What is to be made of a society, people and country whose political
leadership erupts in anger and weaves bizarre conspiracy theories
because its self-declared ‘enemy no. 1’ is eliminated in a drone attack
by a country which has not only accorded it the status of a ‘major
non-NATO ally’, but is the largest aid giver, and one of the largest
trading partners, source of remittances and arms supplier? The words
‘strategic confusion’, ‘policy disarray’, ‘social schizophrenia’ and
‘national Stockholm Syndrome’ immediately come to mind. The drone attack
on November 1, 2013, that killed Hakimullah Mehsud, Emir of the
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), has resulted in total reversal of roles
with the USA being designated as Pakistan's ‘enemy no. 1’ by top
political and religious leaders in Pakistan, and Mehsud, who is
responsible for the killings of thousands of Pakistani civilians and
security force officials, being labelled as a ‘martyr’.
While the Pakistan Army has so far refrained from any comment on the
drone attack on Hakimullah, there has been an almost hysterical reaction
from the political and religious leadership which is not just willing
to take on the US and NATO by threatening to block the Ground Lines of
Communications (GLOCs) – some quarters are even demanding that Pakistan
Air Force be ordered to shoot down the drones – but is also leaning over
backwards with entreaties and pleas to the Taliban to spare them from
any retaliatory terror attacks to avenge the killing of Hakimullah.
There is a desperate effort underway to convince the Taliban that the
Pakistan government had nothing whatsoever to do with the US attack and
is genuine in its desire to enter into negotiations and dialogue with
the Taliban leadership without any pre-conditions. In fact, according to
some reports, which haven’t as yet been denied, the Pakistani
authorities were offering major political and economic concessions to
the Taliban (virtually conceding an autonomous Emirate with Dubai-like
privileges for local people of FATA) to woo them to the negotiating
table.
Not only is the US being accused of deliberately sabotaging the
‘peace talks’ that the Pakistan government was set to start with the
Pakistani Taliban, some leaders like Imran Khan and the Jamaat Islami
chief Munawar Hasan have even gone to the extent of insinuating, if not
outrightly blaming, the US of being behind the major terror attacks –
bombing of the Church in Peshawar, the Kissa-Khwani bazaar bombing in
Peshawar and the killing of the GOC, 17 Infantry Division in Swat –
which followed the All Parties Conference that decided on opening a
dialogue with the Taliban. Clearly, in the minds of the Pakistani
political and religious leadership it is not just that the fear of the
Taliban that over-rides any fear of the US, but also their loathing for
the Americans which far outweighs any such sentiment that they might
harbour for the depredations and devastation caused by the Taliban.
The genuflection of the civilian establishment of Pakistan (which
claims the complete backing of the military establishment in this)
before the Taliban betrays, at one level, the sheer defeatism with which
the Pakistani authorities are approaching the Taliban for peace
negotiations. But there is also a political angle to the whole thing.
The anti-US tirade of the Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali (whose
wife and kids incidentally are US citizens!) has stolen the thunder from
Imran Khan who has for long positioned himself as the anti-American and
pro-Taliban champion in Pakistani politics. At the same time, there are
reports in the Pakistani media that Nisar was unleashed by Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif who wanted to avoid Taliban retaliation in the
Punjab. Apparently, Nawaz Sharif had received intelligence reports that
over a 100 Taliban suicide bombers had been placed in Punjab and were
waiting to strike as soon as they received orders. Nawaz Sharif was
therefore indulging in a dissemble to defuse this threat by taking a
strident anti-US position to assuage the Taliban and dissuade them from
another devastating terror bombing campaign.
Politics and the pusillanimity of the politicians aside, and
notwithstanding the negative impact this has on forging the elusive
national consensus on how to tackle the terrorist challenge, there are
other serious questions that arise from the killing of Hakimullah
Mehsud. The compound that Hakimullah was targeted in bears remarkable
similarity to the Abottabad compound that Osama bin Laden lived in when
he was killed by US Special Forces. Not only did both these structures
stick out like a sore thumb, they were also located right under the nose
of the Pakistani military establishment – Osama bin Laden lived near
the Pakistan Military Academy and Hakimullah a stone’s throw away from
the Miranshah military fort of the Pakistan Army. And yet, either out of
complicity or sheer incompetence, the all-powerful Pakistan Army and
its infamous but powerful intelligence agencies (ISI and Military
Intelligence) were neither able to locate the world’s most wanted
terrorist nor Pakistan’s ‘enemy no.1’. Even more interestingly, he was
living in an area which is dominated by the ‘good Taliban’ – a.k.a.
‘strategic assets’ of the Pakistan Army – namely, Hafiz Gul Bahadur and
the Haqqani Network, without any let or hindrance. This means that
either the area was an undeclared ‘safe zone’ in which all combatants
could live without molesting each other, or else it puts a lie into the
fictitious distinction between the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban. Another
possibility is that the Pakistan Army was deliberately not targeting the
TTP chieftain for some sinister reason.
In all likelihood, the Americans got a fix on Hakimullah, who they
were hunting ever since the bombing of the CIA base in Khost in 2009 and
the botched Times Square bombing in New York by the idiot bomber Faisal
Shehzad in 2010, after they captured his right-hand man Latifullah
Mehsud in Logar, Afghanistan early October last. Apparently, the
Americans had given enough hints to the Pakistanis even before Nawaz
Sharif’s visit to Washington in late October that they had Hakimullah in
their sight and were going to take him out regardless of Pakistani
reservations on drone attacks. For the Pakistanis to now accuse the
Americans of sabotaging the peace talks at the eleventh hour is somewhat
disingenuous.
From the shrillness of the Pakistani protests, it would appear as
though the ‘peace talks’ with the Taliban had reached a conclusion. The
fact, however, is otherwise. These talks had not even started. Some
initial contacts had been made and some tentative understanding reached
on the back channel between intermediaries of the Taliban and the
government. A delegation of Ulema was purportedly going to go to
Miranshah to hand a formal invitation for talks to the Taliban. In other
words, there was no real dialogue underway at the time Hakimullah was
killed. Everything else – the Taliban accepting the invitation for
talks, the terms and conditions under which the talks would proceed,
what solution, if any, these talks would throw up, whether this would be
a lasting solution acceptable to all ‘stakeholders’, and whether any or
all of the sides would stick to their side of the bargain or renege on
it – was all pretty much in the realm of speculation.
What now remains to be seen is the impact that Hakimullah’s killing
will have on the TTP and the Islamist insurgency that it is spearheading
in Pakistan. The hope among some security analysts in Pakistan is that
Hakimullah’s death will deal a body blow to the TTP and could deepen the
divisions within its ranks. Hakimullah was seen as a ruthless and
charismatic commander who was also a brilliant planner of attacks.
Replacing him, according to these analysts, will not be easy. Even more
difficult will be to find a replacement who is able to lead all the
other commanders. But if the past record of the TTP is anything to go
by, then this optimism is likely to be belied.
Every successive commander starting from Nek Muhammed to Abdullah
Mehsud to Baitullah Mehsud to Hakimullah Mehsud had taken the insurgency
to a higher level. While there have been differences between faction
leaders and operational commanders of the TTP (including the occasional
internecine warfare), by and large the commanders stuck together in
pursuit of their larger objective of taking over the Pakistani state,
supporting the Al Qaeda and Taliban and fighting the ISAF and Pakistan
Army. It is unlikely that this dynamic will undergo a major change with
the death of Hakimullah. It is possible that the TTP might agree to
enter into a dialogue for reasons of gaining some tactical space; but it
would be stretching incredulity to think that such a dialogue would
lead to lasting peace and re-establish the writ of the Pakistani state
in the territories over which the Taliban hold sway.
Instead of putting the TTP on the defensive, the killing of
Hakimullah coupled with the cringing appeals from the Pakistan
government and political leadership to not break off the talks, has
given a huge advantage to the TTP to arm twist the Pakistani state into
making concessions even before they deign to enter into ‘peace talks’.
There is also a possibility that the TTP decides to first launch a
campaign of terror to further force the Pakistani state on its knees
before they decide to enter into talks, which again will be on their and
not the Pakistani state’s terms. In either case, the weak-kneed
response of the Pakistani state and its desperate desire to win the
peace without fighting the war is only going to strengthen the hand of
the TTP and its affiliates. While there could be a tussle for the crown
of the next TTP chief, whether this struggle for power will prove
devastating for the Pakistani Taliban is something that will be closely
watched. The fact that the TTP and its affiliates accept the leadership
of the Afghan Taliban (Mullah Omar) could prevent differences over
leadership from spinning out of control. What is more, as an umbrella
organisation, the TTP gives enough operational autonomy and space to all
its commanders. This factor will also limit the potential of the
leadership fight to destroy the TTP from within. To be sure, the
Pakistani agencies will work overtime to sow dissensions between the
various commanders. But over the years, the TTP appears to have
developed the capacity and even structures to effectively counter these
tactics. The next TTP chief could also divide responsibilities in a way
to satisfy all the contending commanders and give them additional
territories to control.
Hakimullah’s death is therefore not likely to deal a body blow to the
TTP. If Pakistan wishes to reclaim the territories it has ceded to the
Taliban, then it will have to use military force and combine it with a
political and ideological narrative that weans away the support, both
open and tacit, that is currently available to the Islamists in
Pakistan. But this will require a complete overhaul of the national
mindset, something that will require clarity of thought and time,
neither of which is available. Simply put, the Pakistani state has
neither the capacity nor the willingness to undertake the reforms that
will enable it to defeat the Taliban. Meanwhile, regardless of the song
and dance made by the Pakistanis about the drone attacks, it is clear
that this remains perhaps the most potent and effective weapon in the
arsenal of the US to target terrorist networks, and is therefore not
going to be given up anytime soon. Pakistan will just have to learn to
live with this awesome weapon, which incidentally is the only weapon
system that really scares the Taliban terror groups, which is also the
reason why they insist on stopping drone strikes if the Pakistani state
wants negotiations. While the opposition of the Taliban to drones is
entirely borne out of an instinct for self-preservation, it would seem
the opposition of the Pakistani – Punjabis really – is the result of
their instinct for self-destruction.
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