Brig (Retd) Vinod Anand,
Senior Fellow, VIF
Higher defence management has continued to remain the focus of the
politico-military establishment for last several years without much
progress having been made in the key areas of defence reforms that have
been underway since the Kargil conflict. A 14-member Naresh Chandra Task
Force (NCTF) had reviewed the gaps in defence reforms and submitted a
report to the government in August 2012.
In early April 2013, the National Security Council chaired by the
Prime Minister discussed the recommendations by the NCTF on National
Security. However, some of the contentious proposals were referred to
yet another body for further scrutiny. The government instructed the
Strategic Policy Group (SPG), chaired by National Security Advisor
(NSA) Shivshankar Menon and Cabinet Secretary, to examine the
contentious proposals, including those connected to the defence ministry
and armed forces. They were expected to take a view on a host of
proposals ranging from a permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff
Committee (COSC), cross- posting of Service officers to MOD, and the
creation of Advanced Projects Agency (APA) to undertake futuristic
military R&D and review of the practice of blacklisting armament
companies.
The Ministry of Defence while reviewing the NCTF’s recommendations
has stuck to its old narrative and has not been in favour of even
creating a permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee which is a much
diluted version of the Chief of Defence Staff recommended by the Group
of Ministers’ Report of 2001 which was again based on inputs provided by
Kargil Review Committee.
The MOD, true to its bureaucratic traditions has not approved of many of
the other recommendations like cross-posting of officers and some other
suggestions of the Task Force on defence reforms. Jaswant Singh, a
former Defence Minister in his book ‘Defending India’(Bangalore:
Macmillan India, 1999,p.109) had remarked that "-the Defence
Ministry, in effect becomes the principal destroyer of the cutting edge
of the military's morale; ironic considering that very reverse of it is
their responsibility. The sword arm of the State gets blunted by the
state itself." In July 2013, the MOD in its recommendations to the
National Security Council Secretariat cited several reasons for its
negative views on NCTF proposals.
MOD Rejects ‘Permanent Chairman of COSC’ Proposal
The 2001 GOM Report’s main recommendations regarding management of
defence included creation of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) with a
designated defence staff with a view to establish synergy and promote
jointness among the armed forces. It is also true that the concept of
CDS however does not evoke an unequivocal and positive response from the
three Services. The apprehension from smaller Services being that their
interests may be disregarded and perhaps the status of single Services
Chiefs lowered. Though, these apprehensions need to be allayed by a
providing careful balance on vesting centralised responsibility and
power to CDS, the absence of CDS on the other hand leaves the field open
to the civil servant to become the 'decider' instead of a uniformed
person for inter-Service issues. Recommendation for CDS based on GOM
Report 2001 could not be realized because the government threw in a
googly in the shape of obtaining political consensus from respective
political parties; little or no efforts were made to obtain consensus. A
letter to the political parties was written and that was the end of it.
While negating the NCTF proposal for a permanent Chairman of COSC,
the MOD in its recommendations to the NSCS has given the reasons in June
this year as lack of consensus amongst the three services on the issue.
According to the MOD submissions to the NSCS, only the Navy supports
the proposal for permanent Chairman COSC, the Army is against the
proposal and the Air Force’s concurrence is conditional. Further, the
MOD says that the present system of the three Service chiefs and the
collegiate COSC briefing the Defence Minister has been functioning well.
And to ward off further criticism of MOD’s attitude, the stock reply
given is that in any case the Government has as yet not decided on the
issue since the NCTF proposals would be considered by the Cabinet
Committee on Security. It appears that the government would continue to
stall the issue in keeping with its erstwhile policy on the matter.
Apparently, there was also some pressure on the members of the NCTF to
not to give such a recommendation. However, wisdom prevailed and the
proposal was included in the report.
However, turf battles between services have been part and parcel of
even the militaries of advanced nations like the U.S. before their
services were forced to move towards integration and jointness through
legislative measures. The U.S. forces were brought together under one
umbrella through Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986. When the need for
creating the institution of CDS/Permanent Chairman COSC has been felt
and approved by expert groups consisting of strategists, politicians and
bureaucrats and endorsed many times by Parliament’s Standing Committee
on Defence, it is only political will that would be instrumental in
fructification of this vital reform.
Not only this, a simple measure like cross-posting of officers
between the MOD and Service HQs to bridge the civil-military disconnect
has also been rejected for some flimsy reasons. Cross-posting of
officers would have generated synergies in functioning of the MOD and
without this the integration would remain ‘cosmetic’ even while the MOD
claims that the present system has been functioning well. Many reports
of the Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence have been urging the
MOD to implement this recommendation of the GOM Report and the same has
been endorsed by the NCTF but the bureaucrats have been adamant on not
executing an already approved recommendation.
Unless there is a CDS with some degree of authority vested in him to
promote interoperability, jointness and integration, the armed forces
would not be able to efficiently pursue their missions in the wars of
knowledge age. CDS is also necessary for commanding eventually the
Integrated Theatre Commands which are inescapable for adopting a unified
approach in envisaged theatre of military operations. Differences in
the respective services on their approaches to a single point military
advisor for the government have also enabled the bureaucrats to stymie
the unification and integration of the defence services. Further, in our
despondency on the government’s approach to the institution of CDS, we
should not accept the half-baked idea of the permanent Chairman, COSC.
Defence Planning
HQ IDS has prepared Technology Perspective Capability Roadmap 2013
which is somewhat of a modified version of TPCR-2010. This document
identifies the military technologies needed by the armed forces in
consonance with its 15 Years Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan
(LTIPP). This is an unclassified document that provides information to
the defence industry (both private and public sector undertakings)
as to what kind of capabilities armed forces would be looking for in the
next 15 years period. According to the Defence Minister Mr. AK Antony,
the objective is “to establish a level playing field for the Indian defence industry, both public sector and private sector.”
Regular interaction between the defence industry and the MOD would
help in developing ‘contemporary and future technologies as well
productionising equipment required by the armed forces’.
As is well known, a major modernisation programme of the armed forces
is under way and it is expected that a capital budget of 150 billion US
dollars is expected to be spent over the next decade or so. The
question remains whether our Defence Procurement Procedures are up to
the mark despite many upgrades. And what can our indigenous defence
industry offer us?
Firstly, the problem of perspective plans remaining an amalgam of the
individual service plans has not been overcome as yet. This is mainly
because there is no CDS or permanent Chairman, COS with the necessary
mandate (i.e. budgetary control) to ensure that Five Year Defence Plans
(FYPD) and consequently 15 years LTIPP are in fact not integrated.
Secondly, it is rare that FYPD and LTIPP are approved by the
government in time. While the Defence Acquisition Council headed by the
Defence Minister approved the 12th FYDP (2012-2017) in April 2012, the
same continues to await approval by the Ministry of Finance and CCS. The
LTIPP (2012-2027) was also approved in principle by the MOD but
continues to await the government’s nod. The approval of the two vital
documents by the MOD is of no consequence unless the same are approved
by the government. Thus, even after introduction of the defence reforms
in 2001, the defence planning process continues to suffer from
inadequacies which can be surmounted if there is a political will.
Problems of defence preparedness are further compounded by the
defence acquisition woes. While the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP)
has undergone a series of modifications and iterations, the evidence on
the ground does not indicate that the acquisition process has acquired
any momentum. The latest version is of 2013 vintage which is said to be
based on experience gained on DPP of 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009
and 2011. The saga of acquisition of 126 Medium Multi-role Combat
Aircraft still continues without any aircraft being inducted so far; the
defence budget is also facing cuts again in the financial year
2013-2014 due to the economic downtrend. Similarly, though a deal for
import of 145 Ultra-Light 155mm was concluded with the U.S. through the
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route some years ago, it has not
fructified. Meanwhile, not only the U.S. has revised its prices for the
guns, the Rupee has also depreciated against the dollar thus further
compounding our budgetary problems. But then these are recurring
problems which our politico-bureaucratic decision-makers have been
unable to address.
Another factor which needs to be paid attention is the fast rate of
obsolescence of technology which has made the operational life cycle of
equipment shorter. The technology upgradations would be required in 10
years or so compared with much longer period in the earlier years. It is
also being said that India has already missed two technology cycles and
in the bargain two acquisition cycles. And therefore, the critical gaps
in our armed forces’ capabilities are widening which needs urgent
attention.
Thus, the much required institution of CDS that was diluted by the
NCTF to the concept of permanent Chairman COSC has also not found
acceptability with our MOD mandarins. But then as mentioned earlier,
there is no point in accepting any watered down version of the CDS. The
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence which had been a strong
votary of the concept of CDS has omitted to take any views on the
subject in the last few reports submitted to the government. Given the
trend and views of politico-bureaucratic class it would be no surprise
if the Naresh Chandra Task Force proposal is finally rejected by the
CCS. The adhocism in our defence planning process and its concomitant
adverse impact on the modernization programme of the Armed Forces
continues. This has been so despite the cautions given by the previous
and current Army chiefs as also by the Air Force and Naval Chiefs. The
critical hollowness and gaps in our capabilities are widening tempting
our known adversaries to take advantage of our vulnerabilities. The
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence has been pointing out to the
various ills connected with our defence planning and procurement
processes and mechanisms without the same being addressed meaningfully
by the government.
There are many useful recommendations made by the NCTF but they are
likely to meet the same fate as earlier reports. Further, optimal
utilization of resources cannot be achieved unless greater emphasis and
attention is given to the process of budget formulation and
implementation including forecasting, monitoring and control of defence
planning processes. While Technology Capability Perspective Roadmap
2013 has been made yet there are many imponderables attached with it.
Our politico-bureaucratic and military leadership needs to move fast in
ushering in the recommended defence reforms to meet the security
challenges from our assertive adversaries.
