Showing posts with label President Asif Zardari. Show all posts
Showing posts with label President Asif Zardari. Show all posts

Thursday, June 28, 2012

The Sarabjit Cockup: Chickening out or Merely Communication Confusion

Sushant Sareen
Senior Fellow, VIF

The celebrations and media excitement over the news that Pakistan's President Asif Zardari had commuted the death sentence of a condemned Indian prisoner, Sarabjit Singh, to life imprisonment and that he would soon be released and repatriated to India soon gave way to gloom and bitterness after it became known that the man in question wasn’t Sarabjit but another Indian prisoner, Surjit Singh. In an era of 24x7 news, with news organisations competing with each other to be the first to ‘break news’, the original story had soon acquired a life of its own and without anyone double checking the authenticity or veracity of the news, it was plastered on TV screens. By the time the clarification came, the damage had been done. While media outfits screamed ‘U-turn’, ‘backtrack’, ‘caving-in by the Pakistani government to pressure of ISI, Islamists and Jihadists’, the roller-coaster of emotions that the hapless family of Sarabjit must have gone through can only be imagined.

The huge controversy that has erupted on the airwaves is centred around one big question: was the cockup a genuine communication error leading to a mix-up over names or was it the result of the government of Pakistan wilting under the pressure of the military, the media mujahideen and the militants? The answer to this all important question lies in the summary that was moved by Pakistan’s law ministry to recommend the release of the Indian prisoner. If the summary was moved in the name of Sarabjit, then it is clearly a case of the government doing a U-turn under pressure; on the other hand, if the summary was indeed in the name of Surjit Singh, then it was most likely a case of misreporting of the news, not necessarily out of malice but probably as an outcome of the old Punjabi ditty: ‘Natha Singh and Prem Singh, one and the same thing’. Given the Pakistani genius for mutilating Indian names, it shouldn’t cause any surprise if President Zardari’s spokesman, Farhatullah Babar, read Surjit as Sarabjit. Nevertheless, the six hour delay by the Pakistani authorities in clarifying who was actually being released has only added to the mystery and suspicion about what actually transpired between the announcement and subsequent clarification.

Although some would explain away this delay as a manifestation of the sheer incompetence of the administration in that country, the fact of the matter is that while Sarabjit’s case has become a cause celebre in the media of both countries, Surjit’s case was hardly on anyone’s radar screen. Even after the release on bail of the Pakistani doctor Khalil Chishty by the Indian Supreme Court, and amidst a clamour for a quid pro quo from Pakistan on Sarabjit, there was no give from the Pakistani side on Sarabjit. Instead, there were some reports in the Pakistani press that Pakistan would reciprocate by expediting the release another Indian prisoner, Surjit, who has already served his prison term. But since Surjit’s name didn’t strike any bell, no one paid much attention to it. It is therefore possible that even though the Pakistanis were releasing Surjit, it was Sarabjit’s name that started doing the rounds.

The news of Sarabjit’s release was also sensational because of the nature of the case in which he was sentenced. While Surjit was serving a prison sentence on charges of espionage, Sarabjit was put on death row on charges of sabotage and terrorism. As a result, releasing Surjit would not be as big a problem for the Pakistan government as releasing Sarabjit. Notwithstanding the merits of the argument given in defence of Sarabjit – mistaken identity, an innocent man implicated in a heinous crime just so the Pakistani security agencies could claim success in their investigation, etc. – his conviction complicates matters immensely for the Pakistani authorities, especially for the incumbent government which is already reeling under the onslaught of the jihadist judiciary. Having already sacked a sitting prime minister on as frivolous a charge as contempt of court and hell bent on taking away the constitutional immunity enjoyed by the President, what are the chances that the judges would allow President Zardari to commute the sentence of Sarabjit and repatriate him to India?

While politically, it would have been practically impossible for the PPP-led coalition to release Sarabjit – the right-wing, Islamist opposition had already started to bay for the government’s blood after the announcement and before the clarification (or if you will, backtracking) – even legally the government would be on a very weak wicket if it tried to do any such thing. Quite asides the fact that last year the Lahore High Court had admitted petitions against any government move to release Sarabjit and the government had denied any intention to pardon Sarabjit, chances are that the Pakistani judges would have probably invoked Islamic jurisprudence to block any relief for Sarabjit. Apart from the raft of petitions that right-wing lawyers (many with links to terror organisations like Jamaat Islami and Lashkar-e-Taiba) would have filed to block Sarabjit’s release, the heirs of the victims of the bomb blasts allegedly carried out by Sarabjit would have resorted to Islamic laws of Qisas and Diyat to demand Sarabjit’s execution. Clearly, Sarabjit’s case was something of a no-go area for the government and it is unlikely if they would have been brave enough, or foolhardy enough, to have released him for winning some brownie points from India.
The timing of the announcement of release of an Indian prisoner also had something to do with the comedy of errors that followed. The Indian media had gone into an overdrive over the arrest of the terrorist Abu Jindal, who is believed to be one of the masterminds and controllers of the 26/11 terror attacks in Mumbai. Pakistan was naturally inviting a lot of flak and the mood in India was once again turning quite ugly. Perhaps, the release of Surjit (or was it Sarabjit?) could well be an attempt by the Pakistani establishment to dilute the growing anger in India. This is a tactic the Pakistanis used very often with the Americans – every time the former military dictator Gen Pervez Musharraf was travelling to the US, or some senior American official was visiting Pakistan, the Pakistanis would present the Americans with some Al Qaeda terrorist. But while this tactic kept the Americans happy, it is unlikely to have worked very much with Indians, most of whom are quite familiar with Pakistan's perfidy. And, if this was the plan, then it has clearly backfired because instead of any goodwill, the cockup has only caused more bitterness inside India.

Of course, if Pakistan really wants to do the right thing and the just thing, then there is clearly a case to be made for reopening and reinvestigating Sarabjit’s case. Sending an innocent man to the gallows on trumped up charges might satisfy the blood-lust of the fanatics in Pakistan, but it will be not only be a crime against humanity but will also add to the existing bitterness in bilateral relations.

Wednesday, June 27, 2012

Pakistan: Judicial Coup could Unravel Democracy

Sushant Sareen
Senior Fellow, VIF

Pakistan’s dubious record of not a single Prime Minister completing his full term remains unbroken. A self-perpetuating right-wing, Islamist-oriented judicial mafia in the country has broken new constitutional ground by delivering a coup de grace on a sitting Prime Minister by disqualifying him on the charge of committing contempt of court. Whether it is as a cause or a result of the steady atrophying of the Pakistani state, the judiciary has emerged as virtually a state within a state, a notoriety it now shares with the Pakistan Army.


From ordering transfers and postings of officials to deciding the price of sugar, and from advising the government on how to maintain law and order to interfering in economic decisions, affairs of political parties, and what have you, the Pakistani judiciary has, for some time now, been playing executive, judiciary and legislature, all rolled into one. Now of course it has even acquired the power to not only break governments (and create an unprecedented constitutional crisis in which a nuclear armed country remains without a government for around four days) but also form governments, especially if the politicians cannot strike a deal on the next Chief Election Commissioner or the next Caretaker Prime Minister.

Notwithstanding the Supreme Court judgment’s sinister and potentially destructive portents for the constitutional scheme in Pakistan, a large part of the blame for the manner in which the government’s, and indeed parliament’s, role has been diminished lies with the political class. Had the incumbent government given a modicum of good and clean governance and retained the support of the people, it is unlikely that the Court’s could have run amok like they have done. But it is equally true that ever since it came into office, the government has lurched from one crisis to another (some the result of its own incompetence and many others the result of being hobbled by an overbearing military, a hostile media and an over-assertive and activist judiciary) leaving it with little time and space for governing effectively.

Given the horrible mess Pakistan is in – a destabilised, fragmented and polarized polity which is being further strained by the tussle for power between institutions of state, a tanking economy, a very precarious security situation, a fraught law and order situation made worse by rising sectarian and ethnic violence, a tense relationship almost on breakpoint with the sole superpower - it is highly unlikely that the new Prime Minister will be able to deliver anything. Not only does Raja Pervez Ashraf face a possible indictment in the alleged scam over sanctioning Rental Power plants (making his continuation in office untenable), he could also face a fate similar to that of his predecessor if he refuses to kowtow to the Supreme Court on the issue of reopening the Swiss money laundering cases against President Asif Zardari. This means that the political crisis in Pakistan could only worsen in the days and weeks ahead.

The big question now is whether or not the Supreme Court will be reckless enough to guillotine a second Prime Minister and continue with this theatre of the absurd. If the Court holds its hand, questions will be raised as to what has happened to its commitment to uphold rule of law; on the other hand, if the Court sacks another PM, then the question will arise whether and for how long the political system can endure such constitutional adventurism. Equally important will be the reaction of the PPP and its allies. If the PPP sheds its pusillanimity (as it must if it doesn't want to see another PM sacked) and forsakes the ‘politics of reconciliation’ (to take on the opposition which is believed to be conspiring with the judiciary), a clash between the government, and perhaps parliament, on one side and the judiciary on the other will become inevitable. In the event this happens, the way will be paved for an extra-constitutional intervention by the Pakistan army which is extremely disquieted by the continuing drift in the affairs of state.

While general elections are being touted as a solution to the logjam, they are unlikely to be a panacea partly because a hung parliament is expected to emerge from the next elections and partly because both the two front-runners i.e. Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan, spook the army and also the Americans. Not surprisingly, Pakistan is abuzz once again with talk of the infamous ‘Bangladesh model’ – a government of technocrats backed by the army. While in Bangladesh, the judiciary partnered the army in supporting this government, replicating the same in Pakistan will be difficult, more so because of the judiciary’s professed commitment to democracy will tie its hands in backing this ‘caretaker’ government beyond the constitutionally mandated 90 days. But for this government of technocrats to have any realistic chance of setting things right, it will need to be in power for longer than 90 days. At that stage, the army might have to step in to send the judges home and the political circus in Pakistan will have come a full circle.

The problem however is that while the army might be thinking that the mess created by the politicians have given them yet another chance to become 'saviours of the country', things on the ground have gone so bad that it increasingly appears unlikely if even the triumvirate of Army, Allah and America together can pull things back. Compounding the problems for the army is the fact that in order to improve the economy they will have to compromise with the Americans. While this could give some very short term relief on the economic side, politically this is a rather unpalatable proposition given the widespread and deep seated anti-Americanism that is sweeping through Pakistan. If nothing else, any deal with the Americans will tarnish the army's image and there is a high chance that it will pit the army against the Islamist fundamentalist and insurgent groups. In the end, it seems that Pakistan will become an even more fractious country and consequently an even more difficult place to manage.