, about what, to what end and for how long?” It is precisely because of this strategic fuzziness that is guiding India’s Pakistan policy that the government hasn’t been able to convince a substantial section of the public about its approach towards Pakistan. Add to this the glaring inability of the current dispensation to understand the nature of the beast called new media – electronic, social, cyber, even print – and try and manage the information flow so that it always has a handle over the situation, and it is no surprise that the entire edifice of the government’s Pakistan policy has come crashing down. 

Perhaps the time has come for India to reduce if not remove the emotional quotient that underscores its Pakistan policy. India’s Pakistan policy should not be guided by the heart, but by the head. This means that instead of an ad hoc policy based on a hope and a prayer that ultimately good sense will dawn on the Pakistani establishment, India needs to have a well-structured policy which is based on facts and not emotions. Rather than harbouring silly notions of forging friendly ties with Pakistan – relations between States are based on interests and friendship is incidental, at best a by-product of these interests – India should adopt a clinically professional approach towards Pakistan in which emotions are subjected to interests and not interests to emotions. In other words, have a relationship without wanting to get related. 

This means that while India should listen to all the sweet nothings that come its way from Pakistan, the substance of relations should be based on actions and not empty words being cooed into India’s ears by Pakistan's leaders. There are always lessons to be learned, even from an adversary. Pakistanis never tire of saying that only Allah knows about the intentions (or if you will, mindsets) of people. Therefore, instead of falling for or looking for changed mindsets in Pakistan, as some retired diplomats turned politicians exhort India to do, let Pakistan’s actions inform us of their changed mindsets. Until now, Pakistan’s actions on the ground really give no indication of either a changed mindset or even a paradigm shift in its approach towards India. In the meantime, keep your powder dry because you never know when you might need to use it to let the adversary know that it crosses India’s red lines at its own peril.