Monish Gulati
Introduction
The Pakistan government approved the National Internal Security
Policy (NISP) 2014-2018 on 25 Feb14. In his statement, after tabling the
policy before the cabinet for approval, Pakistani Interior Minister
Chaudhry Nisar indicated that the NISP has three parts; operational,
strategic and day to day government actions that would remain secret.
The draft of the counter terrorism policy had earlier been presented to
Nawaz Sharif on 13 August 2013. The draft policy had advocated a five
pronged approach of dismantle, contain, prevent, educate and reintegrate
to curb terror, which was distinct from the 3-D (Deterrence,
Development and Dialogue) approach of the previous Pakistan People’s
Party (PPP) government. The Pakistani government had evolved a tentative
political consensus on the draft policy through an All-Party
Parliamentary Conference (APC) before finalizing the policy.
The 100-odd page document, which is Pakistan’s first-ever national
internal security policy, states that close to 50,000 people have been
killed in Pakistan including over 5000 personnel of the law-enforcement
agencies since the country joined the US-led war on terror after 9/11
attacks in 2001. The policy document goes on to estimate the total loss
to the Pakistani economy in the last ten years due to terrorism, at $78
billion. This article examines the key constructs of the NISP to arrive
at the challenges and pitfalls the policy would have to contend in
changing the way Pakistan has been combating its internal strife.
Present Counter-terrorism Mechanism
According to the Constitution of Pakistan, maintaining law and order
is the responsibility of the country’s provinces. Policing is a
provincial matter, with each province maintaining its own police force.
The federal government provides additional support to provincial
governments when requested. The federal government has its own law
enforcement agency, the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), which is
governed by an Act of parliament and investigates offenses mentioned
therein.
The Pakistan federal government in 2003 had assigned
counter-terrorism role to FIA and the Special Investigation Group (SIG)
was formally established in May 2003 within the FIA to combat terrorism.
The SIG had been modelled on a similarly tasked cell of the US Federal
Bureau of Investigation. The first batch of SIG recruits were drawn from
the Police Service of Pakistan, Intelligence Bureau (IB), FIA and
direct recruitment through the Federal Public Service Commission. SIG
Officers were provided extensive training and some equipment by US
government’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program, in the area of crime
scene analysis, computer forensic analysis, cyber terrorism, terrorist
financing investigations and post blast explosives analysis etc1.
The SIG was tasked with identifying and investigating terrorists and
terrorist activities, bank frauds and informal money transaction
systems. It was the only civilian agency dedicated to countering
terrorism”2 and had regional offices in all the four
provinces under the administrative command of Director, FIA. All civil
and military intelligence agencies were required to share their
information on terrorism with the SIG at the FIA level. Later SIG was
re-designated as Counter Terrorism Wing (CTW). The other federal-level
agency – the IB also has a counter terrorism responsibility.
Intelligence Bureau (IB) is Pakistan's main domestic/internal
intelligence and espionage agency. It functions under direct control of
Chief Executive of Pakistan - either the Prime Minister or the
President.
National Counter-Terrorism Authority
As the fight against domestic terrorism has grown in size and
intensity, it had become clear to the Pakistani establishment that there
was a dire need to create a structure to manage and coordinate the
competing demands for security resources and to come up with an
implementable strategy to meet this ever increasing threat. NISP to this
end states that “integrated efforts through an institutionalised
monitoring framework under democratic leadership to elicit support and
cooperation of local and international stakeholders” would be required
to achieve its objectives. The NISP designated the National
Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA) as the focal organisation for
national security.3 The Pakistani cabinet has also agreed
that all decisions pertaining to anti-terror measures would be taken at
the highest level of authority and the Ministry of Interior (MoI) will
be the lead Ministry for implementation of the NISP.
The NACTA had been set up in December 2009, with the aim to overcome
the governance deficit in Pakistan’s security framework left by the
abolition of the National Security Council. In November 2012, the
Pakistani cabinet approved the draft NACTA Bill, which had been
introduced in 2009. The NACTA Bill (2013) was finally promulgated on 11
April 2013. The Bill provided a legal basis to the NACTA which had
become redundant due to lack of clarity about its status since its
establishment in December 2009. Initially it was proposed to be placed
under the MoI but certain stakeholders had opposed the arrangement and
wanted to see it directly controlled by the Prime Minister. Between the
NACTA Bill and the NISP, these jurisdictional issues appear to have been
addressed and the head of the NACTA would be the “National Coordinator”
tasked with execution and monitoring of the new policy.
NISP
The NISP policy framework is based on soft and hard interventions and
attempts to address the entire spectrum of issues impinging on the
internal security environment in Pakistan. The soft component, which
reposes faith in the political process, details a Comprehensive Response
Plan (CRP) which is grounded in a process of research and coordination
on key issues influencing internal security. CRP is focused on winning
over trust and confidence of general public to combat terrorism and
includes infrastructure development, rehabilitation of terror victims,
shaping of the national narrative, reconciliation, reintegration and
related legal reforms. The hard component of NISP comprises of the
Composite Deterrence Plan (CDP), which seeks to complement the existing
National Internal Security Apparatus (NISA) to combat terrorism. CDP
aims to change the posture of the NISA from reactive to proactive.
The organisational restructuring and creation under the NISP will see
the establishment of a Directorate of Internal Security (DIS) under the
NACTA where 33 civilian and military intelligence and operational
agencies will be represented to integrate tactical, operational and
strategic ‘levels’ of civil and military ‘verticals’. In addition to an
Air Wing, a well equipped Federal Rapid Response Force (RRF) with
nationwide reach and capability drawn from Counter-Terrorism Departments
(CTD) and police would be created. The RRF would interface and operate
in close coordination with police, CAFs and Pakistan Armed Forces. The
CTDs within police organisation of all the provinces would themselves be
reorganised and strengthened ideally with uniform structures and
unified command at provincial, region and field level. All CTDs will
comprise of intelligence, operations, investigation, the provincial RRF
and other technical sections to tackle the entire spectrum of internal
security threats. At the federal level, a dedicated CAF Headquarter
would be established under the MoI.4
The NACTA under the NISP will coordinate the efforts of relevant
agencies to obtain a fair assessment of losses due to internal
disturbances and recommend plans for renewal of impacted infrastructure.
It will oversee the process of rehabilitation and reintegration of the
terror affected people. NACTA will liaise with international actors for
fostering cooperation on counter-terrorism and in the process synergise
the public and international support available. It will also in
consultation with other institutions supporting NISP develop a National
De-Radicalisation Programme.
Financing
The NISP 2014-18 is initially expected to cost the Pakistani
exchequer Rs32 billion for setting up the proposed institutions and
strengthen the existing ones.5 Notwithstanding the fact that
the internal disturbances in Pakistan have been a drag on the country’s
finances and they have also set back the country’s development and
economy, Pakistan’s efforts to institutionalise counter terrorism have
been driven to a large extent by external funding. While FBI experts
were actively involved in training the SIG/CTW both in Pakistan and the
US, NACTA received funding support from the EU. According to an April
2012 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, the Obama
Administration in 2013 earmarked $800m for Pakistan Counterinsurgency
Capacity Fund.
In budgeting for the fiscal year 2015 beginning in October 2014, the
US under the foreign military financing category, has earmarked $280
million in military aid to Pakistan. According to the US State
Department, the $280 million is expected to enhance the Pakistan Army,
Frontier Corps, the air force, and the navy's ability to conduct counter
insurgency and counter terrorism operations against militants and
improve Pakistan's ability to deter threats emanating from those areas,
and encourage continued US-Pakistan military-to-military engagement.6
Assessment
Pakistan’s counter terror policy has been comprehensive enough to
cover a wide spectrum of issues ranging from police reforms to loopholes
in Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 and yet pragmatic enough to
recognise the importance of factors such as poverty, meagre land
holdings, the lack of government writ, rehabilitation of surrendered
militants etc for its success.
Yet, the NISP has faced challenges in its formulation, evident from
NACTA’s birth pangs. The basic issue was the designation of the primary
supervising agency- whether it would be the Prime Minister’s office or
the MoI. Though the Federal government’s role and its conflict with a
provincial government is inherent in a federal structure, it is the
degree of trust deficit that defines the problem. The test in this case
has been (is likely to be for some years) to resolve coordination and
jurisdictional issues between the security and intelligence
organisations operating at the federal and provincial levels. It would
be interesting to see if organisational restructuring under the NISP
leads to operational efficiency.
The second issue arises from the fact that insurgency in Pakistan has
reached such intensity that active employment of the army and the air
force to tackle it is the new normal. Civilian authorities have
outsourced internal security to the military, losing both control and
legitimacy. Further, the civil and military hierarchies tend to work in
silos, lacking mechanisms for frequent consultation and collaboration.
The shift in focus of internal security from the military to the
civilian government and from being reactive to proactive is going to be
extremely challenging.
A related issue is the availability of fire support for conduct of
counter-insurgency operations and targeting of high value targets.
Pakistan military in a fine act of duplicity has been relying on US
drone operations to aid its efforts to check the insurgency in certain
areas of Pakistan. With drones acquiring the psycho-legal-political
dimensions, the military has to fall back on the use of air force- which
it has resorted to sparingly in the past. The use of air force in own
territory against own citizens always sends out uncomfortable signals in
a counter-insurgency campaign.
The counterinsurgency environment is further complicated by presence
of foreign militants and the more recent foreign-returned jihadis. This
brings non-local issues in play which the NISP will struggle to contend
with. The presence of state sponsored militias/ terror groups
(furthering cross border national interests) will test Pakistan’s
ability to let them function within the NISP.
Suicide Attacks
While the use of suicide attacks/bombings have become an integral
part of terror campaigns in certain parts of the world, it is still not
the norm and merits a discussion simply because the challenge they pose
not only to the security forces but the society as a whole. The first
suicide bombings in Pakistan were reported in 2002 against foreigners,
and were committed by persons of Arab descent. Between 2002 and 2006, at
least twenty-five such incidents were documented, including two suicide
attacks on former President General Musharraf and one against Shaukat
Aziz, the then Prime Minister. Although military action against the
Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants had begun after 2002, the real tipping
point in increased suicide bombings in Pakistan came after the Lal
Masjid operation in July 2007. After this point, suicide attacks became
fairly routine in Pakistan.
Increased military offensive in tribal areas has resulted in the
terrorists shifting their focus from religious targets to military, law
enforcement, and intelligence targets.7 It has brought
terror strikes to urban and commercial centres, which requires an
operational shift in the counter-terror strategy.
Conclusion
It is important to point out that a discussion on security related
issues of policy and process always surmises availability of political
will, clarity on national interest and an absence of terror-politics
nexus. As we see today, terrorism is hardwired into Pakistan’s society
and polity and the country is internally divided. No single political
force, not even the Army and its conjoin the ISI seem powerful enough to
turn the tide. As some analysts have pointed out, the
operationalisation of Pakistan’s NISP is not a simple matter of
reorienting and restructuring of NACTA and NISA but how Pakistan begins
to sees itself in its neighbourhood and the world order.
Endnotes
- Federal Investigation Agency, Counter Terrorism Wing (CTW).
- Ismail Khan. Pakistan to raise new anti-terrorism force, Dawn, August 21, 2003.
- PM says govt writ to be affirmed as cabinet okays security policy,Dawn.com, February 25,2014. http://www.dawn.com/news/1089371/pm-says-govt-writ-to-be-affirmed-as-cab...
- Text of National Security Policy 2014-18, The Nation, February 27, 2014.
- Ansar Abbasi. The new national security plan: What it envisages on paper, The News, February 28, 2014. http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-28823-The-new-national-security...
- Lalit K Jha. US plans 280 mn aid to Pak to encourage counter-terrorism effort, Rediff.com, March 05, 2014.
- Abbas Zaidi, Syed Manzar. Demographics of suicide terrorism, Dawn.com, August 5, 2010. http://archives.dawn.com/archives/30744
(The author is an independent analyst based in New Delhi)
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