China’s motives in provoking the Depsang valley incident in Ladakh
are not easy to decipher. The Line of Actual Control (LAC) on the
undemarcated India-China border is not defined on the ground, unlike in
the case of the Line of Control in J&K. We have our own perception
of the areas we control and the Chinese their own. One way to signal
territorial control is patrolling, which both sides undertake in
contested areas. Until the sovereignty over these areas is determined
through an agreement, both sides want to maintain the appearance of
actual control, with periodic patrolling serving as proof in future
negotiations. Neither side, however, as matter of practice, sets up
posts in the disputed areas- a noteworthy point.
In Depsang valley the Chinese have violated this practice. Since the
1986 Sumdorong Chu incident in the eastern sector, this is possibly the
first major one of this nature. The implication of setting up a tent and
staying put for almost two weeks is that the Chinese are now frontally
and unilaterally asserting their sovereignty over an area that India too
claims. If all these years they did not feel the need to do this, why
now? The question is all the more pertinent because the purpose of the
1993 peace and tranquility agreement and the 1996 agreement on CBMs was
not to bar patrolling but to avoid any headlong clash between patrols
and observe a certain protocol if they did come face to face.
What is puzzling is that, purely militarily speaking, the Chinese
move makes no sense. They can be easily dislodged by the Indian army.
The Chinese platoon has limited provisions and there is no evidence of
any planned logistic support. Even if that was there, their lines can be
easily cut off, forcing them to retreat. Alternatively, India could set
up a similar position outflanking the Chinese one and wait for the
stand-off to run its course. If, as some speculate, the Chinese move
might be a riposte to aggressive Indian patrolling in eastern Ladakh in
the Chumar area, then why choose such an ineffective counter in military
terms?
The argument that this could be an action by a local commander,
without any larger military or political design, no longer holds because
apart from two flag meetings on the spot, the demarche to the Chinese
Ambassador by the Foreign Secretary hasn’t resolved the stand-off. The
top leadership in China has now been seized of India’s protest through
the Ambassador, but the Chinese government is asserting that they have
not violated any agreement with India and that their platoon is within
their side of the LAC.
Some argue that the Chinese have decided to pressure us in order to
dissuade us from participating in the US pivot towards Asia, about
which they are deeply concerned. Firstly, India is quite reluctant to
join for larger reasons relating to doubts about the capacity and
willingness of the US to seriously confront China. Secondly, such
intimidating steps do not make any sense as the more China takes them,
the more opinion in India would look favourably at forging partnerships
with US, Japan, Australia and South-East countries that too are
threatened by Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea. With
China already embroiled in such maritime disputes in the east, common
sense would dictate that they do not open up another front with India in
the west, as this will only to serve to deepen concerns all round about
Chinese assertiveness as the country grows stronger. Such does not seem
to be China’s thinking, however.
It is difficult to believe, as some suggest, that the communist party
and the PLA might be at odds with each other after the change of
leadership in China and that this adventure in Ladakh constitutes
independent muscle-flexing by the PLA. The latter supposedly wants to
send a hard signal about India to the political leadership in China
before Premier Le Keqiang visits us in May. If this were so, the PLA
would have chosen to provoke us in a location and with means that would
make their action more credible. As things are, the Chinese have exposed
themselves to an effective rebuff by the Indian armed forces, which
could cause them great embarrassment potentially. The assessment of
those who believe that our forces are not capable of dealing with this
incident and any likely escalation thereafter by the Chinese seems
erroneous.
China’s action is also at variance with the general improvement of
India-China ties, notably in the economic domain but also in terms of
maintaining high level political exchanges bilaterally and working
together in multilateral groupings. Defence contacts and regional
dialogues, including the recent one on Afghanistan, are other signs of
positive engagement between the two countries. This incident comes in
the wake of the supposedly friendly exchanges between our Prime Minister
and President XI Jinping at Durban on the occasion of the BRICS Summit.
But then, despite the intensity of US-China economic and financial
ties, the adversarial element in their relationship is sharpening. With
Japan too, despite the huge trade and investment relationship, China is
being aggressive on territorial issues. Clearly, the Chinese logic
allows slaps and a friendly handshake simultaneously.
One explanation that may not be wrong is that China has begun to
believe that India can get easily intimidated, that its leadership is
weak and prone to temporize and concede. Past Chinese presidents like
Jiang Zemin were privately contemptuous about the fibre of the Indian
armed forces. Our lack of reaction to Chinese provocations in recent
years, our overly conciliatory political discourse and eagerness to
reach out to them may have convinced them that a little show of force
will prod us to find ways to placate them.
Our political reaction to their latest provocation would confirm
this. We are downplaying its import, calling it a local affair,
shielding the Chinese political leadership from responsibility even
after our failed demarche to the Chinese Ambassador and the Chinese
spokesperson’s repeated statements that they are blameless. We don’t
want the relationship built up with such effort to be damaged, as if we
have provoked the present crisis. We have taken the responsibility for
defusing it before the Chinese premier visits India next month. We seem
to be more keen than the Chinese themselves to ensure that Li Keqiang
comes and the atmosphere becomes congenial for this visit.
We are describing the Depsang valley incident as part of a growing up
process, as acne on the beautiful face of India-China relations. Our
six decades of differences with China have, some may say, outlived the
phase of adolescence. From China being India’s enemy number one and,
more moderately, India’s biggest strategic adversary, the ugly visage of
the relationship has now become beautiful. Rather than the Chinese
Foreign Minister visiting India to prepare for his Prime Minister’s
visit, our Foreign Minister is, most unusually, going there, as if we
owe China an explanation for the face-off in Ladakh. If now China
withdraws it will seem a friendly gesture in the face of appeals by
India.
Why have we lost our nerve? Prudence, yes, but appeasement, no.
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